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

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ARGUMENTATION

JAMES A. WINANS

PROFESSOR OF PUBLIC SPEAKING
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

AND

WILLIAM E. UTTERBACK

PROFESSOR OF PUBLIC SPEAKING
OBERLIN COLLEGE

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PREFACE

This book represents an attempt to write a thoroughly practical treatise on argumentation.

The book is based on the conviction that, while logic supplies us with most of the tools of argumentation, it is from psychology that we must learn how to use them. This conviction has led to the consideration of two major problems: What are the laws of inference by which the mind travels rationally from premise to conclusion? and, How may these laws be applied in influencing thought and conduct? While those chapters dealing with the latter problem take us into the field of psychology, we have not thought it necessary or desirable to employ technical terminology, the matters discussed calling not so much for the technical equipment of the psychologist as for ordinary common sense sharpened by observation and reflection.

The reader will find in this book a statement of general principles rather than a compendium of rules. No art dealing with human nature as intimately as argumentation does can be reduced to a set of formulas. We have made no attempt to consider all of the many situations which the speaker will encounter. It has been our endeavor rather to set forth general principles and to suggest how these principles may be applied in a few typical speech situations. Further than this we do not believe it helpful to go. It is our hope that a thoughtful study of the book, supplemented by practical experi-

ence, will enable the student to solve for himself any problem he may encounter.

No attempt has been made to treat the subject exhaustively. We have tried rather to include nothing that will not be of practical value to the student, believing that there is little profit in elaborating beyond the point where the student can apply his knowledge in actual practice. Those familiar with other works on argumentation will note the omission of chapters dealing with evidence, debate, and principles of composition. These omissions have been prompted partly by the belief that much of the material included in such chapters is not of sufficient importance to justify the space given to it and partly by the belief that the more useful portions of this material can be treated more conveniently in connection with other topics.

The chapters need not be taken up in the order in which they appear. Most teachers will prefer to assign at least some of the chapters in Part II before proceeding far with the material in Part I. It will probably be found advantageous, for example, to assign the chapter on "Selecting the Subject" and that on "Briefing and Outlining" before asking the student to present argument from the platform. And some teachers will wish to vary the order of the chapters in Part I.

Believing that many teachers will welcome suggestions for practical work in the class-room, we have appended a set of exercises to each chapter and have reprinted in the appendix ten specimens of exposition and argument. It is not supposed that any teacher will ask his students to work out all of the exercises. The exercises are intended only to suggest the sort of practical

work which we have found most useful in illustrating the principles discussed in the chapters. Our procedure in the class-room is usually to spend one or more hours in the discussion of the contents of a chapter, to assign some of the exercises based on it, and finally to call for a carefully prepared speech or written argument involving the use of the principles discussed in the chapter. We have found it helpful to have the members of the class-room audience register their opinions on the proposition to be discussed, together with their main reasons for the opinions, both before and after hearing a speech. These expressions of opinion are often of great value to the speaker in subjecting his argument to an intelligent "post mortem" examination.

It is impossible to acknowledge adequately our indebtedness to previous writers in the field of argumentation. We are more or less indebted to all of the current works on the subject, but especially to Baker and Huntington's *The Principles of Argumentation*, Foster's *Argumentation and Debating*, and O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales's *Argumentation and Debate*.

We are indebted to Professor Lee S. Hultzén for a searching criticism of the manuscript at an earlier stage of its development; to Mrs. Ruth Creighton Grover and Mr. Norman W. Mattis for assistance in the revision of the manuscript; to Miss Mary Venn, Reference Librarian in the Oberlin College Library, for suggestions regarding the material included in the chapter on "Gathering Material"; and to Mrs. Margaret Utterback for assistance in reading proof.

James A. Winans.

March, 1930. William E. Utterback.

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PART I

PRINCIPLES OF ARGUMENTATION

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF ARGUMENTATION

Argumentation is the art of influencing thought and conduct by an appeal addressed primarily to the understanding.

The expression "thought and conduct," as used in this definition, is to be interpreted somewhat broadly. We influence a man's thought when we strengthen or weaken one of his beliefs or when we induce him to modify a belief, to abandon it, or to substitute another belief for it. We influence his conduct when we strengthen or weaken his determination to follow a certain course of action or when we induce him to modify a course of action, to abandon it, or to substitute another for it. We also influence his conduct when we change in him such attitudes toward a proposal as those of indifference, hostility, sympathy, open-mindedness, fear, reluctance, or faith.

The purpose of argumentation—to influence thought and conduct—distinguishes argument from discourse, of which the lighter forms of the after-dinner speech and of the popular lecture are examples, which is designed to interest or entertain. It also distinguishes argument from discourse which is designed to instruct. While the arguer must hold the attention of his hearers and must often instruct them, his primary purpose is to influence their thought and conduct.

It is also apparent from the purpose of argumentation that mere contention is not argument. The disputatious persons who engage in "heated argument" are usually airing their opinions with little regard to the effect of the performance on their hearers. Their purpose, in so far as they have one, is to express themselves rather than to influence others. Unless a speaker is attempting to influence his hearers, he is not arguing in the sense in which we shall use the term.

While the arguer will sometimes use such persuasive methods as suggestion and appeal to the emotions, the method of argumentation—appeal addressed primarily to the understanding—implies that he will not rely chiefly upon such methods. He attempts to secure the acceptance of his views by proposing reasons in support of them and by refuting the objections to them. His method is that of reasoned discourse.

This emphasis upon reasoning as the characteristic method in argument does not mean, however, that argumentation is merely the art of marshaling proofs in support of a contention. The arguer must construct his argument with reference to the knowledge, interests, beliefs, and biases of his hearers, and he must consider their attitude toward himself, for the hearers' attitude toward a proposal and their estimate of the speaker are important factors in determining their reaction to argument. The speaker must also use means adapted to securing favorable attention to his proposal and to translating belief into conduct.

Argumentation is a universal art, practised daily and almost hourly by every one of us. As it is employed in many situations, so it takes many forms. It may take

the form of private conversation, as when one attempts to sell an article to a customer or to persuade a friend to vote the Republican ticket. It may take the form of public address, as when a speaker attempts to influence a committee or a jury or a body of legislators. It may take the form of advertisement. It may take the form of an editorial, essay, magazine article, or book. Argumentation is practised wherever one person attempts to influence another by appealing primarily to his reason.

In this book we shall be concerned especially with the formal argument of the essay and the public address, but most of the principles and methods discussed are equally applicable to other forms of argument. To avoid the laborious repetition of "speaker or writer" and "hearer or reader" we shall often refer simply to the speaker and the hearer, and we shall usually talk of speeches when what we say is quite as applicable to conversation, essay, article, or book.

EXERCISES

I. Find an advertisement designed to influence belief; one designed to induce action; one designed to influence attitude.

II. Which of the specimens of argument in the Appendix are designed primarily to influence belief? which to influence action? which to influence attitude?

III. Classify each of the specimens in the Appendix as expository or argumentative.

IV. Which of the specimens of argument in the Appendix make some use of methods other than reasoning?

CHAPTER II

EXPOSITION

Argument, to be effective, must often be supplemented by exposition. This is especially true if the proposal to be discussed or the facts underlying it are unfamiliar or inherently difficult, or if misunderstanding exists regarding them. The proposal that the United States should immediately withdraw its marines from Nicaragua could hardly be discussed intelligibly before most audiences without an explanation of the circumstances under which the marines were originally stationed in Nicaragua and of the situations since arising in that country which have seemed, at least to some, to justify keeping them there. The argument in favor of adopting the Cotsworth calendar would be unintelligible to many unless it were prefaced with an explanation of the calendar. Exposition is especially needed in the discussion of subjects, like prohibition and socialism, which have become confused in the public mind by prejudice or misrepresentation. Proposals of new methods and institutions, often rejected offhand simply because of their novelty or of fear that they threaten our habits more than they actually do, can often be relieved of some of their novelty and strangeness by explanation of just what is proposed. While explanation of the proposal to be discussed or of the facts underlying it nor-

mally appears early in a speech or an article, there may also be need for exposition at any stage of the discussion, as in the presentation of an argument requiring the use of many technical terms.

Exposition usually includes two processes: (1) the statement of unfamiliar in terms of familiar ideas, and (2) the analysis of the topic to be explained into its logical subdivisions.

I. STATEMENT OF THE UNFAMILIAR IN TERMS OF THE FAMILIAR

A. Exposition a Process of Linking Ideas

A new idea is comprehensible to us only in so far as we can relate it to our present knowledge, and the greater the number of such perceived relations, the better we understand the idea. Except to the student of chemistry the word *tantalum* may be only a meaningless sound, but the layman begins to understand the term when he learns that tantalum is a white metal, that it is hard and tough, and that it has a melting-point of 2800° centigrade. The process of learning has been one of perceiving relations between tantalum and the familiar ideas *metal*, *hard*, *tough*, *white* and *melting-point of 2800° centigrade*.

The same process occurs when one looks up an unfamiliar word in the dictionary. A reader encounters the unfamiliar word *kinkajou*. Turning to the dictionary, he learns that a kinkajou is a "nocturnal arboreal carnivorous mammal of the family of *Procyonidæ*, inhabiting Mexico and Central and South America. It is about

three feet long, and has a slender body, long prehensile tail, large lustrous eyes, and soft woolly yellowish brown fur. It may be easily tamed and kept as a pet." Turning next to the definition of *Procyonidæ*, he learns that the kinkajou is related to the raccoon. This brief description of the kinkajou does not, of course, afford a complete exposition of the subject, but it illustrates the essential nature of the expository process.

Obviously nothing is accomplished by an explanation unless the topic explained is linked with ideas already familiar to the hearer or reader. The dictionary definition of *raceme* as a "type of simple indeterminate inflorescence" means very little to the average person. The statement that *raceme* is that arrangement of flowers on the stalk of a plant to be found, for example, in the lily-of-the-valley, would be more effective, for both the lily-of-the-valley and the arrangement of its flowers on the stalk are familiar to most people.

Since ideas which are familiar to one person or group may be quite unfamiliar to another, a knowledge of the intellectual resources of the particular audience addressed is necessary to successful exposition. In preparing exposition the speaker should ask himself such questions as these: What has been the experience and education of my hearer? What is his background? With what things is he familiar? How can I most effectively relate my topic to his present knowledge? This persistent endeavor to think one's self into the other man's mind, to see the subject through his eyes, lies at the heart of effective exposition, as, indeed, of all effective speaking and writing.

B. Methods of Linking Ideas

When we explain, or partially explain, one idea by linking it with another, we are pointing out a relation between the two. The statement that a bill of exchange is a negotiable paper asserts that a bill of exchange is an example of the class of things known as negotiable papers; that is, it points out a relationship of individual to class between *bill of exchange* and *negotiable papers*. This method may be called linkage by *classification*. It is employed in the opening statement of most definitions and short explanations; for instance, "A dinosaur is a prehistoric animal"; "The horse is a quadruped"; "Paranoia is a form of insanity"; "Amortization is a method of debt payment."

Reversing the method of classification, one may partially explain an idea by citing an *example*. The example may be mentioned briefly or it may be discussed at some length, as circumstances require. If a speaker discussing the crime problem before a general audience wished to use the term *recidivist*, he might explain that a recidivist is an habitual offender, and then illustrate briefly by mentioning the name of an offender of this type with whose criminal record the audience was familiar. If the speaker were explaining the method of selecting the jury for a criminal trial, he might describe in detail the selection of the jury for some particular trial with which his hearers were familiar, using the example to illustrate each of the steps in the process of selecting a jury.

A relationship of *similarity* is affirmed in the statement that the city manager form of municipal govern-

ment is analogous to the organization of a business corporation. An analogy, like an example, may be stated briefly, or it may be expanded to illustrate several points about the topic explained. The closer the analogy between the things compared, of course, the more useful the comparison for explanation. Figurative analogies, like that between the circulation of money and the circulation of blood in the body, though they may add interest to the speech, are of little value for expository purposes.

Other methods of linkage are statement of *origin*, as, for example, "Gasoline is a product of petroleum"; of *purpose*, as, "The purpose of the carbureter is to mix vaporized gasoline with air"; of *cause*, as, "The aurora borealis is caused by electrical disturbances in the atmosphere"; of *effect*, as, "*Pneumococcus* is the bacterium which causes one form of pneumonia." While these methods and the three discussed above are used more often than others, any relation between ideas may be employed in linking a familiar with an unfamiliar idea.

It is seldom that any one method alone will afford a sufficient explanation of anything. Usually several must be used in combination, and in many cases they must be supplemented by an analysis of the topic into its subdivisions, a process to be explained later in this chapter.

It is worth noting that a *definition* is an expository statement based upon two methods of linkage, the first of which is usually classification. A typical definition mentions the class to which the thing defined belongs and then tells enough about it to distinguish it from

other members of the class. We define a triangle when we state that it is a plane surface bounded by three straight lines. "It is a plane surface" classifies *triangle* as a member of the class of all plane surfaces, and "bounded by three straight lines" describes it sufficiently to distinguish it from other plane surfaces. The following are typical definitions: "Mammals are vertebrates which nourish their young with milk"; "A salt is a compound formed when the acid hydrogen of an acid is partly or wholly replaced by a metal or a metal-like radical"; "A monarchy is a state ruled over by a single sovereign person."

II. ANALYSIS OF THE TOPIC TO BE EXPLAINED

A. The Nature of Analysis

A series of statements linking a new idea with familiar ideas enables the hearer to apprehend the new idea as a whole, but it does not enable him to look *into* the idea, to view it as a structure of related parts. To convey this more adequate conception of the topic explained, the speaker must employ analysis; that is, he must break up the topic into its separate parts and present each in turn to his hearer. The following statement explaining the application of the merit system to the selection of city employees illustrates the method:

The application of the merit system involves two steps. The first is the division of municipal service into classified service and unclassified service. The second step is to employ civil service tests in selecting employees for the classified positions.

This simple division of the topic conveys, of course, a very inadequate conception of the application of the merit system. For a more complete explanation it would be necessary to continue the analysis, subdividing one or both of the two major divisions. The process of analysis is continued as far as may be necessary for an adequate explanation of the topic. The use of a more elaborate analysis is illustrated in the following paragraph:

"The merit system as applied in American cities follows rather closely the method of the merit system as employed by the Federal Government. The municipal service is divided into two major classes, known as the classified service and the unclassified service. The latter includes all positions which for one reason or another are exempt from the operation of the merit system. The classified service embraces all positions which are subject to the restrictions of the merit system as to appointment, removal, and conditions of employment, and is in turn divided into three classes: competitive, non-competitive (sometimes erroneously termed 'exempt'), and labor. In the classified service all appointments must be made on the basis of merit and fitness for the position as demonstrated by tests applied by the civil service commission. In the competitive class the merit test takes the form of competitive examinations; in the non-competitive class are placed positions requiring exceptional educational experience or personal qualifications which render competitive examinations impracticable but for which it is feasible to establish standards of fitness with reference to which candidates may be rated; the labor class embraces those positions which require manual labor that can be performed without any particular skill, training, or experience and for which the qualifications can be established by very simple tests, usually of a physical character." [1]

[1] From C. C. Maxey's *An Outline of Municipal Government* (1924), copyrighted by Doubleday, Page and Company, p. 93. Quoted by permission of the publishers.

When the topic to be explained has been analyzed, it will often be found that some of the subordinate ideas are not familiar to the hearer. These subordinate ideas must be explained in terms of familiar ideas. In an exposition of insanity, analysis might reveal lycanthropy as one subdivision of the topic. In addressing most audiences it would probably be necessary to explain this term by the statement that lycanthropy is that form of insanity in which the patient imagines himself a wolf (or some other animal) and imitates its actions.

The statement of the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar must precede as well as follow analysis when the topic is totally unfamiliar to the hearer. In explaining the term *Mammalia* to one ignorant of zoölogy, it would be necessary first to relate the term to familiar ideas by such a statement as that the *Mammalia* are the class of animals which have a backbone and which nourish their young with milk. After this preliminary statement one might present an analysis of the class of *Mammalia* into its subclasses, the *Prototheria*, the *Metatheria*, and the *Eutheria*. Each of these subdivisions would then be explained in terms of familiar ideas. In some cases the statement of the unfamiliar idea as a whole in terms of familiar ideas may be sufficient for the speaker's purpose, but usually analysis must also be employed.

B. Analysis and the Purpose of the Exposition

An analysis may be more or less elaborate as circumstances require, and it may be made from various points of view. Monarchy may be analyzed into a few subordinate ideas, or the process of division may be continued

until it results in hundreds of subordinate ideas, as in a textbook on political science. And the analysis will vary according to the point of view from which it is made. Monarchy may be analyzed with reference to the extent of the sovereign's power into limited and unlimited monarchy; with reference to the selection of the sovereign, it may be divided into hereditary monarchy, elective monarchy, and monarchy based on conquest.

The subordinate ideas into which an expositor divides his topic will be determined not only by the subject itself, but also in part by the purpose of the exposition. If the expositor's purpose is simply to make his subject clear, as in a class-room lecture, he will analyze his topic from as many points of view and as elaborately as may seem helpful to this end while keeping within the limits of the time at his disposal and the patience of his hearers. Very often, however, he will have a more definite purpose. He may wish his hearers to do something, either physically or mentally, which they could not have done before hearing the exposition. An automobile salesman explaining a clutch to a customer wishes his hearer to know how to operate the clutch; a foreman in an automobile factory explaining the same mechanism to a workman wishes his hearer to know how to build or repair it. It is obvious that the purpose back of the two expositions will result in analyses differing both in degree of elaboration and in point of view. Similarly, an exposition of the commission form of government addressed to a board of aldermen who have already decided to install the system in their town will differ radically from an explanation of the same topic introduced

into an argumentative speech in order that the audience may understand the argument in favor of the system. In every case the process of analysis must be guided by this consideration: *What points about the topic must the hearer understand if the purpose of the exposition is to be accomplished?*

III. GRAPHIC METHODS OF EXPOSITION

The principles and devices thus far discussed may often be supplemented by the use of graphic illustrations. The use of such illustrations in books is, of course, familiar to every reader. Speakers sometimes exhibit charts or pictures prepared before the address or they illustrate with hastily drawn diagrams on a blackboard.

In preparing charts, omit irrelevant details which might distract attention from the main features, and take care that the map or diagram is sufficiently large to be easily visible to the audience. For use in explaining a difficult process it may be helpful to prepare a series of charts, each illustrating one step in the process. By the use of different colors or of different systems of barring, more than one fact can sometimes be represented on the same chart. In some cases pictures or diagrams drawn during the course of the speech are very effective, especially if the speaker has some facility in drawing, but usually the chart carefully prepared in advance is preferable.

The following charts are based on some of the more useful forms of graphic illustration.



FIGURE 1

PERCENTAGE OF ILLITERATES IN POPULATION, TEN YEARS AND OVER, 1920



FIGURE 2

HEAVIER-THAN-AIR CRAFT ATTACHED TO THE NAVIES OF THE FIVE PRINCIPAL POWERS

FIGURE 3

DISTRIBUTION OF IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES BY OCCUPATION, 1926



FIGURE 4

THE ORGANIZATION OF A REGIMENT OF INFANTRY IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY

The companies not attached to a battalion are a machine-gun company, a headquarters company, and a supply company.



FIGURE 5

DIVORCES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1924 BY DURATION OF MARRIAGE

IV. ARRANGEMENT OF EXPOSITORY MATERIAL

The points to be presented in an exposition should be so arranged that the hearer or reader can see the successive parts of the exposition building up into an orderly structure. He will then not only attend with greater interest, but will understand the explanation more clearly and remember it longer.

A. Methods of Arrangement

Expository material may be arranged in any one of three ways. The arrangement may be chronological,

points in the exposition being taken up in their natural time order. This method is especially useful in explaining a process or a series of events. An exposition of the origin of the World War might take up in turn the events which led to the war, beginning with the formation of the Triple Alliance. An exposition of the construction of a shoe might include first the cutting of the pieces, followed by each in turn of the various processes involved in manufacturing shoes.

Or the exposition may follow spatial order, as when, in explaining the construction of a building, one begins with the foundation and proceeds toward the roof. Writers frequently employ this method in describing figures, buildings, and landscapes. The exposition of the manufacture of a shoe could be made to follow spatial order if the expositor discussed first the manufacture of the sole of the shoe and then the manufacture of the uppers, though for this topic chronological order would probably be more effective.

The third scheme of arrangement is that of relational order, that is, of order dependent upon the relationship of ideas. A speaker, for example, may discuss first the more general aspects of his subject and then proceed to the more specific, as when, in a lecture on the Philippine Islands, he discusses in order their geography, their natural resources, and their industries. He may proceed from the principal to the subordinate, as when, in discussing the federal court system of the United States, he begins with the Supreme Court and then takes up the inferior courts in the order of their importance. In discussing the causes of the World War, a speaker might begin with the most remote cause, eco-

nomic rivalry perhaps, and proceed to the most immediate cause. The three types of relationship between ideas here illustrated are among the more useful in arranging expository material, but any relationship can be employed. By "relational order" we mean any scheme of order based upon the relation between ideas rather than upon the relation between events in time or between objects in space.

Two or more schemes of order can often be combined to advantage. The major points in the exposition may follow one scheme of order, while the arrangement of the minor points under any main point follows another. In a book on the commission form of government in American cities, the exposition of the Galveston plan is divided into three parts: the origin of the commission government in Galveston, the organization of the government, and its accomplishments. This is a relational arrangement of material. But in discussing the first division, the writer follows chronological order; that is, he takes up in turn the events which culminated in the adoption by Galveston of a commission form of government.

Occasionally a certain arrangement of material will follow both relational and spatial or relational and chronological order. An account of the construction of a building would follow both chronological and spatial order if it began with the foundation and proceeded toward the roof. An exposition of the evolution of the modern steam-engine might follow both relational and chronological order. If relational order were to be followed, the various types of engines would be taken up in turn, beginning with the most primitive and pro-

ceeding to the most highly developed, but this would probably be close to the chronological order.

B. Considerations Governing Choice of Methods

Each method of arranging material has its peculiar advantages. In some cases the nature of the material to be presented indicates one method as obviously the most effective. An exposition of the campaigns of the Civil War, or of any other series of historical events, falls naturally into chronological order, though in an elaborate exposition some use would probably be made of the other schemes of order also; while an account of the federal court system falls naturally into relational order. The purpose of an exposition sometimes indicates one order as most effective; for example, the steps in a mechanical process are best described in chronological order if the hearer is learning to perform the operation. Either spatial or chronological order is usually more interesting than relational order. Consequently popular lecturers often throw their material into narrative form (chronological order), or use charts and diagrams to secure spatial order. Relational order, on the other hand, is often the clearest, especially in the exposition of abstract and difficult subjects. Relational and spatial or relational and chronological orders united make an effective combination for clarity and interest.

V. EXPOSITION IN ARGUMENT

The use of exposition in argument presents several special problems which will be considered here.

A. Adequacy of Exposition

Most inexperienced speakers overestimate the information of the audience and hurry into the argument without sufficient explanatory preparation. It is often wise to review briefly even those facts which are rather familiar. The members of a college audience may have known once that the World Court was established under the auspices of the League of Nations, that it is a permanent body consisting of members chosen by the Assembly of the League, and that it has already tried a number of interesting cases; but a brief statement recalling this information to mind will do no harm and may prove very useful. If the subject under discussion is abstract and involved, or if it has not been widely discussed in the newspapers, a systematic and rather detailed explanation is usually necessary. It is futile to discuss the World Court, government ownership of the coal-mines, or the regulation of the railways before the average audience without devoting some time to an exposition of the leading facts involved in those questions.

The advice against inadequate explanation must be tempered by a caution against introducing unnecessary explanatory material. Nothing is more likely to bore an audience than the elaboration of what seems to them obvious. In discussing a question like the World Court or the League of Nations, the speaker will usually present only the more important and less technical arguments, and he need introduce only the exposition necessary for a comprehension of those arguments.

B. Topics of Exposition

Discussion of the merits and demerits of public policies constitutes a large class of argumentative speeches. Most speeches of this kind present much the same problem in exposition. In nearly every case the speaker must explain the policy he is advocating or opposing in relation to the problem which it is designed to solve. The exposition will often include the following topics, no matter what particular policy is under discussion:

Immediate cause of discussion
Origin of the question
History of the question
Exposition of the speaker's proposal
Exclusion of irrelevant matter

Immediate Cause of Discussion. Agitation for the adoption of a new policy is usually precipitated by some recent event which has brought to public attention the problem requiring solution. Recent discussion of various proposals for controlling the coal industry, for example, was provoked by a series of strikes which resulted in widespread suffering and inconvenience. Under such circumstances a brief discussion of the event uppermost in the public mind often affords a natural starting-point in the explanation of the subject.

Origin of the Question. If the arguer is discussing a policy which has been proposed as the solution of a political or social problem, it may be helpful to review briefly the circumstances under which the problem first arose. The problem of our relations with the

Philippine Islands, for example, originated when we took possession as one result of the Spanish-American War, and much of the argument regarding their independence turns upon the manner in which they first came under our control. An account of the origin of the Philippine question would consequently be necessary before the audience could understand the argument.

History of the Question. The history of the question is often an indispensable background for the argument. An argument on the wisdom of our interfering forcibly in the affairs of China would be quite unintelligible unless it were prefaced by a statement of the activities of foreigners in that country during the past two decades and an outline of the treaties and agreements which we have concluded with the Chinese people. If the policy under discussion is a new solution for an old problem, it is often useful to review briefly the previous attempts which have been made to solve the problem. A speaker discussing government ownership of the railways, for instance, would probably give a brief history of the attempts that have been made in the past by regulatory measures and otherwise to improve the national system of transportation.

Exposition of the Speaker's Proposal. When the use of one or more of the preceding topics has provided the audience with a background for the consideration of a new proposal, the speaker should usually explain at least the main features of the policy he proposes to discuss. The explanation will often involve a definition of terms. The proposition "The shop committee system is preferable to the labor-union" contains two terms that must be understood before the audience

can follow the argument intelligently. In the first place, there are several types of shop committees. The speaker should explain what he means by the term as he intends to use it in his argument. He should also explain whether by "preferable" he means preferable for the employee or for the employer. It is unwise in most cases to proceed with the argument until the audience understands what the speaker proposes to discuss.

Exclusion of Irrelevant Matter. The exclusion of irrelevant matter is useful when it is feared that the audience will confuse the proposal to be discussed with something similar to it or related with it. A speaker opening an address in support of higher entrance requirements for colleges of liberal arts, for example, might find it advisable to point out that the entrance requirements of technical and professional schools are not involved in the argument.

It should not be supposed that an expository introduction must necessarily include all of the topics discussed above. In some cases most of them can be omitted; in other cases additional topics must be included. The most that can be said is that these topics prove helpful so frequently that the advisability of using them should be considered in preparing the introduction to any speech on a question of public policy.

EXERCISES

I. Write a short exposition, making some use of analysis and using all of the methods of linking two ideas. In the margin of your paper label each method used.

II. Study the exposition of "The Catalogue" in the Ap-

pendix. What methods of linking ideas are employed? Are the ideas with which the new ideas are linked sufficiently familiar to the reader? What use is made of analysis? Criticize the analysis, especially with reference to the purpose of the exposition.

III. Assuming an audience of high school students, with what familiar ideas could you link such a topic as "The Survival of the Fittest"? "The Law of Diminishing Returns"? "The Distinction between a Monarchy and a Republic"?

IV. Repeat the preceding exercise for an audience of third-grade children; for an audience of farmers.

V. Formulate a definition of each of the following terms: *dictionary*, *World Court*, *evolution*, *protective tariff*, *honor system*, *college spirit*, *loyalty*, *college traditions*.

VI. Draw diagrams that might assist a day laborer to understand the following topics: "The Construction of a Football Field"; "The Relation between the Fields of Psychology, Advertising, and Salesmanship"; "The Comparative Size of the Different Items in a Monthly Expense Account"; "The Apparatus for Use in Performing a Simple Experiment in Physics"; "The Correct Stances for Driving a Golf-Ball, for Boxing, and for Wrestling."

VII. Study the arrangement of material in the exposition of "The Catalogue" in the Appendix. Which method or methods of arrangement are used? Would you have used different methods?

VIII. What method is used in the arrangement of material in your textbooks? Do historians use chronological order exclusively?

IX. Study the use of exposition in the eighth and tenth specimens of argument in the Appendix. Is the exposition adequate? Where in the argument is it introduced? Is this position effective? What topics of exposition are used?

X. Select for exposition a card trick or some simple mechanical process which you understand but which some one of your classmates does not. You are to write an exposition of the topic aimed specifically at this classmate. Before planning the exposition, ask him a list of questions to ascertain how much

he already knows about the topic. Ask him to read the written exposition; then determine its effectiveness by asking him to perform the operation explained. Suggested topics for this exercise: "How to Tie a Square Knot"; "How to Tie a Reef Knot"; "How to Make a 'Cat's Cradle'"; "How to Play Clock Solitaire"; "How to Extract Cube Root"; "How to Multiply by the Use of Logarithmic Tables."

XI. Select a topic, such as "The Construction of a Dynamo," of such a nature that the exposition of it will require the use of graphic methods. Prepare and deliver a ten-minute expository speech on it. Test the effectiveness of the speech by inviting those who still do not understand the topic after hearing the speech to ask questions about it.

XII. Repeat the preceding exercise with a more abstract and difficult topic.

CHAPTER III

THE PROPOSITION

I. THE NATURE OF THE PROPOSITION

The theme of an exposition can be expressed in a phrase, as, for example, "The Organization of the World Court," or "How the Parole System Works." The theme of an argument, however, is best expressed in a complete sentence, for a sentence is more likely to indicate precisely what the argument is about. In particular, one should never attempt to argue a mere term, such as "The World Court." Argument is directed to the proof or disproof of an assertion, and this assertion should be put in definite form; for example, "The United States should join the World Court." The statement to be supported or attacked in an argument is called the proposition.

The position which the arguer takes on the proposition, when expressed in a complete sentence, is what we shall call the thesis of his argument. The thesis of an argument supporting the proposition "The United States should join the World Court" would be identical with the proposition itself. The thesis of an argument attacking the proposition might be "The United States should not join the World Court," or "The United States should join the World Court only with reservations."

II. PHRASING THE PROPOSITION

The first requirement of a proposition is that it be free from ambiguity. The following propositions contain ambiguous expressions: "The United States should join the World Court with reservations"; "The United States should abandon the Monroe Doctrine"; "A college education is a good investment." The first proposition is susceptible of more than one interpretation, for it does not specify what reservations are meant. The expression "the Monroe Doctrine" in the second proposition would cause confusion because there is no generally accepted interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as it applies to modern international problems. The third proposition does not make clear whether the value of a college education is to be considered solely from the financial point of view or whether such intangible values as the enrichment of one's intellectual life are also to be considered.

The proposition should be expressed in a simple sentence. Statements with compound subjects or predicates usually contain two propositions, and to attempt to argue two propositions at the same time is to invite confusion. The following propositions are objectionable for this reason: "Our military occupation of Nicaragua has been brutal and contrary to the best interests of the natives"; "The federal government should operate the railroads and coal-mines." It occasionally happens that two proposals are so closely related that it is difficult to discuss one without discussing the other. The proposition "The federal government should own and operate the coal-mines," for example, cannot be con-

demned as a double proposition, for the proposal to be discussed provides for a combination of ownership and operation. There would consequently be little profit in discussing either ownership or operation alone.

Since the proposition is a statement of what is to be proved, or disproved, it should contain no words or phrases which beg the question, that is, which presuppose the truth or falsity of the proposition. In the proposition "The insidious propaganda of the Russian government in this country should be condemned," the word "insidious" begs the question, for it assumes the objectionable nature of the propaganda. Whether or not the propaganda is insidious is one of the questions that must be determined by argument. The italicized words in the following propositions beg the question: "The *destructive* activities of radical agitators should be curtailed"; "Our *imperialistic* policy in Latin America should be condemned"; "The *inhuman* practice of capital punishment should be discontinued."

As will appear in the following chapter, the analysis of a proposition is facilitated if the proposition is so worded that the task of advocating the new belief or course of action falls upon those supporting the proposition rather than upon those attacking it. A proposition regarding the question whether the policy of the United States in Latin America is imperialistic, for example, should be worded affirmatively: "The policy of the United States in Latin America is imperialistic." As the prevailing opinion in the United States is that our policy is not imperialistic, this statement would place upon the supporters of the proposition the burden of advocating the new view. A proposition regarding

a change in public policy should also be stated affirmatively. The statement "The United States should join the League of Nations," for example, is preferable to the statement "The United States should not join the League of Nations." It should be observed that a proposition may be stated affirmatively and still fail to place upon its defenders the responsibility of advocating the change in policy. The proposition "The United States should refrain from joining the League" is quite as objectionable as the proposition "The United States should not join the League."

III. THE TWO TYPES OF PROPOSITIONS

Propositions may be divided into the two classes, propositions of policy and propositions of fact. The following are propositions of policy: "The United States should join the World Court"; "Professional training for a business career is desirable"; "The federal government should operate the railroads." These propositions have one characteristic in common: their acceptance or rejection influences conduct. They concern what may broadly be termed matters of policy, public or private.

A proposition of fact is a statement of alleged fact which the arguer invites his audience to accept as true or to reject as false. While such a proposition often has a bearing on conduct, the immediate purpose of argument supporting or opposing it is not to influence conduct, but to secure its acceptance or rejection as a statement of fact. A speaker supporting a proposition of policy asks his hearer to believe that "this should

be done"; a speaker supporting a proposition of fact asks him to believe that "this is true." The following are typical propositions of fact: "Man has evolved from a more primitive species"; "John Doe is guilty of burglary"; "A college education is an asset in business"; "Competitive armament is a cause of war."

The classification of a proposition as one of policy or of fact is determined by the arguer's intention rather than by the verbal form of the statement. The proposition "The interests of the American people would be best served by the election of a Republican president" is in form a proposition of fact; but if the arguer's purpose is to win votes for the Republican nominee, he is attempting to influence conduct, and the proposition is one of policy.

EXERCISES

I. Classify the following propositions as propositions of policy or of fact:

1. The government of the United States should own and operate the railroads.
2. Government ownership and operation of the railroads would result in a more efficient administration of our transportation system.
3. The honor system should be adopted at X College.
4. Buy one of our new fall suits.
5. The French occupation of the Ruhr valley was justifiable.

II. From each of the following general subjects formulate two propositions, one of fact and one of policy:

1. A Federal Marriage and Divorce Law.
2. The Prohibition Amendment.
3. The World Court.

4. The League of Nations.
5. The Open Shop.

III. State the thesis supported in each of the specimens of argument in the Appendix.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSITION

I. THE NATURE OF ANALYSIS

To ascertain the truth or falsity of any proposition it is necessary to examine the arguments for and against it and to determine on which side the stronger argument lies. If the problem underlying a proposition is complex, the mass of facts and arguments bearing on it is likely to be so great that no intelligent consideration of them is possible until the problem has been broken up into its logical subdivisions. Each division of the problem becomes, in effect, a problem in itself, but one sufficiently narrow in scope to make possible the evaluation of evidence on it.

For convenience, both the main problem and the subordinate problems into which it is resolved may be expressed in the form of questions to which the argument supplies an affirmative or a negative answer, or to which some of the argument supplies an affirmative and some a negative answer. The proposition "The government should own the coal-mines," for example, can be expressed as follows: "Is government ownership of the coal-mines desirable?" This general inquiry must be broken up into subordinate questions, each covering one of the organic subdivisions of the problem.

This process of dividing and subdividing the general inquiry into subordinate questions, each covering a point essential to the solution of the problem and each sufficiently limited in scope to permit the evaluation of argument on it, is what is meant by analysis of the proposition.

Since each of the questions in analysis corresponds to one of the organic divisions of the problem, it follows that two independent investigators who make sound analyses of a proposition will arrive at substantially the same set of questions. Different methods of approach may result in slightly different arrangements of the questions, but the questions themselves are inherent in the problem. They must be discovered rather than invented by the investigator.

At least a tentative analysis should be made early in the investigation of a problem. The questions revealed by a preliminary analysis will help the investigator to determine which arguments are relevant and will provide a method of classifying those which are relevant. The questions will also save him much time by indicating in advance those points upon which he must seek evidence. This will guide him in his reading and will go far toward insuring him against omitting the consideration of points which are essential to a solution of the problem. As his knowledge of the problem grows, he will wish to make a more complete and accurate analysis than was possible at the beginning of his study.

The method of analysis to be employed in any given case depends upon whether the proposition to be analyzed is one of policy or of fact.

II. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITIONS OF POLICY

A. The Procedure of Analysis

Common sense indicates that two principles should be observed in deciding upon the wisdom of a change in policy. The first of these is the principle that there is always a presumption in favor of the *status quo*. Any change in policy involves some trouble and expense; consequently we do not adopt a new policy unless it is clear that something can be gained by doing so. This presumption in favor of the existing policy invariably leads us in analysis to the consideration of two questions:

I. Is a change in policy desirable?
II. Would the proposed policy be satisfactory?

If the present situation is in all respects satisfactory, there is no reason to consider the adoption of a new policy, no matter what its virtues may appear to be. And even though the present situation is unsatisfactory, we do not favor a change unless it is clear that the new policy would not only be more satisfactory, but would be sufficiently satisfactory to make the change worth while.

If a new policy is to be adopted and there are two or more new policies to choose from, we of course prefer to adopt the best one. In considering a change in policy, common sense consequently dictates that we shall not decide in favor of any proposed policy until the merits of alternative policies have been canvassed. In

the analysis of a proposition of policy, this principle leads us to the consideration of a third question:

III. Is the proposed policy the most satisfactory policy that could be adopted?

All three of the major inquiries suggested above must be considered in the investigation of any proposition which proposes the adoption of a new policy. Some propositions, however, propose the abandonment of a policy or the abolition of an institution without specifying what new policy or institution is to take its place. The following proposition illustrates the type: "The institution of trial by jury should be abolished." In the analysis of this proposition, it is apparent that we must consider the first main question, "Is a change in policy desirable?" We need not raise the third question, "Is the proposed policy the most satisfactory that could be adopted?" for no specific policy is proposed. The second question, "Would the proposed policy be satisfactory?" must be raised in the following modified form: "Is there *any* new policy which would be satisfactory?" Unless there is some policy which would be satisfactory, the presumption in favor of the *status quo* necessitates a decision against the proposition.

With the exception noted above, the three main inquiries must be raised in the investigation of any question of policy. Before the evidence can be examined intelligently, each of these inquiries must be resolved into subordinate inquiries. This further analysis also follows the organic subdivisions of the problem and can consequently be determined in advance. In the fol-

lowing pages we shall examine this more detailed analysis of the three main inquiries.

I. Is a Change in Policy Desirable? A change in policy is desirable when there are serious evils inherent in the present policy or when there is a desire for benefits other than the alleviation of evils. Government ownership of the coal-mines has been proposed because some believe that certain evils, such as high prices and irregular production of coal, would be remedied by government ownership of the industry. When a city council considers the advisability of paying a sum of money for the privilege of entertaining a political convention, the object in view is not to remedy evils, but to secure such benefits as publicity for the city.

Most public policies are designed primarily to remedy evils and incidentally to secure benefits not connected with the evils. The organization of a separate department of aviation coördinate with the departments of the army and the navy is urged primarily to avoid the incompetent management of the air service which is alleged to exist at present, but advocates of the proposal also believe that such an independent department would stimulate commercial aviation, a benefit in no way connected with the evil which the policy is designed to remedy.

It is apparent from a consideration of the grounds which lead men to desire a change in policy that our first main inquiry must be resolved into the following questions:

A. Do serious evils inherent in the present policy make a change in policy desirable?

B. Does desire for benefits other than the alleviation of evils make a change in policy desirable?

Each of these questions must be further analyzed as indicated in the following paragraphs.

The first question is analyzed as follows:

A. Do serious evils inherent in the present policy make a change in policy desirable?
   1. Do the conditions which appear to be evils actually exist?
   2. Are these conditions really evils?
   3. Are these evils sufficiently serious to justify a change in policy?
   4. Are these evils inherent in the present policy?

It cannot always be assumed that the conditions which appear to make a change in policy desirable actually exist. Those who advocate abandonment of the policy of protecting our private property in Latin America by force of arms often do so partly on the ground that the policy has infringed upon the sovereignty of the Latin American governments, but upon investigation it appears somewhat doubtful whether such infringement has actually taken place. If the conditions actually exist, it is necessary to consider next whether they are really evils. It may appear upon investigation that they harm no one or even that they are blessings in disguise. If the conditions are really evils, we must inquire whether they are sufficiently serious to justify so drastic a step as a change in policy. They may have been exaggerated by those who complain of them or they may be harmful to a comparatively small number of people. Thus a

reasonable question can be raised as to whether the evils in the jury system are sufficiently serious to justify abolition of trial by jury. Finally, it is necessary to inquire whether the evils are inherent in the present policy or institution. If they could be remedied by a slight modification of the present policy or by administering the policy in a different manner, they are not inherent and their existence does not justify a change in policy.

The second subordinate question may be analyzed as follows:

B. Does desire for benefits other than the alleviation of evils make a change in policy desirable?
   1. Would the results desired really be benefits?
   2. Would these benefits be sufficiently great to justify a change in policy?
   3. Could these benefits be secured without a change in policy?

The significance of these three subordinate questions in determining whether desire for benefits makes a change in policy desirable is too apparent to require discussion.

II. Would the Proposed Policy be Satisfactory? To be satisfactory, the proposed policy must produce the results expected of it in sufficient degree to justify its adoption, and it must not be attended by evils so serious as to make its adoption unwise. The first of these two subordinate inquiries should be subdivided as follows:

A. Would the proposed policy produce the results expected of it in sufficient degree to justify its adoption?
   1. Would it remedy the existing evils in sufficient degree to justify its adoption?
   2. Would it produce the other desired benefits in sufficient degree to justify its adoption?

If the policy is designed solely to remedy evils, the second question will of course be omitted; if it is designed solely to secure benefits unconnected with evils, the first will be omitted.

The second subordinate inquiry may be analyzed as follows:

B. Would the proposed policy be attended by evils so serious as to make its adoption unwise?
   1. Would it actually produce the results which appear to be evils?
   2. Would these results really be evils?
   3. Would these evils be sufficiently serious to outweigh the advantages of the policy?
   4. Would these evils be inherent in the policy?

The adoption of any policy is attended by some expense, and some policies bring with them other undesirable consequences as well. One argument against government operation of the coal-mines, for example, is that the large number of government employees created by the policy might have an injurious influence on federal legislation affecting the coal industry. The likelihood that such evils would attend the adoption of a policy must be considered in deciding upon the expediency of its adoption.

III. Is the Proposed Policy the Most Satisfactory Policy that Could be Adopted? When several policies have been proposed, or could be proposed, to remedy existing evils or to secure the benefits desired, each of these alternative policies must be examined in turn and its merits compared with those of the proposed policy. It is of course neither necessary nor possible to consider every alternative policy that could be imagined, but consideration should be given to those which are at all likely to be proposed and especially to those which have already been proposed. In the examination of each alternative policy the following questions must be considered:

A. Would the alternative policy remedy existing evils as effectively as the proposed policy?
B. Would it produce as large a total of benefits unconnected with the alleviation of evils?
   1. Would it produce to as great a degree the benefits of the proposed policy?
   2. Would it produce other benefits?
C. Would it be as free from attendant evils as the proposed policy?
   1. Would it produce to as great a degree the evils of the proposed policy?
   2. Would it produce other evils?

For convenience, all of the questions to be used in the analysis of a proposition of policy are arranged here in the form of a chart:

I. Is a change in policy desirable?
   A. Do serious evils inherent in the present policy make a change in policy desirable?

1. Do the conditions which appear to be evils actually exist?
2. Are these conditions really evils?
3. Are these evils sufficiently serious to justify a change in policy?
4. Are these evils inherent in the present policy?

B. Does desire for benefits other than the alleviation of evils make a change in policy desirable?
1. Would the results desired really be benefits?
2. Would these benefits be sufficiently great to justify a change in policy?
3. Could these benefits be secured without a change in policy?

II. Would the proposed policy be satisfactory?
A. Would it produce the results expected of it in sufficient degree to justify its adoption?
1. Would it remedy the existing evils in sufficient degree to justify its adoption?
2. Would it produce the desired benefits in sufficient degree to justify its adoption?

B. Would it be attended by evils so serious as to make its adoption unwise?
1. Would it actually produce the results which appear to be evils?
2. Would these results really be evils?
3. Would these evils be sufficiently serious to outweigh the advantages of the policy?
4. Would these evils be inherent in the policy?

III. Is the proposed policy the most satisfactory policy that could be adopted?
A. Would the alternative policy remedy existing evils as effectively as the proposed policy?
B. Would it produce as large a total of benefits unconnected with the alleviation of evils?
1. Would it produce to as great a degree the benefits of the proposed policy?
2. Would it produce other benefits?

C. Would it be as free from attendant evils?
   1. Would it produce to as great a degree the evils of the proposed policy?
   2. Would it produce other evils?

It is seldom, if ever, necessary to examine evidence on all of the questions included in the preceding chart. If question IA2 ("Are these conditions really evils?") is answered in the negative, for example, questions 3 and 4 following it will be omitted. It will often happen that the argument on a particular question is either all affirmative or all negative. Thus in considering the evils which it appears might attend a proposed policy, it may be found that there is much difference of opinion on the question whether the proposed policy would actually produce the results in question, it being generally agreed that if such results did occur they would undoubtedly be evils; or it may be found that the results feared would obviously attend adoption of the policy, difference of opinion arising rather over the question whether these results would really be evils or whether they would be sufficiently serious to outweigh the advantages of the policy.

It should not be supposed that one can determine the truth or falsity of a proposition merely by adding up, so to speak, the answers to the questions outlined in the chart. Frequently it is necessary to weigh one answer against another. It may be found, for example, that an alternative policy, while more free from attendant evils than the proposed policy, would secure fewer benefits unconnected with the evils. The total of good to be derived from the alternative policy must be

weighed against that to be derived from the proposed policy.

B. A Specimen of Analysis

The manner of using the scheme of analysis suggested in the preceding section will be illustrated here by the analysis of the proposition "The United States should abandon military protection of American private property in Latin America." By "military protection" is meant the use of warships and marines without a declaration of war, as in our military occupation of Nicaragua. American private property includes all property in Latin America owned by American citizens.

I. Is a Change in Our Latin American Policy Desirable? Do evils inherent in the policy of military protection make a change in policy desirable? The opponents of military protection allege that eight evils result from that policy: We are infringing upon the sovereignty of Latin American governments; in our relations with those governments we are violating our own ideal of political liberty; we are losing the respect of the world by the pursuit of what appears to outsiders an imperialistic policy at variance with our anti-imperialistic professions; we are losing the friendship of the Latin American people; we are losing trade with Latin American countries; the expense of military protection is considerable; we are sacrificing the lives of American marines; we are in danger of becoming involved in war with a combination of Latin American powers.

Do these conditions actually exist? It cannot be

doubted that at least some of them do. There are indications in the European and South American press that our present policy is decreasing respect for us with some. That the maintenance of armed forces in Latin America is expensive and that the use of force involves at least some loss of life are also beyond dispute. There appears to be substantial evidence both for and against the existence of the other five conditions, and until this evidence has been collected and examined, it is impossible to arrive at a conclusion regarding the existence of those conditions.

Are the conditions enumerated above really evils? It is hardly necessary to examine argument on this question. All of the eight conditions mentioned are undoubtedly evils if they exist to an appreciable degree.

Are the evils sufficiently serious to justify a change in policy? To answer this question it is necessary to examine the evidence on each of the eight evils. The examination would probably show that some of them are more serious than others. The question that must be decided is whether or not all of them taken together constitute such a menace to our safety, prosperity, or peace of mind that we are justified in seriously considering a change in policy.

Are these evils inherent in the policy of military protection? Some of them clearly are inherent. So long as we employ military protection, there is no way to avoid the expense incident to military interventions; there is no way to avoid the occasional loss of the lives of American marines; there is no way to convince European and South American critics that our motives in Latin America are not imperialistic. It is barely possible,

however, that the other evils might be avoided, or in some degree alleviated, without abandoning military protection. It is argued by some, for example, that we might remove the threat of war by cultivating the friendship of the stronger Latin American countries, in which we seldom intervene, and by showing a more sympathetic interest in the national aspirations of those weaker peoples in whose countries we have intervened. The possible means of correcting each of the evils without abandoning military protection must be canvassed carefully before it is concluded that the evils are inherent in the present policy.

It does not appear from discussions of the question that any benefits aside from the alleviation of evils are claimed for the abandonment of military protection.

II. Would the Abandonment of Military Protection be a Satisfactory Change in Policy? Would abandonment of protection produce the results expected of it in sufficient degree to justify its adoption? As the sole purpose of abandoning military protection would be to correct the evils complained of, the only inquiry to be noticed under this head is "Would abandonment of military protection remedy the evils in sufficient degree to justify adoption of the policy?" Upon examination of the evidence, it probably will be found that some of the evils would be remedied more effectively than others. When the evidence regarding the policy's efficacy in correcting each of the evils has been examined, it will be necessary to evaluate the total effectiveness of the policy in accomplishing the purpose in view.

Would the abandonment of military protection be

attended by evils so serious as to make adoption of the policy unwise? It is alleged by many students of the subject that two serious evils would follow abandonment of military protection: the exportation of American capital to the less stable Latin American countries would be discouraged, and European powers would be likely to intervene in Latin America.

Would these results actually follow adoption of the policy? There is argument to be examined on both sides of the question. American investors, it is argued, would not risk their money in unstable Latin American countries without a guarantee of protection by the United States government. In opposition to this view it is argued that investments in Latin America pay such high dividends that capital would be invested without military protection. Those who fear the intervention of European powers in Latin America if we withdraw our military forces argue as follows: European investors have large holdings in Latin America; these investments would be jeopardized if we did not maintain order in unstable Latin American countries; European governments consistently follow the policy of protecting the foreign investments of their nationals; consequently, these governments would soon land troops in Latin America. Opposed to this argument is the contention that Europe would refrain from intervention out of respect for the Monroe Doctrine.

Would the two alleged consequences of abandoning military protection really be evils? Here also there is argument on both sides of the question. Some advance the argument that a decrease in the export of capital to the less stable Latin American countries would de-

crease the prosperity of America, while others maintain that all of our surplus capital could find an outlet in fields outside of those countries. Some believe that the presence of European forces in Latin America would do no harm, while others argue that it would produce all of the evils attending our own military interventions, that it would lead to the destruction of the sovereignty of Latin American governments by the frankly imperialistic powers of Europe, and that the presence of European forces so near the Panama Canal and our own shores would endanger our safety in the event of war with a European power.

Would these evils be sufficiently serious to outweigh the advantages of the policy? At this point it is necessary to consider together the evidence regarding the probable efficacy of the policy in correcting existing evils and the evidence regarding the seriousness of those evils likely to follow abandonment of protection, and to decide whether, everything considered, the good to be derived from the abandonment of military protection is sufficiently great to outweigh the evils which might follow it.

It is apparently agreed that if the two evils mentioned above were to ensue, they would be inherent in the new policy.

As no alternative policy has been proposed, we need not consider the third main inquiry, "Is the proposed policy the most satisfactory policy that could be adopted?"

The student, having analyzed his proposition, should arrange his questions in the form of a chart corresponding to that included in the preceding section of this

chapter. The method of doing this is too obvious to require illustration here.

III. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITIONS OF FACT

A proposition of fact affirms the existence of some particular relation between two ideas. Any relation may be employed in such a proposition, but among those most commonly affirmed is that of classification, as in the proposition "Municipal ownership of street railways is a socialistic measure"; that of cause and effect, as in the proposition "Unrestricted immigration causes low wages"; and that of analogy, as in the proposition "The World Court is analogous to the Supreme Court of the United States." The variety of relationships affirmed in propositions of fact makes it impossible to formulate a detailed procedure of analysis applicable to all such propositions. It is possible, however, to indicate a method of approach which will usually point the way to an analysis.

A. The Procedure of Analysis

The analysis of a proposition of fact is based upon an explanation of the second term, or idea, in the proposition. The nature of this explanation and the manner in which the analysis is based upon it can be made clear most readily by illustration.

To analyze the proposition "Municipal ownership of street railways is a socialistic measure," it would be necessary to secure an acceptable definition of socialism. Such a definition would indicate the essential char-

acteristics of a socialistic measure. The analysis would then consist in the formulation of a series of questions to determine whether or not municipal ownership of street railways exhibits each of these characteristics.

The analysis of the proposition "Unrestricted immigration causes low wages" would be based on a statement of the cause of low wages. Since wages tend to obey the law of supply and demand, it is apparent that the analysis must follow two lines of inquiry: (1) Does unrestricted immigration increase the supply of labor? and (2) Does unrestricted immigration decrease demand for labor?

To analyze the proposition "The World Court is analagous to the Supreme Court of the United States," it would be necessary to determine what are the essential features of the Supreme Court and then to inquire whether or not these features are possessed by the World Court.

B. A Specimen of Analysis

The method of analyzing a proposition of fact is illustrated more fully in the following analysis of the proposition "John Doe committed burglary."

Burglary is defined at common law as "breaking and entering the dwelling-house of another in the nighttime, with intent to commit some felony within the same." It is apparent from this definition that the main inquiries in the analysis must be as follows: [1]

I. Did John Doe break into a building?
II. Did he enter the building?

[1] This illustration is suggested by O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales's *Argumentation and Debate* (1917), p. 43.

III. Was the building the dwelling-house of another?
IV. Did the act occur in the night?
V. Was the act done with intent to commit some felony within the building?

The last question must be further analyzed. If the indictment charges, for example, that the defendant's intention was to commit arson, the subordinate inquiries are:

A. Was it John Doe's intention to commit arson?
B. Is arson a felony?

EXERCISES

I. Analyze the following propositions of policy:

1. I should attend a graduate school after completing my college course.
2. The X Glee Club should make a tour this year.
3. X College should play Y College in football this year.
4. X College should adopt the honor system.
5. The Volstead Act should be modified to permit the manufacture and sale of light wines and beer.

II. Analyze the following propositions of fact:

1. A tariff is a tax.
2. A liberal college training is an asset in business.
3. Betting is a form of dishonesty.
4. The study of mathematics is a valuable mental discipline.

CHAPTER V

PROOF REQUIREMENTS OF A THESIS

The process of analysis discussed in the preceding chapter is useful to any one who wishes to investigate a proposition quite regardless of whether or not he intends to discuss the subject in speech or writing. If he does wish to discuss it, however, he will find that a knowledge of the questions revealed by analysis is necessary in the construction of his argument. In this chapter we shall discuss the use to which the results of analysis are put in the preparation of an argumentative speech or article.

I. THE ISSUES

For the sake of illustration we will suppose that a person is preparing an argument in support of the proposition "The United States should abandon military protection of American private property in Latin America." His analysis of the proposition has resulted in the following set of questions:

I. Do serious evils inherent in the present policy make a change in policy desirable?
   A. Do the conditions which appear to be evils actually exist?
      1. Are we infringing upon the sovereignty of Latin American governments?

2. Are we violating our own ideal of political liberty?
3. Are we losing the respect of the world?
4. Are we losing the friendship of the Latin American people?
5. Are we losing trade with Latin American countries?
6. Is the expense of military protection considerable?
7. Are we sacrificing the lives of American marines?
8. Are we in danger of war with a combination of Latin American powers?

B. Are these evils sufficiently serious to justify a change in policy?
   1. Is infringement upon the sovereignty of Latin American governments a serious evil? etc.

C. Are these evils inherent in the policy of military protection?
   1. Is infringement upon the sovereignty of Latin American governments inherent in the present policy? etc.

II. Would abandonment of military protection be a satisfactory change in policy?

A. Would it remedy the evils in sufficient degree to justify its adoption?
   1. Would it stop infringement upon the sovereignty of Latin American governments? etc.

B. Would it be attended by evils so serious as to make adoption of the policy unwise?
   1. Would it actually produce the results which appear to be evils?
      a. Would it discourage the exportation of American capital to the less stable Latin American countries?
      b. Would European countries be likely to intervene in Latin America?
   2. Would these results really be evils?
      a. Would a decrease in the export of capital to the less stable Latin American countries be an evil? etc.

3. Would these evils be sufficiently serious to outweigh the advantages of the policy?
   a. Would a decrease in the export of capital to the less stable Latin American countries be a serious evil? etc.

With this set of questions before him, the speaker must next consider the probable beliefs of his audience on the proposition. Let us suppose that the members of the audience are opposed to the speaker's thesis and that they hold the following beliefs on the subject: [1] All eight of the conditions alleged to be evils actually exist; these evils are inherent in the policy of military protection; they are not sufficiently serious, however, to justify abandonment of military protection; abandonment of protection would remedy these evils; abandonment of protection would decrease export of capital to the less stable Latin American countries and would probably be followed by the intervention of European powers in Latin America; these two conditions would be evils; they would be so serious as to outweigh the advantages of abandoning military protection.

It is apparent from this statement of beliefs that speaker and audience are already in agreement on the answers that must be made to some of the questions revealed by analysis. It will be unnecessary for the speaker to present argument on these questions unless he does so for special reasons discussed in Chapter XII. Checking from the list those questions upon which speaker and audience agree, we have remaining the following set of questions:

[1] For the sake of simplicity we assume what would seldom be true in real life, that all members of the audience hold the same views on the subject.

I. Are the evils sufficiently serious to justify a change in policy?[2]
II. Would abandonment of military protection be attended by evils so serious as to make adoption of the policy unwise?
   A. Would it actually produce the results which appear to be evils?
   B. Would these results really be evils?
   C. Would these evils be sufficiently serious to outweigh the advantages of the policy?

These questions are the points at issue between speaker and audience. We shall refer to them hereafter simply as the issues.

Determination of the issues in a debate presents a slightly different problem in that the speaker must consider not only those beliefs his hearers have on the proposition at the beginning of the debate, but also those beliefs they may acquire as a result of hearing the opposing speaker's argument. If it were assumed that at the beginning of the debate the audience had no beliefs on the subject, the issues would be those questions revealed by analysis upon which the opposing speakers disagree. This is presumably the situation in the courtroom when opposing attorneys address the jury.

To illustrate the method of determining the issues in a debate held before a neutral audience, we recur to the hypothetical trial for burglary discussed in the preceding chapter. The questions revealed by analysis of the proposition "John Doe is guilty of burglary" were as follows:

I. Did John Doe break into a building?
II. Did he enter the building?

[2] To save space we omit statement of the specific evils.

III. Was the building the dwelling-house of another?
IV. Did the act occur in the night?
V. Was the act done with intent to commit some felony within the building?
A. Was it John Doe's intention to commit arson?
B. Is arson a felony?

We shall assume that the counsel for the defense takes the following position on the points raised by these questions: John Doe broke and entered the dwelling-house of another; the act did not occur at night; arson is a felony; it was not John Doe's intention to commit arson. On this assumption it is apparent that the issues to which both counsel for the prosecution and for the defense will address their argument are as follows:

I. Did John Doe's act occur at night?
II. Was it John Doe's intention to commit arson?

II. PROOF REQUIREMENTS

To each of the issues there are two possible answers, one supporting the speaker's thesis, and one attacking it. The answers favorable to the speaker's thesis, when expressed in the form of statements, are the contentions which the speaker may find it necessary or desirable to support in his argument. When the set of issues on the Latin American question presented in the preceding section of this chapter is examined, it appears that a speaker advocating abandonment of military protection before the audience there specified need present argument in support of only the following contentions:

I. The evils are sufficiently serious to justify a change in policy.

II. Abandonment of military protection would not be attended by evils so serious as to make adoption of the policy unwise.

A. It would not actually produce the results which appear to be evils.

B. These results would not really be evils.

C. These evils would not be sufficiently serious to outweigh the advantages of the policy.

It will be observed that those contentions which appear in italics are essential to the support of the speaker's thesis if he is to convince this particular audience. If he omits either of them or fails to secure the acceptance of either of them, he will necessarily fail to secure the acceptance of his thesis. Of the other contentions the most that we can say is that the speaker must succeed in establishing at least one of them. He may, if he likes, present argument on any one of them and ignore the other two. It is more likely that he will present argument in support of more than one. He may decide, for example, to argue both that abandonment of military protection would not produce the results in question and also that those results would not be evils even if they should occur. This plan gives him two opportunities to establish his second main contention. Those contentions which the speaker must succeed in establishing to secure the acceptance of his thesis by the audience we shall call the proof requirements of the speaker's thesis for that particular audience.

A speaker opposing a proposition arrives at the proof requirements of his thesis exactly as does a speaker

supporting the proposition. From the questions revealed by analysis of the proposition he selects those (the issues) upon which he and his audience disagree. For each issue there will be a contention supporting his thesis. Those contentions which are essential to its support are the proof requirements of the negative speaker's thesis.

III. STATEMENT OF ANALYSIS IN THE SPEECH

Frequently a speech is more convincing if the hearer knows before the argument is presented what the issues and proof requirements are, for he will then perceive the relevance and importance of each point in the argument as it is presented. In some cases the speaker may even find it advisable in the introduction of his speech to review briefly the entire process of reasoning by which he arrived at his proof requirements. Such a review might include a statement of the main questions revealed by analysis, a statement of the issues, and a statement of the proof requirements of the speaker's thesis. In a debate the speaker may go one step further and state the proof requirements of the opposing speaker's thesis. More often, if material of this sort is to be included, the speaker will content himself with a statement of the issues alone. This was the method employed by Webster in his address to the jury in the Joseph White murder case. After presenting several introductory paragraphs designed to remove prejudice against himself and his case, Mr. Webster prefaced his argument for the prosecution with the following statement:

"Gentlemen, let us now come to the case. Your first inquiry on the evidence will be, was Captain White murdered in pursuance of a conspiracy, and was the defendant one of this conspiracy? If so, the second inquiry is, was he so connected with the murder itself as that he is liable to be convicted as a principal? The defendant is indicted as a principal. If not guilty as such, you cannot convict him. The indictment contains three distinct classes of counts. In the first, he is charged as having done the deed with his own hand: in the second, as an aider and abettor to Richard Crowninshield, Jr., who did the deed: in the third, as an aider and abettor to some person unknown. If you believe him guilty on either of these counts, or in either of these ways, you must convict him."

The issues set forth in this statement may be arranged in the form of a chart as follows:

I. Was the defendant in a conspiracy to murder Captain White?
   A. Was Captain White murdered in pursuance of a conspiracy?
   B. Was the defendant one of this conspiracy?
II. Was the defendant a principal in the crime?
   A. Did he do the deed with his own hand?
   B. Did he aid and abet Richard Crowninshield, Jr., in the deed?
   C. Did he aid and abet some unknown person in the deed?

When the statement of issues is elaborate, it is often best to present only the main issues in the introduction. Each group of subordinate issues is then presented in the body of the speech immediately preceding the argument upon them. An elaborate statement at the beginning might be tedious and would probably be forgotten before the speaker began to discuss the contentions based upon the subordinate issues.

In the following illustrative passage the speaker presents a statement of the main questions revealed by analysis of the proposition, a statement of the issues, and a statement of the proof requirements of his thesis. The speaker is supporting the proposition "The United States should abandon military protection of American private property in Latin America." Such an elaborate statement of analysis as the one which follows would seldom be justified except in a debate where it is feared the audience has become confused by the presentation of many conflicting arguments.

If we were to undertake an exhaustive discussion of the question before us, it would be necessary to pursue three main lines of inquiry: (1) Are there evils growing out of our use of force in Latin America so serious as to make it proper at this time to consider a change in policy? (2) Would the abandonment of military protection of property remedy those evils in sufficient degree to justify adoption of the policy? (3) Would the abandonment of military protection be attended by evils so serious as to outweigh its advantages? Fortunately it will not be necessary for me to discuss all three of these points. From previous discussion in this assembly it is apparent that most of you are heartily in accord with those who deplore the present situation. It is also apparent that most of you believe abandonment of military protection would remedy all of the evils complained of except that of infringement upon the sovereignty of Latin American governments. The only two points which require discussion, then, are these: (1) Would the abandonment of military protection stop infringement upon the sovereignty of Latin American governments? and (2) Would the abandonment of military protection be attended by evils so serious as to make the change in policy unwise?

Before proceeding to the argument, let me clear the ground further by examining into the nature of the difference of opinion upon these two issues. Upon the first I understand the posi-

tion of some to be that if we withdrew our forces from Latin America, those European powers whose nationals have investments there would intervene exactly as we have done, and with the same disastrous consequences to the sovereignty of Latin American governments. For this reason it is believed that the abandonment of military protection by the United States would not stop infringement upon sovereignty. The evils which some fear would result from the policy I advocate are that this infringement upon sovereignty would be even more serious than it is at present and that the presence of European forces in Latin America would threaten the safety of the United States. I do not believe that European powers would intervene or that, if they did, the intervention would be harmful either to Latin America or to the United States.

It appears, then, that the points really at issue are the following:

I. Would European powers intervene in Latin America if we did not?

II. Would such intervention be undesirable?

A. Would it involve infringement upon the sovereignty of Latin American governments?

B. Would it endanger the safety of the United States?

To win your support for the proposal I advocate I must convince you either that European powers would not intervene, or that such intervention would not have the evil consequences you fear. I shall attempt to do both.

EXERCISES

I. From those propositions listed in the exercises at the close of the preceding chapter select one which you have analyzed. Assume that you are to deliver a speech in support of the proposition before some particular audience. Work out the issues and the proof requirements of your thesis.

II. Repeat the preceding exercise, assuming this time that you are to oppose the proposition.

III. Criticize the statement of analysis in the eighth and tenth specimens of argument in the Appendix.

IV. Prepare and deliver a ten-minute speech before the class, taking special pains with the analysis of the proposition and with the determination of the issues and proof requirements.

CHAPTER VI

TYPES OF ARGUMENT: DEDUCTION

Three types of reasoning are employed in argument: deduction, generalization, and analogy. In this chapter we shall discuss deductive reasoning, the rhetorical forms which it takes in argument, and the fallacies to which it is liable.

I. DEDUCTIVE REASONING

Deduction is that process of reasoning which from two statements assumed to be true infers the truth of a third statement.[1] If it is assumed that all beverages containing more than 6 per cent of alcohol are intoxicating and that wine contains more than 6 per cent of alcohol, we may infer that wine is intoxicating. It is apparent from this example that deduction is essentially a process of classification. Beverages containing more than 6 per cent of alcohol are classified as intoxicating beverages, and wine is classified as a beverage containing more than 6 per cent of alcohol. If these two classifications are valid, the third, that wine is an intoxicating beverage, must also be valid. An argument, like that

[1] *Proposition* is the term commonly used to designate the assertions of which a syllogism is composed. We substitute for it the word *statement* to avoid confusion with *proposition* as employed in Chapter III.

just cited, expressing a single deductive inference is called a *syllogism*.

A. The Elements of the Syllogism

A syllogism consists of three statements: the conclusion, the major premise, and the minor premise. The conclusion is the statement whose truth is to be established; the major premise is the general statement adduced in support of the conclusion; and the minor premise is the more particular statement adduced in support of the conclusion.

The order in which the three statements in a syllogism appear is immaterial, but that illustrated in the following example is perhaps commonest in ordinary argument:

All beverages containing more than 6 per cent of alcohol are intoxicating beverages (major premise).
Wine is a beverage containing more than 6 per cent of alcohol (minor premise).
Therefore, wine is an intoxicating beverage (conclusion).

When this syllogism is briefed, the conclusion appears as the main head and the premises as the subheads supporting it:

I. Wine is an intoxicating beverage, for
  A. All beverages containing more than 6 per cent of alcohol are intoxicating beverages, and
  A′. Wine is a beverage containing more than 6 per cent of alcohol.

In its typical form, a statement consists of two ideas, or terms, joined by a copula. As each term appears twice

in the syllogism, a syllogism contains three, and only three, terms. They may usually be distinguished as follows: the *minor term* is the subject of the conclusion and of the minor premise; the *major term* is the predicate of the conclusion and of the major premise; the *middle term*, which does not appear in the conclusion, is the subject of the major premise and the predicate of the minor premise. The conclusion connects the minor and major terms; the major premise connects the middle and major terms; the minor premise connects the minor and middle terms.

The relation between the terms of a syllogism may be illustrated diagrammatically. The syllogism,

I. Capital punishment is an effective deterrent, for
A. Severe punishments are effective deterrents, and
A′. Capital punishment is a severe punishment,

would be represented as follows:



The medium-sized circle drawn within the large one illustrates the major premise, which states that all severe punishments fall within the larger class of effective deterrents. The small circle drawn within the medium-sized one illustrates the minor premise, that capital punishment is a severe punishment. The position of the small circle within the large one then illustrates the conclusion, that capital punishment is an effective deterrent.

Statements may be classified as *affirmative* or *negative*. An affirmative statement affirms a relation between the subject and predicate, for example, "Capital punishment is a severe punishment." A negative statement denies a relation between subject and predicate, for example, "Lenient punishments are not effective deterrents," or "No lenient punishment is an effective deterrent."

If one premise of a syllogism is negative, the conclusion is negative, as in the following example:

I. Imprisonment is not an effective deterrent against murder, for
   A. Lenient punishments are not effective deterrents, and
   A′. Imprisonment for murder is a lenient punishment.

In diagramming this syllogism, the circle representing the middle term must be drawn outside of the circle representing the major term. Since, according to the minor premise, the minor term falls within the middle term, it is apparent that the minor term cannot fall within the major term.

Statements may also be classified as *universal* and *particular*. A universal statement makes an assertion regarding *all* of the individuals denoted by the subject of the statement; for example, "All severe punishments are effective deterrents." A particular statement makes an assertion regarding only one, or some, of the individuals denoted by the subject of the statement; for example, "Some severe punishments are effective deterrents," or "A few severe punishments are effective deterrents." When one premise of a syllogism is particular, the conclusion is particular, as in the following example:

I. Some criminals are incapable of reformation, for
   A. Mentally defective criminals are incapable of reformation, and
   A′. Some criminals are mentally defective.

B. The Rules of the Syllogism

A syllogism is not valid if it violates any of the following rules:

1. A syllogism must contain three, and only three, terms.
2. The middle term must be distributed in at least one of the premises.
3. A term must not be distributed in the conclusion unless it is also distributed in one of the premises.
4. No conclusion can be drawn from two negative premises.
5. If one premise is negative, the conclusion must be negative.
6. No conclusion can be drawn from two particular premises.
7. If one premise is particular, the conclusion must be particular.

The necessity of the first rule is apparent from the nature of the syllogism. The syllogism establishes a relation between the minor and major terms by first relating each of them to a common middle term. This process requires three terms, and only three.

The second and third rules concern the distribution of terms. A term is said to be distributed if it refers to a class of things in its entirety. *All men*, *no court decisions*, *all cases of law and equity*, *every citizen of the United States* are distributed terms, for each refers to all of the individuals in the class of things mentioned. A term denoting one man or thing, as *Socrates*, *President Hoover*, *Cornell University*, is always dis-

tributed, since it refers to the individual in its entirety. The following terms, referring to only one individual or to a portion of the individuals in the class mentioned, are undistributed: *some citizens*, *many federal statutes*, *a few court decisions*, *one law abridging freedom of speech.*

It should be observed that the subject of a statement is usually distributed, even though *all* or *every* does not appear before it. In the statement "The laws of the United States are binding upon every citizen," the word *laws* obviously means all laws. The predicate of an affirmative statement is usually undistributed, even though *few*, *some*, *many*, or *one* does not appear before it. Thus in the statement "Arbitration is a method of settling disputes," *a method of settling disputes* refers to one of several methods of settling disputes. The predicate is still undistributed in the statement "Arbitration settles disputes," for we still mean that arbitration is one method of settling disputes. While the predicate of an affirmative statement is usually undistributed, the predicate of a negative statement is always distributed. In the statement "The Secretary of State is a member of the Cabinet," *a member of the Cabinet* is undistributed, but the same term is distributed in the statement "The Speaker of the House of Representatives is not a member of the Cabinet," for here *a member of the Cabinet* means any member of the Cabinet.

According to the second rule of the syllogism, the middle term must be distributed in at least one of the premises. If it is undistributed in both premises, we cannot be sure that the major and minor terms have

been related to the same part of the middle term. In the following syllogism the middle term is undistributed in both premises:

I. John Smith is honest, for
A. Most college students are honest, and
A′. John Smith is a college student.

The major premise does not assert that *all* college students are honest, and we have no way of knowing but that John Smith may be one of the few who are dishonest.

The third rule of the syllogism states that a term must not be distributed in the conclusion unless it is distributed in one of the premises. The premises, that mentally normal criminals are amenable to reformative measures and that most criminals are mentally normal, obviously do not warrant the conclusion that *all* criminals are amenable to reformative measures.

The fourth rule states that no conclusion can be drawn from two negative premises. Two negative premises would assert, in effect, that neither the major nor the minor term is related to the middle term, in which case it is clear that nothing can be inferred regarding the relation between the major and the minor term. The conclusion, that Carter College dismisses many freshmen for poor scholarship, for instance, cannot be inferred from the following premises: Colleges which require an examination for admission do not find it necessary to dismiss many freshmen for poor scholarship, and Carter College does not require an examination for admission.

The reason for the fifth rule, that if one premise is negative, the conclusion must be negative, is also clear. The premises of such a syllogism assert that of the major and the minor terms one is related to the middle term and one is not, from which the only possible inference is that the major and the minor terms are not related. From the premises, that all State universities are supported by taxation and that Carter University is not supported by taxation, the only possible inference is that Carter University is not a State university.

A conclusion cannot be drawn from two particular premises, for a syllogism containing two such premises necessarily violates either rule 2 or rule 3. If both premises are affirmative, the middle term will be undistributed in both premises and rule 2 is violated, as in the following example: Some senators from the Western States are Insurgents; some Democratic senators are from the Western States; therefore, some Democratic senators are Insurgents. If the middle term is distributed in the minor premise by making that premise negative, the conclusion must be negative, in which case the major term will be distributed in the conclusion but not in the major premise, thus violating rule 3: Some senators from the Western States are Insurgents; some Democratic senators are not from the Western States; therefore, some Democratic senators are not Insurgents.

If one premise is particular, the conclusion must be particular; otherwise either rule 2 or rule 3 is violated.

In the following syllogism rule 2 is violated, for the middle term is undistributed in both premises: Some Insurgent senators are advocates of a higher tariff on farm products; all senators from the Western States are Insurgents; therefore, all senators from the Western States are advocates of a higher tariff on farm products. If the middle term is distributed in the minor premise by making that premise negative, the conclusion must be negative also, in which case the major term is distributed in the conclusion but not in the major premise, thus violating rule 3: Some Insurgent senators are advocates of a higher tariff on farm products; no senator from a Western State is an Insurgent; therefore, no senator from a Western State is an advocate of a higher tariff on farm products.

C. Special Forms of Deductive Reasoning

The syllogism discussed in the preceding pages is called the categorical syllogism because the statements of which it is composed are categorical, or unqualified. In addition to the categorical syllogism there are two special forms, the hypothetical and the disjunctive, which occur frequently in argument.

In the *hypothetical syllogism* the major premise is a hypothetical statement, one clause of which is either affirmed or denied in the minor premise. The first, or conditional, clause is called the *antecedent;* the second clause is called the *consequent.* The following example will illustrate:

I. The Volstead Act will produce lawlessness, for
A. If the act is unenforceable, it will produce lawlessness, and
A′. The Volstead Act will be unenforceable.

If the act is unenforceable is the antecedent, and *it will produce lawlessness*, the consequent. The argument can easily be thrown into the categorical form, as follows:

I. The Volstead Act will produce lawlessness, for
A. All unenforceable statutes produce lawlessness, and
A′. The Volstead Act will be an unenforceable statute.

Any categorical syllogism can be expressed hypothetically, and any hypothetical syllogism can be expressed categorically. The difference between the two forms is one of wording rather than of logical structure.

In the syllogism cited above, the minor premise affirms the antecedent clause. A hypothetical syllogism is also valid if the minor premise denies the consequent clause, as in the following example:

I. Capital punishment is not an effective deterrent, for
A. If it is an effective deterrent, it will lower the crime rate, but
A′. It has not lowered the crime rate.

This form always results in a negative conclusion. It may be translated into a negative categorical syllogism as follows:

I. Capital punishment is not an effective deterrent, for
A. All effective deterrents lower the crime rate, but
A′. Capital punishment does not lower the crime rate.

The special rule for the hypothetical syllogism is that the minor premise must either affirm the antecedent or deny the consequent.

In the *disjunctive syllogism*, the major premise proposes two or more alternatives, all but one of which are denied in the minor premise. The following argument, condensed from President Wilson's "War Message to Congress," illustrates the type:

I. Our policy must be one of war, for
   A. Our policy must be one of armed neutrality, of submission, or of war, and
   A′. Our policy cannot be one of armed neutrality or of submission.

The special rule for the disjunctive syllogism is that the enumeration of alternatives in the major premise must be exhaustive. It is clear that if an alternative is omitted, the conclusion is not warranted. The argument that John Smith must be a soldier, since he must be either a soldier or a civilian, and we know that he is not a civilian, is fallacious, for it ignores the possibility that John Smith may be a sailor.

Dilemmatic argument is partly disjunctive and partly hypothetical in form. Its use is sufficiently common to justify its inclusion here as a special combined form of disjunctive and hypothetical argument. The following example will illustrate:

I. The proposal to withdraw military protection of American investments in Latin America is unsound, for
   A. Having withdrawn protection of American investments, we must either cease to protect European investments in Latin America or we must continue to protect them.

B. In either case the proposal to withdraw protection of American investments is unsound, for
   1. If we cease to protect European investments, we must abandon the Monroe Doctrine and allow Europe to protect her own investments.
   2. If we continue to protect European investments, we are unfair to the American investors whom we refuse to protect.

Premise A presents two alternatives; premise B and its supporting premises show that under either alternative the conclusion of the argument follows. We sometimes speak of the two alternatives as "the horns of the dilemma" and of an opponent as being "caught" upon the horns or "gored" by the horns.

An *argument a fortiori*, though valid, cannot be expressed in strict syllogistic form. The following example is typical:

I. Juries are reluctant to sentence a man to death, for
   A. If juries are reluctant to sentence a man to imprisonment, they will be still more reluctant to sentence him to death, and
   A′. Juries are reluctant to sentence a man to imprisonment.

The first premise of this argument makes a comparison between two statements, the second of which is even truer, or stronger, than the first. The second premise then affirms the first of the statements. Hence the name, *argument a fortiori*, or argument from the stronger (reason).

Many of the brief arguments in the Bible are in the *a fortiori* form, as the following:

"But if God doth so clothe the grass in the field, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven; how much more shall He clothe you, O ye of little faith?"

The use of a more extended *a fortiori* argument from public address is illustrated by the following passage from Erskine's "Defense of Lord Gorden."

"But it seems that Lord George ought to have foreseen that so great a multitude could not be collected without mischief. Gentlemen, we are not trying whether he might or ought to have foreseen mischief, but whether he wickedly and traitorously preconcerted and designed it. But if he be an object of censure for not foreseeing it, what shall we say to government, that took no step to prevent it; that issued no proclamation warning the people of the danger and illegality of such an assembly? If a peaceable multitude, with a petition in their hands, be an army, and if the noise and confusion inseparable from numbers, though without violence or the purpose of violence, constitute war, what shall be said of that government which remained from Tuesday to Friday, knowing that an army was collecting to levy war by public advertisement, yet had not a single soldier—no, nor even a constable—to protect the state?" [2]

II. RHETORICAL FORMS OF DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENT

In argument deduction seldom takes the form of a single complete syllogism, nor do the statements of which the argument is composed necessarily appear as statements in which the subject and predicate are joined by a copula. For convenience or rhetorical effectiveness statements may be expressed in a variety of

[2] O'Neill, *Models of Speech Composition* (The Century Co., 1921), p. 74.

ways, and syllogisms may be abbreviated and combined.

Statements are often expressed without a copula. The statement "Wine is an intoxicating beverage," for example, might take any of the following forms: "Wine is intoxicating"; "Wine intoxicates"; "Wine must be included among the intoxicating beverages." Sometimes the predicate of the statement appears first, as in "Blessed are the meek." Not infrequently a premise or conclusion takes the form of an interrogation, as in the following syllogism:

Any beverage containing more than 6 per cent of alcohol is intoxicating, and the lightest wines contain at least 6 per cent. Does not this answer the question whether wine is intoxicating?

Syllogisms are often abbreviated by the omission of one of the statements. Such an abbreviated argument is called an *enthymeme*. The major premise, the minor premise, or, less often, the conclusion may be omitted. An implied premise is of course essential to the validity of the argument; if the premise is untrue, the argument is quite as fallacious as if the premise were expressed. In the first of the following three enthymemic arguments, the major premise is omitted; in the second, the minor premise; in the third, the conclusion:

The World Court will discourage war, for it will settle international disputes.

Any agency which settles international disputes will discourage war; therefore, the World Court will discourage war.

The settlement of international disputes discourages war,

and there is no doubt that the World Court will settle many international disputes.

Speakers and writers often support the same conclusion with several independent syllogisms or enthymemes. The following argument consists of three enthymemes supporting the conclusion that the organization of the air service as an independent department of the national defense would strengthen our system of national defense:

The organization of the air service as an independent department of the national defense, with a Secretary of the Air Service sitting in the President's Cabinet, would strengthen our system of national defense in several ways. It would encourage experimentation with the use of the airplane for military purposes; it would attract a more able group of men into the air service; and it would eliminate the animosity now existing between the air service and the regular army.

The argument might be briefed as follows:

I. The organization of the air service as an independent branch of the national defense would strengthen our system of national defense, for
   A. It would encourage experimentation with the use of the airplane for military purposes.
   B. It would attract a more able group of men into the air service.
   C. It would eliminate the animosity now existing between the air service and the regular army.

An argument, like that cited above, which employs several syllogisms or enthymemes to support the same conclusion is called *cumulative proof*.

Frequently one premise of a syllogism, or the ex-

pressed premise of an enthymeme, is supported by another syllogism or enthymeme, as in the following argument:

I. The honor system is desirable, for
  A. Any system which would reduce cribbing is desirable.
  A′. The honor system would reduce cribbing, for
    1. Any system which places a student on his honor will reduce cribbing, and
    1′. The honor system places a student on his honor.

A series of enthymemes, each supporting the enthymeme preceding it, is called a *sorites*. The following passages illustrate the use of sorites:

"It is true, of course, that the immediate reason for accepting the beliefs of revealed religion is that the religion *is* revealed. But it is thought to be revealed because it was promulgated by teachers who were inspired; the teachers are thought to be inspired because they worked miracles; and they are thought to have worked miracles because there is historical evidence of the fact, which it is supposed would be more than sufficient to produce conviction in any unbiased mind." [3]

Come gentle Death, the ebbe of care,
The ebbe of care the flood of life,
The flood of life the joyful fare,
The joyful fare the end of strife,
The end of strife that thing wish I
Wherefore come death and let mee dye." [4]

The following deductive argument illustrates the use of the categorical, the hypothetical, and the dis-

[3] Wilfred M. Short, *Arthur J. Balfour as Philosopher and Thinker* (Longmans, Green and Company, 1912), p. 372.
[4] Sir Thomas Wyatt.

junctive syllogism, and of *a fortiori* argument. Some portions of the argument are in complete syllogistic form, others in enthymemic form.

There are at least two substantial reasons for believing that imprisonment for life is a more desirable form of punishment than death.

In the first place, imprisonment is less likely to inflict an irremediable injustice upon a man. If an innocent man is hanged—and this occurs more often than we like to admit—it is impossible to correct the error. But if an innocent man is sentenced to imprisonment for life, he may be released and restored to his family. Even here an injustice has been committed, but something can be done to right it.

All agree that one of the chief purposes of punishment is to deter others from committing the same offense. Is imprisonment a more or a less effective deterrent than capital punishment? Most men value life more than freedom, and upon first thought this fact may lead us to consider the death penalty the more effective deterrent. But the more we consider the psychology of the criminal, the more likely it seems that imprisonment is the more effective of the two penalties. It is the certainty rather than the severity of punishment which deters. If punishment has any deterrent value—and both common sense and observation tell us that it does have—this deterrent influence must be due to the fact that the potential criminal fears either the certainty of the punishment or its severity. The whole history of crime shows that the severity of a possible, or even of a probable, punishment seldom enters the offender's mind. The bearing of this fact on the point at issue is this: Imprisonment is much more likely to be inflicted than the death penalty, for the average jury is more willing to imprison a man than to hang him. The average juryman is usually very reluctant to deprive a fellow mortal of his freedom. How much more reluctant will he be to deprive him of life!

III. FALLACIES OF DEDUCTION

Many of the fallacies to which deductive argument is liable are too transparent or too rare to require discussion in a textbook on practical argumentation. There are several, however, which often mislead and which occur so frequently in popular argument that the speaker must be constantly on his guard against them both in constructing his own argument and in examining that of an opponent. In the following pages each of the commoner fallacies will be illustrated, and where it seems likely to be helpful something will be said of the manner in which the fallacy may be exposed in debate.

Faults in deductive argument may be divided into two classes: formal fallacies and material fallacies.

A. Formal Fallacies

A formal fallacy occurs when one of the rules of the syllogism is violated. An argument containing such a fallacy yields a false conclusion even though every premise in the argument is true.

The Fallacy of Four Terms. The first rule of the syllogism states that a syllogism must contain three, and only three, terms. No one is misled by a syllogism which clearly contains four terms, but frequently a word or phrase is used with two different meanings, with the result that in reality four terms are employed. The following syllogism exhibits the fallacy:

I. An employer has a right to pay the lowest wages a man will accept, for

A. An employer has a right to do whatever is not forbidden by law, and

A′. The law does not forbid paying the lowest wages a man will accept.

In this argument the word "right" shifts in meaning. In the conclusion the word means *moral* right, while in the minor premise it means *legal* right. The syllogism consequently contains four terms instead of three. The word *right* is a prolific source of such fallacies in popular argument.

The shift in the meaning of a term is especially likely to occur when the two premises of a syllogism are separated by intervening argument or when several syllogisms are employed in combination. In the first part of a speech in defense of the honor system, a speaker argued that the honor system would prevent cheating because every member of the class becomes a proctor pledged to report dishonesty. Later in the same speech he argued that the honor system would develop a sense of honor because it places a student entirely upon his own responsibility, thus appealing to his inherent sense of decency. When this argument is condensed, it is apparent that the term *honor system* has shifted in meaning. In the first part of the speech the speaker referred to that form of the honor system in which students are pledged to report on each other; in the last half of the argument he was discussing the so-called pure honor system, in which no reporting is done. When an argument of this kind is expanded into a ten-minute speech and presented in an interesting manner, the fallacy is not so easy to detect as one might suppose. When the shift in the meaning of a term oc-

curs in the course of an extended argument, the fault is called the fallacy of *shifting terms.*

The Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle. Violation of the rule of the syllogism which states that the middle term must be distributed in at least one of the premises may be illustrated as follows:

I. John Smith is majoring in psychology, for
   A. Some of the students taking the advanced course in psychology are majoring in that subject, and
   A′. John Smith is taking the advanced course in psychology.

A more typical example of the fallacy as it occurs in actual argument is contained in the following passage from a class-room debate:

The point I wish to emphasize is that gamblers take property without paying for it. So do thieves. Consequently gamblers are in reality thieves.

The argument can be briefed as follows:

I. Gamblers are thieves, for
   A. Thieves take property without paying for it, and
   A′. Gamblers take property without paying for it.

The major premise of the syllogism, contrary to the usual practice, is stated with the middle term as the predicate, which makes that term undistributed. Usually the major premise is stated with the middle term as the subject. The fallacy of the undistributed middle is always likely to occur when both premises of a syllogism are stated with the middle term as predicate.

The fallacy in the argument cited above might have been exposed as follows:

It has been argued that "gamblers are thieves because, like thieves, they take property without paying for it." Let us examine the argument. The statement that gamblers take property without paying for it does not prove that they are thieves unless it is assumed that *all* those who take property without paying for it are thieves. And the statement that all who take property without paying for it are thieves, is manifestly untrue; for recipients of Christmas gifts, winners of prizes, and those drawing pensions or allowances take property without paying for it, yet no one would call any of these people thieves. Gamblers may be immoral, and they may be public nuisances, but they are not thieves.

The Fallacy of the Illicit Minor. Another rule of the syllogism states that a term must not be distributed in the conclusion unless it is also distributed in one of the premises. When the minor term is distributed in the conclusion but undistributed in the minor premise, the fallacy of the illicit minor occurs. The following syllogism illustrates the fallacy:

I. Women are unfit for jury service, for
   A. Those who are influenced by an appeal to the emotions are unfit for jury service, and
   A′. Some women are influenced by an appeal to the emotions.

The following passage affords a more typical illustration of the fallacy as it occurs in ordinary argument:

Strict justice in dealing with employees always makes the employer popular with his men. The policy of paying union wages, for example, never fails to win the approval of em-

ployees, and yet the employer who adopts the union wage scale is only doing the just thing.

The fallacy becomes more apparent when the argument is briefed, as follows:

I. Just dealing leads to popularity with one's employees, for
  A. Paying union wages leads to popularity with one's employees, and
  A′. Paying union wages is just.

The minor premise of the syllogism, contrary to the usual practice, is stated with the minor term "just (dealing)" as the predicate, which makes that term undistributed. The fallacy of the illicit minor seldom occurs unless the minor premise is so stated.

As a rule the most effective way to expose the fallacy is to point out some of the exceptions to the too sweeping conclusion, as is done in the following paragraph:

It has been argued that strict justice in dealing with employees always makes the employer popular with them. The speaker supported this assertion with the statement that paying union wages, which undoubtedly makes the employer popular, is after all only the just thing to do. I am ready to admit that the union wage scale is a just one, and that the observance of it increases an employer's popularity with his men. This is *one* form of justice that does lead to popularity. But the speaker is arguing that justice always leads to popularity. His conclusion is not sound unless we assume that paying union wages is the only just thing which an employer can do in his relation with his employees. But discharging a man for incompetence or docking his wages for tardiness is surely just; yet neither of these acts has been known to make an employer popular. Indeed, in many cases a strict observance of justice may make an employer extremely unpopular. Justice sometimes leads to

popularity, but not invariably so; it depends upon who is to profit from the justice.

THE FALLACY OF THE ILLICIT MAJOR occurs when the major term is distributed in the conclusion but undistributed in the major premise, as in the following example:

I. Censorship is the only method of protecting children from indecent motion pictures, for
   A. The elimination of objectionable films would protect children from indecent motion pictures, and
   A′. Censorship would eliminate objectionable films.

The following passage from an argument opposing the World Court also contains the fallacy of the illicit major:

Any court which has legal machinery for enforcing its decisions is respected. The World Court, however, has no such machinery. Consequently it will never be respected.

The argument can be briefed as follows:

I. The World Court will never be respected, for
   A. A court which has legal machinery for enforcing its decisions is respected, but
   A′. The World Court has no legal machinery for enforcing its decisions.

In this syllogism the major term is undistributed in the major premise, but the use of the word "no" distributes the same term in the conclusion. The fallacy of the illicit major does not often occur except in a syllogism leading to a negative conclusion.

The method usually most effective in exposing the

fallacy includes two steps: (1) Restate the major premise in such a way as to distribute the major term, pointing out that the argument is not valid unless the premise is so stated; (2) show that the restated major premise is false by pointing out exceptions to it. The argument cited in the preceding paragraph would be refuted as follows:

The argument that the World Court will never be respected because it has no legal machinery for enforcing its decisions is not valid unless we assume that no court without such machinery is respected. This assumption is unsound. The Supreme Court of the United States, for example, is highly respected notwithstanding that it has no legal means of enforcing its decisions.

The Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent. The special rule for the hypothetical syllogism is that the minor premise must either affirm the antecedent or deny the consequent. If it denies the antecedent or affirms the consequent, the syllogism is fallacious. The following argument illustrates the fallacy of denying the antecedent:

If inoculation for smallpox has been followed by a decrease in the number of deaths from the disease, we may be sure that inoculation is effective. An examination of the statistics covering the period during which inoculation was practised, however, does not indicate any decrease in the number of deaths from smallpox. We must conclude, therefore, that inoculation is ineffective.

It is apparent at a glance that the minor premise of this syllogism denies the antecedent clause of the major premise, but we understand the nature of the fallacy more clearly when we observe that the effectiveness of

inoculation may be indicated by circumstances other than a decrease in the death-rate; it might be indicated, for instance, by a decrease in the severity of the disease in those cases which do not result fatally. The fallacy may be exposed by calling attention to some of the circumstances ignored in the major premise.

The Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent is illustrated in the following argument:

> It follows from the nature of a protective tariff that if our protective tariff is successful in shutting out foreign competition, the price of commodities manufactured in this country will rise. It is a matter of common knowledge that prices have risen sharply since the adoption of our protective tariff policy. We may conclude, consequently, that the tariff has been successful in shutting out foreign competition.

The fallacy in the argument lies in the fact that the rise in prices may have been due to causes other than the operation of the protective tariff. To expose the fallacy it is only necessary to point out this fact.

The Fallacy of Incomplete Disjunction. A disjunctive syllogism is sound only if the enumeration of alternatives in the major premise is exhaustive. When an alternative is omitted, as in the following example, the argument is fallacious:

> The events of the past ten years have made it evident that it is no longer feasible for the United States to pursue a policy of complete isolation from the affairs of Europe. We have no choice, then, but to become a member of the League of Nations.

The implied major premise of this syllogism is that the United States must either join the League of Na-

tions or follow a policy of complete isolation from European affairs. This enumeration of alternatives is incomplete, for the United States might adopt, and in fact has adopted, the middle course of coöperating with the League in many international enterprises without becoming a member of the organization. The fallacy is exposed by pointing out alternatives ignored in the major premise.

Fallacies of Dilemmatic Argument. Of the three fallacies to which dilemmatic argument is liable, the second is properly classified as a material rather than a formal fallacy, but it will be convenient to discuss all three together. The methods of answering the three fallacies have picturesque names, the first two of which carry out the figure of the horns of the dilemma. The first is called "escaping between the horns," the second, "taking the dilemma by the horns," and the third, "turning the dilemma."

A debater escapes between the horns of a dilemma when he shows that the enumeration of alternatives in the first premise of the argument is not exhaustive; in other words, he points out the fallacy of incomplete disjunction. The following argument exhibits the fallacy:

I. Imprisonment is an unsatisfactory penalty for murder, for
   A. Imprisonment must be either for life or for some specified number of years.
   B. In either case the penalty is unsatisfactory, for
      1. If imprisonment is for life, the offender who reforms will be kept in prison unnecessarily.
      2. If imprisonment is for a specified number of years, unreformed offenders may be released.

One might escape between the horns of this dilemma by pointing out that there is a third alternative free from the objections of the two mentioned, namely, an indeterminate sentence, which permits release of the offender when he has reformed.

To take a dilemma by the horns is to accept one of the proffered alternatives and show that the undesirable consequence does not necessarily follow. The following dilemmatic argument may be attacked in this way:

I. The American people will suffer financially no matter what disposition is made of the war debts owed us by the European governments, for
   A. The European governments will either pay the debts or they will not.
   B. In either case the American people will suffer financially, for
      1. If the debts are paid, American industry will suffer from competition with European industry.
      2. If the debts are not paid, the American people must bear the burden of the debts in higher taxation.

To answer this argument one might accept the first alternative and show that payment of the debts would not involve injurious competition with European industry provided payments were spread over a sufficiently long period of time.

The third fallacy to which dilemmatic argument is liable occurs when each of the alternatives mentioned has two consequences, one of which is favorable to the speaker's argument and one unfavorable, and when the conclusion ignores the unfavorable consequences of

the two alternatives. In defending the wisdom of permitting industrial workers to hear radical agitators, for example, a speaker might present the following dilemmatic argument:

I. Industrial workers should be allowed to hear radical agitators, for
   A. Those who listen to such agitators either have a real grievance or they have not.
   B. In either case they should be allowed to hear the agitator, for
      1. If they have a real grievance, it should be discussed.
      2. If they have no real grievance, they cannot easily be incited to violence by the agitator's remarks.

The weakness of the argument lies in the fact that each of the alternatives has, in addition to the consequence mentioned, another consequence which is unfavorable to the speaker's argument but which is ignored in the conclusion: if the workers have a real grievance, they may be incited to violence; if they have no real grievance, the discussion serves no useful purpose.

To reply to the argument one might construct a counter dilemma employing the consequences unfavorable to the conclusion of the argument attacked, as follows:

I. Workingmen should not be allowed to hear radical agitators, for
   A. Those who listen to radical agitators either have a real grievance or they have not.
   B. In either case they should not be allowed to hear the agitator, for
      1. If they have a real grievance, they may be incited to violence.

2. If they have no real grievance, the discussion serves no useful purpose.

This method of attack is called *turning the dilemma.* The counter dilemma is of course quite as fallacious as the dilemma attacked, for it contains the same fallacy. When a speaker turns an opponent's dilemma, he says in effect, "Your dilemma must be unsound, for here is a similar dilemma proving the opposite conclusion." Turning a dilemma is a rhetorical device for exposing a fallacy in an opponent's argument rather than for advancing one's own argument.

B. Material Fallacies

A syllogism, though formally correct, will yield a false conclusion if either of its premises is untrue. A fallacy arising from a false premise is called a *material fallacy.*

The practice of expressing deductive argument in enthymemic form sometimes makes the detection of false premises difficult. The average person is not aware, or is only half aware, of many of the unexpressed premises in his own argument. When these premises are brought to light, they often prove to be half-truths which he has accepted uncritically. The fallacy in an opponent's argument likewise is more likely to occur in his unexpressed premises than elsewhere. It is wise to cultivate the habit of formulating and examining with care all unexpressed premises in argument.

Certain false premises occur so frequently in popular

argument that it will be worth while to call special attention to them.

The Fallacy of Accident consists in the use of a major premise which states as invariably true that which is only usually or accidentally true, as in the following example:

> The protective tariff is beneficial to the farmer as well as to the manufacturer, for the tariff imposes a protective duty on farm products imported from foreign countries.

To identify the fallacy in this argument it is necessary first to supply the missing premise, as follows:

> I. American agriculture is benefited by the protective tariff, for
>
> A. An industry whose products are protected by a tariff duty is benefited by the tariff, and
>
> A′. Agriculture is an industry whose products are protected by a tariff duty.

It is usually, but not necessary or invariably, true that an industry whose products are protected by a tariff duty is benefited by the tariff. The tariff may in the long run be detrimental to an industry which is obliged to buy manufactured goods, for the tariff raises the price on such goods. The farmer is obliged to buy farm machinery, and the tariff-supported high price on this machinery may outweigh the advantage accruing to him from the protective duty on farm products. The fallacy may be exposed by calling attention to this fact.

The Fallacy of Begging the Question. It is not uncommon for a speaker to assume the truth of the very point he is attempting to prove. This is called begging the question. The commonest forms of the fallacy are

the use of question-begging epithets and the fault of arguing in a circle.

A *question-begging epithet* is a word or expression which assumes at the beginning of the argument the truth of the point to be established. When a speaker announces that he will show that "the insidious propaganda of the Communist Party should be condemned," he is assuming in large part the truth of the point he proposes to prove, for *insidious* propaganda presumably should be condemned. The italicized expressions in the following statements beg the question:

The *inefficient* government control of industries is wasteful.
This *Bolshevistic* doctrine is un-American.
The *sacred* Monroe Doctrine must be preserved.
Our *selfish* policy of isolation from Europe should be condemned.

Many expressions which have acquired a slightly evil connotation are likely to beg the question unless they are used with care. Among these are *radical*, *conservative*, *un-American*, *socialistic*, *idealistic*.

Whether or not an expression begs the question depends somewhat on the audience addressed. For an audience of socialists the term *socialistic* might beg the question in favor of the proposal under discussion; for an audience of conservatives it would beg the question against the proposal; for an audience of liberals it probably would not beg the question in either direction.

It sometimes happens in a long and complicated argument that a dishonest or a muddle-headed speaker will use the conclusion he wishes to establish as one of the premises in his argument. An argument of this sort

appears to run in a circle from the point to be proved to a supporting statement, and from this statement back to the point to be proved; hence its name, *arguing in a circle*. A common example of this fallacy is contained in the following argument:

I. Football victories are desirable, for
  A. Whatever attracts good football material to a college is desirable, for
    1. Football victories are desirable.
    2. The attraction of good football material insures football victories.
  A′. Football victories attract good football material.

When the argument is expressed in this condensed form, the fault is so glaring that it may be difficult to believe it would mislead any one. But expand the argument into a twenty-minute speech, and not one college graduate in five will detect anything wrong with it. In a speech of an hour's length or in a long editorial or article, the fallacy of arguing in a circle is neither uncommon nor easy to detect.

EXERCISES

I. Indicate whether each of the terms in the following statements is distributed or undistributed:

1. Socrates is a man.
2. Some business men are college graduates.
3. All is not gold that glitters.
4. Mr. Bell was the inventor of the telephone.
5. No member of the senior class is over twenty-four years of age.
6. Blessed are the meek.

7. A triangle is a plane surface bounded by three straight lines.

8. This manuscript is illegible.

II. Construct in support of the assertion that government administration is wasteful a categorical syllogism; a hypothetical syllogism; a disjunctive syllogism; an *a fortiori* argument.

III. Construct a dilemmatic argument. Write out three replies to the argument, each illustrating one of the methods of replying to a dilemmatic argument.

IV. Express the following enthymemes in complete syllogistic form, label each term and premise in the syllogism, and point out any fallacies you detect in the argument:

1. Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth.

2. Why shouldn't I walk on the grass? Every one else does.

3. Why not abolish final examinations? They do not fairly test a man's knowledge anyway.

4. Jones must live in a fraternity house, for he told me that he did not live in a dormitory.

5. A equals B, for B equals C.

6. As excess causes disease, every man should be temperate.

7. All books, being human productions, are liable to error.

8. The United States should subsidize the merchant marine, for a subsidized merchant marine would be useful in time of war.

9. As our laws exclude illiterate immigrants, this man will not be admitted.

10. Lavish social entertainments are to be commended, for they increase the demand for laborers.

11. The United States should annex Cuba, for Cuba is incapable of self-government.

12. He must be a Democrat, for all Democrats believe in free trade.

13. The World Court is superior to the Hague Tribunal, for it possesses a permanent bench of judges.

14. The typical prison cannot reform the prisoner, for it deprives him of personal responsibility.

15. "If winter comes, can spring be far behind?"

16. An honor system would decrease cheating in examinations. Then why not adopt it?

17. The political prisoners were jailed for expression of opinion—a clear case of the violation of the right of free speech.

18. Swimming is beneficial: it insures a man's own safety in the water; it builds up his health; and it affords pleasant recreation.

V. Brief the following arguments, supplying the missing premises, and point out the fallacies, if any exist:

1. "As it is well known that the 'wise men' came 'from the East,' and as Mr. Touch-and-go Bullet-head came from the East, it follows that Mr. Bullet-head was a wise man."—Poe, "X-ing a Paragrab."

2. Secret treaties cause wars; secret treaties are a form of secret diplomacy; therefore, secret diplomacy causes wars.

3. If he passed the examination, he is eligible. But he did not pass the examination. Therefore, he is not eligible.

4. C is D; for A is B, and I know that if A is B, C is D.

5. Since almost all of the organs of the body have some use, the vermiform appendix must be useful.

6. There can be little doubt that Smith, of the Concord team, was the fastest forward who played in the tournament, for the Concord team won the tournament easily.

7. If a student fails in the final examination, he will fail in the course; but I did not fail in the examination.

8. He must be a Republican, for he told me that he was not a Democrat.

9. If he were well, he would write, and he has written; therefore, he must be well.

10. The instructor said that if answers to the examination questions were not clear, no credit would be given for them. But he admits that my answers were clear. Therefore, I shall receive credit for them.

11. If the winter has been severe, the birds will be dead. The birds are dead. Therefore, the winter has been severe.

12. Republicans are not to be trusted; for partisans are not to be trusted, and Republicans are partisans.

13. On account of the lack of experienced players, it is evident that we cannot have a strong football team next year.

14. Some statesmen are wise; some Republicans are statesmen; therefore, some Republicans are wise.

15. He who harms another should be punished. He who communicates an infectious disease to another person harms him. Therefore, he who communicates such a disease should be punished.

16. The power of the railway employees in the field of transportation is supreme. They could tie up the whole country, for the railway companies could not resist their demands.

17. Scientists believe in the survival of the fittest. Therefore, this old manuscript was one of the best of its time, for it is the only one that has survived.

18. Rain has fallen if the ground is wet; but the ground is not wet; therefore, rain has not fallen.

19. If rain has fallen, the ground is wet; the ground is wet; therefore, rain has fallen.

20. A equals B; B equals C; C equals D; D equals E; therefore, A equals E.

21. The regular practice of swimming tends to build up a sound physique, for it develops the lungs and strengthens the heart.

22. There is little doubt that the recent threat of a general railway strike has hurt the cause of labor. It convinced the public that the unions are ready to disregard the common welfare, if necessary, to defy the government.

23. The proposal of the owners of the garment industry to force piece-work and reduced wages on employees should meet with widespread public disapproval. A return to piece-work means a return to sweat-shop conditions; and a reduction of wages means a cut in the standard of living of a class of people who can ill afford such a cut.

24. The proposal of the faculty to raise the requirements for graduation is undesirable. It would prevent the graduation of men who would be a credit to the college as alumni; for the type of man who is a distinct credit to the college is frequently not a very good student.

25. Every college student faces two alternatives: he can do as little work as possible and devote his time to athletics and other extra-curricular activities; or he can refrain from participation in such activities and be a "grind." The right sort of man will not hesitate long in making his choice. No one has any use for the "grind" or any desire to be one. The obvious conclusion is, do as little studying as possible and take part in extra-curricular activities.

26. Business men will tell you that the young man who invests his earnings in business will get on faster financially than the one who does not. It is clear, then, that the young man ambitious for a business career who spends money on a college education is decreasing his chance for success.

27. Any employer will admit that whatever simplifies for him the task of hiring his help is to his advantage. Under the closed shop the problem of hiring men would be much simplified; for, instead of dealing with several thousand men separately, he would deal with one man only, the union leader. Therefore, the closed shop would benefit the employer.

28. If X College establishes an enrolment limit of 2,000, she will be excluding a great many good students. If the college simply accepts those who apply first until the limit is reached, many good students who are still standing in line will be turned away. On the other hand, if students are selected on the basis of a severe entrance examination, many good students will be rejected; for some excellent students do not do themselves justice in an examination. So in any case, an enrolment limit of 2,000 would deprive the college of many good students.

29. The right of freedom of speech has always been considered a cardinal principle of our government; without a free and unhampered exchange of ideas a republic cannot long endure. In view of this fact, it is clear that the imprisonment of certain pro-German agitators during the war for seditious utterances was a blow at American principles.

VI. Write a short paragraph exposing the fallacy in one of the arguments listed above.

VII. Find an example of deductive argument in each of the specimens of argument in the Appendix.

VIII. Prepare and deliver before the class a ten-minute speech on a campus topic, making considerable use of deductive argument.

IX. Repeat the preceding exercise with a more difficult topic selected from the field of economics or politics.

CHAPTER VII

TYPES OF ARGUMENT: GENERALIZATION

Many of the premises employed in deductive argument are general statements regarding the characteristics of phenomena or the causal relationship between phenomena. The following examples are typical: "All reptiles are cold-blooded"; "Radicals elected to positions of responsibility become conservative"; "The closed shop restricts output." Propositions of this sort are the product of generalization. The scientist, after examining many reptiles and finding them all cold-blooded, concludes that all reptiles are cold-blooded. The casual observer of political life, noticing many instances in which radicals elected to office become conservative, concludes that all radicals elected to office become conservative. The scientist's generalization is the sounder of the two, for it is based upon the examination of more instances and the examination of each instance has been more thorough, but the process of reasoning underlying the two generalizations is the same. Generalization may be defined as that process of reasoning which from the observation of typical instances reaches a general conclusion regarding a phenomenon.[1]

[1] So much confusion exists regarding the use of the words *induction* and *generalization* that it will be well to indicate how the latter term is used in this chapter. Some writers on logic use the two terms almost

Strictly speaking, we do not generalize when we examine all of the instances of a phenomenon. When an astronomer has observed that each of the planets revolves about an axis, he may sum up the results of his observation in the statement that all of the planets revolve about axes. This statement, however, is the result of mere enumeration rather than of inference, for the scientist has not reached a conclusion applicable to unobserved instances of the phenomenon. In true generalization there is always an inference from a limited number of observed instances to a conclusion regarding an entire class of things or events.

The enumeration of all of the instances of a phenomenon or of a class is of course sometimes useful in argument. A speaker wishing to show that all of the justices of the World Court are distinguished jurists might do so by discussing the qualifications and achievements of each justice in turn. In his "Cooper Institute Address," Lincoln undertook to show that a majority of the signers of the Constitution understood that the federal government had power to control slavery in the federal territories. After examining the recorded votes and utterances of each of the thirty-nine, he concluded as follows:

synonymously, while others, like Sellars in *The Essentials of Logic*, insist that induction is not a form of argument at all but a method of scientific investigation. This method of investigation includes four steps: (1) observation, (2) formation of hypotheses, (3) development of the hypotheses, and (4) verification of the hypotheses by further observation. Since the third step involves the use of deduction, the whole process cannot be opposed to deduction as a separate form of reasoning. Following Sellars, we shall use *induction* to indicate this complex process of scientific investigation. By *generalization* will be meant argument in which a conclusion regarding a phenomenon is inferred from the observation of a limited number of instances of that phenomenon.

"The sum of the whole is that of our thirty-nine fathers who framed the original Constitution, twenty-one—a clear majority of the whole—certainly understood that no proper division of local from Federal authority, nor any part of the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control slavery in the Federal Territories." [2]

The complete argument is an excellent example of the use of enumeration as distinguished from generalization.

One seldom finds either a written or an oral argument consisting entirely of generalization. The framework of the argument is usually deductive, generalization being used only in the support of premises.

I. THE REQUISITES OF SOUND GENERALIZATION

The most careful generalization does not amount to a demonstration of the truth of a statement. The scientist may have examined thousands of reptiles without finding a single warm-blooded one, but it is always possible that some day a warm-blooded reptile will be discovered. Generalization conducted under the most rigidly scientific conditions thus involves some possibility of error. The likelihood of error in generalization about social phenomena is of course much greater. For practical reasons, however, we must reach at least tentative conclusions regarding social phenomena, and in our generalizations in this field we should so far as feasible observe the precision and thoroughness of the scientist.

[2] O'Neill, *Models of Speech Composition* (The Century Co., 1921), p. 346.

The soundness of a generalization depends primarily upon (1) whether the instances included are typical of the phenomenon under investigation, (2) whether sufficent precaution is taken against overlooking negative instances, and (3) whether a sufficient number of instances are included in the generalization.

In the field of exact science it is usually easy to determine whether a given instance is truly typical of the phenomenon under investigation. The chemist knows that any sample of chemically pure water is typical of all water; the physicist who has constructed a pendulum of a given length knows that the behavior of the pendulum will be identical with the behavior of any other pendulum of the same length. In the study of social phenomena, on the other hand, it is often difficult to determine whether instances chosen for observation are truly typical. Before the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment, it was customary for advocates of prohibition to cite the low crime-rate in "dry" towns as evidence of the beneficial effects of prohibition. For the purpose of the argument the towns cited could not be considered typical instances if they had an exceptionally efficient police force, if they had an unusually small proportion of illiterate population, or if they were freer than most cities from industrial disturbances and other conditions conducive to crime. These important facts regarding the towns mentioned could seldom be ascertained without an expensive investigation.

The difficulty in the selection of typical instances is increased by the human tendency toward carelessness in this respect. Frenchmen who believe that all Americans are wealthy have observed certain American tourists

without reflecting that these tourists are not typical of the American people. After citing a half-dozen cases of drunken parties attended by college students, a speaker concluded that the college student of to-day is drinking heavily. Careless generalization of this sort is quite valueless, for there is no way of knowing whether or not the instances cited are typical.

It is essential that consideration be given to negative instances, that is, to instances which seem to disprove the generalization. Care must be taken not to ignore such instances when they are brought to attention and to conduct the investigation with such thoroughness that if such instances exist, some of them will be brought to light. All of us are prone to ignore negative instances in our thinking about practical affairs. Those who believe that spilling the table-salt is followed by bad luck sometimes assure us that they "have never known it to fail." We must conclude either that they often do not see what happens before their eyes, or that their memory is poor. It is not only the superstitious who ignore or forget negative instances; all of us tend to see and remember only what we wish to see and remember. Those who believe that Republican administrations are always attended by prosperity, that State-operated industries are always inefficient, or that our treatment of backward peoples is always dictated by the interests of "big business" can seldom recall any instances which challenge their belief; yet such instances are of common enough occurrence.

In selecting instances for a generalization, two precautions may be observed to make it more certain that,

if negative instances exist, they will be brought to attention. In the first place, the number of instances selected should be sufficiently large to make sure that if negative instances exist, some of them will be included. A dozen instances of inefficient municipal operation of water-works, however typical, do not warrant the conclusion that municipal operation of industries is usually inefficient. In so small a number of instances the existence of inefficiency might be a coincidence.

In the second place, the instances may be selected in such a manner as to render more likely the inclusion of negative instances. If the instances of the phenomenon under investigation exhibit such a variety of characteristics that they can be divided into groups, some instances should be selected from each group. An investigator who wished to determine whether or not the prohibition law is being satisfactorily enforced in the United States should select instances from industrial as well as from agricultural districts, from urban as well as from rural districts, from communities having a large foreign element in the population as well as from those having a small foreign element. When the instances of the phenomenon cannot be divided into groups, or when there are so many groups that it would be impracticable to select instances from each one, the instances should be selected at random. If an investigator wished to interview a hundred undergraduates at a university to determine whether or not the student body was predominantly Republican or Democratic in its sympathies, he would do well to select a hundred names at random from the university

directory rather than to interview persons he happened to know or to interview those majoring in any particular subject.

How many instances are necessary for a sound generalization? As was suggested in the preceding paragraph, enough should be included to insure that, if negative instances exist, some of them will be brought to light. The number necessary also depends on how sure the investigator is that the instances chosen are typical. The physicist who wishes to determine at what temperature chemically pure water will boil under a certain atmospheric pressure need make the experiment with only one sample of water, for he can be sure that all samples of chemically pure water under the same atmospheric pressure will boil at the same temperature. In the study of social phenomena it is seldom possible to be sure that the instances selected for observation are truly typical. One difficulty in determining whether college graduates succeed in business as a result of their college training lies in the fact that many of the men whose careers after graduation are examined cannot be regarded as typical college graduates. Some of them entered business with unusually strong financial backing; some of them had the assistance of influential friends in the business world. So many factors of this sort influence a man's success in business, and it is so difficult in a given case to determine whether such factors are operative, that it is necessary to include a large number of instances in order that such exceptional cases may not bulk large in the total number of instances examined.

The difficulty of making sound generalizations re-

garding social phenomena is great, but this does not mean that all generalization in this field is futile. When it is impossible to arrive at a certain conclusion, it may be useful to know that the conclusion is probably true or that it is true in a majority of cases. All that it is reasonable to expect is that the generalization be made as scientifically as the circumstances permit and that the investigator take care not to ascribe to his conclusion a greater degree of certainty than the argument warrants.

II. GENERALIZATION ESTABLISHING CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP

Two types of statements may be supported by generalization: those affirming that all of the individuals in a class of things possess such and such a characteristic; for example, "All cases of smallpox are contagious"; and those affirming a causal relationship between phenomena; for example, "The prohibition of alcoholic liquor decreases crime." Generalization regarding causal relationship is especially difficult. Any phenomenon is accompanied by many circumstances, and it is not easy to determine which of these circumstances, if any, is causally related to the phenomenon.

John Stuart Mill formulated five methods for use in generalization establishing causal relationship. The first four are useful in general argumentation. In the following pages we shall explain and illustrate each of these four methods and point out the difficulties attending their use.

A. The Method of Agreement

The principle employed in the method of agreement may be stated as follows: If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, that circumstance is the cause, or the effect, of the phenomenon. To illustrate the use of the method, let us suppose that we wish to determine whether in American cities there is a causal relation between a high crime-rate and the presence of a large foreign element in the population. From among those cities having a high crime-rate we select twenty or thirty differing from each other as widely as possible in regard to those circumstances which might conceivably affect the crime-rate. We select some large cities and some small cities, some seacoast cities and some inland cities, some cities predominantly industrial and some predominantly residential, some from the North and some from the South. If it is then found that all of the cities selected have a large foreign element in the population, we conclude that there is a causal relation between a high crime-rate and the presence of a large foreign element in the population. This conclusion is not trustworthy, however, unless the presence of a large foreign element in the population is the *only* circumstance which the cities have in common; if they have any other circumstance in common, that circumstance, rather than the foreign population, may be responsible for the high crime-rate. The chief difficulty encountered in the use of the method is in finding instances which have in common only the circumstance whose causal relation to the

phenomenon under investigation is to be determined.

Both of the following passages illustrate the use of the method of agreement:

"One of the classic examples in science of the application of this method is the discovery by Sir David Brewster that the material of mother-of-pearl has nothing to do with the brilliant display of color supposed to be characteristic of it. By accident, he took an impression of a piece of mother-of-pearl in beeswax and found, much to his surprise, that the colors were reproduced upon its surface. His interest being attracted, he carried on the experiment with other materials such as gum-arabic, balsam, etc. In each case, the colors appeared. The inference was obvious. The only feature these objects had in common was the form secured by impression from the mother-of-pearl." [3]

We will suppose that a university student is making a study of the factors influencing the political views of the students at his university. The university is located in Massachusetts, a predominantly Republican State, and influences on the campus appear to be such as would naturally influence student opinion toward support of the Republican rather than of the Democratic party. The question arises, Do those students who support the Democratic party do so because they have been brought up in Democratic communities? To determine whether a causal relation exists between Democratic views and previous residence in Democratic communities, the investigator secures at a political rally held on the campus the names of those students who support the Democratic party. From this list he selects at random 100 names and ascertains from the records of the university registrar whether these students come from predominantly Democratic States. If he finds that a large majority of them do, he will conclude that there is a causal relation between their political views and their previous residence in Democratic communities.

[3] Sellars, *Essentials of Logic* (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1917), p. 216.

B. The Method of Difference

The principle employed in the method of difference is stated by Creighton as follows: "That which is present in a case when a phenomenon occurs, and absent in another case when that phenomenon does not occur, all other circumstances remaining the same in the two cases, is causally connected with that phenomenon." [4] To apply this method in determining whether or not there is a causal relation between a high crime-rate and a large foreign element in the population, it would be necessary to compare a city having a high crime-rate with a city having a low crime-rate, the two cities being essentially alike in respect to other conditions which might affect crime. Both cities should be of approximately the same size, both should be either predominantly industrial or predominantly residential, both should be alike in respect to the efficiency of the police force, and so forth. If it were found that the city with a high crime-rate had a large foreign population, while the one with a low crime-rate did not, we should have some ground for believing that there is a causal relation between a high crime-rate and a large foreign element in the population.

It is essential to the success of this method that the two instances compared differ in only one circumstance—the one whose causal relation to the phenomenon is to be determined. The scientist employing the experimental method can often be quite sure that this is true, but in the realm of social science, where

[4] From Creighton, *An Introductory Logic* (1909), p. 245. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

experimentation is impossible, it is difficult to tell whether the two instances are essentially alike. Let us suppose that, before the adoption of the prohibition amendment, we had wished to prove that the presence of licensed saloons in a town increased the crime-rate. We might attempt to show this by comparing two towns, one having a high crime-rate and licensed saloons, the other having a low crime-rate and no saloons. The conclusion would not be warranted unless we were sure that other factors which might affect the crime-rate were the same in both towns. It would have been difficult to find towns in which these other factors were surely the same. One of the towns might have had a more efficient police force; one might have had a larger foreign element; one might have had a larger number of unemployed. It would have been easier to construct a sound argument if we could have found a town which had abolished the saloon. If the abolition of the saloon had been followed by a decrease in the crime-rate, and if other conditions which might affect crime had not changed, we could have been reasonably sure that the two instances were alike.

The following passages illustrate the use of the method of difference in scientific investigation and in general argumentation:

"If on a clear calm night a sheet or other covering be stretched a foot or two above the earth, so as to screen the ground below from the open sky, dew will be found on the grass around the screen but not beneath it. As the temperature and moistness of the air, and other circumstances, are exactly the same, the open sky must be an indispensable antecedent of dew. The same experiment is indeed tried for us by nature, for if we make observations of dew during two nights which differ in nothing but

the absence of clouds in one and their presence in the other, we shall find that the clear open sky is requisite to the formation of dew." [5]

Through the work of Health Departments, school authorities, and private physicians, hundreds of thousands of children have been immunized against diphtheria with perfect safety. That toxin-antitoxin protects is indicated by the following figures showing the death rate per 100,000 persons before and after toxin-antitoxin was given the children in these communities.

	1921 *Before*	1927 *After*
San Joaquin Co., Calif.	51.0	2.9
New Haven, Conn.	14.4	1.6
Syracuse, N. Y.	44.2	1.5[6]

C. The Joint Method of Agreement and Difference

If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common except the absence of that circumstance, that circumstance and the phenomenon are causally related. Suppose again that we wish to determine whether or not there is a causal connection between a high crime-rate and a foreign element in the population. From among cities having a high crime-rate we first select several which differ as widely as possible from each other. If all of these cities have a large foreign population, we conclude, according to the method of agreement, that the presence of the for-

[5] From Jevons's *Elementary Lessons in Logic* (1892), p. 244. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

[6] From a bulletin on "Diphtheria," published by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.

eign element is probably responsible for the high crime-rate. To verify the conclusion, we now select from among cities having a low crime-rate several which differ as widely as possible from each other. If none of these cities has a large foreign element, the conclusion that crime and a large foreign population are causally related is strengthened. The use of the method is further illustrated in the following passages:

"A large number of cases of typhoid fever occurred at about the same time in a college community. It happened that all those who developed the disease ate at a certain few fraternity and boarding-house tables. The water supply was first investigated. It was found that all these places used water from the same source. But it was also true that the other houses were supplied from the same source, so this possible cause was eliminated. The fresh vegetables were supplied from various sources; some of the places in which the disease was developed used one source, others a different one; moreover, the places in which the disease was not developed were supplied from the same variety of sources. The other food supplies came from various places and the method of Agreement could not be applied so far as they were concerned, with one exception; it appeared that the milk supply was the same for all the places in which the fever was developed, whereas none of the places which escaped used milk from that source. The inference was that the milk contained the cause of the disease. Further, it was found that when milk from this source was no longer used, no new cases of the disease appeared." [7]

That there is a causal relation between excellence in school work and robustness of physique is apparent from an investigation conducted in 1893 by Dr. William T. Porter. In that year Dr. Porter examined some 30,000 children in the schools of St. Louis. He divided these 30,000 children into two groups: those whose school work was good and those whose work was

[7] Jones, *Logic, Inductive and Deductive* (1900), p. 98. Henry Holt and Company, publishers, by permission.

poor. The children in both groups represented homes from every class of society. Dr. Porter found that the members of the first group were on the average considerably above the members of the second group in both height and weight.

D. The Method of Concomitant Variations

When variation in one phenomenon is consistently accompanied by variation in another phenomenon, the two phenomena are causally related. If the figures covering a twenty-year period show that the crime-rate varies with the number of unemployed in the United States, we should conclude, according to the method of concomitant variations, that unemployment and crime are causally related. It is not necessary that the two phenomena vary in the same direction; one phenomenon may increase while the other decreases. Suppose, for example, that all the members of a college class were divided into five equal groups according to the frequency with which they had absented themselves from classes, those who had absented themselves most frequently being put in the first group, those having the next largest number of absences, in the second group, and so on. Suppose further that the average grade of each group were computed. If it were found that the scholarship of the students goes down consistently as the number of absences increases, we should infer that there is a causal connection between absence from class and poor scholarship.

"Pasteur took a series of bulbs of about a quarter of a litre in capacity, and after having half-filled them with a putrescible liquid, he drew out the necks by means of the blowpipe, then

caused the liquid to boil for some minutes, and during the ebullition, while the steam issued from the tapering ends of the bulbs, he sealed them with the lamp. Thus prepared, the bulbs were easily transported. As they were empty of air, that which they originally contained having been driven off, when the sealed end was broken off, the air rushed into the tube, carrying with it all the germs it held in suspension. Closing the tube immediately afterwards with a flame, and leaving the vessels to themselves, it was easy to recognize those in which a change occurred.

"Pasteur opened and resealed 20 of these bulbs in the country, far from all habitations; 20 more in the Jura, at 850 metres above sealevel; and 20 more in the Montavert, at 2000 metres. In the first 20, there were 8 bulbs in which organisms appeared; in the second 20, there were 5; and in the third 20, only 1." [8]

"The great famine in Ireland began in 1845, and increased until it reached a climax in 1848. During this time agrarian crime increased very rapidly, until in 1848 it was more than three times as great as in 1845. After this time it decreased with the return of better crops, until in 1851 it was only 50 per cent more than it was in 1845. It is evident from this that a close relation of cause and effect exists between famine and agrarian crime." [9]

III. FALLACIES OF GENERALIZATION

All generalization is liable to the fallacy of using instances that are not typical, of ignoring negative instances, and of generalizing from too few instances. These have been discussed in the section on "The Requisites of Sound Generalization." Generalization establishing causal relationship is liable to the additional fallacy of *post hoc, ergo propter hoc.*

[8] From Creighton, *An Introductory Logic* (1909), p. 475. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

[9] Hyslop, *The Elements of Logic* (1892), p. 395.

As its name suggests, the fallacy of *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* consists in assuming that because one event follows another, the two events must be causally related. The fallacy occurs most frequently in argument based on the method of agreement, as when a speaker argues that prohibition must have increased the prosperity of the workingman because the figures quoted by this, that, or the other bank show that workingmen are saving more money than they did before prohibition became effective. The method of agreement is sound only when the instances cited have no circumstance in common except the circumstance alleged to be causally related to the phenomenon under investigation. The instances cited of increased saving on the part of workingmen have several circumstances in common in addition to the existence of the prohibition law, among them the high wage-scale carried over from the period of the World War. This circumstance may have had more to do with the workingman's prosperity than prohibition.

The fallacy may be exposed by pointing out circumstances, other than the one mentioned in the argument, which might have caused the phenomenon in question. The method is illustrated in the following passage from a debate on the value of a college education:

> The speaker has presented some very interesting figures to prove that a college education is worth $60,000 to the prospective business man. His figures show that the average college graduate makes considerably more money during his lifetime than does the average high school graduate. From this fact he infers that a college education enables a man to make more

money than he could have made without a college course. But the mere fact that financial success follows attendance at college does not prove that the financial success was the result of college attendance. It is quite as reasonable to suppose that these men succeeded in business because of that very intelligence and ambition which led them to attend college. It is true also that the average college man comes from a more wealthy family than the man whose formal education stopped with the high school. He consequently starts with more financial backing than his less fortunate friend, and this fact may explain his greater degree of success. We have no way of knowing but that college graduates who succeed in business might not have been even more successful if they had not attended college. A college education may have commercial value, but the fact that college graduates make more money than high school graduates does not prove it.

IV. THE USE OF STATISTICS

It has already been pointed out that, in generalization regarding causal relationships between social phenomena, it is difficult to determine whether or not the instances selected are entirely typical of the class from which they are drawn, and that for this reason more instances are required for a sound generalization in this field than in the field of the exact sciences. It is also partly by the observation of a large number of instances that the investigator in this field guards against overlooking negative instances. The number of instances required in a generalization regarding social phenomena often runs into the thousands. Since evidence of this sort cannot be handled except in the form of figures, the use of statistics plays an important part in argument on social questions.

The interpretation of a table of figures is often a

difficult task and one requiring considerable knowledge of statistical method. "Figures do not lie," perhaps, but in popular argument they are made to misrepresent atrociously by even the most honest of speakers and writers. It is not possible to present here a complete discussion of even the elementary principles of statistical method, but the more common faults in the interpretation of statistics will be pointed out.

One common fault is that of not considering sufficiently the competence and fair-mindedness of those who collected and compiled the statistics. Some speakers are in the habit of relying upon almost any set of figures which they may find in magazine articles. Some of these figures are prepared by impartial experts, but many more are prepared by men without proper training for such work, and not a few are the work of men whose personal interest in the question makes it improbable that their investigation has been free from prejudice. A large proportion of the figures presented in the controversial literature of any subject is compiled by men who first accepted a conclusion and then looked for facts to support it. A healthy skepticism regarding all statistics is to be encouraged.

In some cases it is difficult or impossible to learn who is chiefly responsible for a set of figures. The statistics regarding crime in the United States, for example, are based upon figures prepared by persons concerning whom we know very little. Some of them come from investigations made by newspaper reporters, some from the police records of cities, and some from official reports of prison wardens. Figures collected

from sources about which little is known must be viewed with suspicion.

Another common source of error in the use of statistics is failure to appreciate the meaning of the unit represented in the table of figures. Before we can use a set of figures on the number of unemployed men in the United States, we must know what the investigator meant by an "unemployed" man. Did he include all who were not gainfully employed, regardless of the cause? Did he include sick persons? workmen on strike? those who are idle by preference? In a recent college debate, a speaker announced that Europe's war debt to the United States is such and such, and that since the figure is taken from Secretary Mellon's report, it cannot be disputed. What did Secretary Mellon mean by "war debt"? Did he mean the money owed to the United States government or that owed to the citizens of the United States also? Did he mean only the money owed by European governments or that owed by their nationals as well? Did he refer to the debt in terms of gold or in terms of the present depreciated currency of Europe? Did he include interest? What rate of interest did he use, that specified when the loans were made or the lower rate which, in many cases, we have since indicated our willingness to accept? We must know the answer to these questions before we can base any argument on Secretary Mellon's figures.

In interpreting the meaning of a unit employed in a set of figures, it is important that the speaker consider whether the purpose he wishes to make the figures

serve is the same as the purpose which guided the statistician in his investigation. If figures on Europe's war debt to the United States were compiled for the purpose of showing the total assets of the government of the United States, they will not include money loaned to American citizens. In this case the figures cannot be used in estimating the probable effect on our industry of payment of all the debt, for the payment of debts owed to American citizens would involve competition between American and European industry just as surely as would payment of debts owed to our government.

Closely related to the fault of ignoring the definition of the unit employed in statistics is the fault of comparing or combining two sets of figures based on different units. This is perhaps the commonest fault of all. King gives the following illustration:

"It was stated that the death-rate in the navy during the war period was only nine per thousand while in the city of New York for the same period the death-rate was sixteen per thousand. The conclusion was drawn that it was safer to be a sailor in our navy in war time than to live in New York City. A little reflection, however, will convince one that such a conclusion is not warranted by the figures given. In obtaining this ratio, the total number of deaths was taken as the numerator in each case and the denominators were respectively the total number of persons living in New York City and the total number of sailors in the navy. But, as a matter of fact, these numbers were wholly incomparable. It is a well known fact that the death-rate is very high among children and among old people. But the personnel of the navy is composed almost wholly of young men in the prime of strength and vigor. Not only this, but each must pass a strict examination to show that he is healthy and robust. Thus, the weak and diseased are eliminated. Evidently, the

facts would require that the death-rate in the navy be compared with the death-rate of a similar picked body of men in New York City before any legitimate conclusions could be drawn regarding the comparative chances of death in the two places." [10]

The fault of combining dissimilar units is frequently met with in popular argument on the crime problem. It is common to combine the murder-rate for each of the States of the United States to ascertain the murder-rate for the United States, or to compare the murder-rate of two States to show that it is higher in one than in the other. This is an unsafe use of the figures, for the legal definition of murder varies somewhat from one State to another. In some States no distinction is made between murder and manslaughter; consequently the figures for such a State include both classes of homicide. In other States the figures include the number of murders only.

A fourth fault is that of using an average to prove something about the characteristics of an individual. The characteristics of the individual are completely lost in an average and cannot be recovered. In an argument on capital punishment, a speaker argued that the homicide rate in a certain city was probably such and such because that was the "average homicide rate for cities of that size." The speaker overlooked the fact that the homicide rate of a city may vary widely from the average. The average rate during the period from 1910 to 1914 of the thirty-one largest cities in the United States was 11.8 per 100,000 of poulation, but the rates of individual cities ranged all the way from 1.3 to 63.4.

[10] From King's *The Elements of Statistical Method* (1912), p. 40. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

EXERCISES

I. Conduct a number of simple investigations to determine the presence or absence of causal relation between two phenomena. If possible, use each of Mill's four methods of determining causal relation discussed in this chapter. The following problems are of the sort suitable for such an investigation:

1. Why is that portion of a wall immediately above a steam radiator usually the dirtiest?

2. Why does a tea-kettle "sing"?

3. When glass tumblers are washed in hot water and immediately set upside down on a smooth wet surface, they stick to the surface. What causes them to stick?

4. Why does peeling onions make one's eyes water?

5. When a glass tumbler is struck lightly with a fork, it emits a musical tone. What determines the pitch of the tone?

6. Is there a causal relation between high scholarship in your college and the sex of the student? the age of the student? the secondary school from which he comes? the geographical location of his home?

II. Study the use of generalization in the sixth, eighth, ninth, and tenth specimens of argument in the Appendix.

III. Study the use of statistics in the ninth and tenth specimens of argument in the Appendix.

IV. Brief the following arguments and point out any fallacies you detect in them:

1. Employers follow a policy of replacing union men with foreign labor. In 1916 the Pittsburgh Steel Corporation replaced 4,000 union men with cheap foreign labor; in 1907 a Rochester hatter's firm replaced 790 union men with foreign labor; and in the same year the Hamilton-Brown Shoe Company replaced 1,700 union men with foreign labor.

2. The States of Maine and Kansas found it impossible to enforce local prohibition laws; therefore, the United States government could not enforce a federal prohibition law.

3. The following table of figures shows that prohibition improved social conditions in Portland, Oregon:

	1915 (*Saloons*)	*1916* (*Prohibition*)
Non-support cases	91	31
Insane commitments (in jail)	344	256
Vagrants in county jail	406	32
Prisoners in jail in December	215	69
Arrests by police (11 months)	18,243	10,042
Intoxication cases (11 months)	6,305	1,820
Number in penitentiary	566	440

4. California sent 1,500 students all the way from San Francisco to Seattle to back the team against Washington. And California won, which shows what support of a team can do.

5. "Is it so bad, then, to be misunderstood? Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pure and wise spirit that ever took flesh. To be great is to be misunderstood."—Emerson, "Self-Reliance."

6. Following President Roosevelt's attack on large corporations in 1907 there was a period of financial depression. Many banks failed and thousands of men were thrown out of employment. The President should have been condemned for causing such a panic.

7. The industrial depression in America after the World War was due to the Democratic administration, for the depression followed immediately after that administration.

8. What inference, if any, can be drawn from the following statement? "In nine counties, in which the population is from 100 to 150 per square mile, the births are 296 to 100 marriages; in sixteen counties, with a population of 150 to 200 per square mile, the births are 308 to 100 marriages." [11]—Creighton.

9. Union men generally get higher wages than non-union men. For example, in a Massachusetts union shop the men earn 27 per cent of the value of the product they manufacture, while in a South Carolina open shop the men receive but 19 per cent of what they produce.

10. An examination of the facts shows that employers' asso-

[11] From Creighton, *An Introductory Logic* (1909). By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

ciations have very greatly hurt the labor-unions. In 1910 the membership of all labor-unions was 24,773 less than it was two years previous; in 1910, 168 more unions were obliged to surrender their charters and go out of existence than was the case in 1909; and between the years 1908 and 1909 the total voting strength of the unions declined 1,012. And during the period of time covered by these figures, employers' associations were growing rapidly in strength.

11. Moreover, the closed shop movement harbors strikes, violence, and other dangers, and for this reason ought not to be tolerated by the American public. In 1901 over 130,000 men in the steel industry struck solely for the purpose of dictating to their employers regarding whom they should employ. Take a different sort of case: In one strike in the milkmen's union in Chicago the union rules were responsible for a 40 per cent increase in the infant death-rate.

12. "In Sweden the population and the smallpox mortality have been known year by year since 1774. Before vaccination the mortality from smallpox for 30 years averaged 2,145 per million. With permissive vaccination from 1802 to 1816 it was reduced to 480; during 77 years of compulsory vaccination the mortality averaged 155 per million; and for 10 years ending 1894 it has been down to 2 per million."—*Edinburgh Review*, quoted by Creighton.

13. But even more than this, the closed shop restricts output. Take a few examples where this policy has been tried out, and you can easily see how it curtails output. The marble and tile setters of New York, working under a very highly perfected closed shop condition, have limited the output of a member of that association to less than one third of that of the Chicago tile setters, who do their work under the open shop. Take another case of the same sort of thing: in New York the law of the lathers' union specifies a day's work not to exceed 1,660 laths, or less than half as much as is done under the open shop. Take still another case: as the London *Times* states, "Under the closed shop a British mason today lays only 400 bricks, whereas he formerly laid 1,000." These are only a few concrete examples of the ways in which the closed shop has curtailed out-

put in industries where it has been tried out. Surely a policy which has such a direct influence in decreasing the nation's productivity is not the proper solution of the labor needs of our country.

14. "Those who are against child labor legislation, or the proposed amendments now in a congressional committee, sometimes declare that they are so justifiably, 'because the child who leaves school early to go to work gets a flying start on the one who stays to finish his high school course.' Not long ago the Brooklyn Teachers' Association investigated the actual salaries received by two groups, one made up of those who had left school at 14 and the other of those who had left at 18. At the age of 25 it was found that the better educated ones, who had worked only seven years, were averaging twice the salary of the other group and had already received several thousand dollars apiece more salary for their services than had the ones who had worked eleven years. Is any more argument needed?"—*Christian Science Monitor.*

V. Select from a subject of local interest a topic suitable for a ten-minute class-room speech. Prepare and deliver the speech, making some use of generalization in your argument.

VI. Repeat the preceding exercise with a topic chosen from the field of economics or politics.

CHAPTER VIII

TYPES OF ARGUMENT: ANALOGY

Analogical reasoning is based upon the assumption that if two things are alike in several important respects, they will be alike in other respects also. Having observed that the cities of Albany and Dayton are similar in size, in the nature of their population, and in their problems of government, the reasoner infers that because the city manager form of government has been successful in Dayton, it would probably be successful in Albany. Analogical reasoning leads, not to a conclusion regarding a class of things or events, as does generalization, but to a conclusion regarding a specific institution or situation. The three types of reasoning are often distinguished as follows: deduction proceeds from the general to the particular (that is, the conclusion is deduced from the more general major premise); generalization proceeds from the particular to the general; analogy proceeds directly from one particular to another particular.

Analogy may be regarded as an abreviated argument involving both generalization and deduction. It might be said, for example, that from the single instance of Dayton's success with the city manager form of government we infer by generalization that all

American cities of Dayton's size and character would be successful with city manager government. Having made this generalization, we employ the conclusion as the major premise in a syllogism supporting the conclusion that Albany would be successful with the same form of government. The entire argument may be briefed as follows:

I. Albany would be successful with the city manager form of government, for
  A. All American cities of Dayton's size and character would be successful with this form of government, for
    1. Dayton was successful with it.
  A′. Albany is an American city of the same size and character as Dayton.

I. THE USE OF ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT

An analogical argument in its simplest form consists of a conclusion supported by two premises, as in the following example:

Albany would be successful with the city manager form of government, for Dayton has been successful with it and the two cities are similar.

The argument is briefed as follows:

I. A city manager form of government in Albany would be successful, for
  A. Albany and Dayton are similar, and
  A′. The city manager form of government was successful in Dayton.

Several independent analogies may be employed in support of the same conclusion, just as several independent syllogisms may be so employed. In either case the resulting argument is termed cumulative proof. The following brief illustrates cumulative proof consisting entirely of analogical arguments:

I. A government-operated telegraph system would be successful, for
   A. A telegraph system is similar to a post-office, and
   A′. The government-operated post-office is successful;
   B. A telegraph system is similar to an express system, and
   B′. Government operation of the express system during the World War was successful.

An argument employing several analogies in support of the same conclusion resembles generalization in that it consists of the citation of examples. There is, however, this difference between the two types of argument: a generalization is used to support a general conclusion, while a series of analogies is used to support a conclusion regarding a specific plan or institution. When we support the general statement that government-operated industries are successful by citing instances of successful government industries, we are employing generalization; when we argue that a government-operated telegraph system would be successful because similar government industries are successful, we are employing analogical argument.

It is usually necessary to support the first premise of an analogy with argument showing that the two instances are sufficiently similar to warrant the conclu-

sion. In the following passage from Burke's address on "Conciliation with America" the argument in support of the conclusion consists of four analogies, the first premise of each being supported by further argument.

"But, sir, I am sure that I shall not be misled, when, in a case of constitutional difficulty, I consult the genius of the English Constitution. Consulting at that oracle (it was with all due humility and piety), I found four capital examples in a similar case before me: those of Ireland, Wales, Chester, and Durham."

After showing that a policy of conciliation had proved successful in each of these cases, the speaker proceeded to show that the American colonies were similar to Ireland, Wales, Chester, and Durham in regard to those matters which would affect the success of such a policy.

"Now, if the doctrines of policy contained in these preambles, and the force of these examples in the acts of Parliament, avail anything, what can be said against applying them with regard to America? Are not the people of America as much Englishmen as the Welsh? The preamble of the act of Henry VIII. says the Welsh speak a language no way resembling that of his Majesty's English subjects. Are the Americans not as numerous? If we may trust the learned and accurate Judge Barrington's account of North Wales, and take that as a standard to measure the rest, there is no comparison. The people cannot amount to above 200,000; not a tenth part of the number in the colonies. Is America in rebellion? Wales was hardly ever free from it. Have you attempted to govern America by penal statutes? You made fifteen for Wales. But your legislative authority is perfect with regard to America. Was it less perfect in

Wales, Chester, and Durham! But America is virtually represented. What! does the electric force of virtual representation more easily pass over the Atlantic than pervade Wales, which lies in your neighborhood; or than Chester and Durham, surrounded by abundance of representation that is actual and palpable? But, sir, your ancestors thought this sort of virtual representation, however ample, to be totally insufficient for the freedom of the inhabitants of territories that are so near, and comparatively so inconsiderable. How, then, can I think it sufficient for those which are infinitely greater and infinitely more remote?" [1]

II. THE REQUISITE OF SOUND ANALOGY

The soundness of analogical argument depends upon the degree of similarity between the two things compared. It is of course never possible to find two things which are identical in every respect. The question to be considered in evaluating analogy is whether the two things compared are similar in essential particulars, and by essential particulars is meant particulars essential to the matter under discussion. The points of similarity must be weighed, so to speak, rather than merely counted.

The mere fact that there are many points of similarity between two things does not always warrant an analogical inference from one to the other. It is often argued that the decisions of the World Court will be accepted voluntarily by the nations of the world because the decisions of the United States

[1] O'Neill, *Models of Speech Composition* (The Century Co., 1921), p. 166 ff.

Supreme Court have been accepted voluntarily by the States of the Union. It is true that the World Court and the United States Supreme Court are similar in many respects: both have a permanent bench of distinguished jurists; both meet regularly at an appointed time and place; both employ strictly legal procedure; both have a definite body of law upon which to base decisions. But the conditions under which the two courts work are unlike in several important particulars: the States of the Union cannot settle their differences by force, while the nations of the world may do so if they desire; the States of the Union have few conflicting interests that might drive them into irreconcilable conflict, while many nations find their most vital interests opposed; and the populations of the States speak one language, have one culture, and are relatively homogeneous, while those of different nations are divided by barriers of language, culture, and religion. These differences between the two courts, though few in number, far outweigh the points of similarity if we are considering the likelihood of the voluntary acceptance of the World Court's decisions; for the presence or absence of the possibility of appeal to force, of conflicting vital interests, of hatred and misunderstanding between the disputants are the factors that would have most to do with the voluntary acceptance of a court's decision. The World Court and the Supreme Court are alike in many respects, but they are unlike in those respects most relevant to the argument.

Two things that have more points of difference than

of similarity, on the other hand, may still be essentially alike with regard to the point under discussion. The administration of a large city and the management of a business enterprise obviously have many points of dissimilarity; yet both present much the same administrative problems. There is consequently considerable force in the argument that because a city is similar to a business corporation, its affairs can be administered more effectively by a city manager than by a board of aldermen.

III. THE FALLACY OF FALSE ANALOGY

The only fallacy peculiar to analogical argument is that of false analogy. This fallacy occurs, as has already been explained, when the two things compared are not sufficiently alike to justify the conclusion. A further illustration of the fault is found in the following argument, in which it is apparent that the similarity affirmed in the first premise is insufficient:

I. A Massachusetts child labor law can be enforced, for
   A. Massachusetts and Iowa are similar, and
   A′. The Iowa child labor law is enforced.

In regard to the conditions affecting the enforcement of a child labor law these two States are far from similar. One is an agricultural State, where there is no serious child labor problem, while the other is predominantly industrial.

The fallacy of false analogy is the more likely to escape detection because of the practice of expressing this type of argument in enthymemic form with the first premise omitted, as in the following: "A Massachusetts child labor law could be enforced, for Iowa had no difficulty in enforcing such a law."

The following parargraph exposes a false analogy by pointing out essential differences between the things compared:

"Any impartial observer would, I think, have to admit that the success of the prohibitory law in this State, although significantly qualified, is, after all, considerable. But I cannot think that the experience of Maine affords any warrant for the belief that a similar system would have equal or greater success elsewhere. I am, of course, aware that that kind of argument is common with professional advocates of prohibition; nevertheless, the position seems to me to be at once dangerous and unsound. The prohibitory law has been as successful as it has in Maine, not because of anything especially good either in the general principle or in this particular application of it, but very largely because of certain social conditions peculiar to the State. Maine is a thinly settled State, with a population chiefly engaged in agriculture, lumbering and fisheries. Its cities have all less than 40,000 inhabitants, and all but one have less than 25,000; there is no massing of population, and no overwhelming foreign element. The great manufacturing industries of New England are not largely represented in Maine. It is apparent that conditions such as these greatly simplify all problems of law and order, and give any kind of sumptuary legislation a favorable field. Moreover, even rigid enforcement of the prohibitory law would not necessarily prevent any individual from obtaining liquors for his own use, for the simple reason that adjoining States, not under the prohibitory régime, at once

become sources of supply. If Maine could not obtain an abundant supply of liquors from Boston or some other convenient point, the enforcement of the prohibitory law here would be very much less efficient than it is now. That is to say, even with the aid of favorable local conditions the success of prohibition in one State depends very greatly upon the absence of prohibition in neighboring States; and it should not be forgotten that in this country the system has always been tried under these conditions. To insist upon the universal practicability of prohibition as a method of regulating the liquor traffic, pointing meanwhile to the operation of the law in Maine as an illustration of 'how it works,' is both idle and misleading unless these vital qualifications be made." [2]

An analogy which is not sufficiently close to add much to the logical force of an argument may nevertheless render it more persuasive by helping the audience to envisage an unfamiliar institution or situation. Thus a comparison of the World Court and the United States Supreme Court might help an American audience to see the World Court as a going concern, and anything which helped them to picture the court in actual operation would render more persuasive the argument that the court is a practicable instrument for the settlement of international disputes.

Analogies which are too figurative to be effective as argument are also useful for expository and illustrative purposes. For a discussion of these uses of analogy the reader is referred to Chapter II on "Exposition" and Chapter XIV on "Interest."

[2] From a letter by William MacDonald, *The Nation,* vol. 62, Jan. 16, 1896, p. 50.

EXERCISES

I. Find in books or periodicals three examples of analogical argument. Brief the arguments and point out any fallacies you detect in them.

II. Brief the following arguments and point out any fallacies you detect in them:

1. Colonies should not rebel against the mother-country, for colonies are children and children should obey their parents.

2. If a servant girl applies for employment in the family, we demand, first of all, a recommendation from her former mistress. If a clerk is searching for work, he carries with him certain letters which vouch for his honesty and ability. If a skilled workman becomes discontented and leaves his job, he has a right to ask of his employer an indorsement, and armed with that, he feels secure. Why should not every immigrant be required to bring a similar indorsement with him?

3. The fact that some students are poor in mathematics is the best argument for their pursuing mathematical studies. If an athlete finds that he is weak in the ankles or back or forearms, he devotes proportionately more time to exercises bringing those weak muscles into play. The student should do the same. If you are poor in Latin, that proves that Latin is the very study to which you should devote extra time.

4. In discussing the problem of strike prevention, experience is our only sure guide. Kansas tried a law similar to the federal law we advocate and with marked success. If it worked in Kansas, there can be no doubt that it will work as a federal measure.

5. Intercollegiate football is indispensable to a college or university because of the valuable advertising which it gives the school. No one heard of Center College until it defeated Harvard in football. It was intercollegiate football alone that put Lenox College, Indiana, on the map. Just as automobile firms consider it of great importance to advertise their cars by competing in public races, so the college or university needs intercollegiate football contests for advertisement.

6. The recorded progress of our Republic, materially and

spiritually, in itself proves the wisdom of our inherited policy of non-involvement in Old World affairs.

7. "Socrates, in order to show the absurdity of electing magistrates from the Athenian Senate by lot, used the following argument: Would it be wise for sailors about to set out upon a long and dangerous cruise to cast lots among themselves to see who should be pilot, when the lot might as surely fall upon a wretch who knew nothing of the shoals and rocks in their course, or the art of navigation, as upon the most careful seaman?" [3]—Creighton.

8. This is the portrait of "a man who overcame." He was a clerk in a grocery store at six dollars per week. One day he saw an advertisement of the —— Correspondence School. He enrolled in our course in civil engineering, and secured a position at forty dollars per week. What he has done, you can do.

9. Students of prison reform are agreed that the honor system in prisons and reformatories is the most satisfactory solution of the problem of discipline. This is evidenced by the fact that practically all up-to-date prisons have adopted the honor system. If the honor system will work in Sing Sing, surely it will work in X College.

10. Cæsar had his Brutus, Charles I his Cromwell, and George III—may profit by their example.

11. "I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer as a Christian is? If you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die? And if you wrong us, shall we not revenge? If we are like you in these, we will resemble you in that."—*The Merchant of Venice.*

12. "No Body can be healthful without exercise, neither Naturall Body, nor Politique: And certainly, to a Kingdome or Estate, a Just and Honourable Warre, is the true exercise. A Civille War, indeed, is like the Heat of a feaver; but a For-

[3] From Creighton, *An Introductory Logic* (1909). By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

raine Warre, is like the Heat of Exercise, and serveth to keepe the Body in Healthe."—Bacon.

III. Select a campus topic suitable for a ten-minute speech. Prepare and deliver the speech, making some use of analogical argument.

IV. Repeat the preceding exercise with a topic chosen from the field of economics or politics.

CHAPTER IX

BELIEFS OF THE AUDIENCE AS BASIC PREMISES

An argument consists of an inference from premises to a conclusion. In Chapters IV and V we discussed the process of analysis which reveals those conclusions, or contentions, which the speaker must support to secure the acceptance of his thesis, and in Chapters VI, VII, and VIII we discussed the types of inference employed in the argument supporting those contentions. To complete our survey of argument it is now necessary to discuss the use of premises.

The term *premise* is used to indicate any statement in argument employed to support another statement. Such a supporting statement may be a conclusion as well as a premise, for it may in turn be supported by other statements. It is obvious, however, that the argument must ultimately rest upon statements which are themselves left unsupported. These unsupported statements of fact or principle, upon which the superstructure of argument is erected, we shall call the *basic premises* of the argument.

To be convincing, an argument must rest upon basic premises which are acceptable to the hearer. Such a premise will be acceptable (1) if it is already a belief of the hearer, (2) if it is presented by a speaker whom

the hearer accepts as an authority, or (3) if it is presented as the opinion of some one other than the speaker whom the hearer accepts as an authority. The citation of authority and the use of the speaker's authority are discussed in Chapters X and XI. Our concern in this chapter is with the use of the beliefs of the audience as basic premises.

I. THE STRENGTH OF BELIEFS

When beliefs are considered with reference to their use as basic premises, two facts regarding them appear of importance: some are held with much greater certainty than others, and some are held more frankly and openly than others. Both the strength of a belief and the frankness with which it is held are to be considered in using it in argument.

One's beliefs vary in strength from those recognized as only probably true to those felt to be certainly true. The speaker will of course prefer for use as basic premises the strongest beliefs of his audience. As Bain says,

> "The fertile oratorical mind is one that can identify a case in hand with a great number of the strongest beliefs of an audience; and more especially with those that seem, at first sight, to have no connection with the point to be carried. The discovery of identity in diversity is never more called for, than in attempts to move men to adopt some unwonted course of proceeding. When a new reform is introduced in the state, it is usually thought necessary (at least in England) to reconcile and identify it in many ways with the ancient venerated Constitution, or with prevailing maxims and modes of feeling, with which it would seem at variance. To be a persuasive speaker, it is necessary to have vividly present to the view all the leading

impulses and convictions of the persons addressed, and to be ready to catch at every point of identity between these and the proposition or project suggested for their adoption." [1]

Certain conditions are conducive to the formation of strong beliefs. With these conditions in mind, the speaker can infer from the background and experience of his hearers what many of their strongest beliefs are. Those beliefs are likely to be strongest (1) which are based upon habitual modes of action, (2) which are closely bound up with the hearer's personal interests and feelings, (3) which are an integral part of a system of beliefs felt to be mutually dependent, or (4) which are held by all, or nearly all, of those in the hearer's social group. These groups of beliefs are obviously not mutually exclusive, but the classification serves to emphasize those conditions favorable to the development of strong belief.

In the following paragraphs each class of beliefs will be discussed briefly and illustrated. It must not be supposed that the illustrations cited are anything more than suggestive of the type of belief referred to. The compilation of anything like an exhaustive list of such beliefs would be neither possible nor useful. Nor must it be supposed that the beliefs are untrue simply because the source of their strength is primarily emotional rather than rational. The point to be noted rather is that any strong belief, whether the product of reflection or not, usually derives much of its strength from the conditions discussed.

[1] Bain, *Senses and Intellect* (1868), p. 528.

A. Beliefs Based on Habit

Beliefs which have long been held and often acted upon, or which grow out of habitual modes of action, become firmly established. A man who has voted the Republican ticket for twenty-five years is likely to vote that ticket as long as he lives. His habitual adherence to the Republican party has so strengthened his belief in it that to enlist his support for a candidate or a measure it is necessary only to tell him that the candidate is a Republican or that the measure is a part of the Republican party's program.

Those who live in the same section of the country or who have other common interests usually have also certain common habits which explain some of the beliefs prevailing among them. In some sections of the United States most of the inhabitants, who have drunk beer all of their lives, can hardly be persuaded that drinking is either immoral or inexpedient. A law prohibiting the use of liquor consequently seems to them a presumptuous interference with personal liberty. In opposing the Eighteenth Amendment before audiences in these sections of the country, the speaker would probably find the "personal liberty" argument more effective than any other. To most of those who are not habitual drinkers this argument is less convincing.

The tendency to believe in the desirability of habitual modes of action explains, in part at least, the conservatism of most professional groups. Many lawyers believe that it would be unwise to reform the present cumbersome judicial procedure, though leaders of the

profession have often pointed out its defects. College professors are likely to oppose any reform in higher education that would interfere with the familiar practice of giving instruction in courses or that would destroy the present division of the college faculty into departments.

The American people as a whole have certain political habits whose utility they seldom question. Among popular beliefs growing out of our political habits are the following: The two-party system of government is the most effective system; the political convention affords the best method of selecting presidential nominees; trial by jury is an indispensable institution; the United States should avoid "entangling alliances"; State operation of industry is undesirable. When the organization of a third political party was under discussion in 1924, both the advocates and the opponents of the third party appealed to belief in the desirability of the two-party system. Opponents of the third party argued that it would destroy the system, while its advocates argued that by compelling the formation of a liberal and conservative party it would restore the two-party system in its original form.

The American people have many beliefs based upon habits of economic life acquired during the early period of our national development. Among these beliefs are the following: Government interference with private enterprise is unwise; the natural resources of the country should be exploited as rapidly as possible; the pursuit of material prosperity is a proper end of life; urban influence on national life is unwholesome.

B. Beliefs Related to Personal Interests

Some of our strongest beliefs are connected with the so-called fundamental interests: life, health, wealth, power, reputation, pleasure, family. Among such beliefs most useful as basic premises are those related to the interest in wealth, power, and reputation. Almost equally strong are the beliefs bound up with one's interest in the social groups to which one belongs, prominent among which are one's business or professional associates and the members of one's college, church, lodge, neighborhood, city, and nation.

Beliefs connected with desire for wealth are usually strong. Many business men believe that the open shop is the most equitable arrangement between capital and labor, that protective tariff is to the advantage of the American people, that the protection of private property is the chief function of government, that private investments in foreign countries should be protected by the federal government, that the Filipinos profit from our control of the Philippine Islands, that elaborate government regulation of private business is inexpedient, that the interests of the American people are best served by a "business" administration of the federal government, that professors with a leaning toward socialism should not be allowed to teach in colleges, and that radical agitators should be suppressed. Any or all of these beliefs may be justified by the facts, but their relation to the business man's personal interests undoubtedly has something to do with their strength.

Beliefs like those just mentioned are employed con-

stantly in political discussion. No argument is heard more frequently in presidential campaigns than that a candidate is a business man or that he will give the country a "business" administration. In addressing business men, those defending our military interventions in Latin America usually argue that without military intervention American investments in Latin America would be jeopardized. In addressing an audience of liberals an advocate of military intervention is more likely to argue that the "policing" of turbulent districts in Latin America is beneficial to the natives.

Of beliefs related to desire for power one frequently used in popular argument is that the people should control the government. The most effective argument in favor of the direct primary is that it gives the people more control over the nomination of candidates. Among the more effective arguments against the primary is that it can be manipulated by the political boss. Many wealthy people view popular government with suspicion and are of the opinion that property owners should have proportionately a larger share in government. Again, most of us hold tenaciously to those beliefs which, if generally accepted, would give greater power or prestige to the members of our own profession. Many army officers, for example, believe that the United States should make more elaborate provision for national defense. This belief may be well founded, but we may safely assume that the intensity of many an officer's conviction on the subject is due in some measure to his feeling that strong national defense would increase his own importance and power.

Among our strongest beliefs are those which glorify the social groups to which we belong. The following examples are typical: Our college has a finer spirit than any other; our town is the most progressive town in the State; the United States is the most powerful country in the world; our motives in entering the World War were more unselfish than those of any other nation. Beliefs of this sort are especially strong when one is under the spell of an emotion favorable to the belief. During the World War, belief in the high moral purpose of America's participation was more generally and strongly held than now.

C. Systems of Beliefs

Some of our beliefs are grouped into what, for want of a better term, we shall call systems. The orthodox Roman Catholic holds many beliefs regarding Catholic theology, the authority of the Pope, and the code of ethics indorsed by the Catholic Church. These beliefs are felt to be harmoniously related and interdependent, each deriving support from the system as a whole. A belief which is an integral part of such a system is usually firmly established, for to abandon it is to abandon or weaken the entire system.

Such systems as a scientist's beliefs regarding physics or chemistry are coherent and comparatively free from irrelevant and contradictory elements. Other systems, though felt to be coherent, harbor many irrelevant and contradictory beliefs. Such a group of beliefs is seldom the product of reflection. More often it has been picked up almost unconsciously from the social en-

vironment and has never been subjected to critical examination. This is especially true of the very important systems of popular belief regarding economics and politics.

The system of popular beliefs regarding economics includes the following, most of which are widely held in the commercial world: The pursuit of wealth is a proper end of life; the possession of wealth is an index of personal worth; the right to the possession of private property is essential to civilization; profit is a legitimate end of commercial enterprise; contracts should be enforced by law; the credit of business firms and of nations should be maintained. An argument much used before business men in opposing recognition of Soviet Russia is that recognition would encourage the spread of communism and thus eventually endanger private property in other parts of the world. Those advocating recognition sometimes employ the same premise by arguing that the establishment of diplomatic relations with Russia would enable us to combat the spread of communism more effectively. The beliefs just mentioned derive a part of their strength from the feeling that they are in some measure interdependent. To abandon one of them wholly is to place the others under suspicion.

Any argument on political questions must take account of the system of political beliefs held by the American people. Among the more fundamental of these are the following: Sovereignty resides in the people; all citizens have an equal right to vote and hold office; the Constitution of the United States is

the "noblest work ever struck off at one time by the mind and purpose of man"; the division of the federal government into three independent branches is necessary to prevent usurpation of power by temporary majorities. The latter belief is often used as a basic premise in argument against empowering Congress to overrule decisions of the Supreme Court. This power, it is argued, would destroy the balance of power between the legislature and the judiciary.

In addition to holding the fundamental beliefs mentioned above, most American citizens adhere to one or the other of two opposing views regarding republican government. Those holding one view believe that concentration of power in the federal government is wise, that most public officials should be appointed rather than elected, that political institutions should not be too responsive to public opinion, and that the judiciary should be quite independent of public opinion. To those holding these beliefs, the most convincing argument against popular recall of judges is that it would make the judiciary responsible to public opinion. The opposing view of government includes the following beliefs: Local and State governments should retain all powers not clearly necessary to the federal government; too much power has already been concentrated in the federal government; most public officials should be elected by popular vote; political institutions should be responsive to the public will. To those who accept this view of government, the most convincing argument for popular recall of judges is that it would make the judiciary responsible to public opinion.

D. Beliefs Indorsed by the Social Group

Some beliefs are held merely because other members of one's social group hold them, and all beliefs are strengthened by the indorsement of such a group. Many beliefs mentioned in the preceding pages derive part of their strength from this source. This is especially true of systems of beliefs, which are usually held by groups rather than by single individuals.

We shall notice first those beliefs which derive strength from their indorsement by the American people as a whole. Among such beliefs are the following: Growth in population is desirable; Americans are more enterprising than any other people; modern business methods are efficient; government administration is usually cumbersome and inefficient. The fact that these beliefs are widely held in America seems to many people evidence of their soundness. Few of us can doubt what nearly every one is believing.

Members of small, as well as of large, groups share beliefs which derive strength from the mere fact that they are held in common. In some conservative communities, public opinion supports the belief that prohibition is both just and expedient, that smoking by women is immoral or vulgar, that companionate marriage is immoral, and that woman's place is in the home. It was argued recently in such communities that a certain distinguished Englishwoman should not be invited to address women's clubs in this country because she was known to smoke cigarettes. In other communities public opinion supports the belief that pro-

hibition is an unwarranted infringement of personal liberty, that smoking by women violates neither sound morals nor good taste, that the traditional conception of marriage is outworn, and that women have as much right as men to a professional career.

Occupational groups also illustrate the tendency of group opinion to influence the beliefs of individuals. For the average business man the following beliefs probably derive support from the mere fact that most business men hold them: Organized labor threatens to disrupt our economic system; the activity of radicals threatens the existence of our national institutions; the interests of the American people are safest in the hands of a conservative administration; American foreign investments should be protected. In 1924 all of these beliefs were used as basic premises in argument opposing the candidacy of Senator Robert M. La Follette, the independent liberal candidate for the presidency.

A consideration of the four conditions conducive to strong belief emphasizes the importance of studying the hearer before attempting to convince him. With the four conditions in mind, the speaker should consider the hearer's experience and background, his habitual modes of thought and behavior, his interests and feelings, his political and religious affiliations, and his membership in various social groups. These facts will indicate at least roughly what beliefs may be effectively used in argument addressed to the particular audience.

II. THE FRANKNESS WITH WHICH BELIEFS ARE HELD

Some beliefs are held much more consciously and frankly than others. Among beliefs which we are proud to acknowledge in public, though we may not always adhere to them in practice, are the following: One should take an active interest in public affairs; the rights of minorities should be protected; freedom of speech should be accorded to those with whom we disagree. A speaker using such beliefs as basic premises will usually state them plainly, even emphatically. Such beliefs are felt to be to our credit. We are always ready to indorse them publicly and, indeed, rather enjoy the opportunity to applaud them in public.

There are other beliefs of which we are hardly conscious or which we do not like to avow in public, though we may act upon them consistently. Some of these we feel are not entirely to our credit. This is likely to be true of the beliefs that profit is the sole consideration in conducting a business and that in a business transaction it is permissible to take advantage of another's ignorance or misfortune. Other beliefs, though strongly held, are secretly felt to be somewhat foolish; for example, the beliefs that it is unlucky for thirteen to sit together at a table and that one must be dressed in the latest style. Most of us hold beliefs which we are vaguely aware are due to irrational prejudice. Some, for example, hold with a vague consciousness of prejudice the beliefs that the Nordic race is superior to any other and that Americans are superior to the people of other nationalities.

Many of the beliefs which we are reluctant to avow in public, however, are very much to our credit. Those connected with a man's love of family and country, with his religious faith, or with his code of morals are of this sort. We are reluctant to talk frankly about such beliefs for fear of being thought sentimental, and we react unfavorably to a speaker who appeals to them too openly. This is especially true of young people, who are more fearful than older people of being thought sentimental.

In using beliefs of this sort in argument, it is usually best to state them briefly or to leave them as implied premises of the argument. The frankness with which such a belief may be appealed to depends somewhat upon the situation. During the World War, when the public was in a state of emotional excitement, speakers could, and did, appeal to love of country in a much more frank way than would be effective now.

III. THE TRUTH OF BELIEFS

In the preceding discussion emphasis has been laid on the acceptability of basic premises, but nothing has been said about their truth. This may have suggested the query "Must not a basic premise be true as well as acceptable to the audience?"

The purpose of an argument is to secure the acceptance of the arguer's thesis. The only requirement which this purpose makes of basic premises is that they be acceptable to the audience. As an audience will sometimes accept false premises, the answer to the question proposed above is that an argument need not

be based on true premises to be effective. The question whether a speaker shall employ what he believes to be false premises is consequently not a rhetorical, but an ethical problem, which must be decided according to the same principles of honor and decency that govern the speech of honest men in private conversation. Whether or not there are times when one is justified in intentionally deceiving an audience is a problem in casuistry into which we shall not enter except to say that it is essentially the same problem whether one is speaking to a thousand people or conversing with a single man, and that it is only one phase of the old problem "May one justifiably do evil that good may result?" From the lower ground of expediency it is wholesome to reflect that the arguer who does attempt to deceive an audience risks exposure to a greater extent, generally speaking, than does one in ordinary conversation.

A speaker is justified in using a basic premise in which he does not believe if he can do so without giving it his personal indorsement. This can be done by granting the truth of the premise "for the sake of argument" and showing that if it is true, it supports the speaker's position. The speaker may say, for example, "You believe so and so. If this is true, it follows that . . ." Or he may say, "You and I disagree about so and so, but if your position is the sound one, does it not follow that . . . ?" If the speaker is in doubt regarding the truth of a belief held by his audience, he may say, "If it is true, as some hold, that . . ."

The ethical problem involved in the use of premises, like most other ethical problems in public speaking, must be left to the conscience of the speaker. Argu-

mentative skill can be used for either good or evil. To those who fear that it will often be misused we can only say, with Aristotle, "If it is claimed that those who use rhetorical skill unscrupulously can do much harm, the same can be said of all good things except virtue, and especially of the most useful things, such as strength, health, wealth, and generalship. Those who use these things justly can do the greatest good, while those who use them unjustly can do the greatest harm."

EXERCISES

I. List ten of your beliefs which are based primarily on habit; ten related to your personal interests; ten connected with systems of beliefs; ten indorsed by one of the social groups to which you belong.

II. Repeat the preceding exercise for some particular audience which you may have occasion to address.

III. List five beliefs which you hold frankly; five which you dislike to avow publicly but which probably influence your thought and conduct.

IV. Repeat the preceding exercise for some particular audience which you may have occasion to address.

V. Study one of the following subject-audience situations. What beliefs of the audience could you use as basic premises in argument supporting the proposition?

1. Proposition: Our College should supplement its present system of intercollegiate athletics with an elaborate system of intramural athletics. Audience: A group of students on your college campus.

2. Proposition: The United States should recognize the Soviet government of Russia. Audience: A group of American business men.

3. Proposition: Our college should adopt the honor system. Audience: The faculty of your college.

4. Proposition: You should welcome the findings of the "higher criticism." Audience: An orthodox church audience in your home community.

VI. List the beliefs used as basic premises in the third, fifth, and tenth specimens of argument in the Appendix. Classify the beliefs as beliefs based on habit, beliefs related to personal interests, beliefs related to systems of beliefs, or beliefs indorsed by the hearer's social group. Are the beliefs appealed to openly or by implication?

VII. Prepare and deliver before the class a ten-minute speech, attempting to use as basic premises some of the strongest beliefs of your hearers.

CHAPTER X

CITATION OF AUTHORITY

It frequently happens that a certain premise logically necessary to an argument is not acceptable to the audience and cannot be made so by adducing further argument in support of it. The premises of argument on economic questions, for instance, often concern matters of fact or principle which are outside the knowledge of the average audience, and the argument necessary to substantiate those premises is sometimes too technical or too elaborate for popular presentation, especially when the time allowed is short. When the speaker's unsupported assertion regarding such matters will not be accepted, the premise must be substantiated by citing in its support the testimony of men whom the audience will accept as authorities on the subject.

I. QUALIFICATIONS OF AN AUTHORITY

In discussing the use of authority, it is customary to distinguish between matters of fact and matters of opinion. Whether the majority of the immigrants to the United States come from northern or southern Europe is a matter of fact; whether immigrants from southern Europe are more or less desirable than those from north-

ern Europe is a matter of opinion. An audience will accept testimony regarding a fact if they believe that the man quoted knew the facts and that he reported them truthfully. From testimony regarding a matter of opinion they demand more, and rightly so, for in this case the weight of the authority's opinion depends not only upon his veracity and his knowledge of the facts, but also upon his ability to interpret the facts. The interpretation of facts usually involves the exercise of judgment in a greater degree than does the observation of facts. We are willing to accept the statement of the United States Bureau of the Census that the homicide rate in the United States was higher in 1923 than in 1910, but if we wished to know the cause of this increase, we should be more impressed by the testimony of a criminologist than by that of the chief statistician of the Bureau of the Census.

The distinction between fact and opinion is not always easy to draw, especially when the facts concern political or social phenomena. The "simple matters of fact" upon which an argument is based are frequently not as simple as they appear to be. The statement that the population of the United States in 1926 was 117,135,817 would appear to be a statement of fact, but as no federal census has been taken since 1920, the figure is necessarily based on estimates. It must consequently be considered, in some degree at least, as a statement of opinion. The distinction between matters of fact and matters of opinion is of considerable practical value, however, if we keep in mind that some exercise of judgment is involved in nearly all testimony regarding matters of fact.

We shall now examine more particularly the qualifications which chiefly determine an authority's influence with an audience. The more important of these are his reputation with the audience for intellectual competence and veracity and his popularity with the audience.

A. Reputation for Intellectual Competence

Knowledge of the Facts. The more critical members of an audience will not be satisfied that an authority has an adequate knowledge of the facts unless they believe (1) that he has had an opportunity to observe the facts and (2) that his training and experience enable him to observe facts intelligently in the particular field under discussion.

It is sometimes difficult to determine whether or not one testifying regarding social and economic conditions has had sufficient opportunity to observe the facts. The mere fact that a man has visited Russia does not mean that he has had opportunity to observe conditions in that country. If he is quoted as saying that the Russian peasants are nowhere in revolt against the Soviet government, a critical hearer will wish to know whether he made the conventional tourist's visit to the country and saw only what the authorities desired him to see or whether he spent several months visiting the rural districts. The hearer will also wish to know whether he speaks Russian or was obliged to depend upon a perhaps prejudiced interpreter. The more significant facts in an economic or social situation are not usually apparent to the casual observer. Unless a man has spent

considerable time in systematic observation, we cannot be sure that he knows what the facts are.

Training and experience in the particular field are also necessary to intelligent observation. It takes more than a good pair of eyes to observe most facts. All sorts of American citizens have been "observing" Europe since the World War. Upon their return many of them are prepared to tell us "the truth about Europe." Probably most of them honestly describe what they saw, but some of them saw much more significant things than others. American tourists often report, for example, that Germany is at present financially prosperous. Impressed by what they have seen in certain shops and hotels in Berlin, they tell us with a wealth of illustration that the people are well fed, that life in the large cities was never more gay, that the luxuries of life were never bought more freely than now. Most of the economists who have observed conditions in that country since the World War, however, bring back quite a different report. The economist has observed the significant, the tourist the superficial, aspects of European life. The intelligent observation of political, economic, and social conditions requires training and experience in those fields.

When the authority which a speaker wishes to cite is not well known to the audience, it may be necessary to point out his opportunity for observation and the training and experience which qualify him to observe the facts involved in the matter under discussion. The less critical hearers may be satisfied with the testimony of men about whom they know little, for the mere fact that a man is introduced as an authority gives him some

standing in their eyes. The more judicious hearer, however, will not be impressed unless he knows something of the authority's qualifications; and the judicious hearer is an important member of the audience, for he is likely to be a man of influence.

Soundness of Judgment. If the authority is cited upon a matter of opinion, it is important that the audience know him as a man capable of forming sound judgments upon the matter under discussion. A statement regarding the feasibility of conscripting capital in time of war or regarding the expense of constructing a waterway from the Great Lakes to the Atlantic does not carry weight unless the hearer believes the authority capable of forming an expert opinion on these matters. The soundness of an authority's judgment in any given case is determined by his freedom from prejudice, by his training and experience in drawing conclusions from data in the particular field under discussion, and by the care with which he made the statement quoted.

Psychologists tell us that every man is a bundle of prejudices. In nothing is this more evident than in the variety of judgments which different people form on the same basis of fact. Two men, equally honest and intelligent and apparently with the same knowledge of conditions in Mexico, return from a visit to that country and tell us "the truth about Mexico." One is of the opinion that the Mexican government is oppressing its people and persecuting foreigners without regard to law or common decency. The other testifies that the Mexican government, with the support of a substantial majority of the population, is engaged in

a desperate struggle against unscrupulous adventurers for the possession of the country's resources. We begin to understand this difference of opinion when we learn that the first observer owns oil lands in Mexico and that the second is a believer in state socialism.

In determining an authority's freedom from prejudice, we would not overlook the fact that if his personal interests are identified with either side of a controversy, this is likely to influence his judgment, no matter how conscientious he may be. The opinion of a mine-owner is not to be accepted at its face value when he testifies that labor conditions in that industry are satisfactory or that proposed reforms are not feasible. Though a man's financial interests are not involved, his occupation or his professional pride may influence his judgment. Much of the literature appearing on the prohibition question is written by officials of the Anti-Saloon League. These men have something like a vested interest in the prohibition movement; consequently we do not turn to them for an unbiased judgment regarding the success of prohibition enforcement. The testimony of army officers on the necessity of military training is open to suspicion for the same reason. A man's religious beliefs or his beliefs on social or economic questions may also bias his judgment. The average American business man's horror of communism, for example, might be expected to color his opinion of the Russian government.

An authority's fair-mindedness is less likely to be questioned if he is in general opposed to the speaker's thesis or if he has previously been quoted by the speaker's opponents. Under these circumstances the audience

will feel that if the authority has any prejudice on the subject, it will be against the speaker's position rather than in favor of it.

If the audience suspects that an authority is prejudiced, it is usually best not to bring him forward and labor to rehabilitate his prestige; but sometimes the attempt must be made, as when he is the only really good authority on the matter in question. It may be possible to correct some such mistaken belief about him as that he has financial or other personal interests at stake or that he has been identified with the partizans of one side of the controversy.

A man's opinion on a controversial matter is of very little value unless he has had training and experience in the field in which he is quoted. This fact is overlooked by speakers who quote on one subject a man who is a recognized authority on some other subject, as when a speaker quotes Henry Ford on the race question or Thomas Edison on education. "An eminent educator" or "a prominent attorney" is not, by virtue of his eminence or his occupation, qualified to form an expert opinion on the value of the protective tariff.

In quoting an authority whose qualifications are unknown to the audience, it is desirable to explain his qualifications as an expert on the subject. In citing the opinion of Professor Jerome Davis on the desirability of according formal recognition to the Soviet government, for instance, a speaker might point out that Professor Davis's long residence in Russia and his command of the Russian language have given him an opportunity to observe conditions there and that his

training and experience as a professional student of social science make him exceptionally well qualified to interpret conditions in that country.

Not every word uttered by even the most impressive authority can be taken at its face value. The most careful men sometimes speak hastily or carelessly. It is often important to consider whether the statement of an authority was made in the heat of a political campaign or in the quiet of a scholar's study. The manner in which the statement was made is also sometimes significant. Was it made in a public speech or in a carefully prepared article or review? Was it made in a controversial magazine article or in a sober volume addressed to professional students of the subject? Book covers are no guarantee of wisdom, but the critical members of an audience are more impressed by a carefully prepared volume than by a hastily written magazine article.

B. Reputation for Veracity

If an audience questions the veracity of an authority, his testimony is valueless. Unless there is some specific reason for thinking him dishonest, however, an audience will usually assume that a man otherwise acceptable as an authority is truthful. If the authority is known by the audience to be dishonest, usually nothing can be done to make his testimony acceptable to them; but if an honest man's testimony was given under conditions that might tempt to falsehood, it is sometimes useful to call attention to his reputation for veracity if this can be done without seeming to take the defen-

sive. In quoting Senator Borah on a political question where his party affiliations might offer a temptation to misstate, for instance, it might be worth while to mention his recognized probity.

C. Popularity

While popularity has nothing to do with either intellectual competence or veracity, it is a factor that cannot be ignored in estimating the standing of an authority with the audience. The word of a popular hero often carries weight all out of proportion to its logical value. Woodrow Wilson's word during and immediately after the World War was accepted as law by many people both in this country and abroad; during the height of Roosevelt's popularity, his word carried more weight with many than that of the most learned political scientists. The testimony of a man who is unpopular with the audience has little weight, even though his ability and veracity are conceded. Many American business men were willing to concede that Lenin was a man of ability and integrity, but so great was their distaste for communism that few of them would have been favorably impressed by anything Lenin said on any subject.

Of two authorities equally acceptable in other respects the speaker will prefer to cite the one who is more popular with the audience. He may even think it wise in some cases to cite the opinion of a man whose intellectual competence leaves something to be desired if his popularity gives him an authority not possessed by better qualified men. One must not forget,

however, that the more judicious hearer will demand that an authority be qualified to speak on the subject, regardless of his popularity. It is never safe to depend upon mere popularity in selecting authorities for citation.

II. THE USE OF AUTHORITY

A. Definiteness of Citation

Vague, general references to authority have very little weight with a critical hearer, and their effect upon even the most uncritical can be destroyed by a mere challenge. Especially to be avoided are such phrases as "Competent authorities say . . . ," "Many prominent men agree . . ." The speaker should always state definitely who his authority is. There are times when it is sufficient to mention the name of an authority without quoting his exact words, as when Jeremiah S. Black, in defending trial by jury, said, "Montesquieu and De Tocqueville speak of it with an admiration as rapturous as Coke and Blackstone." [1] It is usually more effective, however, to quote the exact words of the authority or, when this would take too much time, to paraphrase them. Exact quotation is preferable, for whoever paraphrases the statements of others, under circumstances in which he might be tempted to distort, lays himself open to suspicion. While there are times when strictness is unnecessary, the paraphraser makes himself to some extent an author-

[1] O'Neill, *Models of Speech Composition* (The Century Co., 1921), p. 90.

ity, and he should be sure that he will be accepted in that rôle. It is not always necessary to specify the exact page upon which a quotation is found, though the speaker should be prepared to do so if called upon, but the source of the quotation should be given with sufficient definiteness to enable those who wish to verify it to do so readily.

B. Value of Concurrent Testimony

It is usually unwise to rely exclusively upon one authority, for an audience will seldom take any one man's word as final. When several authorities studying a problem independently have arrived at the same conclusion, the weight of their concurrent testimony is much more impressive than that of any one of them alone. The use of concurrent testimony is illustrated in the following passage from a speech by Dr. Dudley A. Sargent before the New England Association of Colleges and Preparatory Schools:

"As a matter of fact, criminals, dullards, the feeble-minded, and the insane as a class are considerably below the average normal individual in physique, as shown by height and weight, while the members of any organization known for distinguished mental ability, like those of the Royal Society of England, will be found to be above the average normal height and weight. By ascertaining the physical condition of large numbers of people the natural correlation between body and mind may be readily shown. In the year 1893, Dr. William T. Porter examined some thirty thousand children who were in the public schools of St. Louis. He found that, among pupils of the same age, the average height and weight of those who were of

the higher grades was greater than that of those who were in the lower grades. In other words, he found that those pupils who were mentally the most precocious were also physically the most precocious. This announcement called forth considerable criticism at the time, and many teachers, recalling a number of exceptionally bright pupils who were small in stature for their age, doubted the truth of the statement. It may be of interest, therefore, to note that Dr. Porter's conclusions have since been confirmed by observations made by Dr. Hastings in Omaha, Nebraska, Dr. Byer in Cambridge, Dr. Christopher in Chicago, by Dr. Roberts in London, England, and by Dr. Leharzig in St. Petersburg, Russia. In face of such a body of concurrent statistics from different parts of this country and Europe, no one can doubt for a moment the natural relationship between a vigorous brain and a vigorous body." [2]

C. Excessive Reliance on Authority

One should not hesitate to cite authority when that is the only means, or the best means, of securing the acceptance of an assertion. Unnecessary use of authority, however, should be avoided. The speeches of some high school debaters consist mainly of quotations from prominent men, with very little independent argument by the speaker. When both teams of debaters present speeches of this sort, the debate becomes a futile battle of imposing names, and nothing is done either to enlighten or to convince the hearer. An audience has a right to expect argument rather than a mass of quotations. The speaker or writer should use authority freely where it is needed, but he should not use it to avoid the labor of working out all of the available resources of his case.

[2] Quoted by Foster, *Argumentation and Debating* (1917), p. 109.

III. ATTACKING AUTHORITY

In a debate a speaker will sometimes find it necessary to attack the authority cited by his opponent. This may be done either by showing that the authority cited is not qualified to speak on the matter under discussion or by showing that the opposing speaker has not made a proper use of his authority.

A. Attacking the Authority Himself

If the authority is not qualified to speak on the matter regarding which he is quoted, this fact should be pointed out. Tact is required here if the authority is highly regarded by the audience. If your objection to the authority is that he is prejudiced, do not stir up unnecessary opposition by charging that his word is unreliable. Concede (if you can honestly) that you believe him honest in his expression of opinion and that you believe him to be competent on questions other than the one under discussion. Then show why he would necessarily or probably be prejudiced on that particular question, however conscientious he might be.

B. Attacking the Use of Authority

It is sometimes necessary to show that the opposing speaker has misquoted or misinterpreted his authority. If a statement is misquoted, repeat the exact words of the authority. If the opposing speaker has misinterpreted the authority by a prejudiced paraphrase of his words or by taking them out of their context, this

should be shown, preferably by reading from the authority himself. Sometimes the misinterpretation arises from failure to consider the situation which the authority had in mind when he made the statement. Thus some opponents of the League of Nations have quoted George Washington's warning against entangling alliances in an attempt to show that if Washington were now living, he would oppose our membership in the League. This unwarranted use of Washington's name could be met by calling attention to the important differences between the international situation now confronting us and that which confronted us in Washington's time.

EXERCISES

I. Criticize the following selection of authorities:

1. Before a college audience: Dean Nicholson of Wesleyan University, on the honor system; President Angell of Yale University, on intercollegiate athletics; Dean Brown of the Yale Divinity School, on evolution and religion; the student president of the senior governing body of your own college, on reforming the college curriculum.

2. Before a general audience: President Hoover, on conditions in Mexico; President Hutchins of Chicago University, on the financial value of a college education; John Kirby, formerly President of the National Association of Manufacturers, on the undesirable influence of labor-unions on industry; Professor Seligman, on the educational value of labor-unions.

3. Before an audience of West Virginia coal-miners: W. Z. Foster, on the reorganization of the coal industry; Judge Gary, on the reorganization of the coal industry.

4. Before an audience of business men: Andrew Mellon, on the federal income tax; Senator Borah, on the disposition of the inter-allied war debt; Scott Nearing, on our relations with Latin America.

II. Study the use of authority in an argumentative magazine article or an editorial. Is the testimony quoted exactly, or is it paraphrased? Does the writer tell where the statement was made? Should he have been more explicit? Does he do anything to increase the prestige of the authority? Does he place too much reliance upon one authority? Does he rely too much on the testimony of authority? Are his authorities qualified to speak on the matter under discussion?

III. Repeat the preceding exercise for the tenth specimen of argument in the Appendix.

IV. For each of the following subject-audience situations list the names of three men whose word in regard to matters of fact would be accepted by the audience:

1. College athletics, before an undergraduate audience.
2. Evolution, before an audience of college graduates.
3. Evolution, before an audience of Fundamentalists.
4. The League of Nations, before a college audience.

CHAPTER XI

ATTITUDE OF THE AUDIENCE TOWARD THE SPEAKER

The speaker's reputation and his appearance and conduct on the platform almost inevitably lead the audience to adopt some particular attitude toward him personally. They may consider him well informed or ill informed on his subject, of sound judgment or of poor judgment, trustworthy or untrustworthy in his statements; they may respect and like him, or they may disrespect and dislike him.

This estimate of the speaker by the audience is an extremely important factor in argumentation. It is important, in the first place, because it determines to what extent the speaker may rely upon his own unsupported assertion for the acceptance of his premises. But it is important quite apart from the acceptance of premises. An audience is seldom impressed by argument coming from a speaker in whom they have no confidence, while the argument of a speaker who enjoys their confidence often exerts an influence all out of proportion to its logical value. Le Bon, the psychologist, considers the speaker's authority the "fundamental element in persuasion." [1]

[1] *The Crowd* (1903), p. 157.

I. RELIANCE UPON THE SPEAKER'S AUTHORITY

The extent to which a speaker's unsupported assertions will be accepted depends upon his prestige with the audience. In estimating his authority, the speaker should consider whether the matter upon which he wishes his word to be accepted is one of fact or of opinion. Most American audiences would be impressed by the opinion of Charles Evans Hughes or John Bassett Moore upon the desirability of our joining the World Court. These men are known to have spent years in the study of international law and to have made a special study of the Court. Other men, equally competent but less well known, could take less for granted in estimating their authority. Though a man is not acceptable as an expert on a subject, his word will usually be accepted upon matters of fact if it is known that he has had an opportunity to acquaint himself with the facts. Most audiences would accept the word of a college teacher of history regarding the organization and history of the World Court, though it is less certain that they would attach much importance to his opinion regarding the desirability of our joining the Court.

The student speaker especially needs to consider carefully the degree to which he can rely upon his own authority. If he is addressing an audience composed of students younger than himself, as when a senior addresses a "get-together" meeting of the freshman class, his opinion on campus affairs may carry considerable weight, especially if he is a prominent student leader. If he is addressing those of greater age,

experience, and knowledge than his own, his word upon a question of opinion may carry little weight. An audience will usually accept a student speaker's word, however, in regard to simple matters of fact about which he has had an opportunity to inform himself. Such a speaker might safely assert that in his book on *The American Commonwealth* Viscount Bryce says, "The one conspicuous failure in American government has been in the case of municipal administration," but the student could not make the same statement about municipal administration on his own authority. In general, the young speaker will do well to take little for granted in estimating his authority with an audience.

II. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE SPEAKER'S AUTHORITY

The factors determining the attitude of the audience toward the speaker correspond roughly to the qualifications of an authority listed in the preceding chapter. The three main factors are (1) their opinion of his intellectual competence as a student of the subject under discussion, (2) their opinion of his veracity, and (3) the degree of their good will toward him. By good will we mean that feeling, over and above the audience's appraisal of a man's competence and veracity, which leads them to like one speaker and to give him a sympathetic hearing, while to another speaker, equally competent and trustworthy, they listen with indifference or hostility. This good will may be due to the reputation the speaker brings with him or to the impression he makes on the platform, or to both.

A. Intellectual Competence

Frequently an audience's opinion of a speaker's intellectual competence is formed before he appears on the platform. This is true if he is a well-known public figure or if the audience has heard him discuss the same subject on previous occasions. If the speaker is practically unknown to his hearers, however, they will be forming an opinion of his competence while he speaks. In the following paragraphs we shall notice those factors which chiefly determine the audience's opinion of a speaker's intellectual competence and indicate some of the things which the speaker can do to improve his standing with the audience in this respect.

Knowledge of the Facts. The surest way to enjoy a reputation for knowledge of the subject is to display that knowledge on the platform. The speaker who seems familiar with all aspects of his subject, who does not take refuge in vague generalities, whose statements of fact are complete, and who is never caught in a misstatement of fact soon earns a reputation for knowledge of his subject. Thoroughness in preparation is thus doubly profitable to the speaker: it enables him to construct sound argument, and it increases his prestige with the audience.

In some cases the speaker may properly call attention to the opportunity he has had to observe the facts or to his training and experience in his field. If a speaker discussing the American race problem happens to live in Georgia, he can communicate that fact to the audience without an objectionable use of the first personal pronoun by introducing such a phrase as "down in my

home State of Georgia." This lets his audience know that he has had personal contact with the problem. If he is lecturing on conditions in Russia and has lived or traveled in that country, he may mention the fact without seeming to boast of it. While there are times when a frank statement regarding the speaker's qualifications is useful, as when his qualifications have been openly challenged by an opposing speaker or by a member of the audience, these matters should usually be suggested rather than directly stated. Lack of modesty usually antagonizes an audience.

Soundness of Judgment. The speaker's reputation for soundness of judgment is affected favorably or unfavorably by everything he says on the platform. Keen analysis of the problem under discussion, sound argument, and systematic arrangement of material raise the speaker in the hearer's estimation. This is sometimes very noticeable in intercollegiate debates, where the speakers are unknown to the audience and each must make his reputation after he appears on the platform. Some handle their subject in such a way as to impress the audience almost immediately with the soundness of their judgment; others have not spoken three minutes before the audience decides that their remarks are hardly worth attending to.

Apparent freedom from prejudice is a factor in determining the hearer's opinion of a speaker's judgment. The speaker who is willing to recognize the truth on both sides of a question gains in authority, while the speaker whose prejudices obtrude themselves into his argument weakens his authority. This is especially true, of course, if his prejudices are not shared by the au-

dience. In a speech on the race question before a Southern audience, a Northerner may very nearly destroy his authority with the audience if he betrays the belief that all Southerners are hostile to the negro.

A reputation for soundness of judgment is also weakened by the habit of rash and exaggerated statement. If the speaker recklessly overstates his argument, even occasionally, all of his assertions are likely to be discounted. Extravagance of statement especially repels the constitutionally conservative hearer and increases his natural suspicion of new proposals. It also repels the trained thinker, who is accustomed to looking carefully to the support of assertions. Understatement is, indeed, sometimes more persuasive than overstatement, for it leads the hearer to attach more importance to the speaker's words. An extreme moderation of statement, amounting often to understatement, was the habitual practice of Webster. Marsh comments upon it as follows: "It was a maxim of Webster's, that violence of language was indicative of feebleness of thought and want of reasoning power, and it was his practice to understate rather than overstate the strength of his confidence in the soundness of his own arguments, and the logical necessity of his conclusions. He kept his auditor constantly in advance of him, by suggestion rather than by strong asseveration, by a calm exposition of considerations which ought to excite feeling in the heart of both speaker and hearer, not by an undignified and theatrical exhibition of passion in himself." [2]

[2] *Lectures on the English Language* (1860), p. 235.

The speaker may sometimes mention the training and experience which qualify him to form an opinion on the subject under discussion, or he may say something to convince the audience that he is free from prejudice. When Gilbert Murray first addressed an English audience in defense of Great Britain's declaration of war against Germany, he thought it wise to combat the suspicion that he was a militarist by pointing out that in the past he had consistently opposed war. The opening paragraph of his address served to show that if he had any prejudice on the subject, it was against Britain's declaration of war:

"I have all my life been an advocate of Peace. I hate war, not merely for its own cruelty and folly, but because it is the enemy of all the causes that I care for most, of social progress and good government and all friendliness and gentleness of life, as well as of art and learning and literature. I have spoken and presided at more meetings that I can remember for peace and arbitration and the promotion of international friendship. I opposed the policy of war in South Africa with all my energies, and have been either outspokenly hostile or inwardly unsympathetic towards almost every war that Great Britain has waged in my lifetime. If I may speak more personally, there is none of my own work into which I have put more intense feeling than into my translation of Euripides' 'Trojan Women,' the first great denunciation of war in European literature. I do not regret any word that I have spoken or written in the cause of Peace, nor have I changed, so far as I know, any opinion that I have previously held on this subject. Yet I firmly believe that we were right to declare war against Germany on August 4, 1914, and that to have remained neutral in that crisis would have been a failure in public duty." [3]

[3] From Gilbert Murray's *Faith, War, and Policy* (1917), p. 20. Used by permission of Houghton Mifflin Company.

Use of Language. An audience quickly forms an impression of a speaker's mental caliber from the language he uses. It may not be fair to judge a man in this way, but we all do it. A varied and accurate choice of words and the use of well-constructed sentences impress an audience favorably. This point should be considered especially by those young speakers who do not see that it matters how they express themselves so long as the audience understands them. A speaker's use of English is his intellectual dress; and while clothes in this sense perhaps do not make the man, they undoubtedly have much to do with making his reputation on the platform.

B. Veracity

It is hardly necessary to point out that a speaker who is suspected of deliberately misstating facts or of misquoting his authorities will have little influence with any audience. Some speakers who would never intentionally deceive are habitually careless in regard to truth. By a prejudiced paraphrasing of an authority's words or by taking a statement out of its context they give an essentially misleading impression of what the authority meant to say. The same speaker is likely to be careless in his statement of facts. Carelessness of this kind invites the accusation of deliberate falsehood, and even when the speaker is not accused of deliberate misrepresentation, his carelessness is likely to damage his standing with the audience irretrievably.

C. Good Will of the Audience

Those factors which influence the good will of the audience toward the speaker range all the way from such personal matters as the speaker's apparent sincerity to the use of definite methods for securing good will. Some of the factors have to do primarily with delivery, some with the content of the speech, and some with both delivery and content. For convenience we shall group them under two heads: (1) personal qualities affecting good will and (2) methods of securing good will.

Personal Qualities Affecting Good Will. *Sincerity.* Few things are more destructive of a speaker's authority than the suspicion that he is insincere. "One has only to examine the great speeches from Demosthenes to Lincoln to see how earnestly the orators in all parts of their work impressed their sincerity on their audiences; one has but to consider the wrecked careers among orators to realize that sincerity is the chief essential in persuasion. Without it all else, in the long run, goes for naught." [4] A speaker's influence wanes immediately if it is suspected that he is for sale, ready for a consideration to use his persuasive powers for any cause; or that he is advocating a public measure for the sake of his private interests; or that he is driven to one side or the other by pique, as when a man changes his party allegiance after failing to secure a nomination.

Courage is a quality universally respected and admired by audiences. William Jennings Bryan's influ-

[4] Baker and Huntington, *Principles of Argumentation* (1925), p. 290.

ence over popular audiences was due partly to his reputation as a courageous champion of unpopular causes, and Senator William Borah's courage in political life has won the respect and admiration of many who have no sympathy with his views.

Dignity in word and manner impresses an audience favorably. The speaker who lounges upon the desk or stuffs his hands in his pockets is not impressive; nor is the speaker who shifts his position nervously or fidgets with his watch-chain or coat lapel. The cultivation of self-respect, coupled with physical training, can do much to improve one's bearing on the platform. Dignity of expression is also worth cultivating. Slangy talk is usually slouchy talk and lacks dignity just as slouchy bearing does.

The apologetic manner characteristic of some speakers is incompatible with dignity. No audience will give respectful attention to a speaker who does not respect himself, and it will scorn a man who lacks the courage of his convictions and who seems to be begging his audience to tolerate him and his ideas. An attitude of undue familiarity toward the audience is also to be avoided. Some speakers who aim to be "delightfully informal" succeed only in being very undignified. It is hardly necessary to say, on the other hand, that dignity does not imply stiffness and pomposity; it is quite consistent with geniality and even with a considerable degree of informality.

Modesty. An audience will like a speaker who knows his own mind and speaks with conviction, but will resent any suggestion of strutting or bullying. We have frequently heard a certain speaker of considerable ex-

perience and ability who almost invariably antagonizes his audience by an unfortunate swagger of which he is probably unaware. Some speakers, feeling, perhaps justly, their superiority as thinkers, let a note creep into their voices which implies, "Isn't that clever?" This usually provokes a hostile reaction from the hearer. The same reaction is produced by what sounds to the hearer like an ostentatious parade of knowledge. Hearers are usually glad to be informed and are willing to acknowledge any advantage in learning the speaker may have over them, but they are quick to resent any suggestion of showing off.

Courtesy. Boorishness on the platform almost invariably decreases the hearer's good will toward the speaker. Sarcasm and invective, though sometimes justified, are dangerous weapons always likely to damage the speaker more than the man at whom they are aimed, and loss of temper seldom fails to injure a speaker's standing with his audience. Urbanity and self-control, especially under provocation, are the mark of a gentleman and are so regarded by most audiences. Courtesy toward opponents is important. School and college debaters often aim remarks at each other which pass for humor in private conversation, but which on the platform seem mere insolence.

Tact. A common form of tactlessness was illustrated by the student speaker who opened his speech with the remark, "I believe many of you are ignorant of what forestry really is, and I wish to tell you." It is seldom necessary to refer to the hearer's ignorance of the subject under discussion, and when it is necessary to set him right on matters of fact, this can be done without

seeming to imply that his ignorance is reprehensible. One need not insist that the hearer is altogether wrong in his views. He will not be on any debatable question, and many of his errors are of no importance anyway. In no case should the speaker make his attack on the hearer's beliefs more personal than necessary; it is neither necessary nor expedient to treat all who disagree with one as fools or bigots. An audience may be slow to grasp an unfamiliar or elaborate argument, but the speaker should not mistake slowness for stupidity or limited schooling for ignorance. Lincoln, who addressed many audiences composed of uneducated men, said, "I always assume that my audience is in many things wiser than I am, and I say the most sensible things I can to them. I have never found that they did not understand me."

Closely related to the fault of unnecessarily convicting the audience of ignorance is that of unnecessarily stirring up their prejudices. A speaker must often face prejudices boldly, but it will always be at the risk of decreasing the hearer's good will toward him. Some speakers, either through carelessness or unnecessary belligerency, seem to go out of their way to antagonize the audience. Some Roman Catholics who supported the candidacy of Governor Alfred E. Smith for the presidency in 1928 destroyed their influence with Protestant audiences by implying that Protestants opposed Governor Smith mainly on religious grounds. In marked contrast with their methods was that of William Z. Foster, the communist labor leader, who discussed the use of the general strike before a conservative college audience. An inept speaker might have

aroused ill will by insisting upon the validity of communistic theories or by indulging in a bitter attack on the capitalists. By skilfully avoiding these dangerous topics the speaker succeeded in holding the respectful and almost sympathetic attention of his audience.

Methods of Securing Good Will. An audience is likely to be favorably disposed toward a speaker with whom its members feel they have much in common. They react sympathetically toward a man who shares their interests, feelings, and beliefs. Each of these three bonds of sympathy may sometimes be used by the speaker.

Common interests may be dwelt upon, especially in the introduction of the speech. When two persons are interested in the same sport, study, or business, each is likely to assume that the other is a proper sort of person, wise in his general outlook. Consider how casual acquaintances are drawn together by discovering that they have the same hobbies, have gone through the same experiences, or have come from the same town. Business men think it worth while to spend a little time talking of common interests with a prospective customer. Likewise, the speaker often begins by referring to common interests, especially those which form a natural introduction to his theme. An Englishman addressing an audience of American ex-service men on Anglo-American relations, for example, might dwell on the interests which the English and the American soldier have in common. This discussion of common interests might also afford a natural introduction to his subject.

Common feelings. An emotion shared by speaker and audience is also a strong bond of sympathy between

them. If the speaker can induce his audience to exult with him over a common victory, to dwell with him upon common memories having strong emotional associations, or to laugh with him, he will seldom fail to create a measure of good will. The utilization of a common ground of feeling between speaker and audience is especially useful when the speaker faces a suspicious or unsympathetic audience. Hostility cannot survive the sharing of a common emotion, and especially is it blown away by a gale of laughter.

Humor is probably the method most often used by speakers to induce a common emotional experience; an audience cannot long dislike a man who entertains them. The use of humor has its dangers, however. The speaker who acquires a reputation as a funny man may find that audiences refuse to take him seriously. It is said that Mark Twain published his life of Joan of Arc anonymously because he feared that if its authorship were known, it might be taken as a joke. An additional danger in the use of humor is that humor that is not in keeping with the occasion and the expectation of the audience may offend rather than amuse. It is perhaps not out of the way to suggest that unsuccessful attempts at humor are much worse than none at all, and that the speaker who has no knack for humor should leave it alone. He can console himself with the thought that some of the ablest speakers, Daniel Webster, for example, have made comparatively little use of humor.

Common beliefs. Good will results from the discovery on the part of the audience that they have more views in common with the speaker than they had sup-

posed, or that he is not so radical, or not so conservative, as they thought. There are two ways in which the speaker may use common ground of belief to secure the good will of the audience. In the first place, he may, early in the speech, concede cheerfully, even enthusiastically, the truth that lies on the other side of the question. A speaker defending our occupation of Nicaragua before an audience of liberals who strongly opposed military intervention in Latin America might open his speech by voicing his opposition to the policy of financial domination which has led, as they believe, to most of our interventions in Latin America and by condemning the brutality which has sometimes attended them. Having frankly conceded the force of most of his hearer's objections to his position, he could, with a greater chance of success, proceed to develop the argument that in the case of Nicaragua there are peculiar circumstances which make withdrawal of our marines inadvisable. Much of the hearer's personal ill will toward the speaker will disappear when he sees that the speaker understands and appreciates his point of view. Some points which the speaker cannot conscientiously concede he may ignore, or admit "for the sake of argument," or he may say of them, "I will not contest that."

The persuasive value of dwelling on common beliefs early in the speech may also be utilized by presenting the basic premises of the argument first, without revealing the conclusion to be drawn from them until later in the speech. We may suppose, for the sake of illustration, that a speaker known to be in sympathy with radical agitators wishes to defend freedom of

speech before an audience of conservatives. He could, and probably would, base his argument upon the validity of those principles enunciated in the Constitution and stoutly maintained by the "forefathers." Instead of first announcing his intention of defending the agitator's right to free speech and then proceeding to a discussion of the premises of the argument, he might open his speech with a discussion of those very respectable principles enunciated in the Bill of Rights and indorsed by Washington and Jefferson. With this statement of the basis of his argument his audience would heartily agree, and their agreement would do much to allay the feeling of ill will toward him. The good will thus created would then enable the speaker to proceed with a greater chance of success to a discussion of the application of those principles to the particular case in dispute.

In this discussion of the use of common ground early in the speech to secure good will we have not meant to imply that its use is limited to the introduction. Emphasis on common beliefs may be useful at any point in the argument. Indeed, in a sense all of the basic premises employed in an argument are common ground, for they are acceptable to both speaker and audience. The term *common ground* may well be reserved, however, for the use of material which provokes hearty assent.

EXERCISES

I. Study the third and seventh specimens of argument in the Appendix. Do you think the speaker overestimates his prestige with the audience? If you believe he does, indicate the basic

premises which you think the audience would be unlikely to accept. What, if anything, does the speaker do to increase his prestige? What more might he have done? Does he do anything that decreases his prestige?

II. Make a study of any speaker you have an opportunity to hear, picking out everything in his appearance, bearing, or manner of speaking that seems to affect his prestige favorably or unfavorably.

III. What can you do to increase your own prestige with the audiences you are in the habit of addressing?

IV. Study the use of common ground in any speech you have an opportunity to hear.

V. Find three magazine articles in which the editor has attempted to increase the writer's prestige by placing a statement about him at the beginning of the article. Do you think the attempts successful?

CHAPTER XII

ATTITUDE OF THE AUDIENCE TOWARD THE PROPOSITION

The effect of argument depends partly upon its cogency and partly upon the hearer's previous attitude toward the proposition. An argument may be clear to one hearer and unintelligible to another; it may interest one and bore another; it may be listened to by one with sympathy and by another with suspicion or hostility; it may convince one and antagonize another. The hearer's knowledge of the subject, his interest in it, and his beliefs and bias on it so largely determine his reaction that an analysis of his attitude is essential to the construction of effective argument.

Analysis of the hearer's attitude is a complex process. A number of methods can be suggested for counteracting a hearer's bias, for example, but whether any one of them is available in a given case will depend not only upon the nature of the bias, but also upon the hearer's knowledge of the subject and his interest in it. The problem is further complicated by the fact that few audiences are homogeneous. Most of them include some hearers who are well informed on the subject and some who are ill informed, some who are interested in it and some who are not, some whose beliefs favor the speaker's thesis and some whose beliefs oppose it. In

view of the complexity of the problem, the formulation of a set of rules to guide the speaker in the analysis of all possible situations is obviously impossible. The most that can be attempted is a general treatment of the factors involved in analysis. A detailed treatment would require a book in itself. We have simply tried to indicate the major problems and situations and to give some hints of what may be done in dealing with them. The main purpose of this and of the preceding chapter is to impress upon students of argumentation that they are dealing with human nature as well as with facts and logic, and that they must learn to deal with audiences as they are. Fixed rules are useless, but by study, observation, and practice one can become intelligent in recognizing and solving such problems as are here discussed.

In the following discussion we shall assume a homogeneous audience and shall discuss separately the hearer's knowledge, interest, beliefs, and bias. In applying the suggestions offered to an actual situation, the speaker must consider all four factors together, and if he is to address a mixed audience, he must decide what element he wishes primarily to address or what combination of methods will be most likely to accomplish his purpose with the audience as a whole.

I. THE HEARER'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT

The extent and accuracy of the hearer's knowledge of the subject determine in a measure what argument can be presented and also what exposition will be needed to make the argument intelligible. In discuss-

ing the disposition of the war debts before a high school audience, it would probably be necessary to omit entirely those arguments involving the technicalities of international finance. Other arguments, though not immediately intelligible, could be made so by a judicious use of exposition. The amount of exposition needed and the most advantageous method of presenting it could be determined only by a study of the subject-audience situation.

Hearers with considerable knowledge of a subject sometimes have misconceptions regarding it which must be corrected before the speaker can proceed with his argument. An audience of college students well informed regarding the use of the honor system in examinations may be under the mistaken impression that a speaker intends to advocate that form of honor system in which students are pledged to report cases of dishonesty which come to their attention. If the audience is strongly opposed to this feature of the honor system, the speaker can secure a more favorable hearing by stating plainly at the beginning of the speech that the system he proposes does not contain the objectionable feature.

The speaker should usually avoid referring directly to the hearer's ignorance or misunderstanding. Hearers who have been favorably impressed by a reading of the Kellogg Peace Pact may be quite ignorant of the diplomatic notes interpreting the pact which have been exchanged by the signatory powers. If a speaker opposing the pact believes that the interpretations specified in those notes largely nullify the treaty, he must inform his audience of this correspondence before he

can present his argument. The necessary information can be conveyed in the course of an expository statement regarding the events which culminated in the signing of the treaty. No reference need be made to the hearer's ignorance on the point. In no case should the speaker imply that the hearer's ignorance or misunderstanding is reprehensible.

II. THE HEARER'S INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT

While a speaker addressing those already interested in his subject need not go out of his way to secure attention, he cannot ignore the problem of interest entirely, for the most interested hearer will be bored by an inept address. An audience with considerable initial interest in the problem of farm relief, for example, may be bored by an abstract and technical discussion of the economic principles involved. They would be equally bored by argument pitched below their intellectual level.

In addressing indifferent hearers, the speaker's first task obviously is to arouse interest. If one portion of the argument is more interesting than another, it may be worth while to present that portion first, even though a strictly logical arrangement of material would require that it be introduced later. In some cases the speaker can open the speech with argument showing that the subject concerns the hearer more intimately than he supposes. In opening a discussion of the feasibility of government ownership of power sites, for instance, it may be possible to show that government ownership of the sites, if practicable, would effect a

substantial reduction in the electric light and power rates to the consumer.

To hold the interest aroused early in the speech, it will sometimes be necessary to omit abstract or technical arguments. In discussing some economic and political subjects before high school students, for example, it is necessary to sacrifice completeness in both exposition and argument if attention is to he held. In addition to eliminating material which cannot be made interesting, the speaker must usually avail himself of the methods discussed in the chapter on "Interest."

III. THE HEARER'S BELIEFS ON THE SUBJECT

The speaker usually addresses hearers who have at least some beliefs on the subject. A hearer's beliefs may be favorable to the speaker's thesis; they may be unfavorable to it; or some may be favorable to it and some unfavorable. In the latter case, if the opposing beliefs are of about equal strength, the hearer will be undecided regarding the merits of the thesis. In studying the beliefs of his audience, the speaker's first care will be to determine, if possible, whether his hearer favors the thesis, is opposed to it, or is undecided regarding it. But to construct argument intelligently it is necessary to know something more about the nature of the hearer's beliefs.

For our purpose beliefs may be classified as rational or non-rational and as emotional or dispassionate. By a rational belief is meant one which is the product of reflection. The holder of such a belief, having arrived at it by a process of reasoning, can support it with

argument. A non-rational belief is one accepted without reflection. Many of the beliefs acquired in childhood and many of those accepted on authority or picked up from one's social environment are of this sort. A rational belief is not necessarily true, nor is a non-rational belief necessarily false. The distinction between the two types is simply one of origin. Beliefs vary greatly in emotional intensity, and we shall find it useful to distinguish roughly between emotional and dispassionate beliefs. While it is the emotional belief which usually prompts us to action, the dispassionate belief may be as firmly held as the emotional. A man's belief in the truth of the multiplication tables, for instance, though it does not possess much emotional intensity, is as firmly rooted in his mind as his political or religious beliefs.

A. The Favorably Disposed Hearer

Since a belief may be rational and dispassionate, rational and emotional, non-rational and dispassionate, or non-rational and emotional, it is apparent that several audiences all of which favor the speaker's thesis may still present very different problems in the adaptation of material. Confining ourselves for the present to the hearer who favors the speaker's thesis, we shall discuss three typical situations with which the speaker must frequently deal.

We notice first the hearer whose beliefs in favor of the thesis are rational and dispassionate. Such a hearer need not be instructed or convinced; he is already familiar with the argument which justifies his belief.

The speaker's problem is rather to infuse warmth and life into convictions already held. This is especially the problem of the preacher, whether he urges moral righteousness from the pulpit or civic righteousness from the public platform. A reasoned belief in moral or civic virtue does not necessarily lead to sober living or intelligent voting. The speaker's task is so to intensify convictions that they will become practically effective in the hearer's life.

Though the hearer may already be familiar with the arguments in favor of the speaker's thesis, a review of them has some tendency to provoke an emotional response that may lead to action. We are all familiar with the arguments in favor of sobriety and truth, yet we respond somewhat when we hear them stated effectively. The speaker must take care, however, not to bore his hearers by presenting familiar argument in stale form or to provoke resentment by arguing as if they were unbelievers. The air of recalling and reviewing is better than that of presenting something new. It is important that the argument be presented in an interesting manner.

While a review of familiar arguments is of some value in infusing warmth into convictions already held, the speaker's chief method here must consist in putting his argument in persuasive forms. We note first such a use of description and narration as will enable the hearer to see himself enjoying the results of the course of action urged upon him or such as will enable him to see himself suffering from the consequences of the course of action from which the speaker is attempting to dissuade him. In attempts to secure college building

funds from alumni, it is a common practice to publish attractive pictures of "the campus as it will look." If the alumnus can be made to see himself on the campus viewing with pride and satisfaction those things he is asked to provide, his desire to contribute will be aroused.

Description need not take the form of an imaginary picture; it may be an account of benefits actually enjoyed in other communities. In urging the adoption of a city manager form of government, for instance, speakers often tell of the benefits enjoyed by other cities under that form of government. When the hearer is made to see the other city solving those problems which embarrass his own city and replacing corrupt by honest and efficient administration, his inertia may be overcome.

We may notice also the persuasive force of biographical accounts which enable the hearer to see some one else, preferably some one he respects and admires, pursuing successfully the course of action urged. The favorite method of those urging young men, as in a city Y. M. C. A., to apply themselves assiduously to their work is to tell of the experience of older men who by such application have achieved success. The patriotic address often consists of an account of the life of a national hero who by honesty, courage, and persistence raised himself to a position of influence. The hearer in some degree sees himself in the figure of the hero and is inspired to emulate him.

When the speaker wishes to arouse such feelings as pity or indignation, he may succeed by picturing situations such that if the hearer actually witnessed them,

the desired feeling would be aroused. Thus speakers who wish the hearer to contribute to relief work picture the suffering of those to be relieved. An argument in favor of better living conditions for the employees in the soft coal industry is more effective with the apathetic hearer when it includes a description of the homes of the miners. We can seldom be indifferent to suffering when we have been made to see it.

The fighting instinct may sometimes be appealed to. During the World War, speakers supporting a Liberty Loan drive often told one community of the fine showing made by a rival community. When the hearers feel that they are engaged in a contest with rivals, their fighting instinct is aroused. The same appeal in a slightly different form is used in movements for "better government." Many voters who will not go to the polls to secure such an abstract benefit as good government will vote to dethrone some particular political boss. Those supporting political movements nearly always label the movement as a fight and make the foe as definite and personal as possible, for the more specific and personal the foe is, the more the fighting spirit is aroused. The dramatization of abstract issues so that the voter feels himself engaged in a contest with corrupt officials or predatory interests is the stock in trade of political speakers. Without such an appeal few can be persuaded to act upon their convictions.

For most people argument has more impulsive power when the gist of it is condensed into an epigrammatic statement or a short quotable phrase. Roosevelt, Wilson, and Lloyd George have been unusually successful in coining phrases which catch the popular imagina-

tion. In political campaigns the use of slogans is common. "He kept us out of war" had not a little to do with the reëlection of President Wilson in 1916.

The second typical situation often encountered is that presented by the hearer whose support is due to non-rational emotional beliefs. We may take as an example a political rally attended by those who enthusiastically support their party platform without knowing much about the issues involved. Such hearers wish to hear the speaker glorify the party and denounce the opposition's candidate. It is comparatively easy to win applause from them, but not always easy to hold their attention to serious argument.

When possible the speaker should make his hearer's emotional beliefs serve the purpose of his argument. It is usually impossible to ignore such beliefs, and when the interest which they arouse can be utilized, they become a help rather than a hindrance. A speaker addressing a Democratic mass meeting can usually get applause by a reference to Thomas Jefferson or Woodrow Wilson. By passing from a brief mention of their achievements to a discussion of the political principles for which they stood and from this to the application of those principles to contemporary problems, the speaker may arouse interest in arguments to which the hearer would not at first have been inclined to listen.

In addressing hearers of this type, it is seldom wise to attempt a systematic discussion of the subject. Such hearers may refuse to follow the speaker through a discussion of the origin and history of the question, of the analysis of the proposition, and of the other topics essential to a complete presentation of the subject. The

speaker is more likely to accomplish his purpose if he selects two or three strong arguments, not too technical or elaborate, and dwells upon them without any attempt at completeness or rigorously logical arrangement of material.

Finally, in addressing the hearer with non-rational emotional beliefs, it is necessary to put the argument in an interesting form; a technical or abstract discussion is of little use.

A third typical situation is presented by hearers whose beliefs in support of the speaker's thesis are non-rational but dispassionate. An audience attending a political rally, for example, may be both apathetic and ill informed. In this case the speaker has a two-fold problem: to present the argument justifying the hearer's beliefs in order that his support may be made more dependable, and to infuse into those beliefs enough enthusiasm to insure action. Here also the speaker should usually avoid elaborate formal argument; he should put the argument in interesting form; and he should use description, narration, and similar methods to arouse emotional response.

B. The Neutral Hearer

Hearers who have definite beliefs on a subject may still be neutral regarding the merits of the speaker's thesis, some of their beliefs inclining them to favor the thesis and some inclining them to oppose it. Among such hearers we may distinguish two types.

Of the first type is the hearer whose beliefs are non-rational in origin. Many people who have conflicting

beliefs regarding the wisdom of adherence to the World Court know very little about the issues involved. They may have picked up somewhere the belief that the court has distinguished jurists, that it has settled several disputes, that, on the other hand, these disputes were not very important ones, and that adherence to the court might entangle us with the League of Nations. These beliefs are not based on any real knowledge of the court and its activities, and they could probably be upset by very little argument. If such hearers are sufficiently interested in the subject to listen to serious argument, they present no special problem. Frequently, however, they have little interest in the question. The problem then becomes primarily one of arousing and holding attention.

The second type of neutral hearer is the one who has already examined the argument on both sides of the question and, finding it about evenly balanced, has withheld judgment. This type of hearer is likely to be judicial and critical. If seriously interested in the question, he is willing to listen to sound argument presented in an orderly manner. Sometimes a thorough analysis of the proposition will set the problem in a light new to him. The analysis may demonstrate that some of the arguments on the other side of the question are irrelevant or less important than he supposed, or it may give a new importance to the speaker's argument. The analysis should be followed by a careful presentation of the constructive argument, with special attention to any evidence which may be new to the hearer. Special pains should be taken with the refutation of those beliefs which oppose the speaker's thesis.

Sometimes the judicial neutral, feeling that he has already heard all there is to be said on the question, has come to something like a settled conviction that no rational decision is possible. He consequently has little desire to hear the subject discussed again. In dealing with him it is especially important to open the discussion with an impressive argument and, if possible, to show him by an analysis of the proposition that there are aspects of the subject to which he has not given due consideration.

C. The Unfavorably Disposed Hearer

In addressing hearers who oppose the speaker's thesis, three different situations may be encountered. The first is presented by the hearer whose opposition is due to comparatively dispassionate non-rational beliefs. Speakers advocating complete freedom of speech and freedom of the press often encounter audiences in which this type of hearer predominates. The hearer, though he knows little about the question, may be somewhat opposed to the speaker's proposal because he believes there are radical agitators in the country who would attempt to overthrow the government by appealing to discontented elements in our population.

If the objection does not seem to be a strong one, it may be best to ignore it, especially as it is often difficult to refute effectively an objection based on a non-rational belief. If the objection is a strong one, it may be wise to concede its soundness or to say of it, "We disagree about this, but even if your objection is sound, is it not outweighed by the argument on my side of the

question?" It is still more effective to concede the truth of the objection and then use it to support one's own argument. Speakers advocating complete freedom of speech and freedom of the press often concede that there are radicals in this country who would undoubtedly use the privilege of completely free discussion to attack our form of government. This concession is then followed by the argument that such agitators will be less likely to influence public opinion if we let them "take it out in talk" than if we make martyrs of them by a policy of suppression.

The second situation to be noticed is that encountered when the non-rational beliefs opposed to the speaker's thesis are highly emotional. The problem here is more difficult, for such beliefs are likely to predispose the hearer against all of the speaker's argument. The situation is illustrated by the address of a Democratic speaker before a predominantly Republican audience during a hotly contested presidential campaign.

Sometimes a tactful speaker can discuss his subject without touching upon the hearer's emotional beliefs. It is possible, for example, to present much of the argument in favor of the recognition of Soviet Russia without challenging the highly emotional belief of many Americans that communism is vicious and immoral. We have already cited the address of William Z. Foster, the radical labor leader, delivered before a conservative college audience in defense of labor's use of the general strike. By carefully avoiding such topics as communism and the use of violence, Mr. Foster succeeded in commanding a respectful, if not a sympathetic, hearing for his argument. If the speaker can

get on common ground with his hearers by indorsing some of their emotional beliefs, so much the better. Such indorsement not only raises the speaker in their estimation but predisposes them more favorably toward his argument.

In addition to ignoring or indorsing those beliefs which he does not find it necessary to challenge, the speaker can sometimes overcome opposition by invoking emotional beliefs favorable to his own side of the question. In advocating State ownership of power sites, for instance, he might appeal to the average American's distrust of "big business" by arguing that powerful interests are getting possession of power sites with a view to exploiting them for private gain.

When there is no way to avoid taking issue with the emotional beliefs of the hearer, it is often best to employ the premise-conclusion method of presenting argument. In using this method the speaker begins, not with a statement of his conclusion, but with a statement of those facts and principles which form the basic premises of the argument. With these the hearer will agree. He will then be less inclined to resist the conclusion which the speaker draws from them than if his hostility had been aroused by a blunt statement of the conclusion early in the speech. It may even be wise in some cases to imply the conclusion rather than to state it openly. If the hearer arrives at the conclusion as a result of his own reflection upon the argument presented, he is less likely to resist it.

In the preceding discussion of the hearer whose opposition is due to emotional beliefs, we have not meant to imply that the hearer is necessarily in a state of

emotional excitement when he attends the meeting. Our assumption has been rather that he will give the arguer a polite but unsympathetic hearing. There are times, however, when the speaker finds himself faced by an audience wrought up to a high pitch of excitement. Henry Ward Beecher's address to the laboring men of Liverpool during the American Civil War is a stock example. The North's blockade of Southern ports had cut off England's supply of raw cotton and thrown many textile workers out of employment. Many members of the audience which greeted Beecher at Liverpool came, not to listen to his argument in favor of the North, but to hiss and jeer and, if possible, to prevent his speaking. It was known that some members of the audience were armed, and Beecher's friends feared for his life. When the speaker appeared on the platfom, he was greeted with a pandemonium of hisses and catcalls.

Two methods sometimes employed by speakers in a situation of this kind are humor and an appeal for fair play. It was when Beecher appealed to the Englishman's love of fair play that he most nearly succeeded in winning respectful attention. He also made considerable use of humor, and with good effect. When an audience has laughed with a speaker, they cannot long remain actively hostile, for laughter tends to dispel whatever mood it breaks in upon.

When the use of humor has dispelled the mood inimicable to his purpose, the speaker may attempt to induce another mood more favorable to the acceptance of his conclusion. We may suppose, for the sake of illustration, that a large number of students aroused to a high pitch of indignation by a real or fancied griev-

ance against their faculty have met to consider participating in a "strike." It would probably be of little use for the president of the institution to argue with them. A popular student leader who knew how to amuse them, however, might succeed in dispelling much of the hostile feeling with which they attended the meeting. He would then have an opportunity to awaken in them a feeling of loyalty to the traditions of the school and of regard for her reputation which would render them open to the suggestion that they disperse and return to their classes.

In the third typical situation the hearer's opposition is based on rational beliefs, either dispassionate or emotional. This hearer has already considered the speaker's proposal and decided against it. The speaker's problem is especially difficult, for he must not only overcome the force of the arguments which have led to the hearer's decision, but also the average man's strong reluctance to reopen a question upon which he has definitely made up his mind. Changing one's mind is often a painful experience, and the tendency is strong for such a hearer to minimize the arguments which challenge his conviction and to refute the speaker's argument point by point as it is presented. Since he has studied the question, however, the hearer probably realizes much better than the non-rational objector that there are sound arguments on the speaker's side, and he may be more likely to do them justice.

If the hearer's opposition is due to the feeling that the constructive argument in favor of the speaker's position is weak, the speaker must of course devote most of his time to presenting this argument in the most

convincing manner possible. If there is new evidence or argument on the question which he believes may induce the hearer to reopen the question, he should devote considerable time to it. Such argument may well be introduced early in the speech, for the chief problem is to get the hearer to reopen the question. When he has been persuaded to do this, he will be more responsive to all of the speaker's argument.

When opposition is due to specific objections, the speaker must attempt to show that those objections are irrelevant, unsound, or less important than the hearer supposes. If the objections weigh heavily in the hearer's mind, he may refuse to give more than a grudging attention to the speaker's argument until they have been answered. For this reason it may be wise to preface the constructive argument with a refutation of the stronger objections. It is also sometimes wise to concede the validity of objections. We have already noticed the common practice of speakers defending our occupation of Nicaragua before liberal audiences of conceding at the outset that a policy of financial domination in weaker countries is objectionable. When the audience see that the speaker appreciates the force of the objections to his own position, they are more willing to hear those arguments which the speaker believes outweigh the objections in importance.

IV. THE HEARER'S BIAS ON THE SUBJECT

Hearers who have no definite beliefs on a subject sometimes have a decided bias against the speaker's

thesis which causes them to listen to his argument with suspicion or hostility.

Bias is often due to personal interests which the hearer believes would be jeopardized by the speaker's proposal. Such a bias is encountered by speakers who attempt to convince high school students that only those of special ability should be admitted to college. Students of ordinary ability, seeing that under the speaker's plan they would be excluded from college, are not likely to give a fair hearing to the argument. It is sometimes possible to present argument showing that the hearer's interests would not be adversely affected by the proposal. If the speaker discussing college entrance requirements before high school students can show early in his argument that the average high school student would be better off, financially and otherwise, if he did not attend college, he will probably secure a more favorable hearing for the remainder of his argument.

Hearers are sometimes biased against a proposal by a highly emotional belief which is, strictly speaking, quite irrelevant to the subject under discussion. Thus strong opponents of prohibition are likely to be biased against an outspoken "dry" candidate even when the office for which he is running is of such a nature that his views on prohibition would have nothing to do with the discharge of his duties. A speaker who was himself opposed to prohibition might secure a favorable hearing for argument in favor of the candidate by conceding that the candidate's views on prohibition were objectionable and by then showing that those views would not affect his qualifications for the office.

Bias is sometimes due to a misapprehension that a cherished belief is to be challenged by the speaker. If a speaker opposing the Kellogg Peace Pact on the ground that the reservations which the governments have made in adopting it deprive it of most of its force were addressing an audience of peace advocates, he might do well at the beginning to allay the suspicion that he was an "isolationist," or that he was in general opposed to attempts to outlaw war by treaties. It would also be wise for him to get on common ground with the audience by indorsing their belief in the desirability and practicability of outlawing war.

Those advocating reforms must often reckon with the average man's conservative bias. Most people view with suspicion any proposal which would apparently involve unfamiliar modes of thought or action. In presenting such a proposal it is wise, when possible, to show that the proposal is not so revolutionary as it appears. One way to do this is to cite precedent or authority in its favor. Those advocating the abolition of trial by jury sometimes open the argument by calling attention to such facts as these: that the jury is seldom used in Maryland even in criminal cases; that it is seldom used in any State in equity cases; that some European nations get along very well without it; that the tendency to settle civil cases out of court before a board of arbiters rather than to take them before a jury is a significant modern development of our judicial system. These facts set the whole question in a new light. The typical reaction to them is that the speaker's proposal is not so revolutionary after all. Speakers advocating reforms in judicial procedure often quote the

criticisms of judicial procedure which have been made by William Howard Taft and Charles Evans Hughes. The average American feels that when men of this sort criticize the courts, the question of reform must be at any rate a debatable one.

Hostile bias is sometimes due to the fact that a measure has been proposed or is being supported by persons whom the hearer dislikes. Thus citizens are likely to view with suspicion any proposal made by an official whom they believe corrupt. Even though their suspicion in general is justified, the specific measure may be a good one. The bias may be overcome if the speaker can point out that the proposal also has the support of persons in whom the hearer has confidence.

EXERCISES

I. Study the adaptation of material to the audience in the third, sixth, seventh, and eighth specimens of argument in the Appendix.

II. How would you adapt an argument in favor of withdrawing our marines from Latin America to each of the following audiences?

1. High school students.
2. A women's club interested in the promotion of world peace.
3. A Rotary Club.

III. Select for a ten-minute speech a thesis to which your class-room audience will be strongly opposed. Prepare and deliver the speech, taking special pains with the adaptation of material to the audience.

CHAPTER XIII

REFUTATION

We do not consider in this chapter such intangible causes of opposition as prejudice or bias, but rather definite objections which the hearer could express in the form of arguments. Such arguments may be in the hearer's mind before he hears the speech; they may occur to him as he listens to the speech; or they may be suggested to him by an opposing speaker. Frequently these arguments must be answered before the speaker can secure the acceptance of his thesis. The use of argument to answer another argument is called refutation.

I. SELECTION OF REFUTATION

It is a mistake to suppose that a speaker must answer all of the arguments which have been, or may be, advanced against his thesis. There is valid argument on both sides of most propositions. To admit the truth on the other side, at least tacitly, not only is the fair and honest thing to do, but it also promotes the atmosphere of good will essential to profitable discussion. A frank concession that some of the opinions of opposing speakers and of hearers in opposition are sound may win a sympathetic hearing, while insistence that they are

completely in error is almost certain to antagonize.

It is seldom wise even to attempt a refutation of all the opposing arguments which the speaker considers unsound. To discuss all of them adequately would usually take more time than is available, and hasty, inadequate refutation is likely to emphasize rather than to weaken them. The problem of what to refute and what to ignore is especially likely to arise in a debate, where many arguments are presented on the other side of the question. Usually some of the contentions of the other side are either of comparatively little importance or are such as will be taken care of by the refutation of a few crucial points.

Among the opposing arguments which it is most necessary to refute are those directed against the proof requirements of the speaker's argument. (See Chapter V for a discussion of proof requirements.) If the speaker is advocating government ownership of the coal-mines, the objection that the cost of purchasing the mines would be prohibitive is important. Unless it is answered to the hearer's satisfaction, he cannot possibly accept the speaker's proposal.

It is sometimes necessary to answer a logically unimportant objection if it has been stressed by an opposing speaker or if, for any other reason, it may seem important to the hearer. To the impartial student the fact that the justices of the World Court receive their salaries from the League of Nations may not seem a serious objection to our joining the court. But if the members of an audience are strongly opposed to the league, that one objection may strongly prejudice them against the court.

II. PRESENTATION OF REFUTATION

It is essential that the audience know exactly what argument is being refuted, that they understand the importance of the argument to the opposing case as a whole, and that they know when the speaker has completed the refutation and proceeded or returned to his constructive argument. To make these matters clear the speaker should usually employ the following four steps in constructing a piece of refutation:

1. State clearly and fairly the argument to be refuted.
2. Make clear the importance of the argument.
3. Present the refutation.
4. Summarize the refutation.

The importance of the first step is often overlooked by the inexperienced speaker. He too often assumes that the audience remembers what the argument is, especially if it has just been presented by an opposing speaker. Little should be taken for granted in this respect. It usually takes but a few sentences to state the argument, and the entire refutation is wasted upon a hearer who does not understand what is being refuted. Care should also be taken to state the argument fairly. In a debate it should usually be stated in the opponent's own words if possible. In any case it should be so stated that he cannot consider the statement a misrepresentation of his argument. The most honest speaker needs to guard against the natural tendency to "set up straw men to knock over," that is, to mis-

represent an argument so that it may be more easily refuted.

It is sometimes useful to state the essential points of an argument to be refuted in strict syllogistic form, especially if the argument is long or confused. This not only clarifies the argument, but paves the way for its refutation. The following passage from one of the Lincoln-Douglas debates illustrates the method.

"Now, remembering the provision of the Constitution which I have read, affirming that that instrument is the supreme law of the land; that the judges of every State shall be bound by it, any law or constitution of any State to the contrary notwithstanding; that the right of property in a slave is affirmed in that Constitution, is made, formed into, and cannot be separated from it without breaking it; durable as the instrument, part of the instrument,—what follows as a short and even syllogistic argument from it? I think it follows, and I submit to the consideration of men capable of argumenting, whether as I state it, in syllogistic form the argument has any fault in it?

"Nothing in the constitution or laws of any State can destroy a right distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the United States.

"The right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the United States.

"Therefore, nothing in the constitution or laws of any State can destroy the right of property in a slave.

"I believe that no fault can be pointed out in that argument; assuming the truth of the premises, the conclusion, so far as I have capacity at all to understand it, follows inevitably. There is a fault in it, as I think, but the fault is not in the reasoning; the falsehood, in fact, is a fault in the premises. I believe that the right of property in a slave is not distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution, and Judge Douglas thinks it is." [1]

[1] Putnam, *The Political Debates between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas* (1913), Part II, p. 130.

The second step in presenting refutation requires some explanation. If the argument to be refuted has been advanced by an opponent, it is often useful to point out its importance to the opponent's case. This is especially true if the contention supported by the argument is a proof requirement of his case. In attacking such an argument the speaker should make clear to the audience that a satisfactory refutation of the point makes the opponent's position logically indefensible.

The following refutation employs all four of the steps enumerated above:

In the course of his argument for substituting the Oxford intramural system of athletics for our intercollegiate system, the speaker argued that if the intramural system were instituted, it would make every student on the campus an athlete. This he considers the chief advantage of the system. Indeed, it is apparent from his analysis of the question that the speaker is basing his case on this point. The purpose of any college athletic system, he said, is to provide athletics for the student body; and he has severely criticized the intercollegiate system because less than 20 per cent of the student body participate in intercollegiate games. Consequently, unless he can show that the intramural system would make the benefits of athletics more general, he cannot consistently advocate its adoption.

I venture to believe that the substitution of intramural for intercollegiate athletics would actually decrease general participation in sport. The participation in athletics of any considerable proportion of the student body requires elaborate equipment. It requires scores of tennis and handball courts and a complete system of football fields and baseball diamonds, with the rather expensive equipment necessary for playing those games. It requires a large and expensively equipped gymnasium. Much equipment of this kind is now at the disposal of students who are not on Varsity squads. The figures compiled by the Department of Physical Education last year indicate that 50

per cent of the entire student body participated more or less regularly in intramural sports. But the speaker has forgotten that this provision for the average student is supported financially by the gate receipts from intercollegiate football. Abolish intercollegiate football and you abolish such provisions for the athletic needs of the average student as we now have.

In short, the substitution of intramural for intercollegiate sports, instead of increasing participation in intramural sport, would probably decrease it.

III. METHODS OF REFUTATION

Some of the objections to a speaker's position may be irrelevant or due to misunderstanding. It is of course quite as important to convince the hearer of their irrelevancy or to clear up the misunderstanding as it is to refute those objections having a juster basis. A careful definition of the terms used in the proposition and an explanation of what the proposition would mean in actual practice and what it would not mean will often convince the hearer that some of his fears are unfounded and some of his objections irrelevant.

A contention which requires refutation may be attacked in any one of three ways: by counter-argument, by attacking the argument used to support the contention, or by attacking the implications of the contention.

A. Counter-Argument

A counter-argument is an argument supporting a conclusion in opposition to the contention to be refuted. A speaker seeking to dispose of the objection that the World Court can accomplish nothing of importance might ignore the argument supporting the

objection and construct an argument leading to the conclusion that the Court has already settled a considerable number of important international disputes. Sometimes counter-argument is used, not to support a conclusion directly contradictory to the objection, but to balance against it another consideration which the speaker believes outweighs the objection in importance. Thus an advocate of free trade, without denying the truth of the objection that the adoption of such a policy would temporarily throw men out of employment, might argue that in the long run the lower prices resulting from free trade would more than compensate the laboring man for the temporary loss of employment.

In the following passage from the "Cooper Institute Address," Lincoln builds a counter-argument contradicting the assertion that the Democrats are more conservative than the Republicans:

"But you say you are conservative—eminently conservative—while we are revolutionary, destructive, or something of the sort. What is conservatism? Is it not adherence to the old and tried, against the new and untried? We stick to, contend for, the identical old policy on the point in controversy which was adopted by 'our fathers who framed the government under which we live'; while you with one accord reject, and scout, and spit upon that old policy, and insist upon substituting something new. True, you disagree among yourselves as to what that substitute shall be. You are divided on new propositions and plans, but you are unanimous in rejecting and denouncing the old policy of the fathers. Some of you are for reviving the foreign slave-trade; some for a Congressional slave code for the Territories; some for Congress forbidding the Territories to prohibit slavery within their limits; some for maintaining slavery

in the Territories through the judiciary; some for the 'gur-reat pur-rinciple' that 'if one man would enslave another, no third man should object,' fantastically called 'popular sovereignty,' but never a man among you is in favor of Federal prohibition of slavery in Federal Territories, according to the practice of 'our fathers who framed the government under which we live.' Not one of all your various plans can show a precedent or an advocate in the century within which our government originated. Consider, then, whether your claim of conservatism for yourselves, and your charge of destructiveness against us, are based on the most clear and stable foundations." [2]

B. Attacking the Argument in Support of the Contention

If the speaker knows why his hearers hold a certain objection, he may refute the objection by attacking the argument which supports it. We may suppose, for example, that in a public debate the speaker is upholding the proposition "The United States should join the World Court." An opponent objects that the Court can settle no international disputes and supports his contention with the argument (1) that a court which possesses no means of enforcing its decisions cannot settle disputes, and (2) that the World Court possesses no means of enforcing its decisions. The speaker many attempt to refute the contention by showing that the major premise of the argument is materially false, since public opinion, even without the aid of enforcement machinery, would in many cases be sufficient to enforce the decision. In presenting the refutation the speaker would of course develop at some

[2] O'Neill, *Models of Speech Composition* (The Century Co., 1921), p. 350.

length the contention that legal enforcement machinery is not indispensable to a court of justice.

It is apparent from the example just cited that a preliminary step often useful in attacking the argument in support of a contention is to brief the argument. Until the argument is briefed, it is often difficult to locate false premises or to identify formal fallacies. A vague feeling that the argument is faulty is not sufficient; for effective refutation the speaker must know precisely where the weakness in an argument lies.

In addition to attacking any false premise, the speaker may expose either formal or material fallacies in the argument. For a discussion of methods of exposing fallacies the reader is referred to Chapters VI, VII, and VIII. In some cases it may be necessary to show that the argument is based on premises consisting of an inaccurate set of statistics or that the statistics have been misinterpreted. (See that section of Chapter VI devoted to the subject of statistics.) When premises consist of quotations from authorities, it may be necessary to show that the authorities are unreliable or that those using them have misquoted or misinterpreted their authorities. For a discussion of the ways in which authority may be attacked the reader is referred to Chapter X.

Refutation by attacking the argument in support of contention, though usually requiring more skill than counter-argument, is well worth the time required to master it. The ability to dissect a faulty argument and to point out the fallacy in it is the mark of the independent thinker and the practised debater. As John Stuart Mill says, speakers who are dependent in refuta-

tion upon counter-argument, "when they have to answer opponents, only endeavor, by such arguments as they can command, to support the opposite conclusion, scarcely even attempting to confute the reasoning of their antagonist; and therefore, leaving the question, as far as it depends on argument, a balanced one." [3] There are times, of course, when it is wise to ignore the argument in support of an opposing contention. If the argument is long, obscure, or for some other reason difficult to attack effectively, it may be best to let the audience forget it, if they will, and to direct attention to opposing argument. But most student speakers need to cultivate the ability to dissect an argument and expose the weakness in it.

C. Attacking the Implications of the Contention

One of the methods of refutation least used but most effective in skilful hands is that of assuming "for the sake of argument" that a contention is true and showing that if it is true certain absurd or undesirable consequences follow from it. Four rebuttal devices are based on this method.

Reductio ad Absurdum (Reduction to an Absurdity). As its name implies, this method consists in showing that an argument, if carried to its logical conclusion, results in an absurdity. The speaker using the method employs the contention itself, or one of the points in the argument supporting it, as a premise in

[3] Coss, ed., *Autobiography of John Stuart Mill* (Columbia University Press, 1924), p. 14.

an argument leading to an absurd conclusion. The use of the method is illustrated in the following paragraph:

"To show you the absurdity of much of the evidence advanced in the evolution controversy by so-called scientists, let me take one of their arguments and show what it really means. According to our friends, the evolutionists, the body of man, like that of his monkey ancestors, was originally covered with hair. This hair was finally bred off by sexual selection. Women dislike hair on a man. Consequently the hairiest men were left to enjoy the delights of bachelorhood, while the race was propagated by the men with the least hair. Now if it were really true that women dislike hair on a man, the bald-headed man would be the ladies' favorite; but I can testify from personal experience that this is not true." [4]

In this example the speaker makes a humorous use of reduction to absurdity. The method is not primarily a humorous one, however, as is evident from the fact that Euclid employed it in the demonstration of some of his geometrical theorems. Another example will be given to illustrate the more serious use of the method. Henry Clay once presented in support of slavery an argument which might be briefed as follows:

I. Slavery is justifiable, for
(A. Any institution of long standing is justifiable), and
A′. Slavery is an institution of long standing.

In reply to this argument William Ellery Channing reduced the implied major premise of the syllogism to an absurdity, as follows:

"But this property, we are told, is not to be questioned on account of its long duration. 'Two hundred years of legislation

[4] Quoted from memory from an address by William Jennings Bryan.

have sanctioned and *sanctified* negro slaves as property.' Nothing but respect for the speaker could repress criticism of this unhappy phraseology. We will trust it escaped him without thought. But to confine ourselves to the argument from duration; how obvious the reply! Is injustice changed into justice by the practice of ages? Is my victim made a righteous prey because I have bowed him to the earth till he cannot rise? For more than two hundred years heretics were burned, and not by mobs, not by Lynch law, but by the decrees of councils, at the instigation of theologians, and with the sanction of the laws and religions of nations; and was this a reason for keeping up the fires, that they had burned two hundred years? In the Eastern world, successive despots, not for two hundred years, but for twice two thousand, have claimed the right of life and death over millions, and, with no law but their own will, have beheaded, bowstrung, starved, tortured unhappy men without number who have incurred their wrath; and does the lapse of so many centuries sanctify murder and ferocious power?" [5]

Drawing from the Contention a Conclusion at Variance with Facts. In an intercollegiate debate on the consolidation of the New England railways, one speaker presented the following argument:

I. Better management will not enable the New England railroads to operate at a profit, for
   A. No railroad could be operated profitably in so mountainous a district as New England.

The premise of the argument was attacked by drawing from it a conclusion at variance with known facts:

The speaker has contended that the railroads of New England can never be operated at a profit no matter how well they may be managed. In support of this contention he argues that there are certain inherent handicaps, due to the unevenness of New England's topography, which would render it impossible

[5] *The Works of William Ellery Channing, D.D.* (1841), vol. V. p. 48.

for any railroad to make money. Let us examine this argument. If the obstacles to successful operation of the New England roads are due to the topography of the country, they must have existed in the past as well as in the present. And if it is impossible for a railroad to make money in the face of these obstacles, then the New England roads must always have been unprofitable. But one of the most outstanding facts in the history of New England roads is that up to about 1900 they were more profitable than any other railway system in the United States. This seems to prove that the present deplorable condition of the roads is not due to the topography of the region.

Turning the Tables is a method similar to *reductio ad absurdum* except that the speaker builds upon the contention an argument leading, not to an absurd conclusion, but to a conclusion favorable to his own argument. Just prior to the Civil War the Southern Democrats opposed the newly formed Republican party on the ground that it was a sectional party and that Washington had warned his countrymen against sectional parties. Their argument might have been briefed as follows:

I. The Republican party is objectionable, for
   A. All sectional parties, according to Washington, are objectionable, and
   A′. The Republican party is sectional.

Building upon the major premise of this argument, Lincoln turned the tables in his "Cooper Institute Address" as follows:

"Some of you delight to flaunt in our faces the warning against sectional parties given by Washington in his Farewell Address. Less than eight years before Washington gave that warning he had, as President of the United States, approved and signed an act of Congress enforcing the prohibition of

slavery in the Northwestern Territory, which act embodied the policy of the government upon that subject up to and at the very moment he penned that warning; and about one year after he penned it, he wrote Lafayette that he considered that prohibition a wise measure, expressing in the same connection his hope that we should at some time have a confederacy of free States.

"Bearing this in mind, and seeing that sectionalism has since arisen upon this same subject, is that warning a weapon in your hands against us or in our hands against you? Could Washington himself speak, would he cast the blame of that sectionalism upon us, who sustain his policy, or upon you, who repudiate it? We respect that warning of Washington, and we commend it to you, together with his example pointing to the right application of it." [6]

Drawing from the Contention a Conclusion at Variance with Another Part of an Opponent's Argument. This method might also be described as revealing a hidden inconsistency in an argument. Accepting the contention as sound, the speaker employs it as a premise in an argument attacking another part of his opponent's case. In a debate on the World Court an advocate of the court argued early in the discussion that the court would introduce justice into the settlement of international disputes. Later in the debate he argued that the court would render impartial decisions because a truly legal institution usually renders impartial decisions, and the court is such an institution. An opponent of the court attacked the latter argument in substantially the following manner:

We have just listened to an excellent defense of the World Court as a legal instrument. It is not a mere board of arbitration, we are told, but a real court, comparable to our own

[6] O'Neill, *Models of Speech Composition* (The Century Co., 1921), p. 349 ff.

Supreme Court. It neither formulates international law, nor does it compromise; it simply interprets and thus enforces existing agreements. In short, it is a true legal instrument. This is a thoroughly convincing argument, and I have no fault to find with it. I am prepared to go all the way with the speaker in his praise of the legal machinery of the World Court. Indeed, I suspect I am ready to follow his argument further than he would.

Let us see what is implied in his argument. A true international court, such as the World Court is said to be, is by definition an instrument for enforcing existing law. The body of law to be interpreted and enforced by this court is specified in its statute. It includes, among other things, the recent peace treaties. Indeed, the Treaty of Versailles, together with the less important treaties based upon it, constitutes the most important part of international law upon which the Court's decisions are to be based. This is indicated by the fact that nearly every one of the cases thus far brought before the Court has involved the interpretation of the Treaty of Versailles. The Court, then, is primarily an instrument for enforcing the peace treaties.

But what is the nature of these peace treaties? It is generally conceded now that the Treaty of Versailles was a punitive treaty dictated by the victors to a vanquished nation and forced upon it at the point of a bayonet. The entire treaty was based upon the assumption, now abandoned by all impartial students, that Germany was solely responsible for the war. Injustice is written into nearly every line of it.

The court, in actual practice, is a weapon for the perpetuation of this injustice. And yet the opposing speaker spent fully half of his time defending the Court on the ground that it would substitute justice for violence in the settlement of international disputes. A World Court which must base its decisions on international law cannot render just decisions until we have a body of law that is recognized by mankind as substantially just. Under present international law, the more the Court partakes of the nature of a true legal instrument, the more unjust its decisions will be.

IV. THE USE OF QUESTIONS

Speakers sometimes conceal the weak points in their argument, and divert discussion to those issues upon which they have the advantage, by talking in vague generalities and refusing to take a definite stand on one of the issues or by withholding an important argument until so late in a debate that the opposing speaker has not a fair chance to attack it. Before such an opponent's argument can be refuted effectively, he must be forced to take a definite stand on the issue you wish to discuss.

When opposing speakers are appearing in a series of addresses on the same question, or when both of them appear on the platform several times during the course of debate, a speaker may sometimes drive his evasive opponent into a definite position on an issue by putting a direct question to him with the request that he answer it in his next speech. Suppose, for example, that a debater urging the desirability of complete freedom of speech and of the press devotes most of his time during the early part of the debate to the argument that freedom of discussion is essential to social progress. He says nothing regarding the practicability of complete freedom of discussion during time of war, and it becomes apparent that he intends either to postpone the consideration of this point until late in the debate or perhaps to ignore it entirely. To drive him to a definite stand on the issue early in the debate, his opponent might ask him this question: During the World War would you have permitted a pro-German sympathizer

to advocate resistance to the draft act before an audience of German-born Americans? The advocate of complete freedom of discussion must answer this question in the affirmative, but when he does so, he exposes to attack the most vulnerable part of his case.

In proposing such a question, it is necessary to make clear to the audience, as well as to the opposing speaker, that the question is relevant to the discussion. This may involve some preliminary argument or explanation. Unless the audience sees that the question is pertinent, the opposing speaker may ignore it or dismiss it as irrelevant.

Especially effective in debate is the use of dilemmatic questions. A dilemmatic question is one to which there are only two possible answers, both unfavorable to the argument of the person to whom the question is put.

A brilliant example of the use of dilemmatic questions occurred in the series of debates between Lincoln and Douglas in the Illinois senatorial campaign in 1858. Douglas's name was associated with what was known as the doctrine of "popular sovereignty." According to this doctrine, which Douglas stoutly defended throughout the debates, the people of a federal territory had the right to decide whether slavery should be prohibited within its boundaries. But Douglas also strongly upheld the Dred Scott Decision of the Supreme Court, which declared that it was unconstitutional for the legislature of a territory to prohibit slavery within its boundaries. The inconsistency in the position of Douglas lay in the fact that if the people of a territory could not prohibit slavery, they were not at liberty to be slave or free as the majority might elect.

For the purpose of exposing this inconsistency Lincoln asked Douglas the following dilemmatic question: "Can the people of a United States Territory, in any lawful way, against the wishes of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from its limits prior to the formation of a State constitution?" A negative reply to this question would have contradicted Douglas's doctrine of "popular sovereignty," while an affirmative reply would apparently have obliged him to withdraw his defense of the Dred Scott Decision, which stated that it was unconstitutional to prohibit slavery in a territory. Taking the dilemma by the horns, Douglas replied that a territory could exclude slavery, not by passing legislation prohibiting it, but by withholding favorable police regulation and by passing "unfriendly legislation." Such legislation, he claimed, would make it unprofitable to hold slaves in the territory. This curious position became known as Douglas's "Freeport" doctrine.

In a subsequent debate Lincoln attacked the "Freeport" doctrine with a second dilemmatic question: "If the slaveholding citizens of a United States Territory should need and demand Congressional legislation for the protection of their slave property in such a Territory, would you, as a member of Congress, vote for or against such legislation?" This question was even more difficult to answer than the first one. If a member of Congress refused to vote for legislation favorable to slavery, he would be violating his oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States; for, according to the Dred Scott Decision, the slaveholder in a territory has a constitutional right to property in slaves, and to de-

feat legislation necessary to preserve that right and to make it practically available would be to deprive him of his slave property without due process of law. But if Congress complied with the slaveholder's request for favorable legislation, against the known wishes of a majority of the citizens of the territory, it would be violating the doctrine of "popular sovereignty." Douglas never succeeded in extricating himself from this embarrassing dilemma. His only answer to the question was brief and evasive, and he never returned to the subject.

EXERCISES

I. Study the use of refutation in the second, third, and tenth specimens of argument in the Appendix. Criticize the speaker's judgment regarding what to refute and what to ignore; observe where in the speech he introduces the refutation; observe whether he follows the four steps suggested in this chapter for presenting refutation; observe what methods of refutation are employed.

II. Practise the refutation in class of short fallacious arguments. Let one member of the class read aloud a short fallacious argument from those included in the exercises at the close of Chapters VI, VII, and VIII while the other members of the class brief the argument. Until the members of the class acquire some facility in briefing, it may be necessary to have the argument read twice. The class should be allowed two or three minutes in which to outline a two-minute speech in refutation. Various members of the class should then be called upon to present refutation from the platform.

III. Find in argumentative editorials and magazine articles an example of each of the four methods of attacking the implication of a contention.

IV. Write out several rebuttal arguments employing the methods referred to in the preceding exercise.

V. Arrange an informal class-room debate on some subject reasonably familiar to all members of the class. Have two members of the class present ten-minute constructive arguments on either side of the question while the other members brief the argument of the two speakers. Devote the remainder of the hour to short impromptu rebuttal speeches by members of the class called upon at random.

VI. Construct a dilemmatic question. Construct three arguments in reply to your dilemmatic question, each employing a different method of replying to such a question.

VII. Prepare and deliver a ten-minute speech on a proposition of such a nature that it will be necessary to make considerable use of refutation.

CHAPTER XIV

INTEREST

Emerson says, "The virtue of books is to be readable, and of orators, to be interesting." Whether the ability to interest his audience is the orator's chief virtue may be open to question, but unless he has this virtue no other is of much use to him. It is a virtue, moreover, which most speakers must deliberately cultivate. Some people, for example, seem naturally to express themselves abstractly, and abstractions do not interest the average audience. Student speakers especially deal too much in abstractions. Their knowledge of the questions they discuss in speeches is often derived from textbooks containing little illustrative material, and their personal experience has not furnished them with such material. Such speakers must make a deliberate effort to be interesting if they are to hold the attention of the average audience.

It is sometimes possible to arouse interest in the subject of a speech as a whole or in those phases of the subject that are less interesting by opening the speech with one of the more interesting arguments. In discussing military intervention in Nicaragua, for example, it is possible to open the speech with the argument that our intervention has violated the rights of the Nicaraguans or that it is stirring up ill will against us

in Latin America. Either of these arguments may take the form, in part at least, of the narration of incidents which have occurred during our intervention. Such narration is likely to be more interesting than a discussion, for example, of the economic aspects of the question. When the hearer's interest has been aroused, he will be more ready to attend to the less interesting phases of the subject.

If the argument itself is not sufficiently interesting to hold attention, no matter how it is arranged, the speaker must employ special methods to make it so. After outlining the argument he proposes to present, he should ask himself concerning each point, Is this point sufficiently interesting to hold attention? If not, how can it be made so? There are in general two ways to make a dull argument interesting: relating it to a topic or an activity in which the audience is already interested, and expressing it in language that arouses interest. We shall note some of the ways in which each of these methods may be used in an argumentative speech.

I. THE PRINCIPLE OF DERIVED INTEREST

The principle of derived interest is stated by James in the following words:

"Any object not interesting in itself may become interesting through being associated with an object in which an interest already exists. The two associated objects grow, as it were, together; the interesting portion sheds its interest over the whole; and thus things not interesting in their own right borrow an

interest which becomes as real and as strong as that of any natively interesting thing." [1]

In some cases it is worth while to spend some time at the beginning of the speech in showing how the subject as a whole is related to the hearer's interests. A speaker discussing the proposed Great Lakes–St. Lawrence waterway before a Middle Western audience, for instance, might devote several paragraphs early in his speech to showing how such a waterway would affect the lake ports of Chicago and Cleveland, how much it would reduce the freight-rates on grain from the Middle West to Liverpool, and so forth.

The speaker may sometimes relate his topic to strong but temporary interests of his audience, as when, in discussing capital punishment, he refers to the recent execution of a notorious criminal or to the gang war then going on in some large city. More often, however, he will relate his topic to the permanent interests of the audience. In the following paragraphs we shall mention some of the permanent interests most often available for this purpose in an argumentative speech.

The Fundamental Interests.[2] First to be noted are those fundamental interests shared by most men. Among these is the interest in *life* and *health*. The vast deal of printed matter on health presumably supplies a demand, but it is probable that men in general are more willing to give attention to the acquisition of *property* than to the prolongation of life. This interest is not

[1] James, *Talks to Teachers* (Henry Holt and Company, 1899), p. 94.
[2] Cf. Phillips on "impelling motives," *Effective Speaking* (1908), Chap. V.

limited to one's pocketbook, but extends to all business; witness the number of business stories in popular magazines. Men generally are interested in the means of acquiring *power* and *reputation*. Some are still more interested in what pertains to *honor*, to *social welfare*, to the good of *country* and to *righteousness*, and in other so-called *sentiments*. Again, men are interested in what touches their *affections;* for example, the education of their children. They are interested in all that gives *pleasure;* for example, sports, music, drama, and literature.

These topics are not suggested as themes for discussion, certainly not in abstract form. The suggestion is rather that dull subjects may be made interesting by linking them with these fundamental interests. With which interest or interests the speaker should attempt to link his subject depends, of course, upon the nature of the subject and of the audience.

Human Interest. Carlyle says, "Man is perenially interesting to man." We like to see people, whether we are acquainted with them or not, and most of us prefer books and pictures which portray people. We are not referring here to interest in famous or notorious personages, but rather to interest in common folks like ourselves. A speaker can sometimes present his argument in terms of the people whose welfare is at stake. In discussing the coal problem, for instance, he need not go out of his way to show his audience in concrete terms how the question affects the coal-miners and their families.

Interest in Personages. Newspapers find it profit-

able to print detailed accounts of the doings of political and industrial leaders, of famous actors, of notorious criminals, indeed of any one who is much in the public eye. The speaker may take advantage of this interest by putting his argument in terms of well-known personalities. In discussing the peace conference at Versailles, for example, instead of saying that the French delegation thought this and the English delegation that, he may use Clemenceau and Lloyd George as spokesmen of their respective delegations. In discussing the American labor movement, he may build much of his argument around the figure of Samuel Gompers. The method consists essentially in using as a symbol a personality which in the public mind has come to stand for certain ideas.

Interest in Conflict. We have an instinctive interest in conflict. We may hate it or delight in it, but we are rarely indifferent to it, whether it takes the form of a dog-fight, of athletic struggles, of war, of business competition, or of a struggle with nature. We also like stories of conflict, for through them we become spectators of the struggle or participants in it.

At times a speaker can utilize this interest by throwing his speech, or a part of it, into a narrative of the conflict with the forces of the opposition, whether those forces consist of men, as in war, politics, and commerce, or of natural obstacles, as in building a canal or overcoming disease. No doubt interest is keenest where conflict is with men and passions are aroused, but enmity is not necessary. The story of the heroic period of an enterprise or reform will usually hold attention.

II. METHODS OF AROUSING INTEREST

In addition to associating his subjects with the interests of the audience, the speaker may hold attention by the use of certain rhetorical methods. The more important of these will be discussed briefly.

ILLUSTRATION. Most successful speakers make liberal use of illustration when discussing abstract or difficult subjects before popular audiences. Such audiences will seldom give their attention for long periods of time to abstract argument, and even those trained to abstract reasoning welcome an occasional illustration to relieve the strain of attention.

An illustration may vary in length from a phrase of two or three words to a passage several paragraphs or more in length. Thus a speaker wishing to illustrate the point that the poor boy may aspire to positions of power in our political life, might say, "Both Hoover and Smith have climbed from humble walks of life to positions of influence in our political life," or he might discuss at some length the careers of the two men. A point to be noted in this connection is that illustration emphasizes the point illustrated; the speaker should take care not to give the emphasis of illustration to unimportant points in his argument.

We may distinguish between two forms of illustration, example and analogy. Examples are useful in lending interest to a general statement. In illustrating the statement that prominent Americans have assisted in the work of the World Court a speaker might say, "Elihu Root, for example, helped to draw up the Pro-

tocol of the court, and Charles Evans Hughes and John Bassett Moore have served as justices of the Court." A speaker arguing that our policy in the Caribbean region is provoking the hostility of the Latin Americans might narrate one or more incidents in which hostility to the United States has been manifested. If the point were sufficiently important, he would develop the incidents at some length.

When actual examples are not available, the speaker can sometimes use hypothetical examples. In discussing the unlikelihood that a powerful nation would submit an important dispute to the World Court, a speaker might say, "Suppose, for instance, that the United States were to become involved in a controversy with Japan regarding the admission of Japanese immigrants to this country, and suppose that Japan wished to bring the dispute before the World Court," etc. This use of hypothetical examples is sometimes the only way to bring a remote subject home to an audience.

Analogy is the second form of illustration. The analogy may be a literal one, as when a speaker discussing the World Court before an American audience compares it to the Supreme Court of the United States, or it may be figurative, as when Patrick Henry said, "I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided, and that is the lamp of experience." The following example of figurative analogy is taken from Lincoln's speech at Springfield, June 17, 1858. The analogy was used to illustrate the point that the public acts and utterances of Stephen A. Douglas, Franklin Pierce, Roger Taney, and James Buchanan indicated a con-

spiracy among those men to extend the institution of slavery to all of the States of the Union.

"We cannot absolutely know that all these exact adaptations are the result of preconcert. But when we see a lot of framed timbers, different portions of which we know have been gotten out at different times and places and by different workmen,—Stephen, Franklin, Roger, and James, for instance,—and when we see these timbers joined together, and see they exactly make the frame of a house or a mill, the lengths and proportions of the different pieces exactly adapted to their respective places, and not a piece too many or too few,—not omitting even scaffolding,—or, if a single piece be lacking, we see the place in the frame exactly fitted and prepared yet to bring such piece in,—in such a case, we find it impossible not to believe that Stephen and Franklin and Roger and James all understood one another from the beginning, and all worked upon a common plan or draft drawn up before the first blow was struck." [3]

Description and Narration. Many of the methods of arousing interest already referred to, such as the use of human interest and interest in conflict, are employed most easily in descriptive or narrative passages. Such passages may be of a paragraph or more in length, or they may consist of only a phrase or a sentence worked in with the argument. The use of narration is especially effective. When the speaker can throw his argument into narrative form without an undue expenditure of time, he should usually do so. Much of the interest of Wendell Phillips's famous lecture on the Negro leader, Toussaint L'Ouverture, is due to the fact that he puts his argument that the Negro race is of high quality in the form of a vivid narrative of Toussaint's career.

[3] Putnam, *The Political Debates between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas* (1913), Part I, p. 8.

CONCRETE EXPRESSION. One form of concreteness consists in the use of figures of speech, especially the simile and the metaphor, and in the substitution for the general and abstract of those specific and concrete words which evoke images. A comparison of the following passages will indicate the greater effectiveness of concrete over abstract expression.

We are partially responsible for disorder in Mexico.

"Every American citizen and every American soldier that has been shot to death was killed with an American bullet fired from an American rifle. Murder, arson, lust, rapine, desolation, are the fruits that have ripened under the policy of watchful waiting."—Albert J. Beveridge, "Opening of the 1916 Republican Campaign."

Several years ago a prominent American assisted in the organization of the World Court.

In 1920 Elihu Root, acting as a member of the Advisory Committee, helped to draw up the Protocol of the World Court.

Speed and effiectiveness characterized our entrance into the World War.

"In June, two months after the declaration of war, our fighting men were in France; in October, Americans were on the firing line; in scarcely more than a year, we had 2,000,000 men in France, had whipped the enemy at Belleau Wood, beaten him back at Château-Thierry, wiped out the St. Mihiel salient and delivered the terrific hammer blow at

Sedan that virtually ended the war."—Homer S. Cummings, "Keynote Speech of Democratic National Convention, 1920."

Does exclusion from office render one incapable of doing harm?

"Does the exclusion from office, does any feature of your system of political disabilities, take the revolver or the bowie-knife or the scourge from the hands of anyone who wishes to use it?"—Carl Schurtz, "General Amnesty."

The use of patronage in political appointments can be abolished.

"I assert that this perversion of democracy, this robbing democracy of its virility, can be changed as truly as the system under which Walpole governed the commons of England, by bribery, as truly as the atmosphere which made the *crédit mobilier* scandal possible in the Congress of the United States has been blown away by the force of public opinion."—Elihu Root, "The Invisible Government."

Wit and Humor. One of the surest ways to interest hearers is to amuse them; laughter and boredom are incompatible. Irrelevant humor is out of place in a speech with a serious purpose, and care must always be taken lest humor distract attention from the matter in hand, but the speaker who can be witty or humorous without being irrelevant is so much the better equipped to handle audiences. The humor most effective

on the platform is not that cribbed laboriously from the latest number of *Life*, but rather that which can be found in the subject itself by one who looks for it and has a sense of humor to help him. Humorous stories are sometimes useful, but still more effective is the witty remark, the amusing turn of phrase, the clever reference to matters arising from the immediate occasion. We may note also the use of epigrammatic phrases and statements which, perhaps without provoking laughter, give to a speech the quality that might be called "sparkling." Some of the dangers attending the use of humor have already been pointed out in Chapter XI.

The Rhetorical Question. It is surprising how much vivacity can be infused into an otherwise dull speech by a liberal use of the rhetorical question, that is, of a question which the speaker puts to the audience without expecting an oral response. The effectiveness of the rhetorical question is perhaps due to the fact that nearly every one will make a mental response to a direct question, and such responses keep the mind active. Occasionally the speaker throws out a question to create suspense and direct attention to what he is about to say, as Webster does in the following passage from a speech on the tariff:

> "If such be the state of our commerce and navigation, what is the condition of our home manufactures? How are they amidst the general depression? Do they need further protection? and if any, how much?"

Frequently the speaker does not answer the question, but lets his hearers answer it for themselves. A series

of points in the argument may be summed up in this manner. At the close of an argument against the World Court, for instance, a speaker might present the following summary:

Is it likely that nations will voluntarily submit important disputes to the court? If they do submit them, is it likely that they will accept an adverse decision?

EXERCISES

I. Study the use of methods for securing interest in the first, third, fourth, fifth, eighth, and tenth specimens of exposition and argument in the Appendix.

II. What methods could be used to interest the following audiences in the subjects indicated?

1. A high school audience—the tariff.
2. A college audience—the honor system.
3. The parents of high school students—the value of a college education.
4. A Rotary Club—naval disarmament.
5. A women's club—the evils of instalment buying.

III. Prepare and deliver a ten-minute speech before the class on a subject in which your hearers will have little initial interest.

PART II

METHOD IN SPEECH PREPARATION

CHAPTER XV

SELECTING THE SUBJECT

In court, in the legislature, and even in the pulpit the speaker often finds his subject prescribed for him. The subject of the so-called occasional address, also, may be dictated with more or less definiteness by the occasion, as at a dedication or a celebration. But there are times when the occasion permits such wide latitude in the choice of a subject that the speaker finds the problem of selection a perplexing one. The difficulties that arise from such a situation, and some that are common to all occasions, will be considered here.

I. THE REQUISITES OF A GOOD SUBJECT

Not all subjects yield propositions suitable for discussion in an argumentative speech. The possibilities of a subject can usually be determined by applying to it the test questions proposed in the following paragraphs.

Is the Subject Controversial? There are times when the speaker may wish to support a thesis already accepted by his audience. More typically, however, the argumentative speech is designed to win over those who either oppose the speaker's views or are neutral toward them. There would usually be little point in

delivering a speech in defense of intercollegiate athletics to college students unless the system had recently been attacked on the campus, for most college students already believe intercollegiate athletics desirable. If the speaker wished to oppose or criticize the system, however, he would encounter plenty of opposition. Before some audiences, of course, the value of intercollegiate athletics might be a highly controversial subject.

There is a large class of subjects which practically no one would consider controversial. People do not argue about the physical law of levers, though they may argue about its application to mechanics. They do not argue about the beauty of a sunset or the truth of the multiplication tables. Subjects of this sort are suitable only for descriptive or expository speeches.

A general subject which as a whole does not provoke argument may often be broken up into separate topics some one of which is controversial. The American people seldom argue about the wisdom of popular government as an abstract principle, but its application to a concrete case, the government of the Philippine Islands, for example, leads to endless argument. We do not often argue about the federal judicial system as a whole, but the power of the Supreme Court to nullify federal legislation by the decision of a bare majority has been the subject of much controversy.

Is the Subject Susceptible of Argumentative Treatment? When two people disagree about the tariff, each can present argument in support of his view. Both accept certain fundamental principles concerning justice in government, and both can go to

history for evidence on the question. Some subjects of controversy, on the other hand, have to do, not with matters of fact or principle, but with individual tastes. Argument concerning matters of taste is usually futile. I like mountain scenery while you prefer the seashore, and that is about all there is to be said on the subject; it is unlikely that either of us could convince the other by argument. Subjects that have to do primarily with personal tastes are not suitable for argumentative speeches.

This requirement, however, can be pressed too far. Personal taste is an important factor in the appreciation of art, music, and literature; yet argument on these subjects is both interesting and profitable. The devotee of ultra-modern music may never convince a conservative audience that jazz is more enjoyable than classical music, but he may show them that more can be said in its favor than they had supposed. Certainly painters, musicians, and writers do argue among themselves about their art; and it is not so certain either that they "get nowhere," though it is undoubtedly difficult to reach definite conclusions on matters of this sort.

Can the Subject be Treated Adequately in the Time Available? The speaker's time is usually limited. Even when he is not told in advance by the chairman or by the committee on arrangements how much time he may consume, he should impose a limit on himself and keep within it. Otherwise he is likely to become that most unpardonable of public nuisances, the speaker who does not know when to stop.

To attempt to cover much ground in a short speech is to invite failure. If a ten-minute speech is contem-

plated, the limitations of time rule out such a subject as the World Court, which is too comprehensive and involves too much knowledge of history for satisfactory brief treatment.

Most broad subjects may be broken up into subdivisions some one of which can be discussed briefly. A speaker could not discuss the World Court satisfactorily in ten minutes, but he might present an adequate argument in favor of the proposition that the court is superior to the Hague Tribunal, or that its decisions are not controlled by the League of Nations. This process of narrowing the subject is usually a necesary step in selecting the topic for a short speech. A speaker wishing to talk for ten minutes on the relations between the United States and Latin America might select some one phase of the subject, for example, our relations with Haiti. Even this is too comprehensive for a ten-minute speech. Some one aspect of our relations with Haiti should be chosen, such as the expediency of our military occupation of that country.

Is It Possible to Obtain Sufficient Information on the Subject? On most subjects the speaker will wish to supplement his previous knowledge with information acquired by reading, and it is wise to learn in advance whether such information is available. Many students have spent hours of time in a vain attempt to determine the effect of capital punishment on the crime-rate. It might be supposed that one could secure rather convincing evidence on the deterrent effect of capital punishment by comparing the crime-rate in States which have capital punishment with the rate in those States which have abolished it. It will be

found upon investigation, however, that the figures on crime-rates are in most cases so inaccurate, incomplete, and misleading that nothing whatever can be inferred from them. A brief preliminary investigation in the library will usually indicate whether the necessary information on the subject is available. Methods of exploring the resources of the library on a subject will be discussed in the following chapter.

Is the Subject Interesting to the Speaker? The subject need not appear interesting to the audience at first sight, for the speaker can do much to enliven an apparently dull topic. But to the speaker himself it should be interesting from the beginning. If the speaker is bored by his subject, he cannot discuss it with much conviction or enthusiasm, and he is likely to find the preparation of the speech tedious and burdensome. As a rule, the more one enjoys preparing a speech, the better the speech will be. A student should not decide, however, that a subject has no interest for him until he knows something about it. If he takes time to learn what it means, what its practical implications are, and in what ways it is related to his own interests, he may find it much more interesting than he had supposed.

II. SOURCES OF SUBJECTS

A. Personal Experience as a Source of Subjects

Subjects drawn from the speaker's own experience have certain advantages over those drawn from reading. They usually interest the speaker, and he is likely to have more first-hand information about them than

about other subjects. Subjects of this sort are especially suitable for the beginner, for they relieve him of the task of making an elaborate study of the subject before taking up the preparation of the speech itself.

Campus topics, such as the problems of student self-government, the question of policy involved in the management of extra-curricular activities, and the selection of courses of study, afford suitable topics for argumentative speeches in the class-room. These topics present the difficulty, however, of being as familiar to the audience as to the speaker. Unless the speaker has new information on a subject or is challenging the beliefs of his hearers, he may have difficulty in interesting the audience. In this respect subjects drawn from experience during a summer of travel or work are easier to handle. Work in a factory or on a farm or experience as a salesman will often provide topics of more general interest and importance than those taken from college life. The problem of the ethics of salesmanship, for instance, may be discussed in terms of a student's experience in selling aluminum ware. The best topics are those of some general importance in connection with which the speaker has had interesting personal experiences not shared by his hearers.

While the preparation of a speech on a subject drawn from personal experience may not require elaborate study of the subject, some reading is usually necessary to broaden the speaker's knowledge and correct his personal prejudices. One man's experience is seldom a sufficient basis for the formation of an opinion. His experience may not be typical, and, even if it is typical, the reflection of others upon the same experience

will prove suggestive. A student's knowledge of even so familiar a topic as athletics or fraternity life will be enlarged and corrected by reading on the subject. Among books devoted exclusively to the discussion of campus problems are the following: Richard Rice, ed., *College and the Future;* M. G. Fulton, ed., *College Life, Its Conditions and Problems;* J. H. Canfield, *The College Student and His Problems;* F. P. Keppel, *The Undergraduate and His College.*

B. Reading as a Source of Subjects

It is unwise to draw subjects exclusively from personal experience. The experience of most college students is not sufficiently varied to provide material for more than a few worth-while speeches. It is well to turn soon to subjects suggested by reading. These subjects are usually more difficult in that they require considerable study, but practice in working up difficult subjects is valuable in itself. It teaches the student how to use the library, how to find and arrange evidence, and how to evaluate it. Incidentally he develops new interests and learns much about public affairs. These are valuable by-products of his work in argumentation.

Textbooks and class-room lectures are a prolific source of subjects. An elementary course in economics or sociology will touch upon scores of controversial problems which may be discussed from the platform. The merits of capitalism and of the various substitutes that have been proposed for it, the labor problem, the coal problem, the railway problem, the tariff, child labor, crime, the banking system, government subsidies,

government ownership of public utilities, the race question—all of these questions are full of good subjects. A course in political science will suggest many topics: the cabinet form of government, direct election of public officials, the spoils system, the party system, the powers of the Supreme Court, centralization of government, the powers of the President, States' rights, our relations with foreign countries, the World Court, the League of Nations. A course in psychology, in literature, indeed almost any college course, touches upon controversial matters that may be made the subject of argumentative speeches.

In using topics drawn from this scource, the student should resist the temptation to give his audience merely a résumé of the lecture he has heard or of the book he has read. There is little value in paraphrasing what another man has said. Class-room speeches are to be original, and they cannot be said to be original in any real sense of the word unless they bear the imprint of the speaker's own mind.

The student who does any serious reading outside of his regular class-room work has another source of subjects. Such periodicals as *The Forum*, *Current History*, *The American Mercury*, *The Nation*, *The New Republic*, *The Outlook and Independent*, *The Review of Reviews*, *World's Work*, and *The Literary Digest* are full of suggestive controversial articles. Stimulating non-technical books on controversial subjects are appearing constantly, and any one of them will suggest a number of topics. Among such books are the following: Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West;* J. H. Robinson, *The Mind in the Making;* Walter Lippmann,

Public Opinion; James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth;* A. L. Lowell, *Public Opinion and Popular Government;* John Fiske, *American Political Ideas;* Theodore Roosevelt, *An Autobiography;* S. W. McCall, *The Life of Thomas Brackett Reed;* W. R. Thayer, *The Life and Times of Cavour;* Augustine Birrell, *Obiter Dicta;* E. G. Conklin, *Heredity and Environment;* Olive Schreiner, *Woman and Labor;* W. L. George, *The Intelligence of Woman;* René Vallery-Radot, *The Life of Pasteur;* G. K. Chesterton, *Heretics.* The appendix of *Persistent Questions in Public Discussion,* a collection of thought-provoking essays edited by A. M. Drummond and E. L. Hunt, contains a longer list of such books.

Certain plays and novels, as the following, may provoke reactions that will serve as impulses to speak: Henrik Ibsen, *Ghosts* and *An Enemy of the People;* G. B. Shaw, *The Doctor's Dilemma;* John Galsworthy, *Justice;* Samuel Butler, *Erewhon;* George Meredith, *Evan Harrington.*

It is often a good plan to select a rather broad subject with a view to making a series of speeches on it. This saves labor, for everything learned in the preparation of one speech helps in the preparation of the next. When the study of the same subject is continued for several months, the student acquires a considerable mastery of it and consequently is able to make better speeches than he otherwise could. The more he learns about the subject, the more his interest in it grows and the more he enjoys working on it. When several speeches are to be delivered on the same general subject, it is essential that the speaker continue his study of the problem un-

til the last speech is prepared. The attempt to base a series of talks on a brief study of the subject will result in thin, unprofitable speeches.

The preparation of a series of speeches on the same general subject is more interesting if two or three students select the same subject. They will enjoy discussing it informally among themselves, and as their study progresses differences of opinion will develop that may lead to interesting discussions and debates before the class.

EXERCISES

I. List five subjects suggested by your personal experience which would be suitable for discussion before your class-room audience; five subjects suggested by your reading; five subjects in the discussion of which you could draw upon both your reading and your personal experience.

II. Select a subject suitable for investigation and for discussion in a series of class-room speeches.

CHAPTER XVI

GATHERING MATERIAL

I. READING

No source of material should be neglected in the study of a question. Among special sources sometimes available are tours of observation. In studying the crime problem a student might visit a penitentiary or a police court; in studying labor conditions he might visit a textile mill or a steel plant. A student's tour of observation is not often sufficiently thorough to be of much value as a source of information, but it is one of the best sources of illustrative material and renders more concrete and significant the information secured from books. Conversation may also be helpful. A student of the Chinese question may find on his own campus a Chinese student who can give him first-hand impressions of conditions in that country; a student of the railway question may find among his instructors some one who has made a special study of the problem. Conversation with almost any one who is interested in a question may suggest arguments or points of view that will prove useful.

Reading, however, will be the student's chief source of material on most questions. He must usually go to books and periodicals for a statement both of the facts

underlying the question and of the arguments on either side of the question. In the case of questions with which he has had no personal contact he must go to books and periodicals for illustrative material also.

A. What to Read First

As a general rule, one should read first that material which presents an unbiased statement of the facts underlying the question. If one or two authoritative books of this sort are read carefully at the outset, everything else can be read more intelligently. When original documents are involved, they should be studied early in the investigation.

In a study of the Philippine question, for instance, the student should turn first to an atlas and learn the location, number, size, and other geographical facts about the Islands. He should then read some authoritative work on the population of the Islands, learning all that he can about the racial origin and characteristics of the Filipinos, their habits of living, and the state of their education. It would be advisable to turn next to a reliable historical work presenting the main facts regarding the history of the Islands, especially from the time they first came under the control of the United States. From this history he would learn, among other things, that in 1916 a "Jones Act" was passed defining our relations with the Philippine Islands and our intentions toward them. This act should be read carefully. When the student has completed this study by reading the official reports of some of the more recent investigations conducted in the Islands, he

will have a foundation of fact that will enable him to evaluate the controversial literature on the subject.

There is one condition under which it is perhaps best not to start with the more authoritative informational material. If the student is so ignorant of the subject that he has no idea what the question means or what the arguments are or where he can go for unbiased information, it may be necessary to start with a general discussion of the subject, such as may be found in a magazine article. From such a discussion he will get a general notion of what the question is about and will probably pick up clues that will lead him back to more authoritative sources.

When the student has acquired a mastery of the facts underlying the problem, he is ready to read the controversial literature. There is a vast amount of such literature on any public question which has long been under discussion, and it is wise to select those books and articles written by men with some reputation as students in the field. They are more likely to present the argument in a full and convincing manner. It is wise, of course, to read several popular magazine articles to learn what those other than professional students are thinking about the question. It should go without saying that the student will read on both sides of the question. This is necessary if he is to form an intelligent opinion, and when he speaks on the subject, he must be familiar with the arguments on the other side even though he thinks many of them unsound.

Finally, it may be desirable to read a few books or articles to secure illustrative material. The printed

material on most sociological problems includes books and articles presenting descriptions of living and working conditions, interesting case studies, and the like. Biographies and novels dealing with social or political problems sometimes afford illustrative material. They should not be taken too seriously as a source of information, for novelists take considerable liberty with truth, and even the supposed statements of fact in a biography are apt to be biased somewhat by the point of view of the writer. But read simply for interest, some material of this sort is very useful.

B. How to Read

In taking up a book, one should examine title-page, preface, and introduction. These will enable one to understand the book better, because they indicate what the author has tried to do, the scope of the work, its point of view, and its limitations. They help one to decide, too, whether the book contains an impartial statement of facts or a statement of facts manipulated to establish a thesis. It is also wise to examine the table of contents to get the plan of the chapters and to look over the index, or the index volume if one is dealing with a set of books. Time spent in getting acquainted with a book will save time.

As for the actual reading, no better advice can be given than was given long ago by Francis Bacon: "Read not to contradict and confute, nor to believe and take for granted, nor to find talk and discourse, but to weigh and consider." [1] Read, that is, open-mindedly,

[1] Essay "On Studies."

not with awe of the printed page, not simply to find support for one's views, ignoring or rejecting all that refute them, and not simply to find pat quotations, but with mind alert for all the truth. Bacon continues: "Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested; that is, some books are to be read only in parts; others are to be read but not curiously [carefully]; and some few are to be read wholly, with diligence and attention." Ability to skim books wisely is needed by every reader; but students to-day are sent hurriedly through so many books, in the preparation of so many ill-digested papers, that there is danger they will never gain the ability to exhaust the possibilities of a page. The speaker should read rather widely that he may know all sides of his question, and thus be honest with himself and his audience, and also that he may know what to expect from the opposition; but he should "chew and digest" some of the best works on his subject, making the author's thought his own.

Briefing a difficult argument encountered in reading is often the best way to master it. When the reader has thrown an argument into the form of a brief and set it down in black and white, he can be pretty certain that he understands it. Briefing an argument has the additional advantage of rendering more apparent any weakness or fallacy contained in it.

C. Taking Notes

Some people, like Henry Ward Beecher, seem never to forget what they read. Beecher's mind was a store-

house of material from which he could draw at will in the preparation of his sermons and addresses. But few people have Beecher's memory. If the average reader wishes to be sure that a bit of material will be available for future use, he must make a note of it. And if his notes are to be of any use, they must be taken systematically and filed.

An excellent method of collecting and filing items of miscellaneous material is to carry a small note-book in the pocket and to jot down on a separate leaf any item or scrap of information that is to be preserved. Every few days this accumulation of notes may be torn out of the book and filed in large manila envelopes or folders, each bearing an appropriate label. One advantage of this method is that the note-book in which entries are made is small and can easily be carried about; it is consequently always available. The folders are large enough to accommodate newspaper clippings and other miscellaneous material. And most important of all, the contents of any folder can be emptied on a desk and sorted.

Most of the advantages of the folder method can be retained and a more permanent record made if the notes are written, not upon scraps of paper, but upon small cards of uniform size. Cards three inches wide and five inches long are convenient, and, as this is a standard size, they can be obtained at any stationer's shop. Only one point or item of information should be put on each card, and it should be expressed so clearly that there will be no difficulty later in understanding it. Passages copied down verbatim should be inclosed in quotation marks. If the reader's notes are a paraphrase of the

author's language, that fact should be made clear, so that when he wishes to use the statement in a speech he will know whether or not he is using the author's language or his own interpretation of it. At the top of each card should be clearly indicated the point covered by the material on that card. The following sample illustrates one way of arranging the material:

WORLD COURT—RELATION TO LEAGUE—STATEMENT BY GIBLIN AND BROWN

"A Reservation that the United States should not become legally entangled with the League or assume any obligation is impracticable, for it will be necessary to vote with that League, to pool money with that League, to change the Statute with that League, to elect and re-elect judges and fill vacancies with that League."

Giblin and Brown, *The World Court Myth*, p. 391.

As these cards accumulate, they should be arranged under proper headings and filed in a box or drawer. For convenience in locating cards, each of the major divisions of material should be indicated in the filing system by inserting a card with a tag projecting above the other cards and bearing a word or phrase indicating the point covered by the cards in that division. Such a file of cards is durable and permanent; the cards can be rearranged at any time; and they can be spread out on the table for inspection.

It is important that all notes be carefully documented. When the reader makes a note of a quotation, argument, or item of information, he should indicate

the exact source of the reference so that he can find it again. The material will often be quite useless later unless he knows where he got it, and he may wish also to turn to the original source and reëxamine the passage in its context. This is especially likely to happen when the note consists of an idea for an argument. When he is ready to consider the argument for use in a speech, he is almost certain to wish to reëxamine the original source and read the entire argument again. If he has not noted the source, he may waste hours finding it.

II. THE USE OF THE LIBRARY

To one unacquainted with its use, a modern library is a rather formidable institution. After spending several hours in a library containing hundreds of books and thousands of magazine articles on international relations, a student reported that the library contained nothing on that subject. When he was taken back to the library and shown shelf after shelf of material on the subject, he was still helpless. He did not wish to emulate Thomas Edison, who as a boy is said to have started in with volume I of *The Encyclopædia Britannica* with the intention of reading the entire set as the volumes stood on the shelf. The student did not know, nor did he have any way of learning, which of these hundreds of volumes would repay reading. Some conception of the system on which a modern library is organized would have helped him find the most useful material.

A. The Library Catalogue

The library catalogue is an index to the contents of the library. It consists of small cards of uniform size arranged in drawers. At the top of each card is an author's name and the title of a book or the subject treated by a book. In addition to this information each card contains the "call number" of the book represented by that card, that is, the number which indicates to a librarian the position of the book on the shelves and which one uses in asking for the book.

If one goes to a library to find the works of an author whose name is known, the task is comparatively easy. Certain methods of cataloguing, however, should be noted. The following is taken from the published suggestions of the Cornell University Library:

"Books are entered under the author's family name, unless an author has consistently used an assumed name. A nobleman is entered under the title of nobility, and a married woman under her last married name.

"English compound names are arranged under the last part, *e. g.*, Lane-Poole, under Poole; foreign names under the first part, *e. g.*, Pardo-Bazan under Pardo.

"Prefixes to English names, *e. g.*, De Quincey, Van Buren, etc., form a part of the name and determine their place in the alphabet; prefixes to French, Spanish, and Italian names, when they are articles, *e. g.*, La Fayette, are a part of the name and determine the place in the catalogue, but other prefixes like the prepositions *de*, *von*, *van*, etc., of foreign names except Russian, are disregarded in the alphabetical arrangement. Names beginning with *M'*, *Mc*, *St.*, *Ste.*, are arranged as if spelled *Mac*, *Saint*, *Sainte*. The German umlauts *ä*, *ö*, *ü*, are arranged as *a*, *o*, *u*."

Greater difficulty arises when one goes to a library to find works on a given subject, without knowledge of the authors. A reference librarian says that the chief cause of failure to find the desired book is the tendency to look in the catalogue under the single word the searcher has in mind as representing his subject. A student once complained that he could find nothing of value on the subject of criminology in a library of more than 400,000 volumes. A half-hour of searching by one who is certainly no expert revealed more than could be read in a week. The student would have been helped by the following suggestions:

If one searching for a book does not find it under the subject heading he has in mind, he should try other words of related meaning; for example, if he does not find "Reformatories," he should try "Prisons," and keep trying until he finds what he wants or until he exhausts his vocabulary of words that might form the heading for the desired books. He is likely to come soon upon a "see" reference. Thus the Library of Congress has no works catalogued under the heading "Penology," but under that heading refers to "Prisons," "Punishments," and "Reformatories." Turning to these headings, one will find long lists of books directly upon those topics and "see also" references to related topics. Cards bearing the "see also" references will be found at the end of the alphabetical list of works under a particular subject heading. In the Cornell University Library, for example, the catalogue, after a long list of books under "Penology," has "see also" references to "Criminal Law," "Prisons," "Reformatories," "Pardon," "Punishment," "Crime," "Capital

Punishment," "Degeneration," "Commutation of Sentence," "Detectives," "Foundlings," "Manslaughter," "Insanity," "Responsibility," "Immoral Literature," "Trials," "Criminal," "Temperance," "Women," "Crime," "Police Power," "William Shakespeare," "Criminal Characters," "Suicide."

It should be observed that under a given subject heading the general, unclassified works are listed first, alphabetized according to the authors' names; and that after that there are listed, in separate alphabetical lists, books under various subheads. It helps to note that author and title headings on the catalogue cards are lettered in black, while subject cards have headings in red. On an author card, sometimes on the face, sometimes on the back, will usually be found the subject under which the book is classified, and this will aid one in looking up other works on the same subject. Governments, States, cities, and organizations which publish reports and other works concerning their affairs, are treated as authors of their publications. Some difficulty may arise in finding the reports of an organization which has in its name the name of a political division. A report of the United States Steel Corporation, for instance, will be found, not in its alphabetical order under "United States," but in a separate list after all the publications of the national government.

B. Bibliographies

Much time will be saved in finding the literature on a subject if the reader can secure a bibliography of the books and articles related to it. The card-catalogue

may reveal the existence of such a bibliography in the library. The catalogue cards describing bibliographies will be found in the alphabetical position of the word *bibliography* among the subheads of the subject. *The American Library Annual* contains a list of the bibliographies published each year. A librarian can sometimes obtain from the Library of Congress a bibliography on a topic of public interest, and articles in encyclopedias frequently include bibliographies. *The Book Review Digest*, an "evaluation of literature," gives brief notices of the newest books.

A complete bibliography on a subject that has long been under discussion is likely to be of little value. It will contain the titles of hundreds of books and magazine articles, usually with no comment as to their value or the nature of the material to be found in each. It is useless to attempt to read or even to examine all of them. Occasionally one can find a selected bibliography listing only the more authoritative works, or a descriptive bibliography giving for each item some comment that will help one decide whether the book is worth reading. At the end of chapters in textbooks and of articles in encyclopedias will sometimes be found short lists of the more authoritative books on a subject.

C. Reference Works

Reference works are chiefly useful for looking up special items of information. Many of them, however, contain more general information than most people suppose. Some of the more important reference books will be noted here.

Dictionaries. One frequently has need of a dictionary to determine the exact meaning or pronunciation of a word. Most dictionaries also contain a pronouncing gazetteer, or geographical dictionary, and a biographical dictionary. Among the more important dictionaries for ordinary use are the *New Standard Dictionary*, *The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia* (in ten volumes), and the *New International Dictionary*.

One should not rely too implicitly on the dictionary for the meaning of terms employed in public discussion. The dictionary definition of *indenture*, for example, does not give an adequate explanation of the term as used in discussions of public finance. For the definition of technical terms of this sort one can usually turn to a textbook on the subject under consideration.

Encyclopedias are a much neglected source of information. *The Encyclopædia Britannica*, *The New International Encyclopædia*, and *The Encyclopedia Americana* contain information on a great variety of subjects. A number of encyclopedias are devoted to special subjects, for example, Bailey's *Cyclopedia of American Agriculture*, the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, *The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge*, Lalor's *Cyclopædia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States*, and Bliss and Binder's *The New Encyclopedia of Social Reform*.

Annuals. There are several reference works, similar to encyclopedias but published annually, which may be consulted if one desires information that is strictly up to date. The more important of these are *The New*

International Year Book, *The American Year Book*, *The Statesman's Year-Book*, and *The World Almanac*.

For *historical* facts one may consult *Harper's Book of Facts; The New Larned History for Ready Reference;* and Ploetz's *Epitome of Ancient, Mediæval and Modern History*. These are chiefly useful for finding isolated facts, of course, and do not take the place of more complete works.

For *biographical* information the following works are useful: *Dictionary of National Biography;* the *National Cyclopædia of American Biography*, devoted mainly to contemporaries; *Who's Who*, an English work, and *Who's Who in America* (both dealing with living people); Allibone's *A Critical Dictionary of English Literature and British and American Authors*.

Isolated bits of information about authors or literature can usually be found in one of the following books: Granger's *An Index to Poetry and Recitations*, giving titles, authors, and first lines; Brewer's *Dictionary of Phrase and Fable*, "giving the derivation, source, or origin of common phrases, allusions and words that have a tale to tell"; Brewer's *The Reader's Handbook* of famous names in fiction, allusions, references, proverbs, plots, stories, and poems; Bartlett's *Familiar Quotations;* Harbottle and Dalbiac's *Dictionary of Quotations*, including quotations classical and modern, in English and in foreign tongues.

D. Books on Special Subjects

On nearly any public question of importance it is possible to find one or more authoritative books presenting an impartial exposition of the subject. Books

can often be found dealing with the history of the question under consideration, and these are especially helpful in providing a background of fact. It is important to learn how much of an authority the author is. If the reader is not sufficiently familiar with the field to know who the authorities are, he can learn something about the author of a book by consulting one of the biographical dictionaries.

It frequently happens that the most recent books on a subject are not yet in the library. For this reason it is usually wise, in looking up material, to consult *The Cumulative Book Index*. This is a periodical appearing monthly and containing the titles of all of the books that have been published during that month. The numbers are cumulated every two or three months and at the end of each year are gathered into an annual volume. A copy of the *Cumulative Index* can be found in the reference room of nearly any library. Other publications of the same sort are *The American Catalogue of Books*, beginning with 1876; *The United States Catalogue, Books in Print, 1912; The United States Catalogue, Books in Print, 1928; The English Catalogue of Books*, beginning with 1801; the American book-trade publications; and the catalogue of the Library of Congress (which is found in forty-five of the largest libraries of the country).

E. Pamphlets

One can sometimes find reports and other material in pamphlets of more recent publication than any of the books on a subject.

Government reports are especially useful. The

United States government regularly publishes the *Abstract of the Census;* the *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, dealing with population, finance, commerce, products, immigration, and education; and the Senate and House documents. The Senate and House documents are classified as follows: *Senate Executive Documents*, *Senate Miscellaneous*, *Senate Reports* (of committees), *House Executive Documents*, *House Miscellaneous*, *House Reports* (of committees). In addition, various branches of the government from time to time issue special reports on all sorts of subjects from child labor to the extermination of the boll weevil. For finding these government publications we have the *Monthly Catalogue*, *United States Public Documents*, and the *Index to the Reports and Documents* for each session of Congress. A report issued by a department can be found by looking in the library catalogue under "United States" for the name of the department. A copy of most of these reports can be obtained free of charge or at a nominal cost by sending to the Department or to the Superintendent of Documents, at Washington, D. C.

Other pamphlet material can be found in the published reports and propaganda issued by various societies and organizations interested in reform movements. A few such societies which regularly issue pamphlet material are the League for Industrial Democracy, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the National Transportation Institute, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Fellowship of Reconciliation. The monthly publication of the League of Nations is also useful. The annual *Bulletin of the Public Affairs*

Information Service lists pamphlets on all subjects and from many sources.

F. Periodicals

Magazine articles are more often controversial than informational, but certain magazines contain authoritative discussions by investigators of standing. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *The American Economic Review*, and *The Yale Review* are of this sort. In general, the learned journals devoted to economic and social science can be relied upon for impartial statement of facts. The *Congressional Record* contains a verbatim report of debates and transactions in both houses of the federal legislature. *The Congressional Digest* is a monthly publication which reviews the more important debates in Congress, each number usually being devoted to some one problem, such as child labor, immigration, or the World Court.

As a guide to magazine articles we have *Poole's Index to Periodical Literature*. This index covers the period from 1882 to 1910. For later years we have the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. It is published monthly and cumulated every two or three months. It began in 1902, under the name of the *Cumulative Index*. More technical articles are listed in the *International Index to Periodicals*. For articles dealing with special subjects we have *The Dramatic Index*, which appears as Part II of each volume of *The Annual Magazine Subject-Index; The Industrial Arts Index;* and *The Agricultural Index*.

For finding articles in newspapers one may turn to the yearly indexes published by *The Times*, of London, and by *The New York Times*. These may be used for other papers by taking the dates as clues. The indexes of such weekly and monthly publications as review current events will help in fixing the dates of newspaper items. *The American Library Annual* has an index to dates of importance in each year, and the *Information Annual* is a digest of current events that can be used with newspaper files. The bound volumes of several daily and weekly papers can be found in nearly any library. *The New York Times* is the standard paper for reference work. Most college and city libraries have files of this paper, together with *The New York Times Index*.

EXERCISES

I. Make a brief examination of all of the reference works referred to in this chapter.

II. Make a bibliography of the books and articles you will wish to read during your investigation of the subject you intend to discuss in a series of class-room speeches.

CHAPTER XVII

BRIEFING AND OUTLINING

Argument may be expressed in extended discourse, as in a speech or an article, or it may be condensed and arranged in the form of a chart. The latter form possesses the advantage of making apparent at a glance the relation between the various parts of the argument. Though less effective rhetorically than extended discourse, it is better adapted to the statement of argument for critical examination. Two types of charts will be discussed here, the brief and the outline. The brief is primarily useful in stating in condensed form the arguments collected during the study of a question, and the outline in organizing argumentative material for use in a speech or article.

I. THE BRIEF

A. The Nature and Purpose of the Brief

A brief is a statement, in the form of a chart, of the argument on the affirmative, or on the negative, side of a proposition, together with the exposition necessary to make the argument intelligible. Essential features of the brief are that each point in the argument is expressed in the form of a statement and that these

statements are so arranged as to make immediately apparent the relation of each point to the argument as a whole. The statement of argument in a brief is made without any reference to the personal convictions of the one who draws the brief or of any audience he may expect to address.

The analysis of the proposition, the collection of material, and the examination of this material in the light of the questions revealed by analysis will result in a long list of arguments on either side of the proposition. As these arguments are collected and arranged, they should be embodied in an affirmative and a negative brief. Only when the investigator has the entire argument spread out before him in this manner will it be possible for him to arrive at an intelligent conclusion regarding the truth of the proposition. The brief is thus, first of all, an instrument for use in the investigation of a problem. When the investigation has been completed, either the affirmative or the negative brief will serve as a storehouse from which arguments may be drawn for use in any particular speech or article.

By a "brief" we mean a complete statement of the argument on one side of a question, but we also speak of "briefing" a single argument, meaning to put it in the form employed in the brief. The practice of briefing single arguments is useful in a variety of ways. It puts argument in the form in which it may most conveniently be submitted to another person for criticism; it aids in the clarification and organization of one's own thoughts; it helps one to understand difficult arguments encountered in reading or debate; it makes more

apparent the weakness or fallacy in an argument. Skill in briefing is, indeed, almost indispensable to one who would handle argument effectively.

B. Rules for Drawing the Brief

General Rules. *Rule 1. The brief should be divided into two parts, introduction and discussion.* As we have already indicated, a complete statement of the case for or against a proposition includes argument and usually a certain amount of expository material necessary to make the argument intelligible. The two types of material should be separated, the expository material being restricted to the introduction and the argument to the discussion.

Rule 2. Each point in the brief should be in the form of a complete statement. Any point in an argument may be expressed in the form of a complete statement, and is perfectly intelligible only when so expressed. A student formulating his thoughts on the benefits of the honor system in examinations might set down his ideas in something like the following form:

Benefits of honor system
Freedom from distraction during examinations
Proctors essential feature of present system—distract student—eliminated by honor system
Rest during examination—student may leave room

The first step in reducing these fragmentary notes to the form of a brief is to express each point as a complete statement, as follows:

The honor system would benefit the student.
It would free the student from distraction during examinations.
The presence of proctors is an essential feature of the present system.
These proctors distract the student.
The honor system would eliminate the proctor.
It would enable the student to rest during examinations.
Under the honor system the student may leave the room during the course of the examination.

Two exceptions may be made to the general rule that each point in the brief should be in the form of a complete statement. The first is that the main questions revealed by analysis, which are stated in the introduction (see rule 10), are expressed in the form of questions. The second is that in briefing expository material, words or phrases may take the place of complete statements when complete statements would involve repetition without any compensating gain in clarity. The example cited under rule 11 illustrates the permissible use of phrases in expository briefing.

Rule 3. Each point in the brief should be in the form of a single terse statement. Only one statement is required to express any point. When several sentences are used, or when a compound or a complex sentence is used, it is likely that two or more points are being confused. The following statements are objectionable for this reason:

The honor system eliminates the proctor, which frees the student from distraction during examinations.
The World Court would not only settle disputes justly, but it would also settle them promptly.

In the interest of brevity as well as of clarity, each statement should be expressed tersely. The following statements are not only confusing, but defeat one purpose of the brief, which is to bring the argument into a brief compass:

The proctor, though he may never be noticed by some students, undoubtedly does distract the nervous student by continually walking up and down the room.

It is clear that one of the chief advantages of the World Court as compared with every other known method of settling international disputes is the promptness with which it can settle a case.

The following statements would be preferable:

The proctor distracts some students.

The World Court settles cases promptly.

Rule 4. All statements in the brief should be arranged as heads and subheads. If the statements regarding the honor system used to illustrate rule 2 are examined, it will be found that some are more important than others. The first statement (the honor system would benefit the student) is the principal statement to which all the others are subordinate. The remaining statements may be grouped under the two statements "It would free the student from distraction during examinations" and "It would enable the student to rest during examinations." The logical relation between the statements can be indicated by arranging them as heads and subheads, as follows:

I. The honor system would benefit the student.
   A. It would free the student from distraction during examinations.

1. The presense of proctors is an essential feature of the present system.
2. These proctors distract the student.
3. The honor system would eliminate the proctor.

B. It would enable the student to rest during examinations.

1. Under the honor system the student may leave the room during the course of the examination.

This chart makes it apparent at a glance that the coördinate statements A and B support I; that the coördinate statements 1, 2, and 3 support A; and that 1 supports B.

Material in the introduction, also, should be arranged as heads and subheads.

Rule 5. The relation between heads and subheads should be indicated by the consistent use of symbols and indentation. It is immaterial what system of symbols is used, but care must be taken that the system employed is used consistently. The following system is used in this book:

I. .....,
  A. .....,
    1. .....,
      a. .....,
        (I) ....., etc.

Care should be taken that all statements marked with the same type of symbol receive the same degree of indentation; that is, all statements marked with capital letters should receive the same indentation, all marked with arabic numerals, the same indentation, and so on. It is essential that every statement in the brief be marked with a symbol.

When several coördinate statements are interdependent, as are the two premises of a syllogism, their interdependence may be indicated by using the same symbol for both and placing a prime after the second symbol, as in the following example:

I. The adoption of capital punishment throughout the United States would not decrease crime,
  A. The adoption of a penalty which juries are loath to inflict would not decrease crime, and
  A′. Juries are loath to inflict the death penalty.
  B. Capital punishment has not decreased crime where it has been used.

Rule 6. No head or subhead should be marked with more than one symbol. In a carelessly drawn brief one sometimes finds a statement marked with two symbols, as follows:

I. Military training benefits the individual,
  A. It benefits him physically,
    1. It develops the physique.
    2. It inculcates habits of healthful living.
  B. 1. It teaches obedience to superiors.
    2. It teaches orderliness.

This briefing indicates that the last two statements are related, but it does not indicate the nature of the relation. To do this is would be necessary to introduce a statement, labeled B, which supported I and which summed up the coördinate statements 1 and 2. The following briefing would accomplish this:

B. It benefits him morally,
  1. It teaches obedience to superiors.
  2. It teaches orderliness.

Rule 7. The source of quotations and statements of fact should be indicated in parentheses at the close of the head in which they appear. A reference which any one examining the brief might wish to verify should be indicated as follows:

I. The resources of Cuba are capable of further development,
   A. James Bryce says Cuba can support a population of 10,000,000, seven times her present population. (*The North American Review*, vol. 174, p. 446.)
   B. Ten times the present acreage in sugar is available for good sugar plantations. (Report of the Department of Commerce and Labor, May, 1905.) [1]

Rules for the Introduction. *Rule 8. No argument should appear in the introduction.* The introduction should be strictly unbiased, containing no statement that would not be acceptable to any intelligent, well-informed person regardless of his views on the proposition.

Rule 9. The introduction should contain any exposition necessary to make the argument intelligible. In addition to the definition of any terms used in the proposition which would not be readily intelligible, the expository topics most often useful in the introduction are the immediate cause of discussion, the origin of the question, the history of the question, an exposition of the proposal advocated in the proposition, and the exclusion of irrelevant matter. These topics are discussed in section V of the chapter on "Exposition."

Rule 10. The introduction should contain a statement of at least the main questions revealed by analy-

[1] Adapted from a brief in W. T. Foster's *Argumentation and Debating* (1917), p. 331.

sis. All of the argument in the discussion is addressed to one or another of the questions revealed by analysis. A statement of these questions in the introduction helps to make the argument intelligible by making clear what must be proved to establish or overthrow the proposition.

Rule 11. Each subhead in the introduction should help to explain the head to which it is subordinate. When expository material is properly arranged as heads and subheads, each subhead contributes to the explanation of the head to which it is subordinate, as in the following example:

I. The jurisdiction of the World Court is defined in the Statute of the Court.
  A. The jurisdiction of the court "comprises all cases which the parties refer to it." (The Statute of the Court, Art. 36.)
  B. According to the Statute of the Court, four types of cases are recognized as generally suited for arbitration by the court:
    1. The interpretation of a treaty,
    2. Any question of international law,
    3. The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of any international law,
    4. The extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach.

Rules for the Discussion. *Rule 12. The discussion should contain all of the argument on the given side of the proposition.* This rule implies, not only that the discussion should include all of the arguments which a speaker would be likely to need in addressing

any audience, but also that each argument should be stated completely; that is, the brief should include those statements of fact and principle and those citations from authority upon which the argument is based. The discussion is not an outline of the main points of the argument; it is the argument itself in its entirety. If the brief is correctly drawn in this respect, it will be possible for a reader to evaluate the argument without making inquiries regarding the matters of fact or principle upon which the argument is based.

Rule 13. The discussion should contain nothing but argument. All expository material should be restricted to the introduction. Material, also, which is merely illustrative, though properly used in a speech for interest or impressiveness, is out of place in the brief. The brief contains only the argument, stripped of all rhetorical elaboration.

Rule 14. The main heads and subheads in the discussion should correspond to those questions revealed by analysis which are included in the introduction. This means not only that there should be argument on each of the questions, but also that the argument should be arranged in the order followed in the statement of the questions, and that the headings should by their wording reveal their relation to those questions. The introduction of an affirmative brief on the proposition "The United States should abandon military protection of American private property in Latin America" (see the specimen of analysis in section II of Chapter IV) would contain the following statement of questions:

A. Is a change in our Latin American policy desirable?
B. Would the abandonment of military protection be a satisfactory change in policy?

With this statement of questions in the introduction, the two main heads in the discussion would necessarily be as follows:

I. A change in our Latin American policy is desirable.
II. The abandonment of military protection would be a satisfactory change in policy.

Rule 15. Each main head in the discussion should read as a reason for the truth (or the falsity) of the proposition. In an affirmative brief each main head should be so phrased that it can be connected with the proposition by the preposition *for*, as in the following example:

Proposition: The United States should abandon military protection of American private property in Latin America, for
I. A change in our Latin American policy is desirable.
II. The abandonment of military protection would be a satisfactory change in policy.

In a negative brief each main head should be so phrased that it can be connected by *for* with a negative statement of the proposition. In a negative brief on the Latin American question, for example, the first two main heads would read as follows:

I. There is no need for a change in our Latin American policy.
II. The abandonment of military protection would not be a satisfactory change in policy even if a change were desirable.

Rule 16. Each subhead in the discussion should read as a reason for the truth of the head to which it is subordinate. Conformity to this rule may be tested by the use of the word *for*, as in the following example:

I. Trial by jury delays the administration of justice, for
  A. Time is consumed in the selection of the jury, for
    1. Each prospective juror may be challenged for cause by either the prosecution or the defense.
    2. Both the prosecution and the defense have the privilege of peremptorily challenging a certain number of jurors.
  B. Time is consumed by the deliberation of the jury.
  C. In case of a disagreement, time is consumed by a retrial.

A brief in which the word *hence* or *therefore* occurs, or in which either of these words would correctly state the relation between a head and the subhead following it, is incorrectly drawn. The fault may be illustrated as follows:

I. In case of a disagreement, time is consumed by a retrial, hence
  A. Trial by jury delays the administration of justice.

It is apparent that statement A is the principal statement to which I is subordinate. This method of arrangement is unsatisfactory because it places the principal statement in a less conspicious position than the subordinate statement. To conform to rule 16, the second statement should be labeled I; the first should be labeled A; and the order of the statements should be reversed.

Some care is required in phrasing a head which introduces refutation. The following briefing is objec-

tionable, for it does not make sufficiently apparent the relation between the statements:

I. The World Court can settle important international disputes,
  A. It is argued that in an important dispute the losing party would not abide by the decision, but
    1. This is untrue,
      a. Public opinion would secure acceptance of the decision.

The argument would be clearer if stated as follows:

I. The World Court can settle important international disputes,
  A. The argument that in important cases the losing party would not accept the decision is unsound,
    1. Public opinion would enforce acceptance of the decision.

Care must also be taken to avoid the use of subheads which explain rather than prove the head to which they are subordinate. The fault is illustrated in the following example:

I. The World Court has not settled any important disputes,
  A. Nations are unwilling to submit important disputes to it.

If it is assumed that the cases brought before the court have been unimportant, subhead A helps to explain why this is true, but it does not prove that the cases as a matter of fact have been unimportant. To do this it would be necessary to examine each of the cases and show that all, or most, of them have been unimportant. An explanatory subhead can sometimes

be so stated as to become true argument. The following example, for instance, conforms to the rule we are discussing.

I. It is unlikely that the World Court will be able to settle important disputes,
  A. Nations have shown themselves unwilling to submit such disputes to an arbitral body.

Rule 17. A head introducing refutation should state the argument to be answered and the character of the answer to be made to it. The following examples illustrate the most effective way of phrasing heads which introduce refutation:

A. The argument that decisions of the World Court will not be accepted is unsound, etc.
A. The argument that capital punishment has lowered the crime-rate where it has been used is based on a misinterpretation of the figures, etc.
A. The argument that the Eighteenth Amendment has the support of the American people is irrelevant to this question, etc.

Rule 18. A head introducing counter-argument should state the argument against which the counter-argument is directed in a subordinate clause preceding the principal clause. A counter-argument seeks to dispose of an opposing argument, not by showing that it is unsound, but by opposing to it another argument or consideration of equal or greater importance. The following example illustrates the clearest method of phrasing a head which introduces counter-argument:

I. Although our military interventions infringe somewhat upon the sovereignty of Latin American governments,

yet such interventions are to the advantage of the Latin American people,

A. They stabilize governments which might otherwise collapse, etc.

The rules for use in drawing the brief are here collected for reference:

GENERAL RULES

1. The brief should be divided into two parts, introduction and discussion.
2. Each point in the brief should be in the form of a complete statement.
3. Each point in the brief should be in the form of a single terse statement.
4. All statements in the brief should be arranged as heads and subheads.
5. The relation between heads and subheads should be indicated by the consistent use of symbols and indentation.
6. No head or subhead should be marked with more than one symbol.
7. The source of quotations and statements of fact should be indicated in parentheses at the close of the head in which they appear.

RULES FOR THE INTRODUCTION

8. No argument should appear in the introduction.
9. The introduction should contain any exposition necessary to make the argument intelligible.
10. The introduction should contain a statement of at least the main questions revealed by analysis.
11. Each subhead in the introduction should help to explain the head to which it is subordinate.

RULES FOR THE DISCUSSION

12. The discussion should contain all of the argument on the given side of the proposition.

13. The discussion should contain nothing but argument.

14. The main heads and subheads in the discussion should correspond to those questions revealed by analysis which are included in the introduction.

15. Each main head in the discussion should read as a reason for the truth (or the falsity) of the proposition.

16. Each subhead in the discussion should read as a reason for the truth of the head to which it is subordinate.

17. A head introducing refutation should state the argument to be answered and the character of the answer to be made to it.

18. A head introducing counter-argument should state the argument against which the counter-argument is directed in a subordinate clause preceding the principal clause.

C. A Specimen of Briefing

AN AFFIRMATIVE BRIEF[2]

ON THE PROPOSITION

The practice of buying "consumption" goods on the instalment plan is detrimental to the American people.

INTRODUCTION

I. Two terms appearing in the proposition require definition:
   A. "Consumption goods" are goods for immediate consumption as distinguished from goods for use in production.
   B. "The instalment plan" is the plan of paying for goods in fixed portions at stated intervals.

II. The volume of instalment buying, especially of certain commodities, has increased at a phenomenal rate during the last decade.
   A. Professor Seligman says, "So far as ordinary commodities are concerned, the instalment method has

[2] Prepared by Elvajean Hall, Oberlin College, 1930.

been applied for over a century to the furniture business, for over three-quarters of a century to sewing machines, and for over half a century to pianos and books." (*The Economics of Instalment Selling*, p. 54.)

B. "The real change [in the volume of instalment buying] may be ascribed to the introduction of the method in the case of automobiles, beginning a little over a decade ago." (*Ibid.*, p. 54.)

C. "The colossal growth of the automobile business and the multiplication of finance companies during the last five years finally led to the application of the instalment system to many other lines of industry. As a consequence durable goods and commodities that are not sold on the instalment system form today the exception rather than the rule." (*Ibid.*, p. 54.)

D. Milan V. Ayres estimates that in 1925 of all goods sold the per cent sold on the instalment plan was as follows:

New automobiles	76
New trucks	80
Household furniture	70
Pianos	90
Phonographs	80
Radio sets	75
Washing-machines	90
Vacuum cleaners	85
Sewing-machines	90
Gas stoves	70
Mechanical refrigerators	90
Jewelry store goods	25
Clothing	5
Tractors	75
Other farm machinery	10

("Instalment Selling and Financing," a paper read at the Third National Automotive Financing Conference, Chicago, November, 1926.)

III. Analysis of the proposition:
  A. With reference to instalment buying, the American people can be divided into the following groups:
    1. Sellers,
    2. Buyers.
  B. The two main questions upon which evidence must be examined are the following:
    1. Is the sale of consumption goods on the instalment plan detrimental to the seller?
    2. Is the sale of consumption goods on the instalment plan detrimental to the buyer?

DISCUSSION

I. The sale of consumption goods on the instalment plan is detrimental to the seller,
  A. It encourages overproduction,
    1. It has caused overproduction in the automobile industry,
      a. There has been overproduction in the automobile industry.
      b. Increase in the production of automobiles has been caused by selling on the instalment plan,
        (I) According to Milan V. Ayres, 76 per cent of the new automobiles and 80 per cent of the new trucks solds in 1925 were sold on the instalment plan. ("Instalment Selling and Financing.")
        (II) C. L. Hemphill says, "The factor which has made possible this remarkable development of an infant industry [the automobile industry] during the past 25 years and without which this business could not hope to maintain its present conditions is credit,—the credit granted to the purchaser of automobiles." ("Principles of Credit," *Commercial Investment Trust.*)
    2. It has caused overproduction in the radio industry,

a. The radio market has reached the saturation point,

(I) On April 1, 1928, the per cent of all families in the various population groups having radios was as follows:

Larger cities	37.16
Smaller cities	41.17
Rural towns	31.76
Farms	28.81

(Policyholders' Service Bureau of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Bulletin on "Radio as an Advertising Medium," p. 5.)

(II) In March, 1929, the per cent of families having radios was especially high in certain States:

California	90.73
Nevada	96.75
Oregon	72.24

("Radio as an Advertising Medium," p. 8.)

b. This large volume of radio sales was caused by selling on the instalment plan,

(I) According to Milan V. Ayres, 70 per cent of radio sales in 1925 were on the instalment plan. ("Instalment Selling and Financing.")

c. This large volume of sales has been followed by depression in the radio industry,

(I) The retail price of radio sets has been sharply cut.

(II) During the general depression in the fall of 1929 the drop in the value of radio stocks was especially severe,

(A) *Radio Corporation* stock dropped from 114 to 26.

(B) *Kolster Radio* stock dropped from 78 to 5.

B. The sale of consumption goods on the instalment plan causes inflation of credit,
   1. People tend to buy to the extent of their credit.
   2. Under the instalment plan many who could not borrow at the bank can buy on credit,
      a. Under the instalment plan no security is required of the buyer, whereas
      b. Banks require security on loans to most people.

C. The sale of consumption of goods on the instalment plan causes "frozen credit,"
   1. Finance paper which is not accepted by Federal Reserve Banks for rediscount cannot readily be liquidated.
   2. Instalment paper is not accepted for rediscount by Federal Reserve Banks. (*Federal Reserve Bulletin*, 1918, p. 197.)

II. The sale of consumption goods on the instalment plan is detrimental to the buyer,

A. The extra charge made for an article sold on the instalment plan often represents an excessive interest charge on the debt,
   1. Purchasers of Ford and Chevrolet cars on the instalment plan pay the equivalent of about 15 per cent interest on their debt. (Computed from the 1929 rate charts of the Ford and Chevrolet companies.)
   2. Purchasers of diamonds on the instalment plan from Montgomery Ward and Company pay the equivalent of 40 per cent interest on their debt. (Computed from the statement of terms in the Montgomery Ward catalogue for 1929.)
   3. Purchasers of Ford parts on the instalment plan from Montgomery Ward and Company pay the equivalent of 59 per cent interest on their debt. (Computed from the statement of terms in the Montgomery Ward catalogue for 1929.)

B. The sale of consumption goods on the instalment plan encourages the excessive purchase of luxuries,

1. About 6.7 per cent of our entire national income is spent annually in the purchase and use of automobiles, radios, and phonographs alone,
   a. In 1928 our national income was $89,419,000,000. (*The Wall Street Journal*, quoted in *The Literary Digest*, Jan. 4, 1930, p. 56.)
   b. According to Stuart Chase, in the year 1928 $6,000,000,000 was spent in the purchase and use of automobiles, radios, and phonographs. ("Play," in Beard's *Whither Mankind*, p. 336.)
2. According to Milan V. Ayres, in 1925 the following per cent of all automobiles, radios, and phonographs were purchased on the instalment plan:

Automobiles	76
Radios	75
Phonographs	80

II. THE OUTLINE

A. Nature and Purpose of the Outline

We will suppose that a student has completed his study of proposition, has embodied the results of the study in an affirmative and negative brief on the proposition, and, after weighing the argument on both sides of the question, has decided that the proposition is, or is not, true. He is now ready to consider the construction of a speech for some particular audience. In the preparation of the speech he will consider those matters discussed in earlier chapters: the proof requirements of his thesis, the types of argument to be employed, the selection and use of premises, the citation of authority, the attitude of the audience

toward the speaker and toward the proposition, interest, and refutation. As he considers these matters and the speech begins to take shape in his mind, he will need another chart, differing somewhat from the brief, in which to set down the material to be used in the speech. Such a chart is the outline.

The outline serves two purposes, the most important of which is to assist the speaker in the preparation of a speech. Unless the argument is set down in brief but intelligible form, it is difficult to keep in mind all of the material to be used and the order in which it is to be presented. The outline is also useful in the analysis of another's speech. Before one can make an intelligent study of a speech, such as one of those in the Appendix, it is often necessary to reduce it to the form of an outline sufficiently condensed to make the different parts of the speech and their relation to each other apparent at a glance.

A speech usually has three parts, introduction, discussion, and conclusion. The outline has the same parts. Judgment must be exercised in deciding how full to make the outline. It should be sufficiently full to enable a person other than the speaker to ascertain from it what material is to be used. To include a statement of minor illustrations and the like, however, would make the outline so long that it would lose part of its usefulness as a brief chart of the speech. It is perhaps safe to say that the outline for a ten-minute speech should be about one page long.

As regards form, the outline follows in general the rules already prescribed for the brief. Each point should be expressed in the form of a terse statement.

These statements should be arranged as heads and subheads, and a system of indentation and notation should be used consistently to indicate the logical relation between heads. It is apparent that the use of this method of arranging the points makes it impossible to indicate in the outline the order in which points are to be presented when the premise-conclusion method of arranging argument is to be followed wholly or in part. When this method is followed in the speech, the speaker presents first, not the main head of the argument, but the subheads to be used in developing it. The main head is then presented as a conclusion drawn from the premises. This arrangement of argument cannot well be indicated in the outline without destroying most of its intelligibility as a chart. In other respects, however, the outline should clearly indicate the order in which material is to be presented. When the speaker wishes to imply rather than to state one of his heads, the head to be implied will appear in the outline inclosed in parentheses.

B. Specimens of Outlining

The following outline is for a class-room speech of about ten minutes in length.

Title

MILITARY TRAINING FOR CARSON COLLEGE

INTRODUCTION

I. The students of Carson College have just petitioned the Board of Trustees to establish military training in the college.

II. Exposition: This training would be directed by commissioned officers in the United States Army.

III. Thesis: Military training in college benefits the individual student.

IV. Partition: I shall show that the student is benefited in two ways:

A. Military training benefits the student physically.

B. Military training benefits the student morally.

DISCUSSION

I. Military training benefits the student physically,

A. It builds up the student's physique,

1. The exercises are sufficiently rigorous to afford genuine physical training for young men.

2. These exercises are practised daily.

3. The appearance of men who have attended military training camps indicates that such training develops the physique.

B. Military training improves the student's general health,

1. It develops regular habits of living.

2. It provides regular outdoor exercise,

a. There is either a close-order drill or a hike every day.

C. The belief that some students would be harmed by the exercises is unfounded,

1. Those who are physically defective would not receive the training.

2. At the beginning of the training the exercises are not strenuous.

II. Military training benefits the student morally,

A. It instils respect for authority.

B. It develops habits of orderliness,

1. This fact is illustrated by the care the student must take of his equipment.

CONCLUSION

Provision for military training would do as much for the student, physically and morally, as any other measure the Board of Trustees could adopt.

The following is an outline of David D. Field's address, "The Child and the State." [3] It illustrates the type of outline to be used in the rhetorical analysis of a speech.

Title

THE CHILD AND THE STATE

INTRODUCTION

I. The picture of "The Homeless Boy" illustrates the wretched condition of homeless children.
II. The condition illustrated by the picture argues a serious defect in our Christian civilization.
   A. New York City has 12,000 homeless children under the age of twelve.
   B. This condition of wretchedness exists side by side with wealth and luxury.
III. Failure to provide for the homeless child is due to ignorance rather than to lack of sympathy.
IV. The case of one tenement child places the problem before us.
V. All would agree that the State should protect this child from violence.
VI. The State should also provide for the child.
VII. I concede two points at the outset:
   A. I concede that the State should not supersede the family except in case of necessity.
   B. I concede that the State need not act from a motive of charity.

[3] The article is reprinted in the Appendix.

DISCUSSION

I. It is the duty of the State to provide for homeless children,
  A. Public economy imposes this duty upon the State,
    1. The cost to the State of police, courts, and prisons is great, and
    1′. Proper care of children would decrease this expense,
      a. Children properly cared for do not become criminals.
  B. Public safety imposes this duty upon the State,
    1. Homeless children are future voters.

II. The right of the State to interfere in the care of children has already been recognized,
  A. It is recognized in the truancy laws.
  B. It is recognized in sections 287, 288, 289, and 291 of the Penal Code regarding deserted and mistreated children.
  C. It is recognized in sections 887, 888, and 893 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding juvenile vagrancy.

III. The present laws regarding homeless children are unsatisfactory,
  A. They cannot be properly enforced.
  B. They treat the child as a criminal.

IV. In its treatment of homeless children, the aim of the State should be twofold:
  A. When possible it should compel the parents to support the child.
  B. Through the aid of incorporated institutions of public charity it should place the child in a satisfactory home.

CONCLUSION

I. There should be a public guardian of homeless children charged with the duty of examining individual cases and taking appropriate action.

II. Every police officer should be required and every citizen should be permitted to bring a homeless child before this guardian.

III. The child should not be treated as a criminal.

EXERCISES

I. Brief the second specimen of argument in the Appendix.

II. As you proceed with the investigation of the subject upon which you are to make a series of class-room speeches, put the results of your study in the form of an affirmative and a negative brief.

III. Make an outline of the third specimen of argument in the Appendix.

CHAPTER XVIII

DELIVERY

I. CONVERSATIONAL QUALITY

In a text of this kind, space does not permit an extended discussion of what constitutes excellence in delivery or of the methods of achieving it. All that can be attempted is a statement of fundamental principles. The subject might be omitted entirely were it not that some students have a complete misconception of what good delivery is. Unless such a misconception is corrected at the beginning, their platform work may do them more harm than good.

As regards delivery, public speaking is best thought of as a conversation between the speaker and his audience. It is not a one-man activity, but involves a process of give-and-take in which the audience plays an active and important part. To every statement the speaker makes, the audience responds in one way or another, even though they give no outward sign of their response. Usually they betray something of their reaction. If they are interested in the speaker's remarks, they show it by being attentive; if they are bored, they express their boredom by restlessness and inattention; if they are pleased, they applaud or nod assent; if they are displeased, they hiss or rather pointedly withhold

applause. Experienced speakers become very sensitive to these signs of the reaction of the audience.

Not only should the speaker conceive of his speaking as an enlarged conversation, but he should, while on the platform, have the *feeling* that it is conversation. He should not feel that he is talking *at* his audience or over their heads, but that he is talking *with* them. His delivery will not be effective unless he feels that he has entered into a direct, personal relation with his hearers.

This conception of public speaking as a conversation between the speaker and his audience will be clearer if we contrast with it several common misconceptions of the nature of public speech.

The most common misconception is that public speaking is an exhibition comparable to singing or acting, in which the speaker goes through his performance while the audience looks on and admires. A speaker who has this misconception is apt to put on a grand manner and to "orate" at his audience, speaking as he imagines Daniel Webster or Demosthenes must have spoken. High school declaimers and Fourth of July orators often have this particular misunderstanding of the speaker's relation with his audience.

A closely related misconception is that delivery is a complicated artificial process, essentially different from ordinary speaking, and that it requires the conscious use of an elaborate set of rules. Those who consciously manage their hands and voices by rule while on the platform are artificial and affected in their manner of speaking. Their delivery is almost certain to lack genuineness and spontaneity, and their attention is likely to be so much taken up with the technique of

their speaking that they can give little attention to the content of the speech or the reaction of the audience.

Occasionally a student feels, or has been told, that his delivery is not conversational, and yet cannot decide just why it is not. It may help such a speaker to notice that his delivery is conversational when, and only when, two conditions exist. These conditions have to do, not with the management of his voice or his body, but with his state of mind while on the platform.

The first condition of conversational delivery is a *full realization of the content of one's words as one utters them.* The speaker must not recite empty words; his mind must be concentrated on the meaning of each sentence as he speaks it. When this condition does not exist, he speaks absent-mindedly. The badly frightened school-boy speaking his "piece" on Friday afternoon often illustrates the fault. His hearers feel that he is parroting the words he has learned and that his own mind is a blank during the process. He is not concentrating his mind on what he says at the time he says it. This fault is especially likely to occur when one is speaking from memory or from a manuscript, but it sometimes occurs in extemporaneous speaking. Even an experienced speaker may not infrequently realize that his mind has wandered and that he has been talking while hardly aware of what he was saying.

The second condition of conversational delivery is a *lively sense of communication.* The speaker must feel that he is talking with some one rather than to himself. Absence of this feeling of communicativeness results in the fault of soliloquizing. All are familiar with the college lecturer who gives the impression that he is talk-

ing to himself rather than to his audience. Frequently this impression is confirmed by the fact that he does not look directly at his audience, but at his notes, out of a window, or at a spot on the back wall of the room. Failure to look at the audience is almost always accompanied by the fault of soliloquizing. Indeed, the speaker can do much to overcome the fault by the mere expedient of forcing himself to look at the audience. The fault of soliloquizing is especially likely to occur when the speaker is not properly prepared and is obliged to devote so much of his attention to formulating his argument that he forgets the audience.

If the speaker has a full realization of the content of his words as he utters them and a lively sense of communication, his delivery will have the fundamentally important virtue of conversational quality.

It should not be supposed that the advice to develop delivery with conversational quality carries with it any suggestion that delivery should be careless, weak, or commonplace or that it should necessarily be informal. It is the contact of mind with mind, the give-and-take, the communicative element of conversation that should be striven for; and this may be achieved both in the simplest talk and in the most eloquent address.[1]

It should be noted that conversational quality alone does not insure good delivery. Delivery possessing conversational quality may also have all of the faults of the speaker's private conversation, perhaps in an ex-

[1] It should be noted that conversational quality is not the same as conversational manner, style, or mode, with which it is sometimes confused. Whether conversational style is good in a given instance depends upon various considerations, but conversational quality should be present in all public speaking.

aggerated degree. When the speaker has learned to speak conversationally on the platform, he may profitably devote attention to improving his delivery in such particulars as bearing, gesture, pronunciation, enunciation, and the quality, control, and expressiveness of the voice. Excellence in these respects, however, is to be developed mainly by drill in private rather than by giving attention to them while on the platform. For a fuller discussion of this aspect of delivery the reader is referred to Chapters II, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, and XVII of Winans' *Public Speaking*.[2]

II. METHODS OF DELIVERY

There are four ways to deliver a speech. It may be delivered extemporaneously, from memory, from manuscript, or impromptu. No one method can be used exclusively, for some occasions call for one method and some for another. The speaker should be skilful in the use of all four.

A. Extemporaneous Speaking

An extemporaneous speech is one for which the speaker has made preparation but which he does not read or deliver from memory. During his preparation he may have decided what material he will use and the order in which he will present it, and he may have drawn up one or more outlines of the speech. He may even have written out the speech to clarify his ideas and to insure that he has words for their expression,

[2] Published by The Century Co.

but if he does not memorize what he has written or read it from the manuscript, he is said to speak extemporaneously.

The chief advantage of the extemporaneous speech is its flexibility. Since the speaker has not committed himself in advance to any particular phraseology and since he may even change somewhat the choice and arrangement of his material after he takes the platform, he can adapt the speech to the exigencies of the situation as they arise. This flexibility is especially needed when the speaker is likely to be interrupted by questions or when, as in a debate, he must adapt his speech somewhat to the argument of an opponent.

For the beginner, extemporaneous speaking has the additional advantage that it affords a better opportunity for the development of conversational quality than does speaking from memory or from manuscript. The inexperienced speaker usually finds it easier to realize fully the content of his words as he utters them if he has not committed himself in advance to a set phraseology. The necessity of keeping an idea in mind while he seeks words for its expression, though it may result in lack of fluency at first, prevents his reciting empty words, as he is likely to do if he is speaking from memory or reading from a manuscript. For this reason it is advisable for most students to begin their platform work with extemporaneous speaking.

The chief disadvantage of extemporaneous speaking is its tendency to encourage carelessness in expression. Henry Ward Beecher, who believed the extemporaneous method best for most occasions, warned young speakers against "the temptation to slovenliness in

workmanship, to careless and inaccurate statement, to repetition, to violation of good taste." [3] The tendency toward slovenliness is very marked. The extemporizer is likely to seize the first word that comes to mind, whether it is just the right word to express his meaning or not. Feeling, sometimes, that he has not exactly expressed his idea, he goes on repeating and becomes verbose. Or he may quite forget to say what he most desired to express. Afterward he experiences the humiliation of remembering this, or of learning from others that he has been misunderstood because of careless statements or omissions.

Something can be done both in the preparation of the speech and during its delivery to overcome this weakness in the extemporaneous method. The practice of writing out portions of the speech with close attention to choice of words and sentence structure encourages precision of statement on the platform. Indeed, the discipline of writing and rewriting is essential to one who would extemporize effectively. While on the platform the speaker cannot, of course, consult a dictionary of synonyms, but he need not use the first word that occurs to him. By speaking deliberately and choosing his words with care he can learn to avoid the slovenliness characteristic of so much extemporaneous speaking.

B. Speaking from Memory

There are some occasions when the speaker feels that it is highly important to say just the right thing in just the right way, but when the use of a manuscript seems

[3] *Yale Lectures on Preaching* (1872), First Series, p. 216.

inappropriate or is for some reason impracticable. It is then necessary to speak from memory. This method permits a care in regard to phraseology and a certainty of saying precisely what one wishes to say that are impossible in extemporaneous speaking. These advantages are so important that speeches are delivered from memory more often than is commonly believed by the inexperienced.

From the point of view of training in public speaking, it may also be urged in favor of this method that occasional use of it in the class-room is helpful in developing a vigorous and impressive delivery. When an inexperienced extemporaneous speaker, lacking in command of words, is feeling his way cautiously through a speech, choosing his words as he goes and hesitating now and then over the expression of his ideas, he is not likely to put as much warmth and vigor into the speech as is necessary for effective delivery. He is afraid to work up to a climax for fear that he will be left groping for words at an inopportune moment or that his language will appear ridiculously inadequate for the expression of his feeling. He consequently seldom attempts any flights above the prosy level of matter-of-fact statement. This may lead in time to a habit of unimpressive delivery. The fault can be corrected by occasionally writing out a speech, memorizing it, and drilling on its delivery.

The disadvantages of speaking from memory can be overcome to some extent by a careful preliminary study of the probable audience and situation, by writing with the audience always in mind, perhaps by talking to the audience in imagination before writing,

and by taking pains to memorize the speech thoroughly. The importance of thorough memorization can hardly be overestimated. With a poorly memorized speech, the speaker has neither the freedom of the extemporizer nor the sureness of the reader.

Speakers often combine the methods of committing to memory and of extemporizing. Certain passages which are difficult or important, as a candidate's statement of policy or his pledges, are fixed in memory, and also passages in which particularly effective expression is desired. This method decreases the speaker's freedom somewhat, for he must lead up to these passages, and sometimes an effect of incongruity is produced by the contrast between them and the extemporaneous parts. "But," as Brander Matthews says, "there is no denying the popularity of this third method with the speakers of the first rank, at whose hands its possibilities have been adroitly improved. John Bright used to write out certain parts of his more important speeches. So did Mr. Gladstone. Daniel Webster, a far greater orator than either of them, had stored his capacious memory with arguments that might lie there for years ready for his use. The Reply to Hayne was not written out before delivery, either as a whole or in part, but it certainly contained more than one mighty passage the wording of which had been elaborately prepared against the long-waited occasion." [4]

C. Speaking from Manuscript

When a speaker wishes to deliver a written speech but lacks time for memorizing or dares not trust to

[4] *Notes on Speech-Making* (Longmans, Green & Co., 1901), p. 31.

memory, he must read from a manuscript. Many college lecturers, who deliver several long lectures in a week, find this the only practicable method. Public officials, who must weigh their words but who have little time for memorizing, often read their more important addresses. The President's inaugural address and his addresses to Congress, for example, are usually read. Men who occupy prominent positions often protect themselves, when making important speeches, by writing out their remarks and giving copies to the press. They then read from a manuscript, making such minor alterations in the text as the immediate occasion seems to require.

The disadvantages of reading from a manuscript can be overcome to a large extent by preparing with the particular audience in mind, by gaining sufficient familiarity with the manuscript, and by making a determined effort to keep in touch with the audience. The reader is likely to speak too rapidly and to do very little thinking. He should speak slowly; and after pausing deliberately to get each new statement in mind, he should deliver it to his hearers as directly as possible.

D. Impromptu Speaking

An impromptu speech is one for which the speaker has made no preparation whatever. No wise speaker would prefer to speak impromptu when there is opportunity for preparation, but it is sometimes necessary to speak on the spur of the moment. At such times it is embarrassing to be left stuttering and gasping because one "cannot speak without preparation." For this

reason some facility as an impromptu speaker is an essential part of one's equipment for the platform.

Some practice in impromptu speaking before the class-room audience is also useful in developing fluency. Many young speakers need to be warned, however, against the belief that fluency makes an effective speaker. Mere fluency is of no value on the platform. Indeed, a glib tongue is often a serious obstacle in the way of a young speaker's development, for it may lead him to underestimate the importance of thorough preparation. Readiness of expression is an undoubted advantage to a speaker who has something to express, but unless he has something to express, his readiness only makes him a public nuisance.

III. PREPARATION FOR DELIVERY

Rarely does an inexperienced speaker deliver a speech effectively without first rehearsing it in private; and the most experienced are not above rehearsing on occasion. Such preliminary practice, however, is not useful, and may even be harmful, unless the speaker imagines that he is talking to an audience. If he merely recites empty words during his practice, he will find it nearly impossible to be conversational when on the platform. He should stand while rehearsing his speech and imagine as vividly as he can that his audience is before him. It will help if he can visualize them listening attentively and perhaps interrupting him with questions. If a friend is willing to make himself one member of the audience, so much the better. Practice of this sort is quite as useful for one who intends to

read from a manuscript as for one who intends to speak from memory.

Even extemporaneous speaking does not necessarily preclude practice in delivering the speech. In fact, such practice is usually necessary if the inexperienced speaker is to present his material effectively on the platform. After fixing firmly in mind the successive ideas in the speech so that he has no need to refer to notes, the speaker should go through the speech aloud several times before an imaginary audience. During this practice he should choose his words carefully and frame his sentences as effectively as possible, but he should make no effort to repeat the same wording twice. This practice will greatly increase his freedom on the platform without committing him to any particular phraseology.

Preliminary practice in the delivery of an extemporaneous speech will also help the speaker to improve the speech itself. His ideas will grow clearer as he tries to express them orally; he will think of more effective ways of expressing them; he may even think of better arguments and illustrations than had previously occurred to him. He may also find that some of his arguments sound less convincing than he had supposed or that they are too difficult for presentation in the time at his disposal. And last but not least, he will learn how much time is required to deliver the speech.

The use of notes on the platform to assist the memory is a practice to be indulged in sparingly. There is little necessity for the use of notes in a ten-minute speech, and no speaker should need to look at his notes often. If a speaker is dependent upon notes, he is not

properly prepared. It is permissible, of course, to read quotations or sets of figures from notes.

If notes are to be used, they should be brief. The outline drawn up during the preparation of the speech is of slight value on the platform. What the speaker needs there are a few words or catch-phrases that the eye can take in at a glance—just enough of a reminder to recall the line of thought. Many notes interfere with effective delivery, for reading them distracts the speaker's attention from his audience. No attempt should be made to conceal notes, chiefly because such an attempt is almost sure to fail. They should be laid on the speaker's desk, if there is one, where they can be glanced at or picked up conveniently. The beginner should be warned against the habit of holding notes in his hand when he is not reading from them. The habit, once formed, is exceeding hard to break and will make it difficult for him to learn to gesture.

EXERCISES

I. Observe the delivery of any speaker you have an opportunity to hear. Is the speaker's delivery conversational? If it is not, try to determine why.

II. Is your own delivery conversational? What can you do to make it more so?

APPENDIX OF ILLUSTRATIVE MATERIAL

I

THE CATALOGUE[1]

By John Adams Lowe

The following discussion of the library catalogue is the first chapter in Mr. Lowe's *Books and Libraries*, a manual intended for the use of college students. At the time of its publication Mr. Lowe, formerly Librarian of Williams College, was Agent for the Free Public Library Commission of Massachusetts.

When you visit a strange city and wish to call upon a citizen at his house, which is unknown to you, would you go from house to house on the principal street seeking him? In all probability you would look in the city directory and turn at once though the alphabetical arrangement to find the name of the person. His location in the city, his street and number, would there be indicated, and having learned it you could go directly to his house.

If one of your instructors sent you to the library to look up material on the problem of sanitation in the Canal Zone, you might be referred to Bishop's *Panama Canal*. In all probability you would not take the clumsy method of turning the pages with the hope of stumbling upon just that for which you are looking, but would turn at once to the index in the back of the book and look down the columns until you found "Sanitation." Here is given information which would

[1] Reprinted by permission of F. W. Faxon Company.

enable you to turn immediately to the pages referred to.

In the same fashion, suppose you wished to find in the library President Fitch's *College Course and the Preparation for Life*. You do not know where it is kept. You would not search the shelves, shelf after shelf, any more than you hunted through the streets for a person's house, nor through the pages of a book to find an assigned topic. Just as you consulted the directory in one case and the index in the other, you will find a specific book by consulting the index to the library collection, that is the card-catalogue.

Formerly library catalogues were printed in books, but this method has been abandoned as inefficient. A catalogue thus prepared is out of date as soon as it appears, for entries of new books added to the library may not be indicated after the printing is completed. The great catalogues of the British Museum, Peabody Institute, the Boston Athenæum, and Harvard College Library, in book form, for example, are being superseded by card-catalogues. If a person who is accustomed to using an index to a book or a printed book catalogue remembers that a card-catalogue is practically the same thing, having each individual entry on a separate card instead of on a line of a page, he will have little difficulty with the card arrangement. To make the filing of cards more convenient, the top line is reserved to bring out the distinctive thing for which the card stands.

The primary purpose of the catalogue is to make available all the resources of the library. It stands ready to answer a multitude of questions, but the most

common which are brought to it are: "What books by a certain author are in the library?" "Who wrote a book by a given title?" and "What books on a given subject are available?"

These are answered by three kinds of cards, called author cards, title cards, and subject cards because of their headings or the words, phrase, or name at the top of the card. The purpose of the catalogue is accomplished in a small library where only the simplest entries are necessary by providing these three cards for each book in the library collection, but in a large library where demands of a scholarly and reference nature are made of the catalogue, it is necessary to insert a great many additional varieties of these three kinds of cards.

The author card in most catalogues presents the most detailed information. For an example, if you wished to find out whether the library contained *Engineering Mathematics*, written by Steinmetz, you would consult the cards in the catalogue tray containing the *S*'s, and you would find this author card:

510 St3e	Steinmetz, Charles Proteus, 1865– Engineering mathematics: a series of lectures delivered at Union College. New York, McGraw, Hill book co., 1911. 292p. 24cm.

(Card for author)

Many college librarians are using the cards printed by the Library of Congress, Harvard College Library, Chicago Public Library, the John Crerar Library, and others, all of which follow, more or less, a standard and uniform arrangement of material presented

thereon. Others typewrite their cards and still others are writing them. Some use a card $3'' \times 5''$, while others use a narrower card, but in most cases the general principles here discussed will be found to be common to all. In addition to the author entry on the author card on the top line, this information appears on the card. The book number 510 St3e is found in the upper left-hand corner, and indicates the location of the particular book on the shelf. This is for the reader's use in asking for the book at the loan desk or in searching for it himself on the shelves. Its construction and the fact that each book has an individual mark will be discussed when we consider the classification of books. On the line below the author follows the title of the book as it appears on the title-page. The data inserted on the card after the title give certain information about the book: the place of the publication (New York), the publisher (McGraw-Hill), and the date on which it was printed (1911), the number of pages it contains (292), and its size (24 cm.) usually indicated in centimeters. Frequently librarians have used, 32°, 24°, 18°, 12°, 8°, 4°, to indicate size. This is not as accurate as the use of centimeters in showing the size of a book. A duodecimo volume is indicated by 12, that is, one in which the sheets of paper making it up have been folded so as to make twelve pages from the sheet. If paper manufacturers always made a standard size, then the books thus folded would be practically the same size, but as such is not the case this becomes only a rough indication of the size of a book. The figures in centimeters indicate the height of the book as it stands on the shelf.

The data indicated on cards as enumerated above seem to be essential to a college student. The place of publication has importance in suggesting to some extent the nationality of the author and in indicating thereby his point of view. The data assist in estimating at a glance the value of the information contained in the book. A volume on harbor defense published in 1870 or even in 1910 would have little value other than that of historic interest. Frequently you will find after the title of a book the abbreviations, "new ed." (new edition), or "new ed. rev." (new edition revised). This is important if there is more than one edition, and it is mentioned in order that a reader may find the particular edition he desires. The number of volumes and pages is helpful. If you wish a quick survey of English literature you would not select the *Cambridge History of English Literature*, now in eleven volumes.

We have been discussing the simplest case of an author card, that in which one person's name appears on the title-page of the book as its author. There are several other more complicated forms which are closely allied to author cards. These are: joint authors, impersonal authors, authors brought out analytically, editors, translators, and compilers.

In the case of a joint author, or secondary author as he is sometimes called, that name is put at the top of the card over the primary author's name and the rest of the data given as stated above. It is to be remembered that the catalogue contains author cards not only for persons, but for societies, bureaus of the state and federal governments, etc., which issue bulletins,

publications, proceedings, and transactions and are therefore considered authors. Thus we shall find the Massachusetts Historical Society entered as the author of the *Proceedings* of the society; the United States Bureau of Education as author of its *Bulletin;* and an infinite number of similar cases.

If the catalogue is going to show with any completeness the resources of the collection, it is essential that many books shall be so analyzed that an author writing a part of the volume shall be represented. In this way, just as every book has an author, subject, and title card, some books have what is called an analytical author, subject, and title card for several parts of it. You have been directed to read an essay, "Uses of Great Men," by Emerson, and you know that it is not long enough for an entire book. Looking in the card-catalogue under Emerson's name, you find this card, which indicates that this particular essay is to be found in Brewer's *World's Best Orations.* The notation or book number is that of the volume containing this essay as well as other orations:

815	Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 1803–82.
B	Uses of great men.
	(In Brewer, D. J., ed. The World's best orations. 1901.)

(Card for author analytic)

Books are always listed under the author. But perhaps a particular book is better known to you by an editor, a compiler, or a translator. In this case you would expect to find information about the book under that name. To provide for this the catalogue contains

cards similar in form to author cards having as a heading, superimposed over the author's name, the name of the editor in one case, the translator in another, and the compiler in the third, followed by the abbreviation "ed.," "comp.," "trans." For example, you have been instructed to read *Henry IV*, for an assignment, using the Rolfe edition. Of course you could consult all the editions of plays listed under Shakespeare's name and hunt until you found the volume containing *Henry IV*, but a more direct procedure would be to turn to the catalogue containing the *R*'s and look under "Rolfe," thus:

822.3 Rolfe, William James, ed.
R Shakespeare, William, 1564–1616.
History of King Henry the Fourth. 2 vols.
ed. by W. J. Rolfe. N. Y., 1880.
(English Classics)

(Card for editor)

Suppose you wished to quote some poem which you might reasonably hope to find in the *Oxford Book of Victorian Verse*, which is compiled by Quiller-Couch. You will find that the card-catalogue has a card which will direct you immediately to the desired volume:

821 Couch, Sir Arthur Thomas, Quiller-, comp.
Q4 The Oxford book of Victorian verse, chosen
by Arthur Quiller-Couch. Oxford, The Clarendon press, 1913.
XV, 1023. 19cm.

(Card for compiler)

And again, if one of your instructors insists on your using a particular translation, if you are to use any, and he designates the volume, in all probability you will find that it is indicated in the card-catalogue under the translator's name:

874.5	Bennett, Charles Edwin, tr.
H78b	Horatius Flaccus, Quintus.
	Horace, the Odes and Epodes, with an English translation, by C. E. Bennett, London, W. Heinemann, 1914. 430p. 17cm.

(Card for translator)

In many cases the real value of a particular edition of an author's work is the editorial work done on it. Frequently a compilation is of such a nature that its compiler becomes virtually its author. In the case of classics and translations it is essential to enumerate the translators in order to distinguish between the different translations.

So much for author cards. If you do not remember the author of a particular book and therefore cannot locate it in the card-catalogue by the author card, you still have a chance of finding it. The catalogue contains title cards. The author is unknown to you, but the book you desire is called *Engineering Mathematics.* If you turn over the cards in the tray containing the *E*'s in the catalogue you will probably find this one:

510	Engineering mathematics, 1911.
St3e	Steinmetz, Charles Proteus, 1865–

(Card for title of book)

This card indicates the book number so that you may find the volume itself, and it also designates on the second line the author so that you may consult the author card for further details. If you turn to that part of the catalogue containing the *S*'s, you may discover all the other books in the library written by the same man. This is called a title card because the title of the book stands at the top of the card.

Similar to author analytical cards are title analyticals. A story, an essay, or a play which appeared in a book of collected stories, essays, or dramas, is frequently brought out in the catalogue so that you may find it immediately. If the quaintness of *The Workhouse Ward* charmed you at the theater and you wished to read *The Rising of the Moon*, you would turn to the catalogue under that title and find that it is Lady Gregory's and appears as a part of a book with a different title.

822 Rising of the moon.
D56 Gregory, A. B., Lady.
(In Dickinson, Thomas Herbert, 1877– ed. Chief contemporary dramatists). Boston, Houghton, Mifflin co., 1915.

This form is sometimes used:

839 Miss Julia. 1913.
St8 Strindberg, August, i. e. Johan August.
Plays. 2d series: There are crimes and crimes, Miss Julia, The stronger, Creditors, Pariah; translated by E. Björkman. N. Y., Scribner's, 1913.

(Title of play forming part of a volume of plays)

Probably one of the most important uses that is made of the catalogue is that of consulting it to find out what the library contains on a certain subject. Just as cards have been made for authors and titles of books, there have been inserted in the catalogue cards indicating the subject or subjects treated by each book. Thus:

510	Mathematics
St3e	Steinmetz Charles Proteus, 1865– Engineering mathematics. 1911.

(Underscored word in red)
(Card showing subject of book)

Since a subject card is made for every book except fiction, essays, poetry, and a few similar classes, all the cards filed together indicate at once the books in the library on that subject. Similar to the author and title cards for analyticals we have subject analyticals.

There is still another class of cards found in the catalogue called reference cards. Frequently writers assume a pseudonym, but librarians insist on listing books under the real name of the author. You will be assisted to find the form used in the library by a reference card from the pseudonym to it.

Twain, Mark, pseud. See
Clemens, Samuel Langhorne.

(Reference from pseudonym to real name)

Again, if you do not find exactly what you need under the subject you have in mind, you may perhaps find it under a related subject to which the catalogue di-

rects you. These cards are usually placed in the catalogue at the end of all the cards on the original subject.

Fraternities, see also
Greek letter societies.

(Underscored words in red)
(Reference from one subject to related subject)

The user of a catalogue cannot be expected to know which of the two names for the same thing a library may elect to use. It would be proper to put all books dealing with wit and humor under either heading, although it would be confusing to use both. A cross-reference card is inserted directing the attention of the user from the unusual and unused form to that used in the particular library.

Jests, see
Wit and humor.

(Reference from heading not used to accepted form)

Thus different kinds of cards appear in the catalogue to indicate the resources of the library. In general they are author, subject, and title cards. Because of their similarity in function to authors, corporate bodies, societies, States and governments, editors, compilers, and translators are treated accordingly. Analytical cards bring out material appearing as parts of books under authors, subjects, and titles. Reference cards direct the attention from one subject to an allied subject, or from one form not used to one that is.

When we come to consider the arrangement of the cards in the catalogue, we find that there are several

methods. The form gives the catalogue its name. Some are made having three alphabets: one for the author cards, one for the subject cards, and one for the title cards. Each of these is named according to its characteristic card. In another form the cards are filed in the order that the books stand on the shelves, and this is called a class catalogue. In each case all the cards are arranged in the catalogue trays according to the heading on the top line. Probably that which is the most convenient and most generally used is the dictionary catalogue, so called because all the headings, whether author, subject, or title, are filed alphabetically just as the words in a dictionary are arranged. The cards headed by the name of an author are alphabetically arranged according to the title of the book. The cards bearing the same subject are alphabetically arranged according to the authors of the books represented. The cards are so arranged that the trays read down in vertical tiers and the cards in each tray read from the front to the back. Guide cards, inserted at short distances, are plain cards with words printed on projecting labels, filed alphabetically among the other cards to show a heading distinctly.

The use to which a student puts a card-catalogue varies with the individual. He may require of it only to answer the three elementary questions as to whether the library has a book by a certain author, one having a given title, or one dealing with a particular subject. To the casual browser satisfying himself with an occasional volume selected at random, the use of the catalogue seems unnecessary. He should, however, consult it in connection with whatever he reads to dis-

cover the other resources of the library along the same line. A careful reader, a studious lover of books, will find the catalogue of infinite value. The scientific investigation of a subject demands an exhaustive use of the card-catalogue. This shows in a compact form the resources of the collection although the books themselves are widely separated on the shelves. For the making of a bibliography, a list of the works of an author, or of the books and literature written on a subject, the catalogue is indispensable. The same is true of checking up a bibliography already made to ascertain what specific material is available in the in the library you are using.

In connection with the work of the curriculum it is most essential. All too frequently students rely too much on the work that has been mapped out for them by their instructors and go no further than assigned readings or collateral studies. I have known students in a college where the departmental library system is developed not to have entered the main library for a whole half of a college year to consult the catalogue of all books owned by the college. They limited their study, and in many cases their reading, to what they found on the assigned section of a reference shelf of a particular course. When they had work in a course where assignments of reading were not so carefully prepared in "pill form" for them, they were lost. Perhaps you are assigned a topic for a theme, "Choosing a Vocation" or "Pinero's Contribution to the English Drama." The catalogue will assist you. For a term thesis or report you may be required to present as a preliminary step a list of the material you are going to

use in writing it. Suppose, for example, you were to write on "Shakespeare's London" and you were required to prepare such a list of references and were allowed to use only the card-catalogue. Would you expect to produce much of a list of books on the subject? Fifteen minutes' use of the card-catalogue produced the following:

Shakespeare's London: This suggested first that I consult the cards under Shakespeare, and passing over the plays and the discussions on authorship, etc., etc., these struck my attention:

Drake, N. Shakespeare and his time.
Goadby, E. The England of Shakespeare.
Goadby, E. Shakespeare's time.
Rolfe, W. J. Shakespeare, the boy, with sketches of the home and school life, the games and sports, manners and customs, and folklore of the time.
Stephenson, H. T. The Elizabethan people.
Stephenson, H. T. Shakespeare's London.
Warner, C. D. The people for whom Shakespeare wrote.

and the next subject suggested by the assigned title is London. The titles under the heading "London, Description" promising of having anything in them for this particular purpose were these:

Hutton, L. Literary landmarks of London.
Lang, E. M. Literary London.
Shelley, H. C. Inns and taverns of London.

and an examination of each of these proved that they contained many interesting items for the matter in hand. Of course London naturally suggests that per-

haps something of help would be found under Stratford-on-Avon, and sure enough, I found:

Goadby, E. A. Pilgrimage to Stratford-on-Avon.
Howells W. D. The seen and the unseen at Stratford.
Lee, S. L. Stratford-on-Avon: from the earliest times to the death of Shakespeare.

These have suggestions about the London of the time and tell much of the daily life of the playwright. It is only one step to think that it might be well in the theme to have something to say about the country in which Shakespeare's London was situated, and among 160 cards headed "England, Description," I made a note of one:

Winter, W. Shakespeare's England.

This is an account of two trips which Mr. Winter made to England in 1877 and 1882, but they are suggestive as giving a modern aspect of the ancient scenes, interpreted by a dramatic critic. Going still one step further, under "Europe, Social life," I discovered:

Moryson, F. Shakespeare's Europe . . . being a survey of the condition of Europe at the end of the 16th century.

No statement about the London of the time of Shakespeare would be satisfactory if it did not have something to offer about the theaters of the day. Well, the card-catalogue has something to suggest to us under the heading "Theaters, England":

Albright, V. E. The Shakespearian stage.
Collins, J. C. Posthumous essays: number one being entitled, Shakespearian theatres.

Sullivan, M. Court masques of James I: their influence on Shakespeare and public theatres.

and turning back again to London, I found a card headed "London, Theaters," and from the seven cards chose two as possible assistants:

Ordish, T. F. Early London Theatres.
Williams, M. Some London theatres, past and present.

Of course this list is in no way complete, nor does it mean that in order to prepare the theme assigned a student would attempt to read from cover to cover all the books here mentioned. It is simply suggestive of the kind and amount of use to which the card-catalogue may be put in an attempt to discover what the library makes available for the investigation of any subject.

Thus we find that the catalogue endeavors in a systematic, convenient manner to indicate what material is available in the library. It shows immediately not only whether a book is in the library but also where it is and something about its value, its date, size, etc., and indicates its location on the shelves. It tells not only what books by certain authors are in the library but also those which may be called for by their editors, translators, or compilers. It brings together in one place an indication of what the library possesses on a given subject not only in entire volumes but in parts of volumes, or in some cases chapters of books. Moreover, by the use of reference cards, it directs the reader to other parts of the catalogue than that which he is consulting where he should find other material which may be of assistance to him.

The arrangement of the cards in the catalogue determines its form. This has been made as compact and as simple to follow as possible. An arrangement bringing all of the different kinds of information presented into one alphabet, as in the dictionary catalogue, seems to be the most serviceable for general purposes, although other forms are made to suit other needs.

The use of the card-catalogue is varied and far-reaching.

II

DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS[1]

The Independent

The following article appeared in the editorial pages of *The Independent* for February 23, 1914.

After the tariff—the currency, after the currency—the trusts, after the trusts—the Presidential primary. In his address to Congress last December President Wilson urged "the prompt enactment of legislation which will provide for primary elections throughout the country at which the voters of the several parties may choose their nominees for the Presidency without the intervention of nominating conventions." There are indications that Mr. Wilson expects this to be the next big task which he will urge Congress to undertake.

The proposal for the direct nomination of candidates for the Presidency is based upon solid grounds.

It is a logical development. The direct primary has for fifteen years been making steady and irresistible progress from State to State. In only one State was a direct primary law ever repealed, and there it was promptly reënacted. Thirty-seven governors are today nominated at the direct primary. If a governor, why not a President? The extension of the direct primary to the nation is irrefutably logical.

[1] Reprinted by permission of *The Independent*.

It is democracy. It is trite to say that the very core of that great entity, the American republic, is the free, unhampered, absolute rule of the people—or it would be trite if it were not so profoundly true. When "we, the People of the United States" did "ordain and establish" the Constitution of the United States, the matter was settled once for all. Whenever in our political processes we allow ourselves to be led away from the complete and untrammeled rule of the people, we are false to our national ideals. The direct primary is a means for facilitating popular rule. Where it has been used, it has helped to preserve and develop popular rule. It is democracy.

It is an instrument of representative government. It is one of the favorite grounds of criticism of the direct primary that since ours is a representative government and not a pure democracy, we must apply the methods of representative government to the selection of party candidates as well as to the business of government. Since we do not legislate by town meeting, we ought not to nominate candidates by town meeting. This argument, frequently advanced and hotly defended, is the result of loose thinking. The direct primary is not a denial of representative government, it is the best way to attain it.

There are two essential elements in representative government—the one negative, the other positive. The first is that the people do not govern directly. This is the negative essential, the most emphasized, but the least important. The other essential is that those who do govern represent the people. They are not autocrats, carrying out their own will; they are not despots,

however benevolent, imposing upon the people, however graciously and altruistically, what they decide that they should have. They are *representatives*. Their power is not their own, it belongs to the people. The will they wield as a scepter is not their own, it is the will of the people. It matters not a bit how much the people may have divested themselves of the duty of direct government; if those who govern do not truly represent them, it is no representative government that we have but a base imitation of it.

Now the best, indeed the only infallible, way discovered by mankind for making sure that representatives actually *represent* is to have them directly selected by those they are to represent. Every obstacle placed between the people and their choice of representatives is a bar to representative government.

Public officials who owe their selection for office to any one except the people themselves will naturally, inevitably, tend to represent, not the people, who did not select them, but the boss, or the special interest, or the political machine, or whatever it was, that did. The direct primary brings the official close to the people from the very beginning. It makes difficult the intervention of the boss. It puts a stumbling block in the way of the special interest. It tends strongly to make party nominees truly representative of the party members.

It works well. For fifteen years the direct primary has been found to be a workable, effective, and useful instrument of democracy. In a few States which tried the experiment of the presidential preference primary two years ago, the results were far more satisfactory

than under the old convention system. The only difficulties in those States arose from the fact that a hybrid system was being used. The voters were trying to do two things at once—express their preference for party candidates for President and select delegates to go to a national convention. The two things were incompatible. One of them was utterly superfluous. If the voters in those States had been asked only to cast their votes for their choice for party candidate, the result in every one of them would have been perfectly satisfactory and harmonious. If every State had had a presidential primary, the regrettable spectacle of the Chicago convention would have been an impossibility. The direct primary works; the presidential primary will work.

Various arguments are urged against the presidential primary, besides the one which we have sought to dispose of—that it is opposed to the principle of representative government.

It is said that the voters will not come to the polls. It is hard enough to get them out for an election; to get them out twice will be impossible. The answer is simple and based on experience. More will certainly come to the primary than come to a caucus under the old system to elect delegates to a convention; and every additional voter who can be brought to take part in the making of nominations is a clear gain for democracy.

The expense of a primary campaign will be so great, it is urged, that it will put a premium on wealth; only a rich man will be able to run for a nomination. But they have solved that problem in Oregon and New Jersey by strict laws limiting the amounts that may be expended.

It is contended that the people need leadership which the direct primary system does not encourage. The reverse is the fact. The direct primary produces leadership; the convention system produces bosses.

The real arguments against the presidential primary come from two kinds of persons: bosses and other usurpers of political power who know that their continued prestige and profit depends upon the success with which they interpose machinery between the voter and the ultimate selection of public officials; and conservative and cautious citizens who do not quite trust the mass of the voters to know what is best for them and to do it.

Every real believer in democracy, every one who thinks that the people on the whole and in the long run can be trusted to be right more often than they are wrong, every one who believes with de Tocqueville that the remedy for the evils of democracy is more democracy, every one with his face to the future and an abiding faith in the American people in his heart, should give his support to the proposal for the presidential primary.

III

LIVERPOOL ADDRESS

By Henry Ward Beecher

During the American Civil War, the North's blockade of Southern ports shut off the English textile mills' supply of raw cotton. The resulting unemployment among English textile workers created in some sections of England a public opinion bitterly hostile toward the United States government. The following address before a Liverpool audience, composed partly of friends of the North and partly of discontented textile workers, was one of a series of address which Mr. Beecher delivered in England in an attempt to stem the rising tide of public opinion hostile to the Northern cause. Mr. Beecher was known in England as a distinguished American clergyman and an outspoken Abolitionist. A more detailed account of the situation and the audience at Liverpool will be found in Beecher and Scoville's *Biography of H. W. Beecher*, pp. 406–426, and in G. P. Baker's *Specimens of Argumentation*, p. 154.

For more than twenty-five years I have been made perfectly familiar with popular assemblies in all parts of my country except the extreme South. There has not for the whole of that time been a single day of my life when it would have been safe for me to go South of Mason's and Dixon's line in my own country, and all for one reason: my solemn, earnest, persistent testimony against that which I consider to be the most atrocious thing under the sun—the system of American slavery in a great free republic. [Cheers.] I have

passed through that early period when right of free speech was denied to me. Again and again I have attempted to address audiences that, for no other crime than that of free speech, visited me with all manner of contumelious epithets; and now since I have been in England, although I have met with greater kindness and courtesy on the part of most than I deserved, yet, on the other hand, I perceive that the Southern influence prevails to some extent in England. [Applause and uproar.] It is my old acquaintance; I understand it perfectly—[laughter]—and I have always held it to be an unfailing truth that where a man had a cause that would bear examination he was perfectly willing to have it spoken about. [Applause.] And when in Manchester I saw those huge placards: "Who is Henry Ward Beecher?"—[laughter, cries of "Quite right," and applause]—and when in Liverpool I was told that there were those blood-red placards, purporting to say what Henry Ward Beecher had said, and calling upon Englishmen to suppress free speech—I tell you what I thought. I thought simply this: "I am glad of it." [Laughter.] Why? Because if they had felt perfectly secure, that *you* are the minions of the South and the slaves of slavery, they would have been perfectly still. [Applause and uproar.] And, therefore, when I saw so much nervous apprehension that, if I were permitted to speak—[hisses and applause]—when I found they were afraid to have me speak—[hisses, laughter, and "No, no!"]—when I found that they considered my speaking damaging to their cause—[applause]—when I found that they appealed from facts and reasonings to mob law [applause and uproar]—I said, no man

need tell me what the heart and secret counsel of these men are. They tremble and are afraid. [Applause, laughter, hisses, "No, no!" and a voice: "New York mob."] Now, personally, it is a matter of very little consequence to me whether I speak here to-night or not. [Laughter and cheers.] But, one thing is very certain, if you do permit me to speak here to-night you will hear very plain talking. [Applause and hisses.] You will not find a man—[interruption]—you will not find me to be a man that dared to speak about Great Britain three thousand miles off, and then is afraid to speak to Great Britain when he stands on her shores. [Immense applause and hisses.] And if I do not mistake the tone and temper of Englishmen, they had rather have a man who opposes them in a manly way—[applause from all parts of the hall]—than a sneak that agrees with them in an unmanly way. [Applause and "Bravo!"] Now, if I can carry you with me by sound convictions, I shall be immensely glad—[applause]; but if I cannot carry you with me by facts and sound arguments, I do not wish you to go with me at all; and all that I ask is simply FAIR PLAY. [Applause, and a voice: "You shall have it too."]

Those of you who are kind enough to wish to favor my speaking—and you will observe that my voice is slightly husky, from having spoken almost every night in succession for some time past,—those who wish to hear me will do me the kindness simply to sit still, and to keep still; and I and my friends the Secessionists will make all the noise. [Laughter.]

There are two dominant races in modern history—the Germanic and the Romanic races. The Germanic

races tend to personal liberty, to a sturdy individualism, to civil and to political liberty. The Romanic race tends to absolutism in government; it is clannish; it loves chieftains; it develops a people that crave strong and showy governments to support and plan for them. The Anglo-Saxon race belongs to the great German family, and is a fair exponent of its peculiarities. The Anglo-Saxon carries self-government and self-development with him wherever he goes. He has popular GOVERNMENT and popular INDUSTRY; for the effects of a generous civil liberty are not seen a whit more plain in the good order, in the intelligence, and in the virtue of a self-governing people, than in their amazing enterprise and the scope and power of their creative industry. The power to create riches is just as much a part of the Anglo-Saxon virtues as the power to create good order and social safety. The things required for prosperous labor, prosperous manufactures, and prosperous commerce are three. First, liberty; second, liberty; third, liberty. ["Hear, hear!"] Though these are not merely the same liberty, as I shall show you. First, there must be liberty to follow those laws of business which experience has developed, without imposts or restrictions or governmental intrusions. Business simply wants to be let alone. ["Hear, hear!"] Then, secondly, there must be liberty to distribute and exchange products of industry in any market without burdensome tariffs, without imposts, and without vexatious regulations. There must be these two liberties—liberty to create wealth, as the makers of it think best, according to the light and experience which business has given them; and then lib-

erty to distribute what they have created without unnecessary vexatious burdens. The comprehensive law of the ideal industrial condition of the world is free manufacture and free trade. ["Hear, hear!" A voice: "The Morrill tariff." Another voice: "Monroe."] I have said there were three elements of liberty. The third is the necessity of an intelligent and free race of customers. There must be freedom among producers; there must be freedom among the distributors; there must be freedom among the customers. It may not have occurred to you that it makes any difference what one's customers are, but it does in all regular and prolonged business. The condition of the customer determines how much he will buy, determines of what sort he will buy. Poor and ignorant people buy little and that of the poorest kind. The richest and the intelligent, having the more means to buy, buy the most, and always buy the best. Here, then, are the three liberties: liberty of the producer, liberty of the distributor, and liberty of the consumer. The first two need no discussion; they have been long thoroughly and brilliantly illustrated by the political economists of Great Britain and by her eminent statesmen; but it seems to me that enough attention has not been directed to the third; and, with your patience, I will dwell upon that for a moment, before proceeding to other topics.

It is a necessity of every manufacturing and commercial people that their customers should be very wealthy and intelligent. Let us put the subject before you in the familiar light of your own local experience. To whom do the tradesmen of Liverpool sell the most

goods at the highest profit? To the ignorant and poor, or to the educated and prosperous? [A voice: "To the Southerners." Laughter.] The poor man buys simply for his body; he buys food, he buys clothing, he buys fuel, he buys lodging. His rule is to buy the least and the cheapest that he can. He goes to the store as seldom as he can; he brings away as little as he can; and he buys for the least he can. [Much laughter.] Poverty is not a misfortune to the poor only who suffer it, but it is more or less a misfortune to all with whom he deals. On the other hand, a man well off—how is it with him? He buys in far greater quantity. He can afford to do it; he has the money to pay for it. He buys in far greater variety, because he seeks to gratify not merely physical wants, but also mental wants. He buys for the satisfaction of sentiment and taste, as well as of sense. He buys silk, wool, flax, cotton; he buys all metals—iron, silver, gold, platinum; in short he buys for all necessities, and all substances. But that is not all. He buys a better quality of goods. He buys richer silks, finer cottons, higher-grained wools. Now a rich silk means so much skill and care of somebody's that has been expended upon it to make it finer and richer; and so of cotton and so of wool. That is, the price of the finer goods runs back to the very beginning, and remunerates the workman as well as the merchant. Now, the whole laboring community is as much interested and profited as the mere merchant, in this buying and selling of the higher grades in the greater varieties and quantities. The law of price is the skill; and the amount of skill expended in the work is as much for the market as are the goods. A man comes to

market and says: "I have a pair of hands," and he obtains the lowest wages. Another man comes and says: "I have something more than a pair of hands; I have truth and fidelity." He gets a higher price. Another man comes and says: "I have something more; I have hands, and strength, and fidelity, and skill." He gets more than either of the others. The next man comes and says: "I have got hands, and strength, and skill, and fidelity; but my hands work more than that. They know how to create things for the fancy, for the affections, for the moral sentiments"; and he gets more than either of the others. The last man comes and says: "I have all these qualities, and have them so highly that it is a peculiar genius"; and genius carries the whole market and gets the highest price. [Loud applause.] So that both the workman and the merchant are profited by having purchasers that demand quality, variety, and quantity. Now, if this be so in the town or the city, it can only be so because it is a law. This is the specific development of a general or universal law, and therefore we should expect to find it as true of a nation as of a city like Liverpool. I know that it is so, and you know that it is true of all the world; and it is just as important to have customers educated, intelligent, moral, and rich out of Liverpool as it is in Liverpool. [Applause.] They are able to buy; they want variety, they want the very best; and those are the customers you want. That nation is the best customer that is freest, because freedom works prosperity, industry, and wealth. Great Britain, then, aside from moral considerations, has a direct commercial and pecuniary interest in the liberty, civilization, and

wealth of every nation on the globe. [Loud applause.] You also have an interest in this, because you are a moral and religious people. ["Oh, oh!" Laughter and applause.] You desire it from the highest motives; and godliness is profitable in all things, having the promise of the life that now is, as well as of that which is to come; but if there were no hereafter, and if man had no progress in this life, and if there were no question of civilization at all, it would be worth your while to protect civilization and liberty, merely as a commercial speculation. To evangelize has more than a moral and religious import—it comes back to temporal relations. Wherever a nation that is crushed, cramped, degraded under despotism is struggling to be free, you—Leeds, Sheffield, Manchester, Paisley—all have an interest that that nation should be free. When depressed and backward people demand that they may have a chance to rise—Hungary, Italy, Poland—it is a duty for humanity's sake, it is a duty for the highest moral motives, to sympathize with them; but besides all these there is a material and an interested reason why you should sympathize with them. Pounds and pence join with conscience and with honor in this design. Now, Great Britain's chief want is—what?

They have said that your chief want is cotton. I deny it. Your chief want is consumers. [Applause and hisses.] You have got skill, you have got capital, and you have got machinery enough to manufacture goods for the whole population of the globe. You could turn out fourfold as much as you do, if you only had the market to sell in. It is not so much the want, therefore, of fabric, though there may be a temporary obstruc-

tion of it; but the principal and increasing want—increasing from year to year—is, where shall we find men to buy what we can manufacture so fast? [Interruption, and a voice, "The Morrill tariff," and applause.] Before the American war broke out, your warehouses were loaded with goods that you could not sell. [Applause and hisses.] You had over-manufactured; what is the meaning of over-manufacturing but this: that you had skill, capital, machinery, to create faster than you had customers to take goods off your hands? And you know that rich as Great Britain is, vast as are her manufactures, if she could have fourfold the present demand, she could make fourfold riches to-morrow; and every political economist will tell you that your want is not cotton primarily, but customers. Therefore, the doctrine, how to make customers, is a great deal more important to Great Britain than the doctrine how to raise cotton. It is to that doctrine I ask from you, business men, practical men, men of fact, sagacious Englishmen—to that point I ask a moment's attention. [Shouts of "Oh, oh!" hisses, and applause.] There are no more continents to be discovered. ["Hear, hear!"] The market of the future must be found—how? There is very little hope of any more demand being created by new fields. If you are to have a better market there must be some kind of process invented to make the old fields better. [A voice, "Tell us something new," shouts of "Order," and interruption.] Let us look at it, then. You must civilize the world in order to make a better class of purchasers. [Interruption.] If you were to press Italy down again under the feet of despotism, Italy, discouraged, could

draw but very few supplies from you. But give her liberty, kindle schools throughout her valleys, spur her industry, make treaties with her by which she can exchange her wine, and her oil, and her silk for your manufactured goods; and for every effort you make in that direction there will come back profit to you by increased traffic with her. [Loud applause.] If Hungary asks to be an unshackled nation—if by freedom she will rise in virtue and intelligence, then by freedom she will acquire a more multifarious industry, which she will be willing to exchange for your manufactures. Her liberty is to be found—where? You will find it in the Word of God, you will find it in the code of history; but you will also find it in the Price Current ["Hear, hear!"]; and every free nation, every civilized people—every people that rises from barbarism to industry and intelligence, becomes a better customer.

A savage is a man of one story, and that one story a cellar. When a man begins to be civilized he raises another story. When you Christianize and civilize the man, you put story upon story, for you develop faculty after faculty; and you have to supply every story with your productions. The savage is a man one story deep; the civilized man is thirty stories deep. [Applause.] Now, if you go to a lodging-house, where there are three or four men, your sales to them may, no doubt, be worth something; but if you go to a lodging-house like some of those which I saw in Edinburgh, which seemed to contain about twenty stories ["Oh, oh!" and interruption], every story of which is full, and all who occupy buy of you—which is the better customer, the

man who is drawn out, or the man who is pinched up? [Laughter.] Now, there is in this a great and sound principle of economy. ["Yah, yah!" from the passage outside the hall, and loud laughter.] If the South should be rendered independent—[at this juncture mingled cheering and hissing became immense; half the audience rose to their feet, waving hats and handkerchiefs, and in every part of the hall there was the greatest commotion and uproar.] You have had your turn now; now let me have mine again. [Loud applause and laughter.] It is a little inconvenient to talk against the wind; but after all, if you will just keep good-natured—I am not going to lose my temper; will you watch yours? [Applause.] Besides all that, it rests me, and gives me a chance, you know, to get my breath. [Applause and hisses.] And I think that the bark of those men is worse than their bite. They do not mean any harm—they don't know any better. [Loud laughter, applause, hisses, and continued uproar.] I was saying, when these responses broke in, that it was worth our while to consider both alternatives. What will be the result if this present struggle shall eventuate in the separation of America, and making the South—[loud applause, hisses, hooting, and cries of "Bravo!"]—a slave territory exclusively—[cries of "No, no!" and laughter]—and the North a free territory,—what will be the final result? You will lay the foundation for carrying the slave population clear through to the Pacific Ocean. This is the first step. There is not a man that has been a leader of the South any time within these twenty years that has not had this for a plan. It was for this that Texas was invaded, first

by colonists, next by marauders, until it was wrested from Mexico. It was for this that they engaged in the Mexican War itself, by which vast territory reaching to the Pacific was added to the Union. Never for a moment have they given up the plan of spreading the American institutions, as they call them, straight through toward the West, until the slave, who has washed his feet in the Atlantic, shall be carried to wash them in the Pacific. [Cries of "Question" and uproar.] There! I have got that statement out, and you cannot put it back. [Laughter and applause.] Now, let us consider the prospect. If the South becomes a slave empire, what relation will it have to you as a customer? [A voice: "Or any other man." Laughter.] It would be an empire of twelve millions of people. Now, of these, eight millions are white, and four millions black. [A voice: "How many have you got?" Applause and laughter. Another voice: "Free your own slaves!"] Consider that one third of the whole are the miserably poor, unbuying blacks. [Cries of "No, no!" "Yes, yes!" and interruption.] You do not manufacture much for them. [Hisses, "Oh!" "No."] You have not got machinery coarse enough. [Laughter, and "No."] Your labor is too skilled by far to manufacture bagging and linsey-woolsey. [A Southerner: "We are going to free them, every one."] Then you and I agree exactly. [Laughter.] One other third consists of a poor, unskilled, degraded white population; and the remaining one third, which is a large allowance, we will say, intelligent and rich.

Now here are twelve millions of people, and only one third of them are customers that can afford to buy

the kind of goods that you bring to market. [Interruption and uproar.] My friends, I saw a man once, who was a little late at a railway station, chase an express train. He did not catch it. [Laughter.] If you are going to stop this meeting, you have got to stop it before I speak; for after I have got the things out, you may chase as long as you please—you would not catch them. [Laughter and interruption.] But there is luck in leisure; I'm going to take it easy. [Laughter.] Two thirds of the population of the Southern States to-day are non-purchasers of English goods. [A voice: "No, they are not"; "No, no!" and uproar.] Now you must recollect another fact—namely, that this is going on clear through to the Pacific Ocean; and if by sympathy or help you establish a slave empire, you sagacious Britains—["Oh, oh!" and hooting]—if you like it better, then, I will leave the adjective out—[laughter, "Hear!" and applause]—are busy in favoring the establishment of an empire from ocean to ocean that should have fewest customers and the largest non-buying population. [Applause, "No, no!" A voice: "I thought it was the happy people that populated fastest."]

Now, what can England make for the poor white population of such a future empire, and for her slave population? What carpets, what linens, what cottons can you sell them? What machines, what looking-glasses, what combs, what leather, what books, what pictures, what engravings? [A voice: "We'll sell them ships."] You may sell ships to a few, but what ships can you sell to two thirds of the population of poor whites and blacks? [Applause.] A little bagging and

a little linsey-woolsey, a few whips and manacles, are all that you can sell for the slave. [Great applause and uproar.] This very day, in the slave States of America there are eight millions out of twelve millions that are not, and cannot be your customers from the very laws of trade. [A voice: "Then how are they clothed?" and interruption.]

But I know that you say, you cannot help sympathizing with a gallant people. ["Hear, hear!"] They are the weaker people, the minority; and you cannot help going with the minority who are struggling for their rights against the majority. Nothing could be more generous, when a weak party stands for its own legitimate rights against imperious pride and power, than to sympathize with the weak. But who ever sympathized with a weak thief, because three constables had got hold of him? ["Hear, hear!"] And yet the one thief in three policemen's hands is the weaker party. I suppose you would sympathize with him. ["Hear, hear!" laughter, and applause.] Why, when that infamous king of Naples—Bomba, was driven into Gaeta by Garibaldi with his immortal band of patriots, and Cavour sent against him the army of Northern Italy, who was the weaker party then? The tyrant and his minions; and the majority was with the noble Italian patriots, struggling for liberty. I never heard that Old England sent deputations to King Bomba, and yet his troops resisted bravely there. [Laughter and interruption.] To-day the majority of the people of Rome is with Italy. Nothing but French bayonets keeps her from going back to the kingdom of Italy, to which she belongs. Do you sympathize with

the minority in Rome or the majority in Italy? [A voice: "With Italy."] To-day the South is the minority in America, and they are fighting for *independence!* For what? [Uproar. A voice: "Three cheers for independence!" and hisses.] I could wish so much bravery had a better cause, and that so much self-denial had been less deluded; that the poisonous and venomous doctrine of State rights might have been kept aloof; that so many gallant spirits, such as Jackson, might still have lived. [Great applause and loud cheers, again and again renewed.] The force of these facts, historical and incontrovertible, cannot be broken, except by diverting attention by an attack upon the North. It is said that the North is fighting for Union, and not for emancipation. The North is fighting for Union, for that ensures emancipation. [Loud cheers, "Oh, oh!" "No, no!" and cheers.] A great many men say to ministers of the Gospel: "You pretend to be preaching and working for the love of the people. Why, you are all the time preaching for the sake of the Church." What does the minister say? "It is by means of the Church that we help the people," and when men say that we are fighting for the Union, I too say we are fighting for the Union. ["Hear, hear!" and a voice: "That's right."] But the motive determines the value; and why are we fighting for the Union? Because we never shall forget the testimony of our enemies. They have gone off declaring that the Union in the hands of the North was fatal to slavery. [Loud applause.] There is testimony in court for you. [A voice: "See that," and laughter.]

In the first place I am ashamed to confess that such

was the thoughtlessness—[interruption]—such was the stupor of the North—[renewed interruption]—you will get a word at a time; to-morrow will let folks see what it is you don't want to hear—that for a period of twenty-five years she went to sleep, and permitted herself to be drugged and poisoned with the Southern prejudice against black men. [Applause and uproar.] The evil was made worse, because, when any object whatever has caused anger between political parties, a political animosity arises against that object, no matter how innocent in itself; no matter what were the original influences which excited the quarrel. Thus the colored man has been the football between the two parties in the North, and has suffered accordingly. I confess it to my shame. But I am speaking now on my own ground, for I began twenty-five years ago, with a small party, to combat the unjust dislike of the colored man. [Loud applause, dissension, and uproar. The interruption at this point became so violent that the friends of Mr. Beecher throughout the hall rose to their feet, waving hats and handkerchiefs, and renewing their shouts and applause. The interruption lasted some minutes.] Well, I have lived to see a total revolution in the Northern feeling—I stand here to bear solemn witness of that. It is not my opinion; it is my knowledge. [Great uproar.] Those men who undertook to stand up for the rights of all men—black as well as white—have increased in number; and now what party in the North represents those men that resist the evil prejudices of past years? The Republicans are that party. [Loud applause.] And who are those men in the North that have oppressed the negro?

They are *the Peace Democrats; and the prejudice for which in England you are attempting to punish me, is a prejudice raised by the men who have opposed me all my life.* These pro-slavery Democrats abuse the negro. I defended him, and they mobbed me for doing it. Oh, justice! [Loud laughter, applause, and hisses.] This is as if a man should commit an assault, maim and wound a neighbor, and a surgeon being called in should begin to dress his wounds, and by and by a policeman should come and collar the surgeon and haul him off to prison on account of the wounds which he was healing.

Now, I told you I would not flinch from anything. I am going to read you some questions that were sent after me from Glasgow, purporting to be from a working man. [Great interruption.] If those pro-slavery interrupters think they will tire me out, they will do more than eight millions in America could. [Applause and renewed interruption.] I was reading a question on your side too. "Is it not a fact that in most of the Northern States laws exist precluding negroes from equal civil and political rights with the whites? That in the State of New York the negro has to be the possessor of at least $250 worth of property to entitle him to the privileges of a white citizen? That in some of the Northern States the colored man, whether bond or free, is by law excluded altogether, and not suffered to enter the State limits, under severe penalties? and is not Mr. Lincoln's own State one of them? and in view of the fact that the twenty million dollars compensation which was promised to Missouri in aid of emancipation was defeated in the last Congress (the

strongest Republican Congress that ever assembled), what has the North done toward emancipation?" Now, then, there's a dose for you. [A voice: "Answer it."] And I will address myself to the answering of it. And first, the bill for emancipation in Missouri, to which this money was denied, was a bill which was drawn by what we call "log-rollers," who inserted in it an enormously disproportioned price for the slaves. The Republicans offered to give them ten million dollars for the slaves in Missouri, and they outvoted it because they could not get twelve million dollars. Already half the slave population had been "run" down South, and yet they came up to Congress to get twelve million dollars for what was not worth ten millions, nor even eight millions. Now as to those States that had passed "black" laws, as we call them; they are filled with Southern emigrants. The southern parts of Ohio, the southern part of Indiana, where I myself lived for years, and which I knew like a book, the southern part of Illinois, where Mr. Lincoln lives—[great uproar]—these parts are largely settled by emigrants from Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, Virginia, and North Carolina, and it was their vote, or the Northern votes pandering for political reasons to theirs, that passed in those States the infamous "black" laws; and the Republicans in these States have a record, clean and white, as having opposed these laws in every instance as "infamous." Now as to the State of New York; it is asked whether a negro is not obliged to have a certain freehold property, or a certain amount of property, before he can vote. It is so still in North Carolina and Rhode Island for *white* folks—it

is so in New York State. [Mr. Beecher's voice slightly failed him here, and he was interrupted by a person who tried to imitate him. Cries of "Shame!" and "Turn him out!"] I am not undertaking to say that these faults of the North, which were brought upon them by the bad example and influence of the South, are all cured; but I do say that they are in *process* of cure which promises, if unimpeded by foreign influence, to make all such odious distinctions vanish.

There is another fact that I wish to allude to—not for the sake of reproach or blame, but by way of claiming your more lenient consideration—and that is, that slavery was entailed upon us by your action. ["Hear, hear!"] Against the earnest protests of the colonists the then government of Great Britain—I will concede not knowing what were the mischiefs—ignorantly, but in point of fact, forced slave traffic on the unwilling colonists. [Great uproar, in the midst of which one individual was lifted up and carried out of the room amid cheers and hisses.]

The Chairman: If you would only sit down no disturbance would take place.

The disturbance having subsided,

Mr. Beecher said: I was going to ask you, suppose a child is born with hereditary disease; suppose this disease was entailed upon him by parents who had contracted it by their own misconduct, would it be fair that those parents that had brought into the world the diseased child, should rail at the child because it was diseased? ["No, no!"] Would not the child have a right to turn round and say: "Father, it was your fault that I had it, and you ought to be pleased to be

patient with my deficiencies." [Applause and hisses, and cries of "Order!" Great interruption and great disturbance here took place on the right of the platform; and the chairman said that if the persons around the unfortunate individual who had caused the disturbance would allow him to speak alone, but not assist him in making the disturbance, it might soon be put to an end. The interruption continued until another person was carried out of the hall.] Mr. Beecher continued: I do not ask that you should justify slavery in us, because it was wrong in you two hundred years ago; but having ignorantly been the means of fixing it upon us, now that we are struggling with mortal struggles to free ourselves from it, we have a right to your tolerance, your patience, and charitable constructions.

No man can unveil the future; no man can tell what revolutions are about to break upon the world; no man can tell what destiny belongs to France, nor to any of the European powers; but one thing is certain, that in the exigencies of the future there will be combinations and recombinations, and that those nations that are of the same faith, the same blood, and the same substantial interests, ought not to be alienated from each other, but ought to stand together. [Immense cheering and hisses.] I do not say that you ought not to be in the most friendly alliance with France or with Germany; but I do say that your own children, the offspring of England, ought to be nearer to you than any people of strange tongue. [A voice: "Degenerate sons," applause and hisses; another voice: "What about the *Trent?*"] If there had been any feelings of

bitterness in America, let me tell you that they had been excited, rightly or wrongly, under the impression that Great Britain was going to intervene between us and our own lawful struggle. [A voice: "No!" and applause.] With the evidence that there is no such intention all bitter feelings will pass away. [Applause.] We do not agree with the recent doctrine of neutrality as a question of law. But it is past, and we are not disposed to raise that question. We accept it now as a fact, and we say that the utterance of Lord Russell at Blairgowrie—[Applause, hisses, and a voice: "What about Lord Brougham?"]—together with the declaration of the government in stopping war-steamers here—[Great uproar, and applause]—has gone far toward quieting every fear and removing every apprehension from our minds. [Uproar and shouts of applause.] And now in the future it is the work of every good man and patriot not to create divisions, but to do the things that will make for peace. ["Oh, oh!" and laughter.] On our part it shall be done. [Applause and hisses, and "No, no!"] On your part it ought to be done; and when in any of the convulsions that come upon the world, Great Britain finds herself struggling single-handed against the gigantic powers that spread oppression and darkness—[Applause, hisses and uproar]—there ought to be such cordiality that she can turn and say to her first-born and most illustrious child, "Come!" ["Hear, hear!" applause, tremendous cheers, and uproar.] I will not say that England cannot again, as hitherto, single-handed manage any power—[applause and uproar]—but I will say that England and America together for religion and liberty—[A voice:

"Soap, soap," uproar, and great applause]—are a match for the world. [Applause; a voice: "They don't want any more soft soap."] Now, gentlemen and ladies—[A voice: "Sam Slick"; and another voice: "Ladies and gentlemen, if you please"]—when I came I was asked whether I would answer questions, and I very readily consented to do so, as I had in other places; but I will tell you it was because I expected to have the opportunity of speaking with some sort of ease and quiet. [A voice: "So you have."] I have for an hour and a half spoken against a storm—["Hear, hear!"]—and you yourselves are witnesses that, by the interruption, I have been obliged to strive with my voice, so that I no longer have the power to control this assembly. [Applause.] And although I am in spirit perfectly willing to answer any questions, and more than glad of the chance, yet I am by this very unnecessary opposition to-night incapacitated physically from doing it. Ladies and gentlemen, I bid you good-evening.

IV

THE CHILD AND THE STATE[1]

By David Dudley Field

"The Child and the State" appeared originally in *The Forum* for April, 1886. At the time of its publication Mr. Field was widely known as a jurist and a writer on law reform.

"The Homeless Boy" is the title of a woodcut circulated by the Children's Aid Society. It is a sad picture. The little waif sits on a stone step, with his head bent over and resting on his hands, stretched across bare knees, his flowing hair covering his face, and his tattered clothes and bare feet betokening utter wretchedness. Turning the leaf, we are informed that twenty dollars will enable the society to give the boy a home.

Can this picture be real and the statement true? The picture is too real, and that the statement is made in good faith and for reasons sufficient, we have the guaranty of the society's good name and the known fidelity of its excellent secretary, Mr. Brace.

How many of such homeless children are there in the city of New York? We are told that there are at least twelve thousand under twelve years of age; seven thousand of them having no shelter, not knowing at morning where they can sleep at night, and the rest

[1] Reprinted by permission of D. Appleton and Company from *Speeches, Arguments, and Miscellaneous Papers of David Dudley Field,* vol. III, edited by Titus Munson Coan, M.D.

having only shelters revolting to behold. Less than $250,000, then, would give them all decent and comfortable homes. Every night that these twelve thousand children are wandering in the streets, or lurking about rum-shops and dance-houses, or huddled in dens that are as foul in air as they are foul in occupants, that sum many times over is spent in superfluous luxury. Rich parlors and wide halls are filled nightly with pleasure-seekers, where the air is sweetened with the perfume of flowers, music wafted with the perfume, and the light is like "a new morn risen on mid noon." The voice of mirth in the ball-room drowns the wail of the children beyond, and, when the night pales into morning, the dancers go home rejoicing and the children go about the streets. Surely there must be something wrong with our civilization, our Christian civilization, so long as these strange contrasts are permitted to last.

It is not for the lack of sympathy or Christian charity. New York is charitable and generous beyond most cities, and I think I might have said beyond any city of Christendom, which is as much as to say beyond any city of the earth. Private charity is great, and association for public charity is greater. On every hand are asylums, retreats, dispensaries; more than a hundred institutions organized for the relief of poverty and suffering; associations for mutual help established in all trades and nearly all professions; and over four hundred churches have their societies and committees in aid of needy members. How, then, is it that we behold this dreadful apparition of helpless and innocent suffering, these homeless children, who, by no fault

of their own, are in want of food, clothing, and shelter, and are lurking in corners or scattered in the streets? It is because there is not a wider knowledge of the extent of the evil, and a closer study of the means to counteract it.

Let us enter into some details.

In one of the tenement-houses of the city, and their number is legion, there is a room, nineteen feet long, fifteen feet broad, and eleven feet high, where live a man and his wife and eight children. They sleep, dress, wash, cook, and eat in this one room. These ten persons have altogether thirty-one hundred and thirty-five cubic feet of air, while the law requires at least six thousand feet—nearly twice as much as they get. From tenement-houses like this there flows out daily a stream of children, ragged and dirty, to pick up rags, cigar stumps, and other refuse of the streets, or to pilfer or beg, as best they can. This is not the place to describe the horrors of the tenement-house, nor to discuss the duty or failure of duty on the part of the State in respect of its construction and occupation. I ask attention only to the condition of the children, and for illustration take the case of a boy, five years old, who is found, in a chill November day, bare-footed, scantily clothed, searching among the rag heaps in the street. He is a well-formed child, his face is fair, and, as he turns his bright eyes upon you when you ask him where he lives, you see that he has quick intelligence. Altogether he is such a child as a father should look upon with pride and a true mother would press to her bosom. Yet the parents are miserably poor, the father half the time out of work, and the mother wan

with the care of her family. This is not all. Father and mother both drink to excess, and each is intoxicated as often at least as Saturday night comes around.

Has the State any duties toward this little boy, and if so what are they?

All will agree that it has some duty, at least that of protection from personal violence. May it go further, and rescue the child from its loathsome occupation, its contaminating surroundings, and its faithless parents? I think that it may, and having the right, that it is charged with the duty of rescuing the child. This is a large subject, larger indeed than can be fully treated in this paper, but some of the reasons for my opionion shall be stated. At the outset, let me say that I am not a believer in the paternal theory of government. The great ends for which men are associated in political communities are mutual protection, and the construction of those public works, of which roads and bridges are examples, for which individuals are not competent. The State should interfere as little as possible with the economy of the family and the liberty of the individual to pursue his own happiness in his own way. And as a general rule parents are the best guardians of their children. The family is the primeval institution of the race. The love of the parent is the strongest of motives for the care of the child. But when parental love fails, and the offspring is either abandoned or educated in vice, the State may rightfully intervene. Its right is derived from its duty to protect itself and to protect all its people.

I am not deducing the right of interference from

an impulse of the heart, though that be the foundation on which our hospitals and almshouses are built, but I place it upon the inherent and all-pervading right of protection and self-defense. Charity is an individual privilege; the impulse is an individual gift from Heaven. The State is not founded for charity, but for protection. The dictate of humanity is without doubt to take a child from an unfaithful parent and give it the training most likely to lead to an honest and industrious life. This is to transfer the child from an unclean home to one that is clean, from indecency to decency, from foul air to pure, from unhealthy food to that which is healthy, from evil ways to good. Who can doubt that the greatest good which can be done to a child neglected by its parent or taught beggary or crime, is to take it from the wicked parent, and give it into the care of one who will teach it, not only the rudiments of learning, but honest labor? In what other way can we better follow the example of the Divine Master than by caring for these little ones, who are unable to take care of themselves?

Protection, however, is the foundation of the right I am asserting. We must, of course, have a care that interference for protection be not carried beyond its rightful limits. If any general rule could be laid down for marking these limits, it would perhaps be this, that the State should not invade one man's rights in order to protect another's. What the individual can do for himself the State should not undertake. But in the case supposed, the faithless parent has forfeited his right to his child, and the only point to be considered is the relation of the child to the State. This

relation involves considerations of economy and of safety, each of which may be considered by itself.

The question of economy has political and social aspects. The prevention of crime and the punishment of the criminal impose upon the State some of its heaviest burdens. The cost of the police, of the courts, and of the prisons, makes one of the longest items in the roll of public expenditure. In the year ending September 30, 1885, the maintenance of the three State prisons cost about $400,000. Besides these prisons, there are penitentiaries at New York, Brooklyn, Albany, Syracuse, Rochester, and Buffalo, and there is a county prison in each county. What all these cost there are no readily accessible statistics to tell. The yearly cost of the police in the city of New York is about $3,700,000, and that of the criminal courts $300,000. The cost, defrayed from the city treasury, of prisons, reformatories, asylums, and other charitable institutions is over $3,000,000. The expense of prisons alone is with difficulty separated from the rest. These are approximate figures. It is hard to find out how much the people of this State, in all their municipalities and political divisions, pay for police, courts, and prisons. We know that the amount is appalling. Much of this, how much cannot be told, might be saved by fulfilling the scriptural injunction, "Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it."

The question of safety is more vital still. Every one of these boys may be a voter ten or twenty years hence. His vote will then be as potent as yours or mine. In countries where the sovereign is a prince, it has

ever been thought prudent to bestow special care upon the training of an heir to the throne. Here the people are sovereign, and the little boy, now wandering about the streets, neglected or led astray, is in one sense joint heir to a throne. Every dictate of prudence points to his being fitted to fulfil the duties of his station. Who can say that if duly cared for he may not grow to the stature of a leader of the people, ranking with the foremost men of his time, a benefactor of the race, a teacher of great truths, a helper of the helpless, a brave soldier in the "sacramental host of God's elect"? If, on the other hand, he is left to himself in the swift current of want and vice, floating in the scum of sewers and the company of thieves, he will prove a scourge to the State, and may bring up in a prison, or perchance on the scaffold.

For this reason, and the one preceding, it should seem to be the duty of the community to look after children whose parents abandon them or lead them into evil ways, or are incapable of taking care of them.

We have already in many instances acted upon a like theory. The compulsory education acts, the corporations formed to prevent cruelty to children, and the unincorporated societies organized for their relief, are so many agencies established upon this principle. Take, for example, the eighth section of the elementary education act of 1874, as amended in 1876; which provides that the board of education in each city and incorporated village, and the trustees of the school districts and union school in each town, by the vote of a majority at a meeting called for the purpose, shall make all needful regulations concerning habitual tru-

ants and children between the ages of eight and fourteen, who may be found wandering about the streets or public places during school hours, having no lawful occupation or business, and growing up in ignorance; the regulations to be such as in the judgment of the board will be conducive to the welfare of the children, and to the good order of the city or town, and to be approved by a judge of the Supreme Court. Suitable places are to be provided for the disclipine, instruction, and confinement, when necessary, of the children, and the aid of the police of cities, or incorporated villages, and constables of towns, may be required to enforce the regulations.

The Penal Code makes it a crime to desert a child "with intent wholly to abandon it" (Sec. 287), or to omit without lawful excuse to perform a duty imposed by law to "furnish food, clothing, shelter, or medical attendance" (Sec. 288), or wilfully to permit a child's "life to be endangered, or its health to be injured, or its morals to become depraved" (Sec. 289), or "the child to be placed in such a situation or to engage in such an occupation" as that any of these things may happen. Another section (291) provides that a child under sixteen who is found "gathering or picking rags, cigar stumps, bones or refuse from markets," or without a home, or improperly exposed or neglected, or in a state of want or suffering, or destitute of means of support, being an orphan or being in certain immoral company, "must be arrested and brought before a proper court or magistrate as a vagrant, disorderly, or destitute child." The Code of Criminal Procedure (Sec. 887) declares, as vagrant,

any child between five and fourteen, "having sufficient bodily health and mental capacity to attend the public schools, found wandering in the streets or lanes of any city or incorporated village, a truant without any lawful occupation"; and it provides in the next section (888) that when a complaint is made against any such vagrant, the magistrate must cause the child and its parent to be brought before him, and may order the parent to take care of the child, and, if he does not, "the magistrate shall, by warrant, commit the child to such place as shall be provided for his reception." If no such place has been provided, the child must be committed to the almshouse of the county, and a child so committed may be bound out as an apprentice. A child found begging (Sec. 893) must be committed to the poorhouse, and there kept at useful labor until duly discharged or bound out.

These are very sweeping provisions, but they are said to fail of the effect intended, by reason of defects in the machinery for working them. Indeed, the theory upon which they are framed is in some respects erroneous. A child under twelve should never be treated as a criminal except after conviction for crime, in the few cases in which a child between seven and twelve may be convicted. To treat him as a criminal leaves a stigma, which after years do not efface. A friend who visited lately one of the reformatory schools in Boston described an inspection of the inmates, noting in particular the bearing of a little boy, three years old, who went through the exercises with the greatest spirit, intelligence, and glee. Should this little child be classed with criminals, brought into contact with

them, or be exposed ever to be told that he had been so classed? Our laws now use in regard to such a child the expressions "arrest," "prefer complaint," "bring before a migistrate for hearing," and the like. When the word "arrest" is used in respect of legal process, it is darkened with the shadow of criminality. Why not say "take," or better still "rescue"? A child under seven years of age is, and one between seven and twelve is presumed to be, incapable of committing crime. A policeman finding such a child homeless should be required to bring him before an officer specially charged with the duty of examining such cases, not a police justice. The state would thus appear to take the child under its protection as one of its wards or children. Such should be the treatment of every child under twelve years of age, whatever might be the circumstances; and the same officer should be the one to decide in the first instance whether a child between seven and twelve should be sent to a criminal magistrate.

When a child not charged with crime is brought before such an officer and is shown to be abused or abandoned, what should be done with him and with the parent? The latter should be required to support the child, so far as the law can make him responsible. The like is required of persons classed as disorderly by Section 901 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and under the education acts is also required of parents who fail to send their children to school. How to reach the parent is a question for the criminal law, with which we are not dealing at present. But for the child, what should be done with him? Most certainly he

should be placed in a healthy and sufficient home and taught the rudiments of knowledge and honest ways. Here the State should seek the aid of private charity, acting through incorporated institutions, because the State can in this way best control the institutions, and look after the treatment and welfare of the children. These agencies are sufficient for the present and may be sufficient always. Show the people the way in which they can best help the outcast, and their benevolence will supply the motive.

If these views are sound, they lead logically to the following conclusions:

I. That there should be a public guardian of homeless children under twelve years of age, whose duty it should be to find out the condition and treatment of those brought before him, and, when he sees that they require it, to place them in some institution incorporated for the care of such children, to be kept there or sent by them to homes here or in other States. In the category of homeless children may be included not only orphans without homes, but all children under twelve years of age who are abandoned by their parents or so neglected or abused as to require that they should be taken in charge.

II. That every police officer should be required, and every citizen should be permitted, to bring a homeless child before this guardian.

III. That a child under seven years of age should never under any circumstances be treated as a criminal, and a child between seven and twelve should not be so treated until he has been examined by the guardian and by him sent to the criminal magistrate. No child

under twelve should ever be left in the society of criminals under any circumstances whatever.

This paper has already reached the limit intended. It has not gone into particulars; on the contrary, it has been carefully confined to certain general propositions. Their development and execution are matters of detail. The aim of the article is attained, if it has helped to impress upon the reader this lesson, partly social and partly political: Take care of the children, and the men and women will take care of themselves.

V

THE SHORT BALLOT [1]

By R. S. Childs

The following argument by Mr. Childs, the well-known publicist and student of affairs, appeared in *The Outlook* for July 17, 1909.

Do you know that ours is the only habitually misgoverned democracy? Other democracies, Canada and the English, French, and German cities, are generally well governed, many of them splendidly governed. Their councils and legislatures stay clean automatically, without need for public uprisings to clean them out. True, they sometimes suffer from graft, but it is local, haphazard, and unorganized, like graft in business life. But with us misgovernment is universal and ever present. Every State and every city is constantly at war with it. The brand new city of Gary begins to grapple with it as soon as there is an election. And the success of the forces of righteousness is always temporary, like sweeping back flooding water with a broom. We say truly, "A reform administration is never reëlected." Good administration is actually abnormal in American cities and States. Maladministration is the normal.

This condition, unique among democracies, indicates

[1] Reprinted by permission of the author and *The Outlook*.

the existence of some peculiarity in our system of government as the underlying cause.

Starting at the broad base of our structure, the voters, we notice one unique phenomenon which is so familiar to us that we usually overlook it entirely—that is, our habit of voting blindly. Of course intelligent citizens do not vote without knowing what they are doing. Oh, no! You, Mr. Reader, for instance, you vote intelligently always! Of course you do! But for whom did you vote for Surrogate last time? You don't know. Well, then, whom did you support for State Auditor? for State Treasurer? for Clerk of the Court? for Supreme Court Judge? And who is your Alderman? Who represents your district at the State Capitol? Name, please, *all* the candidates you voted for at the last election. Of course you know the President and the governor and the mayor, but there was a long list of minor officers besides. Unless you are active in politics, I fear you flunk this examination. If your ballot had by a printer's error omitted the "State Comptroller" entirely, you would probably not have missed it. You ignored nine tenths of your ballot, voting for those you did not know about, and casting a straight party ticket for the rest, not because of party loyalty, but because you did not know of anything better to do. You need not feel ashamed of it. Your neighbors all did the same; *My* neighbors did (observe the little census reproduced here!):

CONFIDENTIAL CENSUS

Do you know the name of the new State Treasurer just elected? .....87% said "No"

Do you know the name of the present State Treasurer? .....75% said "No"
Do you know the name of the new State Assemblyman for this district? .....70% said "No"
Do you know the name of the defeated candidate for Assemblyman for this district? ...80% said "No"
Do you know the name of the Surrogate of this County? .....65% said "No"
Do you know the name of your Alderman? ..85% said "No"
Do you know whether your Alderman was one of those who voted against the increase in the Police Force last year?.....98% said "No"
Are you in active politics? .....96% said "No"

THE INTELLIGENCE (?) OF THE VOTE IN THE MOST INDEPENDENT ASSEMBLY DISTRICT IN BROOKLYN.

(Data collected immediately after election, 1908.)

Ex-President Eliot, of Harvard, the "ideal citizen," confessed in a public address recently that he did it too. Philadelphia has even elected imaginary men. It is a typical and universal American attitude. We all vote blindly. The intelligence of the community is not at work on any of the minor offices on the ballot. The average American citizen never casts a completely intelligent vote.

This is not all the fault of the voter. To cast a really intelligent ballot from a mere study of newspapers, campaign literature, and speeches is impossible, because practically nothing is ever published about the minor candidates.

The gossip around the local headquarters being too one-sided to be trusted by a casual inquirer, a deep-

working personal acquaintance with politics, involving years of experience and study, becomes necessary before a voter who wants to cast a wholly intelligent ballot can obtain the facts.

This is not the fault of the press. In New York City the number of elective offices in the State, city, and county to be filled by popular vote in a cycle of four years is nearly five hundred. In Chicago the number is still greater. Philadelphia, although smaller than either city, elects more people than either. No newspaper can give publicity to so many candidates or examine properly into their relative merits.

Plainly the voter is overburdened with more questions than he will answer carefully, for it is certain that the average citizen cannot afford the time to fulfil the unreasonable requirements that are now essential to intelligent voting. The voters at the polls are the foundation of a democracy, and the universal and incurable habit of voting blindly constitutes a huge break in that foundation which is serious enough to account for the toppling of the whole structure.

Let us see, then, if we can trace out a connection between blind voting as a cause and misgovernment as the effect.

No one will deny that if nine tenths of the citizens refrained from voting on election day, the remaining tenth would govern all. And when practically all vote in nine-tenth ignorance and indifference, about the same delegation of power occurs. A remaining fraction who do give enough time to the subject to cast an intelligent ballot take control. That fraction we call "politicians" in our unique American sense of the

word. A politician is a "political specialist." He is one who knows more about the voter's political business than the voter does. He knows, for instance, that the coroner's term will expire in November, and he contributes toward the discussion involved in nominating a successor, whereas the voter hardly knows a coroner is being elected. These politicians come from all classes, and the higher intelligence of the community contributes its full quota. Although they are only a fraction of the electorate, they are a fair average selection, and they would give us exactly the kind of government we all want, if only they could remain free and independent personal units. But the impulse to organize is irresistible. Convenience and efficiency require it, and the "organization" springs up and cements them together. Good men who see the organization go wrong on a nomination continue to stay in and to lend their strength, not bolting until moral conditions become intolerable. Were these men not bound by an organization with its social and other non-political ties, their revolt would be early, easy, and effective, and every bad nomination would receive its separate and proportionate punishment in the alienation of supporters.

The control of such active political organizations will gravitate always toward a low level. The doors must be open to every voter—examination of his civic spirit is impossible—and greed and altruism enter together. Greed has most to gain in a factional dispute, and is least scrupulous in choice of methods. The bad politician carries more weapons than the politician who hampers himself with a code of ethics one degree

higher. Consequently corruption finally dominates any machine that is worth dominating, and sinks it lower and lower as worse men displace better, until the limit of public toleration is reached and the machine receives a set-back at election. That causes its members to clean up, discredit the men who went too far, and restore a standard high enough to win—which standard immediately begins to sag again, by the operation of the same natural principle.

Reformers in a near-sighted way are constantly endeavoring to maintain pure political organizations and reëlect reform administrations. Suppose, however, that the Citizens' Union of New York, which is at present sincerely bent on improving the condition of politics, should succeed in carrying the city for its tickets several times in succession. After the first election, small political organizations which aided toward the victory would rush in, clamoring for their share of the plunder. For a term or two the reformers might be able to resist the pressure. Nevertheless the possession of power by their party would attract the grafters; they would find themselves accepting assistance from men who were in politics for what there was in it, men who wanted to make more use of the power and patronage that lay at hand unutilized; and those men would in time, working within the union, depose the original heads of the party and substitute "more practical" leaders, until in time the Citizens' Union would itself need reforming.

Theoretically, there is always the threat of the minority party which stands ready to take advantage of

every lapse; but as there is no debate between minor candidates, no adequate public scrutiny or comparison of personalities, the minority party gets no credit for a superior nomination, and often finds that it can more hopefully afford to cater to its own lowest elements. In fact, it may be only the dominant party which can venture to affront the lowest elements of its membership and nominate the better candidate.

The essence of our complaint against our government is that it represents these easily contaminated political organizations instead of the citizens. Naturally! When practically none but the politicians in his district are aware of his actions or even of his existence, the office-holder who refuses to bow to their will is committing political suicide.

Sometimes the interests of the politician and the people are parallel, but sometimes they are not, and the office-holder is apt to diverge along the path of politics. An appointment is made, partly at least, to strengthen the party, since the appointee has a certain following. A bill is considered, not on its simple merits, but on the issue, "Who is behind it?" "If it is Boss Smith of Green County that wants it, whatever his reasons, we must placate him or risk disaffection in that district." So appointments and measures lose their original and proper significance and become mere pawns in a chess game of politics which aims to keep "our side" on top. The office-holders themselves may be upright, bribe-proof men—they usually are, in fact. But their failure to disregard all exigencies of party politics constitutes misrepresentative govern-

ment, and Boss Smith, of Green County, can privately sell his influence as he chooses, whereby the public is in the end a heavy loser.

By the way, every factor in this sequence is a unique American phenomenon! The long ballot with its variegated list of trivial officers is to be seen nowhere but in the United States. The English ballot never covers more than three offices, usually only one. In Canada the ballot is less commonly limited to a single office, but the number is never large, and includes only offices that are of such importance as to attract close scrutiny by the public. To any Englishman or Canadian our long ballot is astonishing, and our blind voting appalling. The politicians as a professional class, separate from the popular leaders or office-holders, are unknown in other lands, and the very word *politician* has a special meaning of reproach in this country which foreigners do not attach to it. And government of a democracy from behind the scenes by politicians, in endless opposition to government by public opinion, is the final unique American phenomenon in the long ballot's train of consequences.

The blind vote of course does not take in the whole ballot. Certain conspicuous offices engage the attention of all of us. We go to hear the speeches of the candidates for conspicuous offices; those speeches are printed in the daily papers and reviewed in the weeklies; the candidates are the theme of editorials, and we need take no part in politics to be able to vote with knowledge on certain important issues. We would laugh at an attempt to control our vote on any of these questions when we have opinions of our own. With

this independent intelligence always at work upon the major nominations, we secure a higher normal level of conditions. Aldermen we elect who do not represent us, and State legislatures which obey the influence of unseen powers, but we are apt to speak effectively when it comes to the choice of a conspicuous officer like the President, a governor, or a mayor. For mayor, governor, or President we are sure to secure a presentable figure, always honest and frequently an able and independent champion of the people against the very political interests that nominated him. We are apt to reëlect such men, and the way we sweep aside hostile politicians where the issue is clear shows how powerfully the tide of our American spirit sets toward good government when the intelligence of the community finds a channel—witness Roosevelt, Taft, Hughes, Deneen, Folk, and a host of mayors.

Sometimes there is rank misgovernment in a conspicuous office, as when Van Wyck ruled New York City. But, as is rather usual at such times, a reform wave followed, and his party was punished by a defeat at the polls. Since then Tammany has temporarily conceded the conspicuous offices to the people, nominating thereto men of independent character, and even accepting two who had already been nominated by the reformers. It has been content with graft from borough presidents, the aldermen, and its friends in the lower grades of the departments.

Misgovernment is secure only in the minor offices, in the shadowy places where the spot-light of publicity rarely wanders. When the rats venture out of these obscurities into the blazing light, it is to nibble the

cake cautiously, and always with timid eyes upon that great giant, the public, ready to scamper if he stirs. If, growing confident from long immunity, they become too bold and noisy, punishment, clumsy but heavy, suddenly swoops upon them.

And so in those conspicuous offices—those on which we do not vote blindly—we secure fairly good government as a normal condition, considering that the organized and skilful opposition which always faces us occupies a position of great strategic advantage in possession of the nominating machinery.

To reduce this idea to a working rule:

In an obscure contest on the blind end of the ballot, merit has little political value; but in the conspicuous contests, where we actually compare man and man, superior merit in a nominee is a definite political asset. Hence, in the case of an obscure nomination, the tendency is automatically downward; but in a conspicuous nomination (where all the voting is intelligent), the tendency is upward.

We cannot hope to raise the political intelligence of our citizenship to a level where it will scrutinize the long ballot and cease to vote blindly on most of it. The mountain will not come to Mahomet; Mahomet then must go to the mountain. We must *shorten the ballot* to a point where the average man will vote intelligently without giving to politics more attention than he does at present. That means making it very short, for if it exceeds by even a little the retentive capacity of the average voter's memory, the "political specialist" is created. A voter could remember the relative merits of probably about five sets of candidates,

and could keep that many separate contests clear in his mind, but he would probably begin to vote blindly on more than five. Also we must take all unimportant offices off the ballot, since the electorate will not bother with such trifles whether the ballot be short or not. Why, indeed, should fifty thousand voters all be asked to pause for even a few minutes apiece to study the relative qualifications of Smith and Jones for the petty post of County Surveyor? An intelligent citizen may properly have bigger business!

To be pictorial, let us see how a revised schedule of elections might look if we put into the realm of appointive offices as many as possible of those which we now ignore. All county offices, many city positions, and the tail of the State ticket would thus be disposed of, and the ballot might look somewhat like this (New York State titles):

First Year	*Second Year*	*Third Year*	*Fourth Year*
President and Vice-President (four years)	Governor (four years)	Congressman (two years)	State Senator (four years)
Congressman (two years)	State Assemblyman (two years)	Mayor (four years)	State Assemblyman (two years)
City Councilman (two years)		City Councilman (two years)	

This is merely organizing the State and city as simply as the federal government. There is endless room for discussion on the details, and many other arrangements could be devised. This schedule provides

for every office which must be kept within the realm of politics. It provides short ballots which every man would vote intelligently without calling on a political specialist to come and guide his pencil.

On such a short-ballot basis, the entry of our best men into public life becomes possible. To-day the retired business man, for instance, who is willing to devote his trained mind and proven executive ability to the service of his city finds it difficult to enter public life even as a humble alderman. He cannot win as an independent, for the voters do not distinguish his voice in the political hubbub. He must get his name on the ticket of the dominant party, which can elect him regardless of whether he makes a fierce campaign or remains silent on every issue. In seeking this nomination, direct primaries will help him a little, but in the confusion of making the nominations for a multitude of offices he is again unable to attract much attention, and the "machine," swinging in solid blocks of well-drilled voters to the support of some old-time pillar of the "organization," is likely to defeat him despite his manifest superiority of character. His only hopeful resort is to go down into the unfamiliar shaded underworld of ward politics, kowtow to district leaders and captains whose social and business standing is perhaps inferior to his own, and satisfy their queries, "What have you done for the party?" and "What will you do for us?" Such procedure being at least distasteful and probably stultifying, his activities turn toward philanthropies and recreations. The city has thus refused his proferred services, has turned away

the man who considered the office as an opening for civic usefulness in favor of one who probably wanted it as a good job.

But if he is to be conspicuous as an important and almost solitary figure before his prospective constituents, such a candidate can easily get a satisfactory hearing, and his superior merit will be an all-important asset to him. In such a simple situation the "ward politician" has no function. Every ordinary voter is a complete politician too. The party bosslet who prates of "regularity" will find the voter replying with facts regarding the personality and principles of the candidate, and the discussion shifts to a new level. If the politician can win over the voter on that level, well and good. That is leadership, not bossism, and is unobjectionable.

After such an election this conspicuousness will continue, encouraging good behavior in office. The legislator will fear public indignation because his constituents, damning a measure, will also damn him specifically for his part in it. Likewise, if deserving, he can get popular support over the heads of any political coterie whom he ventures to disobey.

Good government is entirely a matter of getting the right man elected. Nothing else is so vital. No city charter or State constitution, however ingenious, will make bad men give good government or keep good men from getting good results.

To get the right man is first of all a matter of arranging for the maximum amount of concentrated public scrutiny at the election. It is not superior intelligence

in the British electorate that enables it uniformly to elect the best men in town to the city councils, save in that the individual voter in the ward selects only a single officer at election, and can hardly fail to know just what he is doing. Likewise there cannot be a mysterious virtue in the new plan of governing American cities by small commissions (the success of which in Galveston, Houston, and Des Moines is undeniable) save in that the importance and conspicuousness of the five commissionerships attract so fierce a limelight at election that no unworthy figure who ventures into that blazing circle can hope to conceal his unworthiness from the eyes of even the most careless voter.

The Galveston plan would be better yet if the commissioners were elected one at a time for long terms in rotation. Then public scrutiny at election would focus still more searchingly on the candidates, and merit would increase still further in value as a political asset.

We must manage somehow to get our eggs into a few baskets—the baskets that we watch! For remember that we are not governed by public opinion, but by public-opinion-as-expressed-through-the-pencil-point-of-the-Average-Voter-in-his-election-booth. And that may be a vastly different thing! Public opinion can only work in broad masses, clumsily. To make a multitude of delicate decisions is beyond its coarse powers. It can't play the tune it has in mind upon our close-stringed political harp, but give it a broad key-board simple enough for its huge, slow hands, and it will thump out the right notes with precision!

There is nothing the matter with Americans. We are

by far the most intelligent electorate in the world. We are not indifferent. We do want good government. And we can win back our final freedom on a "short ballot" basis!

VI

ON MUNICIPAL AND GOVERNMENTAL OWNERSHIP [1]

By J. P. Altgeld

Mr. Altgeld was judge of the Superior Court of Chicago from 1886 to 1891 and Governor of Illinois from 1893 to 1897. He was an advocate of free silver and of socialism and was much interested in problems of prison reform. The following address was delivered in Philadelphia on Labor Day, September 5, 1897.

Aside from the money question, the most serious problem that confronts the people of America to-day is that of rescuing their cities, their States, and the federal government, including the federal judiciary, from absolute control of corporate monopoly. How to restore the voice of the citizen in the government of his country; and how to put an end to those proceedings in some of the higher courts which are farce and mockery on one side, and a criminal usurpation and oppression on the other.

Corporations that were to be servants and begged the privilege of supplying cities with conveniences, or of serving the country at large, have become masters.

We have had thirty years of colorless politics in which

[1] Reprinted from *Modern Eloquence,* 1923, vol. X, by permission of the Modern Eloquence Corporation.

both of the political parties were simply conveniences for organized greed. There was nothing to arouse the deep, slumbering patriotism of the masses and a race of politicians came to the front, most of whom had no convictions and many of whom straddled every proposition and then waited to be seduced. They were men who made every promise to the laborer, and then betrayed him. These men became the instruments through which the corporations worked.

Having learned that vast sums can be extorted from the American people, the monopolies used a part of the wealth they got from this source to corrupt the people's representatives, and thus obtained unlimited privileges of plunder, until almost every great city in this country is tied and gagged, and cannot even enter a protest while being robbed. All of this falls with crushing force on the laborer, for his hands must earn the taxes the landlord pays—he is forced to depend on the public conveniences, and always suffers under bad government. An individual rarely has interest enough or money enough to bribe a city council or buy a legislature. But the corporations have both, and, as the money all comes off the public, they offer temptations that are too strong for the average man to resist.

In as much as no government can endure in which corrupt greed not only makes the laws, but decides who shall construe them, many of our best citizens are beginning to despair of the republic. Others urge that we should remove the bribe-givers—that is, destroy this overwhelming temptation by having the government take all these monopolies itself and furnish the service which they now furnish, and thus not only save our

institutions, but have the great profits which now go into the pockets of private corporations turned into the public treasury.

But the corruptionists, the monopolists, and all men who are fattening on the existing rottenness and injustice, cry angrily, "Why, that would be socialism, rank socialism, and we are opposed to it!" Some of these men know the meaning of socialism and some do not, but they control all those men who cling to the skirts of wealth.

Socialism has been defined as a system of government in which the competitive system is entirely abolished and the principle of associated effort is applied to everything. According to the standard authorities, socialism is an ideal state founded on justice, and one in which the benefits of modern invention and of monopoly shall be shared by all the people instead of being controlled by the few and used by these few to make themselves the absolute masters of the many. The word *socialism* is used as a term of derision only by the ignorant or the servile.

During the former administration of Lord Salisbury as premier of England, it was once charged that the tendency of the government was socialistic; that there was a tendency for the government to do those things which always had been left, and should be left, to the individual; that most of the great cities of the Empire had not only assumed the functions of supplying their inhabitants with water, gas, electric light, and street railway service, but that they were going a great deal further and were even building and renting houses

and doing a host of other things that were not within the province of government.

He was reported as saying in answer to this criticism, that it was not a question of socialism at all, but simply a question of business; a question whether a given community can secure certain advantages or in a more satisfactory manner when acting collectively, than by leaving everything to individual effort; that a collective body has the same right to pursue the best methods, and do all things necessary to its welfare, or the welfare of its members, that an individual has; that the best interest of the community must be the criterion by which to decide each case; that there was a time when private individuals carried mails and charged what they pleased, there being no government post-office; but as the world advanced, every government took the postal business into its own hands, and no intelligent man would have it turned over to a private corporation.

Let us see what civilized man is doing elsewhere. Take the cities of Great Britain first, for they have the same power of self-government that American cities have. In all that pertains to the comfort and enterprise of the individual we are far in the lead; but in the government of cities we are far behind. Glasgow has to-day nearly one million inhabitants and is one of the great manufacturing and commercial cities of the world. Thirty years ago there was scarcely a city that was in a worse condition. Private corporations furnished it a poor quality of water, taken from the Clyde River, and they charged high rates for it. The city drained into the Clyde, and it became horribly filthy. Private corpor-

ations furnished a poor quality of gas, at a high price; and private companies operated the street railroads. Private companies had the same grip on the people there that they have in most American cities. Owing to the development of great shipbuilding and other industries in the valley of the Clyde, the laboring population of Glasgow became very dense and the means of housing the people were miserable. Poorly lighted, poorly ventilated, filthy houses brought high rents. In many cases two families lived in one room. Cleanliness was impossible; the sanitary conditions were frightful and the death-rate was high. As for educational facilities, there were none worth mentioning for these people. The condition of the laboring classes was one of degradation and misery; children were growing up mentally, morally, and physically diseased; a generation was coming which threatened to be an expense and a menace to the country. It was a great slum city.

But patriotic and public-spirited men came to the front and gave the city the benefit of their services free. In fact, none of the highest city officials in Great Britain received any pay other than the well-being of humanity and the good opinions of their country. The city rid itself of the private companies by buying them and then brought fresh water from the highlands, a distance of sixty miles. It doubled the quantity of water furnished the inhabitants, and reduced the cost of consumers by one half. And yet the department now yields over $200,000 a year net income over all fixed charges.

The municipality, after much difficulty, bought the private gas plants and gradually reduced the price of gas from $1.14 to 58 cents, and it now illuminates not

only the streets and public places, but all passageways and stairways in flat buildings, experience having shown that a good lamp is almost as useful as a policeman. The total debt of the city for plants, extensions, etc., perfectly to illumine all the city had reached nearly five and a half millions of dollars. Notwithstanding the low price at which gas is sold, this sum has gradually been reduced to less than two and a half millions of dollars out of the earnings of the system, and it will soon be wiped out and the entire revenue go into the city treasury.

The street railways were owned by the city, but, until 1894, they were leased out under an arrangement which paid the city full cost of construction, with interest, besides a yearly income of $750 per street mile. In 1894 the city began to operate the lines itself. The fares were reduced 33 per cent, besides special tickets to laborers, so that the average is under two cents, and over one third of all the fares are one cent each.

The private company had worked its men twelve and fourteen hours a day and paid irregular and unsatisfactory wages. The city at once reduced the number of hours to ten, and fixed a satisfactory scale of wages. And, compared with what it formerly was, the service has been greatly improved. In spite of all these acts for the benefit of the public, the roads, which had cost the city nothing, now net over all charges for improvements, etc., one fourth of a million annually. In 1892 the city bought out a private electric light company, and now has the monopoly of furnishing electric light and power. This promises to be a source of enormous revenue for the city.

For sanitary reasons, the city built a number of public wash-houses, with all modern conveniences, so that a woman living in a small apartment can take a basketful of clothes to a public wash-house and for four cents an hour can have a stall and use all of the machinery for washing and drying, and at the end of an hour take her basket of clothes home, washed and dried. For the same reasons, public baths and parks or pleasure grounds were established; and the city condemned a large amount of poor tenement property and tore the houses down and built whole rows of apartments, airy and well lighted, which it now rents to laborers, and which, in time, will pay for themselves and will then be a great source of revenue.

The city had become filled with cheap lodging-houses which were overcrowded and were filthy and prolific of both disease and crime. On sanitary and police grounds combined, the municipality built a number of airy and well-lighted lodging-houses, some for men and some for women, where, for from six to nine cents, a person can get a bed in a small, separate room, with the use of a large sitting-room and the privilege of cooking his own food at the kitchen range.

The city has acquired all the docks and dock privileges and furnishes all the labor in managing them. It also has the exclusive ownership of all the markets and slaughter-houses and derives a large income from them.

Instead of draining into the Clyde, large works have been established, in which the solid matter is all taken out of the sewage and pressed into cakes and loaded automatically on cars and then taken to the country, where it is used as manure on a farm belonging to the

city, and where all the food for the city's horses is raised, while the liquid sewage is run through filtering beds and made clear and odorless.

Manchester has within its narrow limits only a little over half a million people, but within a radius of twenty miles from her city hall there are over three million inhabitants. These have to be considered in discussing Manchester, which is essentially a manufacturing and commercial city. Its history is in many respects a parallel of that of Glasgow. It seemed to be a great city of slums, degradation, and misery, and was in the grip of private monopolies.

To-day the city furnishes all the service that is furnished here by private corporations, and does it at about one-half the cost. It furnishes gas at fifty-six cents a thousand, and after deducting all that is used perfectly to illuminate the streets and after applying $200,000 a year on the original cost of plants, etc., it still turns $300,000 a year into the public treasury, although the aim in nearly all English cities is not to make money, but to serve the public.

The city constructed an aqueduct ninety miles long to secure pure water and furnishes this for a little more than half what the private company had charged for a poor quality of water. It owns the street railways, and besides giving greatly reduced rates and giving half-fare tickets to workingmen, the city derives a large revenue from this source. Like Glasgow and Birmingham, the city owns large cemeteries in which there are separate sections for the different religious denominations, and prices are so arranged that while those who desire to do so can get lots costing from ten to thirty

dollars, yet "a decent burial with inscription on stone over a grave can be had at about four dollars for adults and three dollars for children. This charge includes all cemetery fees and expenses."

The city owns the markets and slaughter-houses. It has provided parks and swimming baths and, like Birmingham and Glasgow, it maintains large technical schools in which thousands of young men are instructed in the industrial arts and sciences, so as to be able to maintain Manchester's greatness.

Birmingham has over half a million of people, and its experience resembles that of Glasgow and Manchester. Formerly private corporations controlled almost everything and charged very high rates for very poor service, and the sanitary conditions were frightful. But here again municipal statesmen came to the front, the most prominent among whom was the Honorable Joseph Chamberlain, who has since been in the British government. He gave his time free and was three times elected mayor. Under his guidance the gas works were purchased of the private companies for $10,000,000. There are about two thousand men employed in connection with the gas works; they work only eight hours a day; the price of gas has been reduced to fifty-eight cents; the streets have been better lighted than ever before; and the net amount now annually turned into the city treasury, after deducting all fixed charges, is over $300,000.

The water-works were purchased of the private companies for $6,750,000. The system was greatly extended, the supply doubled and the cost to consumer very much reduced.

This city has condemned the worst section of the slums and thus acquired the ground at a cost of about $8,000,000, and upon this ground it has built modern houses which it rents, and the death-rate in the section has been reduced from an average of eighty to the thousand persons down to an average of twenty. It has now been demonstrated that in the end this property will pay for itself and thereafter go far toward defraying the annual expenses of the city.

Not going further into detail, let me say there are at present in the United Kingdom 185 municipalities that supply their inhabitants with water, with gas and electric light, and one third of the street railway mileage of Great Britain is owned by the municipalities. Leaving out London, it amounts to two thirds. And in most instances in which they do not own the street railways, they have compelled the companies to grant low fares and divide profits.

While these things are taking place in Europe, the private corporations in America are bribing legislatures and city councils, reducing wages, charging higher rates, and collecting dividends on millions and millions of watered stock. According to legislative investigation, the stock in the Boston Street Railroad is over half water; in New York, in Brooklyn and in Philadelphia the ratio is 4 to 1.

Every business reason applicable to the municipalities and governments of Europe is applicable here. We want as pure water, as good drainage, as cheap services as they have, and we want the same privilege of supplying ourselves as they exercise; and when it is apparent that, by acting collectively, we can do business more

successfully, can serve ourselves better in every way, and can secure for the public treasury these millions which now go into the pockets of grasping individuals, have we not a right to do it? If we find that, in this manner, we can give steadiness to labor, and can elevate its standard and improve the conditions of all our people, dare we not do it? Every one of the reforms carried out in England and on the Continent met with fierce opposition from the same classes that oppose them here, but the business sense and patriotic impulse of the people prevailed, and I believe will prevail here.

VII

THE AMERICAN RED CROSS[1]

By Henry P. Davison

Mr. Davison, a member of the banking firm of J. P. Morgan and Company, was Chairman of the Red Cross World Organization during the World War. The following address was one of those delivered at the Metropolitan Opera House in New York City at the meeting in which the Red Cross Drive was opened, May 18, 1918. At the time Mr. Davison had just returned from a tour of the war districts of Europe.

It must be admitted that the military situation on the Western front is serious and that the next few months will undoubtedly be the critical months of the war, as Germany is hurling, at all costs, her vast force against the line, determined if possible to divide and smash the armies before we can get there in force. Conscious of this, I can say that I have never left Europe more confident of the final success of the Entente, as I have never known the morale as high—all along the line and back of the line, as it is to-day.

I have spoken of the military situation because the work of the American Red Cross is closely allied with it. You must appreciate that it is impossible to give, within a few minutes, any picture of the work it is doing, both at home and throughout the Western front. You have

[1] Reprinted from *Modern Eloquence*, 1923, vol. XI, by permission of the Modern Eloquence Corporation.

seen our boys don their uniforms. They have given you their leave-taking. They have gone to their camps, and many of them have gone over there! You have resolved that nothing which would protect them from sickness or add to their comfort shall be withheld. Furthermore, you have demanded that a service should be rendered to their families left behind, and to them "over there" for their peace of mind in connection with their families at home, and also that to those unfortunate enough to become prisoners of the enemy every possible service through the Red Cross shall be extended for their health and comfort. The women of the country have not only demanded this of the American Red Cross, but by their patriotism and industry have made it possible to make provisions for their comfort. Of course, it is not conceivable that this work at home, enormous as it is, and requiring every kind of talent and human resource, should be in any sense restricted, but rather enlarged and continued during the war.

If you could have seen during the recent offensive, the rushing by night of Red Cross camions loaded with food to meet the thousands of men, women, and children being bombarded out of their homes without notice; if you could have seen them receiving the hot food and drink given to them by the American people as they are on their way they know not where; and if later you could see the thousands and thousands of them who have been helped by the American people to secure lodging, food, and clothing, you would then understand the look of gratitude upon their faces—gratitude to the American people.

If you could go throughout those countries into the

buildings where thousands of children are being cared for, maternity homes where mothers and their babies are attended, workshops where thousands of people are given employment to make materials necessary for the destitute of these countries, in the dispensaries and countless villages where with the aid of the Rockefeller Foundation, the greatest war is being carried on against tuberculosis; if you could visit with Red Cross representatives the families of the soldiers whose names are given by the military authorities, to whom direct relief is extended; and could go with the Red Cross representatives in the front-line trenches to see them give articles of comfort and serve hot drinks to the soldiers of our allies; if you could go into the Red Cross rest-rooms and canteens and see them care for and feed over 3,000,000 men a month; if you could visit the many hospitals in Europe organized and being run by the Red Cross and knew that in addition supplies are contributed to more than 5,000 military hospitals in France and Italy; if you could go through the factories where artificial limbs are being made for our own boys and those of our allies, through the factory where splints are being so scientifically made that they have been put on the wounded men before they have been moved from No Man's Land, thus saving many lives and limbs which otherwise would have been lost—you would then not fully cover the field of Red Cross operations, for there is to-day practically no breach into which Red Cross does not rush. It is in this way that the American people are giving courage not only to the soldiers of our allies, but to their families, and assuring them that they must keep heart whatever happens, as the American forces

will soon be there in number and quality to fight with them until the war is won.

My tour on the Continent with the heads of the respective Red Cross commissions was practically an ovation from beginning to end, not to me or to the Red Cross, but to the American people, as we have studiously made clear that the work of the American Red Cross is but an expression from the American people to those who have suffered for us as well as themselves in a common cause.

The continuation of this work will hold and further establish our relations with the peoples of our allies. This should make a recurrence of the present situation, which is not within the power of man to describe, impossible, and will contribute more than any other voluntary act within our power to the winning of the war, to the saving of the lives of our own boys and to the end that this world shall be made possible to live in, which it will never be again until the German military power is crushed.

I hope there are no American men and women who do not realize that the time has come when each must contribute generously and cheerfully with the feeling that his or her contribution is in no sense a gift but an act of protection and of justice as well. A Frenchman, prefect of one of the provinces, a picturesque and charming old gentleman, said to me: "We of France knew of your riches, knew of your power, but it took the war to show us your heart." Now in these tragic weeks of the world's history when all our associates are in the death struggle for freedom, let us indeed carry on—carry on and show not only to them—those fighting with us and for us, on

and back of the lines, but to our enemies as well—that there is yet in the world a power of love, a power of sympathy, a power of Christianity, and a power of justice which must and shall reëstablish the world for the betterment of all mankind.

VIII

BUSINESS—A PROFESSION [1]

By Louis D. Brandeis

At the time the following address was delivered, Mr. Brandeis was widely known as an attorney, especially in connection with cases involving the constitutionality of labor legislation in Oregon, Illinois, and Ohio. Since 1916 he has been Justice Brandeis of the Supreme Court of the United States. The address was delivered in 1912 at the Commencement Exercises of Brown University.

Each commencement season we are told by the college reports the number of graduates who have selected the professions as their occupations and the number of those who will enter business. The time has come for abandoning such a classification. Business should be, and to some extent already is, one of the professions. The once meager list of the learned professions is being constantly enlarged. Engineering in its many branches already takes rank beside law, medicine, and theology. Forestry and scientific agriculture are securing places of honor. The new professions of manufacturing, of merchandising, of transportation, and of finance must soon gain recognition. The establishment of business schools in our universities is a manifestation of the modern conception of business.

The peculiar characteristics of a profession as distinguished from other occupations, I take to be these:

[1] From *Business—A Profession.* Used by special permission of the publishers, Hale, Cushman and Flint.

First. A profession is an occupation for which the necessary preliminary training is intellectual in character, involving knowledge and to some extent learning, as distinguished from mere skill.

Second. It is an occupation which is pursued largely for others and not merely for one's self.

Third. It is an occupation in which the amount of financial returns is not the accepted measure of success.

Is not each of these characteristics found to-day in business worthily pursued?

The field of knowledge requisite to the more successful conduct of business has been greatly widened by the application to industry not only of chemical, mechanical, and electrical science, but also the new science of management; by the increasing difficulties involved in adjusting the relations of labor to capital; by the necessary intertwining of social and industrial problems; by the ever extending scope of State and federal regulation of business. Indeed, mere size and territorial expansion have compelled the business man to enter upon new and broader fields of knowledge in order to match his achievements with his opportunities.

This new development is tending to make business an applied science. Through this development the relative values in business of the trading instinct and of mere shrewdness have, as compared with other faculties, largely diminished. The conception of trade itself has changed. The old idea of a good bargain was a transaction in which one man got the better of another. The new idea of a good contract is a transaction which is good for both parties to it.

Under these new conditions, success in business must

mean something very different from mere money-making. In business the able man ordinarily earns a larger income than one less able. So does the able man in the recognized professions—in law, medicine, or engineering; and even in those professions more remote from money-making, like the ministry, teaching, or social work. The world's demand for efficiency is so great and the supply so small, that the price of efficiency is high in every field of human activity.

The recognized professions, however, definitely reject the size of the financial return as the measure of success. They select as their test, excellence of performance in the broadest sense—and include, among other things, advance in the particular occupation and service to the community. These are the basis of all worthy reputations in the recognized professions. In them a large income is the ordinary incident of success; but he who exaggerates the value of the incident is apt to fail of real success.

To the business of to-day a similar test must be applied. True, in business the earning of profit is something more than an incident of success. It is an essential condition of success; because the continued absence of profit itself spells failure. But while loss spells failure, large profits do not connote success. Success must be sought in business also in excellence of performance; and in business, excellence of performance manifests itself, among other things, in the advancing of methods and processes; in the improvement of products; in more perfect organization eliminating friction as well as waste; in bettering the condition of the workingmen, developing their faculties, and promoting their happi-

ness; and in the establishment of right relations with customers and with the community.

In the field of modern business, so rich in opportunity for the exercise of man's finest and most varied mental faculties and moral qualities, mere money-making cannot be regarded as the legitimate end. Neither can mere growth in bulk or power be admitted as a worthy ambition. Nor can a man nobly mindful of his serious responsibilities to society, view business as a game; since with the conduct of business human happiness or misery is inextricably interwoven.

Real success in business is to be found in achievements comparable rather with those of the artist or the scientist, of the inventor or the statesman. And the joys sought in the profession of business must be like their joys and not the mere vulgar satisfaction which is experienced in the acquisition of money, in the exercise of power, or in the frivolous pleasure of mere winning.

It was such real success, comparable with the scientist's, the inventor's, the statesman's, which marked the career of William H. McElwain of Boston, who died in 1908 at the age of forty-one. He had been in business on his own account but thirteen years. Starting without means, he left a fortune, all of which had been earned in the competitive business of shoe manufacturing, without the aid of either patent or trademark. That shows McElwain did not lack the money-making faculty. His company's sales grew from $75,957 in 1895 to $8,691,274 in 1908. He became thus one of the largest shoe manufacturers in the world. That shows he did not lack either ambition or organizing ability. The working capital required for this rapidly growing

business was obtained by him without surrendering to outside investors or to bankers any share in the profits of business; all the stock in his company being owned either by himself or his active associates. That shows he did not lack financial skill.

But this money-making faculty, organizing ability, and financial skill were with him servants, not masters. He worked for nobler ends than mere accumulation or lust of power. In those thirteen years McElwain made so many advances in the methods and practices of the long-established and prosperous branch of industry in which he was engaged, that he may be said to have revolutionized shoe manufacturing. He found it a trade; he left it an applied science.

This is the kind of thing he did: In 1902 the irregularity in the employment of the shoe worker was brought to his attention. He became greatly impressed with its economic waste, with the misery to the workers and the demoralization which attended it. Irregularity of employment is the worst and most extended of industrial evils. Even in fairly prosperous times the workingmen of America are subjected to enforced idleness and loss of earnings, on the average, probably 10 to 20 per cent of their working time. The irregularity of employment was no greater in the McElwain factories than other shoe factories. The condition was not so bad in shoe manufacturing as in many other branches of industry. But it was bad enough; for shoe manufacturing was a seasonal industry. Most manufacturers closed their factories twice a year. Some manufacturers had two additional slack periods.

This irregularity had been accepted by the trade—

by manufacturers and workingmen alike—as inevitable. It had been bowed to as if it were a law of nature—a cross to be borne with resignation. But with McElwain an evil recognized was a condition to be remedied; and he set his great mind to solving the problem of irregularity of employment in his own factories; just as Wilbur Wright applied his mind to the aëroplane, as Bell, his mind to the telephone, and as Edison, his mind to the problems of electric light. Within a few years irregularity of employment had ceased in the McElwain factories; and before his death every one of his many thousand employees could find work three hundred and five days in the year.

Closely allied with the establishment of regularity of employment was the advance made by McElwain in introducing punctual delivery of goods manufactured by his company. Shoes are manufactured mainly upon orders; and the orders are taken on samples submitted. The samples are made nearly a year before the goods are sold to the consumer. Samples for the shoes which will be bought in the spring and summer of 1913 were made in the early summer of 1912. The solicitation of orders on these samples began in the late summer. The manufacture of the shoes commences in November; and the order is filled before July.

Dates of delivery are fixed, of course, when orders are taken; but the dates fixed had not been taken very seriously by the manufacturers; and the trade was greatly annoyed by irregularities in delivery. McElwain recognized the business waste and inconvenience attendant upon such unfulfilled promises. He insisted that an agreement to deliver on a certain day was as

binding as an agreement to pay a note on a certain day.

He knew that to make punctual delivery possible, careful study and changes in the methods of manufacture and of distribution were necessary. He made the study; he introduced the radical changes found necessary; and he so perfected his organization that customers could rely absolutely upon delivery on the day fixed. Scientific management practically eliminated the recurring obstacles of the unexpected. To attain this result, business invention of a high order was of course necessary—invention directed to the departments both of production and of distribution.

The career of the Filenes of Boston affords another example of success in professionalized business. In 1891 the Filenes occupied two tiny retail stores in Boston. The floor space of each was only twenty feet square. One was a glove stand, the other a women's specialty store. Twenty years later their sales were nearly $5,000,000 a year. In September, 1912, they moved into a new building with more than nine acres of floor space. But the significant thing about their success is not their growth in size or in profits. The trade offers many other examples of similar growth. The preeminence of the Filenes lies in the advance which has been made in the nature, the aims, and the ideals of retailing, due to their courage, initiative, persistence, and fine spirit. They have applied minds of a high order and a fine ethical sense to the prosaic and seemingly uninteresting business of selling women's garments. Instead of remaining petty tradesmen, they have become, in every sense of the word, great merchants.

The Filenes recognized that the function of retail

distribution should be undertaken as a social service, equal in dignity and responsibility to the function of production; and that it should be studied with equal intensity in order that the service may be performed with high efficiency, with great economy, and with nothing more than a fair profit to the retailer. They recognized that to serve their own customers properly, the relations of the retailer to the producer must be fairly and scientifically adjusted; and, among other things, that it was the concern of the retailer to know whether the goods which he sold were manufactured under conditions which were fair to the workers—fair as to wages, hours of work, and sanitary conditions.

But the Filenes recognized particularly their obligations to their own employees. They found as the common and accepted conditions in large retail stores, that the employees had no voice as to the conditions or rules under which they were to work; that the employees had no appeal from policies prescribed by the management; and that in the main they were paid the lowest rate of wages possible under competitive conditions.

In order to insure a more just arrangement for those working in their establishment, the Filenes provided three devices:

First. A system of self-government for employees, administered by the store coöperative association. Working through this association, the employees have the right to appeal from and to veto policies laid down by the management. They may adjust the conditions under which employees are to work, and, in effect, prescribe conditions for themselves.

Second. A system of arbitration, through the opera-

tion of which individual employees can call for an adjustment of differences that may exist between themselves and the management as to the permanence of employment, wages, promotion, or conditions of work.

Third. A minimum wage scale, which provides that no woman or girl shall work in their store at a wage less than eight dollars a week, no matter what her age may be or what grade of position she may fill.

The Filenes have thus accepted and applied the principles of industrial democracy and of social justice. But they have done more—they have demonstrated that the introduction of industrial democracy and of social justice is at least consistent with marked financial success. They assert that the greater efficiency of their employees shows industrial democracy and social justice to be money-makers. The so-called "practical business man," the narrow money-maker without either vision or ideals, who hurled against the Filenes, as against McElwain, the silly charges of being "theorists," has been answered even on his own low plane of material success.

McElwain and the Filenes are of course exceptional men; but there are in America to-day many with like perception and like spirit. The paths broken by such pioneers will become the peopled highways. Their exceptional methods will become accepted methods. Then the term "Big business" will lose its sinister meaning, and will take on a new significance. "Big business" will then mean business big not in bulk or power, but great in service and grand in manner. "Big business" will mean professionalized business, as distinguished from the occupation of petty trafficking or

mere money-making. And as the profession of business develops, the great industrial and social problems expressed in the present social unrest will one by one find solution.

IX

THE NATURAL WEALTH OF THE LAND AND ITS CONSERVATION [1]

By James J. Hill

At the time this address was delivered, Mr. Hill was completing fourteen years of service as president of The Great Northern Railway System. He enjoyed a national reputation as a student of industrial problems, especially of those connected with transportation. This address was delivered before the Conference of Governors which met in Washington in 1907.

In the movement of modern times, which has made the world commercially a small place and has produced a solidarity of the race such as never before existed, we have come to the point where we must to a certain extent regard the natural resources of this planet as a common asset, compare them with demands now made and likely to be made upon them, and study their judicious use. Commerce, wherever untrammeled, is wiping out boundaries and substituting the world relation of demand and supply for smaller systems of local economy. The changes of a single generation have brought the nations of the earth closer together than were the States of this Union at the close of the Civil War. If we fail to consider what we possess of wealth available for the uses of mankind, and to what extent we are wasting a national patrimony that can never be

[1] From *Highways of Progress* by James J. Hill, copyright, 1910, by Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc.

restored, we might be likened to the directors of a company who never examined a balance-sheet.

The sum of resources is simple and fixed. From the sea, the mine, the forest, and the soil must be gathered everything that can sustain the life of man. Upon the wealth that these supply must be conditioned forever, so far as we can know, not only his progress but his continued existence on earth. How stands the inventory of property for our own people? The resources of the sea furnish less than 5 per cent of the food supply, and that is all. The forests of this country, the product of centuries of growth, are fast disappearing. The best estimates reckon our standing merchantable timber at less than 2,000,000,000,000 feet. Our annual cut is about 40,000,000,000 feet. The lumber cut rose from 18,000,000,000 feet in 1880 to 34,000,000,000 feet in 1905; that is, it nearly doubled in twenty-five years. We are now using annually 500 feet board measure of timber per capita, as against an average of sixty feet for all Europe. The New England supply is gone. The Northwest furnishes small growths that would have been rejected by the lumberman thirty years ago. The South has reached its maximum production and begins to decline. On the Pacific Coast only is there now any considerable body of merchantable standing timber. We are consuming yearly three or four times as much timber as forest growth restores. Our supply of some varieties will be practically exhausted in ten or twelve years; in the case of others, without reforesting, the present century will see the end. When will we take up in a practical and intelligent way the restoration of our forests?

Turning now to one of the only two remaining sources of wealth, the mine, we find it differing from the others in an important essential. It is incapable of restoration or recuperation. The mineral wealth stored in the earth can be used only once. When iron and coal are taken from the mine, they cannot be restored; and upon iron and coal our industrial civilization is built. When fuel and iron become scarce and high-priced, civilization, so far as we can now foresee, will suffer as man would suffer by the gradual withdrawal of the air he breathes.

The exhaustion of our coal supply is now in the indefinite future. The startling feature of our coal production is not so much the magnitude of the annual output as its rate of growth. For the decade ending in 1905 the total product was 2,832,402,746 tons, which is almost exactly one-half the total product previously mined in this country. For the year 1906 the output was 414,000,000 tons, an increase of 46 per cent on the average annual yield of the ten years preceding. In 1907 our production reached 470,000,000 tons. Fifty years ago the annual per capita production was a little more than one quarter of a ton. It is now about five tons. It is but eight years since we took the place of Great Britain as the leading coal-producing nation of the world, and already our product exceeds hers by over 43 per cent, and is 37 per cent of the known production of the world. Estimates of coal deposits still remaining must necessarily be somewhat vague, but they are approximately near the mark. The best authorities do not rate them at much over 2,000,000,000,000 tons. If coal production continues to increase

as it has in the last ninety years, the available supply will be greatly reduced by the close of the century. Before that time arrives, however, the use of lower grades and mines of greater depth will become necessary, making the product inferior in quality and higher in price. Already Great Britain's industries have felt the check from a similar cause, as shown in her higher cost of production. Our turn will begin probably within a generation or two from this time. Yet we still think nothing of consuming this priceless resource with the greatest possible speed. Our methods of mining are often wasteful; and we not only prohibit our industries from having recourse to the coal supplies of other countries, but actually pride ourselves upon becoming exporters of a prime necessity of life and an essential of civilization.

The iron industry tells a similar story. The total of iron ore mined in the United States doubles about once in seven years. It was less than 12,000,000 tons in 1893, over 24,000,000 tons in 1899, 47,750,000 tons in 1906 and over 52,000,000 tons in 1907. The rising place of iron in the world's life is the most impressive phenomenon of the last century. In 1850 the pig-iron production of the United States amounted to 563,758 tons, or about fifty pounds per capita. Our production now is over 600 pounds per capita. We do not work a mine, build a house, weave a fabric, prepare a meal, or cultivate an acre of ground under modern methods without the aid of iron. We turn out over 25,000,000 tons of pig-iron every year, and the production for the first half of 1907 was at the rate of 27,000,000 tons. This is two and one-half times the product of Great

Britain. It is nearly half the product of the whole world. And the supply of this most precious of all the metals is so far from inexhaustible that it seems as if iron and coal might be united in their disappearance from common life.

A few years ago a Swedish geologist prepared for his Government a report which stated that the entire supply of the iron ore in the United States would be exhausted within the present century. The United States Geological Survey declared this an overstatement; but here is the conclusion of its own report, after a careful examination of this question in the light of the best authorities. I quote the official published document: "Assuming that the demand for iron ore during the present century may range from 50,000,000 to 100,000,000 tons per year, the Lake Superior district would last for from twenty-five to fifty years more, if it supplied the entire United States. But counting on the known reserves elsewhere in the United States, the ore will last for a much longer period, though, of course, it must necessarily show a gradual but steady increase in value and in cost of mining, along with an equally steady decrease in grade." The most favorable view of the situation forces the conclusion that iron and coal will not be available for common use on anything like present terms by the end of this century; and our industrial, social, and political life must be readjusted to meet the strains imposed by new conditions. Yet we forbid our consumers access to the stores of other countries, while we boast of our increased exports of that material for want of which one day the nation may be reduced to the last extremity.

We now turn to the only remaining resource of man upon this earth, which is the soil itself. How are we caring for that, and what possibilities does it hold out to the people of future support? We are only beginning to feel the pressure upon the land. The whole interior of this continent, aggregating more than 500,000,000 acres, has been occupied by settlers within the last fifty years. What is there left for the next fifty years? Excluding arid and irrigable areas, the latter limited by nature, and barely enough of which could be made habitable in each year to furnish a farm for each immigrant family, the case stands as follows: In 1906 the total unappropriated public lands in the United States consisted of 792,000,000 acres. Of this area the divisions of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, and Wyoming contained 195,700,000 acres of surveyed and 509,000,000 acres of unsurveyed land. Little of Alaska is fitted for general agriculture, while practically all of the rest is semi-arid land, available only for grazing or irrigation. We have, subtracting these totals, 50,000,000 acres of surveyed and 36,500,000 acres of unsurveyed land as our actual remaining stock. And 21,000,000 acres were disposed of in 1907. How long will the remainder last? No longer can we say that "Uncle Sam has land enough to give us all a farm."

Equally threatening is the change in quality. There are two ways in which the productive power of the earth is lessened: first, by erosion and the sweeping-away of the fertile surface into streams and thence to the sea; and, second, by exhaustion through wrong

methods of cultivation. The former process has gone far. Thousands of acres in the East and South have been made unfit for tillage. North Carolina was, a century ago, one of the great agricultural States of the country and one of the wealthiest. To-day as you ride through the South you see everywhere land gullied by torrential rains, red and yellow clay banks exposed where once were fertile fields; and agriculture reduced because its main support has been washed away. Millions of acres, in places to the extent of one tenth of the entire arable area, have been so injured that no industry and no care can restore them.

Far more ruinous, because universal and continuing in its effects, is the process of soil exhaustion. It is creeping over the land from East to West. The abandoned farms that are now the playthings of the city's rich or the game preserves of patrons of sport bear witness to the melancholy change. New Hampshire, Vermont, Northern New York, show long lists of them. In Western Massachusetts, which once supported a flourishing agriculture, farm properties are now for sale for half the cost of the improvements. The same process of deterioration is affecting the farm lands of Western New York, Ohio, and Indiana. Where prices of farms should rise by increase of population, in many places they are falling. Official investigation of two counties in Central New York disclosed a condition of agricultural decay. In one, land was for sale for about the cost of improvements, and 150 vacant houses were counted in a limited area. In the other, the population in 1905 was nearly 4,000 less than in 1855.

Practically identical soil conditions exist in Mary-

land and Virginia, where lands sell at from $10 to $30 an acre. In a hearing before an Industrial Commission the chief of the Bureau of Soils of the Department of Agriculture said: "One of the most important causes of deterioration, and I think I should put this first of all, is the method and system of agriculture that prevails throughout these States. Unquestionably the soil has been abused." The richest region of the West is no more exempt than New England or the South. The soil of the West is being reduced in agricultural potency by exactly the same processes which have driven the farmer of the East, with all his advantage of nearness to markets, from the field.

Within the last forty years a great part of the richest land in the country has been brought under cultivation. We should, therefore, in the same time, have raised proportionately the yield of our principal crops per acre, because the yield of old lands, if properly treated, tends to increase rather than diminish. The year 1906 was one of large crops and can scarcely be taken as a standard. We produced, for example, more corn that year than had ever been grown in the United States in a single year before. But the average yield per acre was less than it was in 1872. We are barely keeping the acre product stationary. The average wheat crop of the country now ranges from 12½, in ordinary years, to 15 bushels per acre in the best seasons.

But the fact of soil waste becomes startlingly evident when we examine the record of some States where single-cropping and other agricultural abuses have been prevalent. Take the case of wheat, the mainstay of single-crop abuse. Many can remember when New

York was the great wheat-producing State of the Union. The average yield of wheat per acre in New York for the last ten years was about 18 bushels. For the first five years of that ten-year period it was 18.4 bushels, and for the last five 17.4 bushels. In the farther West, Kansas takes high rank as a wheat producer. Its average yield per acre for the last ten years was 14.16 bushels. For the first five of those years it was 15.14 and for the last five 13.18. Up in the Northwest, Minnesota wheat has made a name all over the world. Her average yield per acre for the same ten years was 12.96 bushels. For the first five years it was 13.12 and for the last five 12.8. We perceive here the working of a uniform law, independent of location, soil, or climate. It is the law of a diminishing return due to soil destruction. Apply this to the country at large, and it reduces agriculture to the condition of a bank whose depositors are steadily drawing out more money than they put in.

What is true in this instance is true of our agriculture as a whole. In no other important country of the world, with the exception of Russia, is the industry that must be the foundation of every state at so low an ebb as in our own. According to the last census, the average annual product per acre of the farms of the whole United States was worth $11.38. It is little more than a respectable rental in communities where the soil is properly cared for and made to give a reasonable return for cultivation. Nature has given to us the most valuable possession ever committed to man. It can never be duplicated, because there is none like it upon the face of the earth. And we are racking and impover-

ishing it exactly as we are felling the forests and rifling the mines. Our soil, once the envy of every other country, the attraction which draws millions of immigrants across the seas, gave an average yield for the whole United States during the ten years beginning with 1896 of 13.5 bushels of wheat per acre. Austria and Hungary each produced over 17 bushels per acre, France 19.8, Germany 27.6, and the United Kingdom 32.2 bushels per acre. For the same decade our average yield of oats was less than 30 bushels, while Germany produced 46 and Great Britain 42. For barley the figures are 25 against 33 and 34.6; for rye, 15.4 against 24 for Germany and 26 for Ireland. In the United Kingdom, Belgium, The Netherlands and Denmark, a yield of more than 30 bushels of wheat per acre has been the average for the past five years.

When the most fertile land in the world produces so much less than that of poorer quality elsewhere, and this low yield shows a tendency to steady decline, the situation becomes clear. We are robbing the soil, in an effort to get the largest cash returns from each acre of ground in the shortest possible time and with the least possible labor. This soil is not mere dead matter, subject to any sort of treatment with impunity. Chemically, it contains elements which must be present in certain proportions for the support of vegetation. Physically, it is made up of matter which supplies the principal plant food. This food, with its chemical constituents in proper admixture, is furnished by the decomposition of organic matter and the disintegration of mineral matter proceeding together. Whatever disturbs either factor of the process, whatever takes out

of the soil an excessive amount of one or more of the chemical elements upon which plant growth depends, ends in sterility. Any agricultural methods that move in this direction mean soil impoverishment; present returns at the cost of future loss; the exhaustion of the land exactly as the human system is enfeebled by lack of proper nourishment.

Our agricultural lands have been abused in two principal ways; first, by single-cropping, and, second, by neglecting fertilization. It is fortunate for us that nature is slow to anger, and that we may arrest the consequence of this ruinous policy before it is too late. In all parts of the United States, with only occasional exceptions, the system of tillage has been to select the crop which would bring in most money at the current market rate, plant that year after year, and to move on to virgin fields as soon as the old farm rebelled by lowering the quality and quantity of its return. It is still the practice, although diversification of industry and the rotation of crops have been urged for nearly a century and are to-day taught in every agricultural college in this country.

The demonstration of the evils of single-cropping is mathematical in its completeness. At the experiment station of the Agricultural College of the University of Minnesota they have maintained 44 experimental plots of ground, adjoining one another, and as nearly identical in soil, cultivation and care as scientific handling can make them. On these have been tried and compared different methods of crop rotation and fertilization, together with systems of single-cropping. The results of ten years' experiment are available. On a tract of good

ground sown continuously for 10 years to wheat, the average yield per acre for the first five years was 20.22 bushels and for the next five 16.92 bushels. Where corn was grown continuously on one plot, while on the plot beside it corn was planted but once in five years in a system of rotation, the average yield of the latter for the two years it was under corn was 48.2 bushels per acre. The plot where corn only was grown gave 20.8 bushels per acre for the first five and 11.1 bushels for the second five of these years, an average of 16 bushels. The difference in average of these two plots was 32.2 bushels, or twice the total yield of the ground exhausted by the single-crop system. The corn grown at the end of the ten years was hardly hip-high, the ears small, and the grains light. But the cost of cultivation remained the same. And the same is true of every other grain or growth when raised continuously on land unfertilized. We frequently hear it said that the reduction in yield is due to the wearing-out of the soil. The fact is that soils either increase or maintain their productivity indefinitely under proper cultivation.

The remedies are as well ascertained as is the evil. Rotation of crops and the use of fertilizers act as tonics upon the soil. The more careful and thorough the tillage, the less the waste and the speedier the restoration of soil values. We might expand our resources and add billions of dollars to our national wealth by conserving soil resources, instead of exhausting them, as we have the forest and the contents of the mines.

Every intelligent and progressive farmer will join stock raising with grain raising. Nature has provided the cattle to go with the land. There is as much money

in livestock as there is in grain. Looked at in any way, there is money in livestock; money for dairy products, money for beef, money for the annual increase, and most money of all for the next year's crop when every particle of manure is saved and applied to the land.

We need not consider at present really intensive farming, such as is done by market gardeners with high profit, or such culture as in France, in Holland, in Belgium, and in the island of Jersey produces financial returns per acre that seem almost beyond belief. What our people have to do is to cover less ground, cultivate smaller farms so as to make the most of them, instead of getting a scant and uncertain yield from several hundred acres, and raise productivity by intelligent treatment to twice or three times its present level.

There is more money in this system. The net profit from an acre of wheat on run-down soils is very small; consequently decreasing the acreage of wheat under certain conditions will not materially decrease profits. Here are some reliable estimates. The price of wheat is given from the United States Department of Agriculture Yearbook, average for ten years:

Yield	*Price*	*Market value per acre*	*Cost of production including rent*	*Net profit or loss*
20	$0.638	$12.76	$7.89	+$4.87
16	"	10.21	"	+ 2.32
12	"	7.66	"	— 0.23
10	"	6.38	"	— 1.51
8	"	5.10	"	— 2.79

From the above table it will be seen that as large a net profit is realized from one crop of 20 bushels per

acre as from two crops of 16 bushels; and that a 12-bushel crop or less yields a net loss. It is a safe conclusion that 75 acres of land, growing a crop of clover every fourth year, will yield a larger net profit than will 100 acres sown to grain continually. A small field of eight acres of clover in the Red River valley in 1907 yielded 42 bushels, worth over $60 per acre from the sale of seed.

Nearly 36 per cent of our people are engaged directly in agriculture. But all the rest depend upon it. In the last analysis, commerce, manufactures, our home market, every form of activity runs back to the bounty of the earth by which every worker, skilled and unskilled, must be fed and by which his wages are ultimately paid. The farm products of the United States in 1906 were valued at $6,794,000,000 and in 1908 at $7,778,000,000. All of our vast domestic commerce, equal in value to the foreign trade of all the nations combined, is supported and paid for by the land. Of our farm area only one half is improved. It does not produce one half of what it could be made to yield; not by some complex system of intensive culture, but merely by ordinary care and industry intelligently applied. It is the capital upon which alone we can draw through all the future, but the amount of the draft that will be honored depends upon the care and intelligence given to its cultivation. Nowhere in the range of national purposes is the reward for conservation of a national resource so ample. Nowhere is the penalty of neglect so threatening.

The pressure of all the nations upon the waste places of the earth grows more intense as the last of them are

occupied. We are approaching the point where all our wheat product will be needed for our own uses, and we shall cease to be an exporter of grain. There is still some room in Canada, but it will soon be filled. The relief will be but temporary. Our own people, whose mineral resources will by that time have greatly diminished, must find themselves thrown back upon the soil for a living. If continued abuse of the land should mark the next 50 years as it has the last, what must be our outlook?

Even the unintelligent are now coming to understand that we cannot look to our foreign trade for relief from future embarrassment. Our total exports, about one fourth in value of the products of our farms, and destined to shrink as consumption overtakes production, consist to the extent of more than 70 per cent of articles grown on the soil or directly sustained by it, such as livestock, or made from soil products, such as flour. Of all the materials used in manufacture in this country, 42 per cent are furnished by the soil. We shall have less and less of this agricultural wealth to part with as population increases. And as to enlarging greatly our sale of manufactured products in the world's markets, it is mostly a dream. We cannot finally compete there, except in a few selected lines, without a material lowering of the wage scale at home and a change in the national standard of living which our people are not ready to accept without a struggle. When capital cannot find a profit, there will be no money for the payrolls of an unprofitable business. Doubtless as we grow we shall buy more and sell more; but our main dependence half a century ahead must be

upon ourselves. The nation can no more escape the operation of that law than can the man.

Not only the economic, but the political future is involved. No people ever felt the want of work or the pinch of poverty for a long time without reaching out violent hands against their political institutions, believing that they might find in a change some relief from their distress. Although there have been moments of such restlessness in our country, the trial has never been so severe or so prolonged as to put us to the test. It is interesting that one of the ablest men in England during the last century, a historian of high merit, a statesman who saw active service and a profound student of men and things, put on record his prophecy of such a future ordeal. Writing to an American correspondent 50 years ago, Lord Macaulay used these words:

"As long as you have a boundless extent of fertile and unoccupied land your laboring population will be found more at ease than the laboring population of the Old World; but the time will come when wages will be as low and will fluctuate as much with you as they do with us. Then your institutions will be brought to the test. Distress everywhere makes the laborer mutinous and discontented and inclines him to listen with eagerness to agitators who tell him that it is a monstrous iniquity that one man should have a million and another cannot get a full meal. . . . The day will come when the multitudes of people, none of whom has had more than half a breakfast or expects to have more than half a dinner, will choose a legislature. Is it possible to doubt what sort of a legislature will be chosen? . . . There will be, I fear, spoliation. The spoliation will increase the distress; the distress will produce fresh spoliation. . . . Either civilization or liberty will perish. Either some Cæsar or Napoleon will seize the reins of govern-

ment with a strong hand, or your republic will be as fearfully plundered and laid waste by barbarians in the twentieth century as the Roman Empire in the fifth."

We need not accept this gloomy picture too literally, but we have been already sufficiently warned to prevent us from dismissing the subject as unworthy of attention. Every nation finds its hour of peril when there is no longer free access to the land, or when the land will no longer support the people. Disturbances within are more to be feared than attacks from without. Our government is built upon the assumption of a fairly contented, prosperous, and happy people, capable of ruling their passions, with power to change their institutions when such change is generally desired. It would not be strange if they should in their desire for change attempt to pull down the pillars of their national temple. Far may this day be from us. But since the unnecessary destruction of our land will bring new conditions of danger, its conservation, its improvement to the highest point of productivity promised by scientific intelligence and practical experiment, appears to be a first command of any political economy worthy of the name.

These are for us quite literally the issues of national existence. The era of unlimited expansion on every side, of having but to reach out and seize any desired good, ready provided for us by the Hand that laid the foundations of the earth, is drawing to a close. The first task is to force the facts of the situation deep into the public consciousness; to make men realize their duty toward coming generations exactly as the father feels it a duty to see that his children do not suffer want. In a

democracy this is a first essential. In other forms of government one or two great men may have power to correct mistakes and to put in motion wise policies that centuries do not unsettle. A part of the price of self-government is the acceptance of that high office and imperative duty as a whole by the people themselves. They must know, they must weigh, they must act. Only as they form and give effect to wise decisions can the nation go forward. The principle of the conservation of national resources as the foremost and controlling policy of the United States henceforth is coming to be seen by many, and must be heartily accepted by all, as the first condition, not only of continued material prosperity, but also of the perpetuation of free institutions and a government by the people. The work now being done by the Department of Agriculture and the agricultural colleges of the various States furnishes a broad and intelligent foundation upon which to build up a new era of national progress and prosperity. It calls for a wise, generous, and continuing policy on the part of both federal and State governments.

If this patriotic gospel is to make headway, it must be by organized missionary work among the people, and by the people. It cannot go on and conquer if imposed from without. It must come to represent the fixed idea of the people's mind, their determination, and their hope. It cannot be incorporated in our practical life by the dictum of any individual or any officer of nation or State in his official capacity. It needs the cooperation of all the influences, the help of every voice, the commendation of nation and State that has been the strength and inspiration of every worthy work on

American soil for one hundred and twenty years. Reviving thus the spirit of the days that created our Constitution, the days that carried us through civil conflict, the spirit by which all our enduring work in the world has been wrought, taking thought as Washington and Lincoln took thought, only for the highest good of all the people, we may give new meaning to our future; new luster to the ideal of a republic of living federated States; shape anew the fortunes of this country, and enlarge the borders of hope for all mankind.

X

THE ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

A class-room debate

AFFIRMATIVE ARGUMENT

We are told that when Cain killed his brother Abel, he was branded on the forehead as a punishment for his crime. This is the first of an interminable list of ineffective punishments designed to protect society from the murderer. Man has taxed his ingenuity to devise a torture terrible enough to stay the hand of violence. But it has been only in comparatively recent years that men have made any attempt to approach the problem in the scientific spirit. Cruel punishment, motivated by blind desire for revenge, has demonstrated its failure as a solution of the crime problem. Is there not a more intelligent way to deal with the criminal, a way that is at once more humane and more useful to society? I believe there is. And it is in the spirit of the disinterested student that I wish to approach our problem.

It is interesting to observe that the history of penology during the last century or two has been one of steady abandonment of the death penalty as a punishment for crime. In England in 1780 no less than two hundred and forty offenses were punishable by death. In Blackstone's time this number had been reduced to

one hundred and sixty. At present but four or five crimes are punishable by death in any civilized country, and the only crime for which the penalty is often invoked is that of first-degree murder. In our own country fourteen States have abolished the death penalty; eight of these have reëstablished it; and one, Maine, has abolished it a second time. In those States which retain the capital penalty, there is increasing reluctance to inflict it, the jury in many cases having the right, and usually exercising the right, to prescribe life imprisonment in its place.

I do not propose to contest with my opponent the State's right to inflict the death penalty if this action shall appear necessary to safeguard the lives of its citizens. No one disputes the individual's right to kill in self-defense, and surely a group of individuals, acting through the State, may do the same. The issue between us is solely one of expediency. Is it a wise public policy to deprive the murderer of his life?

There are, so far as I know, but two methods of dealing with the murderer, to kill him and to imprison him. These two methods must be compared and the advantages and disadvantages of each weighed before we can come to an intelligent opinion on the question before us. Obviously this comparison must be made in the light of some accepted principles regarding the purposes of punishment. The original purpose of punishment was revenge—"an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth"—but no intelligent person now contends that blind desire for revenge should influence the State in its treatment of offenders. Consequently, we may dismiss this purpose without argument. Two other purposes

have been held and are still held: to restrain the offender from repeating his offense, and to deter others from committing the same offense. These are undoubtedly two of the most important purposes of punishment, and we must not lose sight of them in this debate. But in recent years there has arisen a conviction, now shared by practically all thoughtful men, that the reclamation of the offender to a life of usefulness in society is also a proper purpose of punishment in cases where such reclamation can be effected. The modern sciences of psychology and penology have made it evident that many, perhaps most, crimes are committed because the offender has grown up in an unfavorable environment or because he is mentally or emotionally abnormal at the time of the crime. These unfortunates are to be regarded as sick rather than as morally depraved. This, of course, is not to say that they should be allowed to menace society, but most people would agree that if they can be turned into useful citizens, it is a proper function of the State to do it.

The issues about which our discussion must turn, then, are these: 1. Is capital punishment the only effective means of restraining the offender from repeating his offense? 2. Does it deter others from committing the same offense more effectively than imprisonment? 3. Does imprisonment hold out any hope of reclaiming the offender? In the course of my argument I hope to show that imprisonment is quite as effective as the death penalty in accomplishing the first two purposes of punishment, and that it does afford opportunity to reclaim many offenders.

Since its deterrent effect is generally considered the

strongest argument for capital punishment, let me begin with that point.

It is customary for the advocates of the death penalty to quote figures showing that the homicide rate is higher in States which do not inflict the penalty. Not much reliance can be placed on figures in a question of this kind, but lest I be thought to shun them, let me call your attention to the figures on the homicide rate for the year 1925. The *World Almanac* for 1927 quotes the homicide rate per 100,000 of population for the fifty-six largest cities in the United States. Fifty-one of these cities are located in States which have capital punishment, five of them in States which have abolished it. The average homicide rate in 1925 for the fifty-one cities with capital punishment was 12 per cent; for the five cities without capital punishment, 5 per cent. I do not infer from this that the abolition of the death penalty lowers the homicide rate (differences in the type of population in the States account for much of the difference in the homicide rate), but at any rate it is difficult to maintain in the face of these figures that capital punishment is superior to imprisonment as a deterrent.

As a matter of fact, the argument for the greater deterrent effect of capital punishment is based on the totally false premise that it is the severity of a punishment that deters. "Men fear death more than imprisonment," it is argued; "therefore, they are less likely to commit murder if they know that the death penalty may be inflicted." Curiously enough, those who hold this view never carry it to its logical conclusion. If severity is the chief virtue sought in a punishment for

murder, why not boil the offender in oil or break him on the wheel, as was done in the Middle Ages? These punishments are surely more horrible than hanging, and the crime figures show that hanging leaves much to be desired as a deterrent. As Mr. Alexander says in the *Journal of Criminal Law*, August, 1922, "If the efficacy of punishment be found in its severity, such severity must be increased until it results in minimizing crime. We exhibit no faith in our advocacy of severity if we stop short of its limits." And why not make the lesson more effective by holding the execution in public? This is exactly what was done in England two centuries ago, and we are all familiar with the story of the gang of pickpockets who plied their trade at the public hangings of pickpockets.

The truth of the matter, as is now generally recognized by penologists, was expressed by George W. Kirchwey in his address before the American Prison Congress at Detroit, October 18, 1922: "It has become a truism that it is not the severity but the certainty of punishment that gives it its deterrent effect." And the infliction of the death penalty in this country is so uncertain as to deprive the punishment of whatever deterrent effect it might otherwise have. In his book entitled *Capital Punishment*, Mr. Raymond Bye declares that out of more than 7,000 homicides in the United States in 1917, only eighty-five offenders were executed. "That means," he says, "that only one man in eighty who commits homicide suffers death for it. Of course, not every homicide is deliberate murder, but, even if not more than half can be so classed, it is still true that one murderer out of every thirty-five or forty

pays the full penalty for his act. These figures render the deterrent argument in favor of capital punishment extremely weak. Every criminal knows that few murderers are executed and he reasonably expects to be one of the thirty-four out of every thirty-five who are spared the extreme punishment." Probably the chief reason for this failure to invoke the death penalty when it is available is the natural reluctance of juries to deprive a man of his life. In the address which I have just quoted, the speaker remarks, "In Chicago recently I found the judges of the criminal court, the State's attorney and Colonel Chamberlain [head of the Chicago Crime Commission] all together, lamenting the fact that, however clear the case, juries would not convict in capital cases. I hear the same cry in New York, here in Detroit, in many other cities. It is country-wide."

Let me consider now whether or not imprisonment is as effective as capital punishment in restraining the offender from repeating his crime.

It is true that the offender who has been executed can no longer prey upon society, but neither can the offender who is under lock and key. It is no part of my plan to release murderers to prey upon society. I quite agree that so long as the offender is a public menace he must be segregated. "This is all very well," my opponent may reply, "but what about the possibility that the criminal may escape from prison?" If imprisonment is inferior to the death penalty as a restraint upon the offender, it can only be because the offender may escape; so let me examine this argument.

In the first place, let me remind you that, according to Mr. Bye, under capital punishment only one mur-

derer out of every thirty-five is ever executed; the other thirty-four either are acquitted outright or sentenced to imprisonment, where they have exactly the same chance to escape that they would have if the death penalty were not in use. In thirty-four out of every thirty-five cases, then, the argument we are examining has no bearing whatever upon the question. And after all, what opportunity has a criminal to escape from a modern penitentiary? Extremely little. The successful escape of a convict is headline material for the newspaper. Yet how many of you can recall a single instance within the last three years of a murderer escaping from prison and successfully eluding pursuit? It simply doesn't happen. Here, also, the advocates of capital punishment seldom are willing to accept the logical conclusion of their argument. If we must kill those whose escape from confinement might endanger society, why not kill the incurably insane? They endanger society when at large, and they might possibly escape. Indeed, they are more likely than a convict to escape, for they are less carefully guarded. Until it can be shown that under capital punishment most offenders convicted of first-degree murder are actually executed, and until it can be shown that there is real danger that such offenders, if imprisoned, would escape, I think we must conclude that imprisonment restrains the offender quite as effectively as does the death penalty.

It seems to me that the evidence thus far presented shows that so far as the protection of society is concerned, either by deterring others or by restraining the offender, imprisonment is quite as effective as capital punishment. If it can now be shown that imprisonment

holds out any hope of reforming the offender, the balance of good clearly will be in favor of imprisonment. If only one criminal out of a hundred can be turned into an honest, useful citizen, the abolition of capital punishment is justified.

Can the murderer be reformed? To answer this question intelligently, we must first inquire, what are the causes of murder?

According to Warden Lawes, "Murderers may be divided roughly into two groups. First, the usually normal, dependable type, who in a moment of great mental stress commit the crime and who are, except for that one moment of their lives, normal individuals. Second, the abnormal type, including those really insane, the border-line cases, the defectives and moral delinquents and those with low mental development." Strange as it may appear to those unacquainted with the facts, the majority of murderers belong to the first group; that is, they are essentially normal men who have been driven by rage or jealousy into a single act of violence. They are not professional criminals; they are no more criminal by nature than you are. If this group of men were returned to civil life, very few of them would commit another offense. How do I know this? Because it is the nearly unanimous testimony of those who know murderers best—the prison wardens. The following facts from Warden Lawes of Sing Sing are significant: Of the 124 murderers who during six consecutive years were committed to that prison, nearly three fourths had been convicted for their first offense. Mr. Lawes goes on to say, "During five recent consecutive years, 180 inmates of Sing Sing who had been con-

victed for various degrees of homicide, were paroled after serving the minimum terms of their sentences. Of these 180 men only three were brought back for violation of parole, and in these three cases the violations were minor ones. . . . During the past twenty years I have personally known a great many men who have been commuted from death to life imprisonment. There is a considerable group in Sing Sing to-day, and without exception they are quiet, dependable, trustworthy. Many are in places of responsibility and except for that one deed they are in every way fitted and worthy to be normal and useful members of society." Professor Robinson in his book on *Penology in the United States* says substantially the same thing, and his opinion is confirmed by Sir Basil Thompson of Scotland Yard. This large group of murderers who have no previous criminal records and who are not criminal by nature are more amenable to reformative treatment than the average burglar or pickpocket, and there seems no good reason why, after serving a minimum sentence, they should not be returned to normal life under proper supervision.

But what of the other group of murderers—those who have criminal records? These may be divided into three groups: the professional criminals who occasionally kill in the course of their business, the insane, and the mentally defective. I do not contend that much can be done to reclaim them, but not all are hopeless. Take, first, the professional criminals. Many of them are mere boys who have drifted into a life of crime because their environment had never suggested to them the possibility of earning a living honestly. If these young men were

segregated from the hardened criminals, if they were taught a trade, if something were done to develop in them a sense of responsibility, some of them might be reclaimed. The insane should receive expert medical attention. Those who can be cured should be returned to normal life under close supervision for the first few years; those who are incurable should be committed to an institution for the insane. And what of the mental defectives? These, for the most part, are men whose mental equipment is not adequate to solve the problems of modern life. We cannot discharge them from prison, for they would almost immediately become hopelessly entangled and turn again to violence as the only way out. And yet it seems stupid and inhuman to confine them in a cell for the rest of their lives. In a simple environment and under proper supervision, perhaps in an asylum for the feeble-minded, many of them could learn to be self-supporting and lead harmless and reasonably happy lives. It is, indeed, a sad commentary on our civilization if we cannot find anything more useful to do with these unfortunates than to hang them.

What I am pleading for is a more modern, a more scientific treatment of the criminal. For the hangman I would substitute the penologist, the psychiatrist, and the physician. At best, the execution of a criminal is a confession of failure on the part of society. It says, "For some reason which we are too stupid or indifferent to understand, you have harmed society. We don't know what to do with you and we won't take the trouble to find out. You may not be altogether, or at all, responsible for your misdeeds; you may be potentially a useful citizen. But that does not interest us. You shall

'hang by the neck until dead.' To do anything else with you would require intelligence and effort, and we have neither to spare on you." In no other department of life do we follow this stupid and barbarous policy. Is it not time to try the application of intelligence to the crime problem?

NEGATIVE ARGUMENT

You may be sure that it is with considerable diffidence that I rise to defend the "stupid and barbarous" institution of capital punishment, and to resist the "application of intelligence" to the crime problem. Lest I be thought as barbarous as the institution I am defending and as much in need of reformative treatment as the "unfortunates" the opposing speaker has been telling you about, let me hasten to add that I am not altogether opposed to the application of intelligence to this problem. It seems to me that there are two kinds of intelligence. There is the intelligence which expends itself in the contemplation of the ideal, in picturing that world "nearer our hearts' desire," which we shall construct when we have "shattered this sorry world to bits." And there is the intelligence which is concerned primarily with the examination of the actual facts in the problem before us. I suppose both forms of intelligence are essential in solving the problem of crime. It is well to have our eyes on the stars; but it is also well to have our feet on the ground. It will be my purpose to supply some of the facts regarding the criminal and regarding our penal system which I believe are necessary for a profitable discussion of this subject.

My opponent prefaced his argument with the statement that the purposes of punishment are three: to restrain the offender from repeating his offense, to deter others from committing the same offense, and to reclaim the offender. You will recall that he does not claim any superiority for imprisonment so far as the first two of these purposes are concerned. He bases his case solely upon the contention that under imprisonment many murderers can be reformed. Let me begin with an examination of his argument on this point.

Let us suppose that the opposing speaker, in a fit of rage or oratorical frenzy, has brutally murdered the chairman of this meeting. We are not interested, of course, in the fate of our unfortunate chairman or in the grief of his relatives. The question is, how are we to reform the speaker? We may imagine him seated before us now. The passion which inspired his crime has passed; he is a pathetic picture of remorse and hopeless despair—the victim of heredity and environment. Do you know how to reform him? I don't. Does any one know how to reform him? I doubt it. I suspect it is a hopeless case, but I do not know. But supposing that we do know what kind of treatment to prescribe, how are we to know certainly when he is cured? We cannot be sure that in his next debate he will not turn upon another chairman, or even upon his opponent. It is idle to talk about reformation until we have a scientific method to apply and until we can tell when the method has been successful. But let us give up this case as hopeless and turn to murderers as a class.

All murderers, my opponent says, may be divided into three classes: those who, like my opponent, have no

previous criminal record; the professional criminal; and the mentally defective.

The first of these groups, including the majority of murderers, have really nothing the matter with them; their crime was, so to speak, an accident. My opponent would not prescribe any treatment for them. He sees "no good reason why, after serving a minimum sentence, they should not be returned to normal life under proper supervision." But if nothing is the matter with them, why compel them to serve even a minimum sentence? Why not apologize to them? I wonder what the speaker means by returning them to normal life "under proper supervision"? If they commit crime only once in thirty years, how will you supervise them? We cannot have a detective shadow them for the rest of their lives to be on hand when another brain-storm occurs, and there would be no object in having them report to a parole officer at periodic intervals. There is absolutely no way to guarantee that a man of this type, who has once committed murder, will not do it again. I challenge my opponent to show how a psychiatrist or any one else can tell whether such a man can be trusted.

What about the professional criminals? It is claimed that some of them can be reclaimed. But does the psychiatrist or the penologist or any one else have a reliable method of reforming the character of a man who has been brought up in a life of crime? Just what is the method? I have never heard it explained. The speaker talks vaguely of developing in the murderer a sense of responsibility. But how is this to be done? There is no subject upon which modern science has less to say than upon this subject of how to rebuild a man's character.

And the little science of penology that does exist is not applied in most prisons. The average prison warden knows no more about it than the man in the street. And, again, assuming that we had a scientific method of reclaiming the professional criminal, do we have any method of telling certainly when he has been reformed? I do not know of any, and I do not believe my opponent does.

The third class of murderers is the insane and mentally defective. But insanity or mental abnormality sufficient to deprive the offender of moral responsibility at the time of his crime is a recognized legal defense against a charge of first-degree murder. Men of this type are not sentenced to death. Consequently, I do not see that we have anything to do with them in this discussion.

I do not wish to seem disrespectful toward those who look forward to the day when the development of modern science will teach us how to reclaim the criminal. I agree that society has a duty toward these men. When we have a more intelligent method of dealing with them, I shall be the first to advocate its application to the crime problem. A hundred years from now, perhaps fifty years from now, we shall not find it necessary to inflict any punishment upon those who endanger society with the knife and revolver. But to-day the science of penology is in its infancy. Those who know most about it claim the least for it. Unfortunately my opponent is in the position of insisting that we abandon our present admittedly unsatisfactory penal system without substituting anything in its place. In closing this part of my argument, let me ask my opponent this

question: Does he know of a single reputable scientist who believes that we have a reliable method either of reforming criminals or of telling certainly when they have been reformed? Unless he can answer this question in the affirmative, he can hardly convince us that we should abandon our present penal system. For after all, the present system does work after a fashion. A lifeboat may be a precarious defense against a storm at sea, but it is better than nothing.

Please remember that my opponent is basing his entire case upon his ability to prove that we can reform the criminal. I shall leave him to worry with this problem again in his closing speech. In the meantime, let me return to the first part of his argument.

The speaker's first contention was that imprisonment deters others from crime at least as effectively as does capital punishment. He even quoted some figures to show that imprisonment is more effective, but generously admitted that the figures prove nothing. I quite agree with him. I am even ready to agree that so far as we have any knowledge on the subject, there is nothing to choose between the two forms of punishment on the score of deterrence.

I cannot agree with him, however, that imprisonment restrains the offender from repeating his crime as effectively as capital punishment. To be sure, the murderer cannot commit another crime so long as he is "under lock and key." But how long does he stay under lock and key? In New York State, just ten years. In discussing this point the speaker devoted all of his time to showing that prisoners seldom escape from the penitentiary. Why should they escape when the warden

will obligingly unlock the cell door and permit them to walk out? Because of the abuse of the parole and pardon systems there is, for all practical purposes, no such thing in this country as a "life" sentence.

In an article published in *Scribner's Magazine* in July, 1926, Boyden Sparkes gives a digest of the parole laws now in operation in the various States of the Union. The length of time a prisoner must serve before he becomes eligible for parole is almost incredibly low in many States. In Pennsylvania, Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, and Michigan, he may be paroled when he has served one half of the maximum sentence prescribed by law; in New York, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin, when he has served one half of the maximum sentence or less, depending upon his record while in prison; in Maryland and the District of Columbia, when he has served one third of his sentence; in California, when he has served one or two years of his sentence; in Iowa and Minnesota, at any time after he has been committed to prison. Do State parole boards take advantage of the leniency of these laws? Most of them do—with a vengeance. During and for some time preceding the year 1925, according to Mr. Sparkes, 90 per cent of the prisoners in Sing Sing and in Eastern Penitentiary were granted a parole upon their first application; in Eastern Penitentiary, in the year 1923, 97½ per cent were granted a parole upon their first application. It is interesting to notice that an investigation of the activities of the much admired New York Parole Board revealed that its members devoted, on an average, just eight minutes to the consideration of each case which came before them.

But if the prisoner is denied a parole, he still has an excellent chance to secure a pardon from the State governor. On December 5, 1925, the *Chicago Daily Tribune* published the names of 1,000 criminals whom Governor Small had pardoned in the course of two years. Most of you remember that Governor "Ma" Ferguson once celebrated Thanksgiving Day by pardoning 105 criminals. You may not recall that during her administration she pardoned 1,126 prisoners, an average of 100 each month. According to Robert Field, writing in the *Outlook*, for December 9, 1925, "Ma" pardoned in eleven months almost one third of the entire prison population of Texas.

With these figures before us, we cannot be surprised when Lawrence Veiller, in the *World's Work* for March, 1927, tells us that the average length of a "life" sentence in Illinois is eleven years; in New York, ten years; in Missouri, eleven years. In 1913, according to the editor of the *Cleveland Leader*, the average "life" sentence in Ohio was seven years.

I repeat: Why should a prisoner escape when he can walk out after serving a "life" sentence of eight or ten years? Some of these men have served several "life" sentences. The proverbial cat must look to his laurels!

When my opponent argues that imprisonment restrains the offender as effectively as capital punishment, he is completely ignoring the most obvious facts regarding our present prison system. To make his argument sound, he must show us that the entire pardon and parole system will be reformed overnight. And not even he will attempt this impossible task.

A hundred years from now my opponent may be on

the right side of this question. I sincerely hope so. When we have a science of penology that will tell us how to reform criminals; when we have tests by which we can determine when they have been reformed; when prisons are administered by wardens trained in the use of these methods; when the pardon and parole power is exercised by scientific experts, then we shall have no use for the death penalty. But that science and those experts do not now exist. Opponents of capital punishment are not advocating the substitution of a more scientific method for the present one, for there is no scientific method; they are simply advocating the weakening of the present system.

Is this the time to weaken our penal system? It is notorious that we are the most criminal nation on earth and are rapidly becoming more so. The murder rate has practically doubled in the last twenty-four years. Every five and one-half years more people are killed in the United States than were killed in the American ranks during the World War. The citizen of Memphis, Tennessee, is 135 times as likely to be murdered as the citizen of England or Wales. In 1923 there were forty more murders committed in the City of Brotherly Love than in all Canada during the previous year. Our homicide rate is twice that of Italy and from four to thirty times that of any other civilized country on the globe.

I do not advocate an indiscriminate use of the death penalty. In nearly every State in the Union the jury may substitute imprisonment if they see fit. As my opponent has already pointed out, the average jury is very cautious in the use of the extreme penalty. If there are extenuating circumstances, if there is the slightest

reason to think the murderer was insane at the time of his crime, he is not sentenced to death. And this is quite as it should be. But in view of our disgraceful and rapidly mounting homicide rate, and in the absence of any acceptable substitute for the death penalty, can we afford to deprive the American jury of the only sure method of disposing permanently of such a menace to society as the incurable first-degree murderer?

AFFIRMATIVE REBUTTAL

The crime record of the United States, which we have just heard quoted, is indeed appalling. The figures quoted are interesting, but I am not sure that they have any bearing upon the question under discussion. I am quite sure that they do not prove what my opponent is trying to make them prove. This, he says, is not the time to relax the severity of our penal system. I quite agree with him. But does the abolition of the death penalty weaken the system? Let us see.

The death penalty can protect society better than imprisonment only if it deters from crime more effectively or if it permanently disposes of a considerable number of those who commit murder. The opposing speaker himself has admitted that capital punishment is not a more effective deterrent than imprisonment. It must be, then, that it permanently disposes of a good many murderers. But does it? Even in those States which employ the death penalty, it is used so seldom that it permanently disposes of a negligibly small percentage of the murderers. According to Warden Lawes, in twelve States, all of which have the death penalty,

there were 19,775 homicides committed during the years 1912 to 1919 inclusive. Of this number only 467, or about 2.2 per cent, were sentenced to death. Of those sentenced to death, only 336 were finally executed. In other words, only about 1.7 per cent of these offenders were executed. Perhaps no more than one half of these offenders were murderers liable to the death sentence, but even on this assumption, only 3.4 per cent of the murderers were executed. What became of the other 96.6 per cent? They were sent to prison, where they have exactly the same chance of securing a pardon or parole that they would have if these States did not have capital punishment. Does this look as if the abolition of the death penalty would relax seriously the severity of the penal system? In view of the infrequency with which the death penalty is used, it does not seem to me that the chance that a prisoner may be released is much of an argument in favor of capital punishment.

But I cannot pass unnoticed my opponent's charge that a "life" sentence is a myth. He tells us that the average length of time served by a "lifer" is as low as ten years in some States. This is not so bad as it sounds, for these figures take no account of the number whose sentences are terminated by death or insanity. Prison routine is not conducive to longevity. There are no figures available on this, but I doubt if many men committed to prison for life would last much longer than ten or fifteen years anyway. We do know that over a period of eight years, in the New York penitentiaries, 11.32 per cent of all prisoners committed became insane before their sentences had been completed.

Nor should we be too much impressed by the pardon

records of Len Small and "Ma" Ferguson. These two Governors pardoned over 2,000 prisoners—without question a disgraceful record—but how many of these men were first-degree murderers? We cannot be sure that any of them were.

Several years ago, Mr. Lawes made an elaborate investigation of the prisoners serving life sentences in all of the penitentiaries in the United States. During the eight years from 1912 to 1919 inclusive, 2,936 men were sentenced to life imprisonment in this country. In 1923, 77 per cent of these men had died in prison, become insane, or were still in prison. Since my opponent's figures were taken mostly from New York penitentiaries, let us take the figures from this State alone. During the same eight-year period, 282 prisoners were sentenced to life imprisonment in New York. In 1923, 86.15 per cent had died in prison, become insane, or were still serving their sentences.

When we consider these figures, and when we remember that under capital punishment only an extremely small proportion of those convicted of first-degree murders are sent to the electric chair, it seems to me that not much is left of the argument that we must keep capital punishment to protect society.

If imprisonment protects society as well as capital punishment does, what reason is there for opposing it? The only reason we have heard is that we do not yet have a thoroughly satisfactory method of reforming offenders or of telling when they have been reformed. We have been told that the penologists have much to learn about methods of reformation. So they have. But this is not equivalent to saying that they now know

nothing about it. We cannot cure all criminals. But in spite of the stupid and antiquated régime now in vogue in many prisons, we do reclaim many offenders. Charles B. Galbreath, Warden of the Wisconsin State Prison, says, "There have been received in this institution 263 prisoners under life sentence. Of these sixty-five have been discharged by pardon. Our records show but one case where the prisoner discharged returned to crime." I have already quoted the statement of Warden Lawes of Sing Sing that "During five recent consecutive years, 180 inmates of Sing Sing who have been convicted of various degrees of homicide, were paroled after serving the minimum term of their sentences. Of these 180 men only three were brought back for violation of parole, and in these three cases the violations were minor ones." Doesn't this show that something worth while is being done even now to reform offenders?

In closing, let me sum up briefly the result of our discussion. It has been shown, I think, that something can be done toward reclaiming men who are sentenced to prison rather than to the electric chair. I believe it has been shown also that imprisonment protects society at least as well as capital punishment does. To this we might add, what no one would deny, that killing a man is at best a stupid and barbarous way to deal with him. How can we defend the retention of an institution which all admit to be brutal and inhuman, which does not protect society, and which precludes all possibility of reclaiming the offender? In the words of Charles Galbreath, let us look forward to the day when "an enlightened public conscience will veto this decree [the

death penalty] and write for the State, as the State has written for its citizens, the injunction, at once rational, Scriptural, salutary, and humanitarian, 'Thou Shalt Not Kill.'"

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